


INDIAN STUDIES

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INDIAN STUDIES

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
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
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
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INDIAN STUDIES





LA FLEXION DE *PÁNTHĀH* EN VÉDIQUE, ET LES NOMINATIFS EN -*ĒS* DU LATIN

By ANTOINE MEILLET

IL suffit de se reporter à la deuxième édition du *Handbuch der lateinischen Laut-und Formenlehre* de M. Sommer, pp. 371 et suiv., pour constater que la question de l'origine des nominatifs latins en -*ēs*, du type de *sēdēs*, n'est pas résolue.

A rapprocher le type latin *uolpēs* du lit. *lāpē*, comme l'a fait M. W. Schulze, on ne gagne rien: le type lituanien est un ancien type en -*iē*: lit. *žēmē* répond à v. sl. *zemlja*. Au surplus le baltique a -*ē* et non -*ēs*. Et, si l'on rapproche *fidēs* de *sēdēs*, comme l'a fait Brugmann, on ne comprend pas ce qui peut être expliqué par là: *sēdēs*, *sēdis* et *fides*, *fidei* ont des flexions entièrement distinctes.

Le vocalisme montre que *sēdēs* n'a rien à faire avec gr. *ēōs*, ni *mōlēs* avec *mōlestus*. Du reste aucune forme de nominatif de thème en -*s*-tels que seraient *sēdēs* et *mōlēs* n'existe dans aucune langue indo-européenne; le latin lui-même ne connaît que le type *honōs*. Quant à *pūbēs*, rien n'autorise à y chercher un thème en -*es*: *pūber* a un ancien *r*, témoin *pūbertās*.

L'hypothèse que M. Sommer met en première ligne, à savoir un ancien nominatif en -*ē(i)s* de thème en -*i*- serait plausible. Mais M. Sommer ne signale, hors du latin, rien de comparable. Or, pour l'explication d'une forme, ce qui importe avant tout, c'est de trouver une forme qui lui corresponde.

Il y a en indo-iranien un nom dont la flexion rappelle le type *sēdēs*. C'est celui dont, en védique, le nominatif singulier est *pánthāh*, l'accusatif singulier *pánthām*, le nominatif pluriel *pánthāh* — l'Instrumental pluriel *pathībhih*, le locatif pluriel *pathīsu* — le génitif-ablatif singulier *pathāh*, l'Instrumental singulier *pathá*, l'accusatif pluriel *pathāh*, le génitif pluriel *pathām*. Il n'y a pas à tenir compte des formes en -*n*- de l'Atharyaveda: le nominatif pluriel *pánthānah* qui se trouve sept fois, est une formation analogique grâce à laquelle était évitée la confusion avec le singulier *pánthāh*; à l'accusatif singulier, où aucune confusion n'avait lieu, l'innovation n'a pas prévalu: *pánthānam* se lit une seule fois contre 19 *pánthām* (sur tous ces faits, v. la précieuse étude de M. Lanman, *Noun-inflection in the Veda*, pp. 441 et 470). Les monuments iraniens confirment le caractère indo-iranien des formes védiques:

l'Avesta a *pantā* au nominatif singulier, *pantqm* à l'accusatif et *paθqm* au génitif pluriel, *paθō* au génitif singulier et à l'accusatif pluriel; la forme en *-i-* est attestée indirectement par l'accusatif singulier *paθim* du vieux-perse, qui montre une normalisation de la flexion dans le parler déjà très évolué qu'est le perse des inscriptions achéménides; d'autre part, on voit, par un nominatif *paθā*, par un accusatif *paθqm* des *gāthā*, que la flexion fortement anomale du mot s'est altérée de bonne heure en iranien.

L'exemple de *pánthāh* est unique en indo-iranien. Car véd. *mánthāh*, dont on n'a la flexion que partiellement, appartient à une racine disyllabique; l' *-ā-* a chance d'appartenir à la racine, et le cas est, par suite, différent de celui de *pánthāh*.

Hors de l'indo-iranien, une flexion du nom du "chemin" pareille à celle de véd. *pánthāh* n'est pas attestée. En slave et en baltique, l'histoire commence trop tard pour qu'une flexion aussi archaïque soit conservée. Toutefois, le contraste de v. sl. *pqti* "chemin" et de v. pruss. *pintis* "chemin" montre que le jeu du vocalisme radical observé dans véd. *pánthāh*, *pathāh*, *pathísu* a existé dans le domaine slave et baltique. On entrevoit par là que la flexion connue par l'indo-iranien y a existé aussi. — Gr. *πάτος* "chemin" et *πόντος* "mer" sont des thèmes dérivés par lesquels on aurait évité le vieux nom anomal du "chemin." La parenté avec skr. *pánthāh*, etc., est du reste incertaine. — L'arm. *hun* "chemin" n'enseigne rien. — Quant à lat. *pons*, dont le sens ne concorde pas exactement avec celui de skr. *pánthāh* et de v. sl. *pqti*, et dont par suite le rapprochement est contesté (L. Havet a toujours soupçonné, à tort ou à raison, qu'un rapprochement avec le groupe de *pendō* *pendeō*, où le *-d-* est secondaire, rendrait compte du mot), la flexion est la même que celle de *mons* et de *mens*, et il n'y a, en tout cas, rien à en tirer ici. — Le mot n'est clairement attesté que dans la partie orientale de l'indo-européen: en indo-iranien, arménien, slave et baltique.

Deux traits caractérisent le type latin à nominatif en *-ēs-*. Le premier est que des formes en *-i-* s'y juxtaposent à des formes de la flexion consonantique et au nominatif en *-ēs-*: le mot *uātēs*, *uātem* a un génitif pluriel *uātum* (à côté de *uātium*), tout comme le védique *a pánthāh*, *pánthām*, mais *pathām*, *pathísu*. Et la forme en *-i-* est attestée par un nominatif *uātis* chez Plaute et par la flexion régulière en *-i-* de irl. *fáith*. — En face de *sēdēs*, *sēdem*, le génitif pluriel est *sēdum*. — La concordance du type latin avec le type indo-iranien de skr. *pánthāh* est complète.

Le second trait est celui-ci: dans véd. *pánthāh*, *pánthām* en face *pathāh*, *pathísu*, l'alternance vocalique est la même que dans *dán*,

dántam, en face de *datáḥ*, *datsú*. Or, la voyelle longue radicale de lat. *sēdēs*, *mōlēs*, en face de *sēdeō*, *mōlestus*, s'explique seulement au nominatif singulier. La longue a été généralisée en latin où les alternances vocaliques ont été beaucoup simplifiées, mais on aperçoit un vocalisme de nominatif singulier, reste d'une alternance comparable à celle qu'offrent les formes védiques.

Si le rapprochement proposé est exact, la flexion de *uātēs*, *uātum*, *uātibus* et de *sēdēs*, *sēdum*, *sēdibus*, pareille à celle de véd. *pánthāḥ*, *pathāṁ*, remonte à l'indo-européen. On peut se dispenser de rechercher comment s'est formé le type: c'est un problème de préhistoire de l'indo-européen; les données sont trop peu nombreuses pour qu'il soit sage de l'aborder.

En indo-iranien, véd. *pánthāḥ* est une survivance unique. En latin au contraire, le type *sēdēs* est représenté par un bon nombre d'exemples; v. Neue-Wagener, *Latinische Formenlehre*, I. p. 400 et suiv. Ces exemples sont pour la plupart nouveaux et tiennent à la difficulté que faisait le nominatif des thèmes consonantiques. Le latin a paré à cette difficulté dans beaucoup de mots à l'aide de *-i-*, et il a *iuuenis* en face de gén. plur. *iuuenum*, cf. skr. *yúvan-*, ou *apis* en face de *apum*; etc. Ailleurs il s'est servi de *-ēs*, et c'est ainsi que, à côté de *plēbs*, il a *plēbēs*; à côté de *nūbs*, *nūbēs*. Du thème *can-* établi par abl. sg. *cane*, gén. plur. *canum*; il y a les deux formes de nominatif, l'une usuelle *canis*, pareille à *iuuenis*, l'autre *canēs*, rare, pareille à *uātēs*.

Si lat. *pons* est apparenté à skr. *pánthāḥ* — ce qui demeure probable — on s'explique ainsi le nominatif *pons* au lieu de la forme ancienne: le type en *-ēs* de *sēdēs*, *uātēs* ne s'est maintenu ou étendu que là où il était utile pour éviter des formes obscures et courtes, telles que seraient **sēs*, **uās*; or un ancien **pontiś*, qui a passé à *pons*, ne faisait pas plus de difficulté que **mentiś (mens)* ou **montiś (mons)*.

Comme il s'est produit des interférences entre le type **uātēs*, **uātum* (gén. plur.), **uāti-*, identique au type véd. *pánthāḥ*, *pathāṁ*, *pathiśu*, et l'ancien thème consonantique **sēd-* (nom d'action radical de **sed-*) qui a reçu un nominatif *sēdēs* par suite de l'obscurité qu'offrirait un nominatif de la forme **sēs*, il est impossible de faire un départ entre les origines des divers substantifs latins à nominatif en *-ēs*. L'étymologie ou la formation de la plupart sont du reste inconnues. Il serait malaisé d'expliquer pourquoi l'on a *nūbium* en face de *nūbs*, *nūbēs* (*nūbum* étant exceptionnel), tandis que l'on a *sēdum*. Ici comme à beaucoup d'autres égards, le latin offre l'aboutissement d'un développement complexe, traversé par des influences multiples, dont le détail ne se laisse pas restituer.

Abstraction faite des innovations analogiques plus ou moins récentes qui ont troublé la netteté du type, le latin conserve ici, plus largement que l'indo-iranien, une flexion qui caractérise bien la complication de la morphologie indo-européenne. Attesté tardivement, le latin n'a pas l'archaïsme général du védique; les alternances de la flexion de véd. *pánthāḥ* ne sauraient s'y retrouver. Mais, au lieu d'un exemple unique du type, il en a toute une série. Les exemples du type *uātēs*, *uātum* sont de ces survivances par lesquelles le latin est demeuré si instructif pour l'historien des langues indo-européennes.

Note additionnelle. — L'article ci-dessus a été envoyé aux organisateurs du recueil longtemps avant la publication de l'étude de M. H. Pedersen, *La cinquième déclinaison latine*, Copenhague, 1926. Depuis, M. Wackernagel a, à son tour, traité de skr. *pánthāḥ*, K. Z., vol. LV, pp. 104 et suiv. (1927). Voir aussi Stolz-Leumann, *Lat. Gramm.* (1928), p. 232. Sur plusieurs points essentiels, je suis heureux de constater que mes vues concordent avec celles de ces éminents linguistes. A certains égards, la doctrine exposée ci-dessus en diffère; il est impossible d'entrer ici dans une discussion qui serait gauche. Je note seulement que le vocalisme, sûrement ancien, de véd. *pánthāḥ*, *pánthām*, av. *paniā*, *pantqm* ne se comprendrait pas si l'*ā* était un élément essentiel du mot; car l'élément radical serait alors au degré zéro. Comme dans lat. *uātēs*, etc., l'*-ēs* final du nominatif est un élément adventice. Dès lors, l'*i* de véd. *pathibhiḥ*, *pathiṣu* n'a pas à être considéré comme étant en alternance avec l'*ā* de *pánthāḥ*. Le genre féminin de v. perse *parīm* ne prouve pas que l'on ait ici un dérivé en *-i-*: tout nom de genre animé peut être ou masculin ou féminin en indo-européen suivant la façon dont il était conçu; or, la notion de la "route" pouvait être conçue comme féminine, ainsi que le montre avec évidence gr. *δός*, féminin; cf. aussi lat. *via*, etc. Sl. *potī* doit être un ancien thème en **-i-*; car on n'y signale aucune trace de flexion consonantique.

COLLÈGE DE FRANCE.

ON DIMINUTIVE PRONOUNS IN JAINA SANSKRIT

BY MAURICE BLOOMFIELD

A READER of Ajitaprabhasūri's Cāntinātha Caritra¹ cannot fail to notice the large number of pronouns with suffixed or infixd ka which on closer inspection show some kind or other of diminutive function. This text of 4890 clokas contains sixty cases, and such cases appear, to be sure much more sporadically, in other narrative Jaina texts, beginning with Hemacandra (Triṣaṭīcalākāpuruṣa Caritra, and Parīciṣṭāparvan) where they are quite rare. For example, Hemacandra's Cāntinātha Caritra (Triṣaṭī, Fifth Parvan), containing 2143 clokas, does not show a single diminutive with ka, as contrasted with the sixty cases of Ajitaprabha's treatment of the same theme.

The quasi-biografies treated by Hemacandra in his great chronicle, the Triṣaṭī and its appendix, the Parīciṣṭāparvan, as well as other personal chronicles (Caritras and Prabandhas) not touched upon in these two texts, are taken up by the later literati (Sūris) with a degree of eagerness that would be furious, if it were not so pious. Especially, each of the 24 Jaina Saviors is again and again the theme of a Caritra (Carita), Mahākāvya, Kathānaka, or Purāṇa, whose author — with all due and boundless respect for Hemacandra, "the all-knowing in (this) age of brass"² — seems to be impelled by the desire "to go him one better." I have listed a goodly number of such works on Pārçvanātha, at the beginning of my digest of Bhāvadevasūri's Pārçvanātha Caritra, published under the title of "The Life and Stories of the Jaina Savior Pārçvanātha" (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1919).³ The "history" of the sixteenth Savior Cāntinātha is not only written by Hemacandra and Ajitaprabha, but I have also in my hands a Cāntinātha Mahākāvya by Munibhadra sūri, an elaborate work in nineteen sargas and 4349 stanzas.⁴ Guérinot's *Essai de Bibliographie*

¹ Published by the Jainadharma-prasārakasabhā at Bhavnagar in 1917 (Virasamvat 2443; Vikramasamvat 1973).

² Kalikālasarvajñācīhemicandra.

³ Hertel, in the Introduction to his Translation of Hemavijaya's Kathāratnākara, p. xv (Leipzig, 1920), mentions in addition a Pārçva-caritam by Hemavijaya; cf. also his 'Indische Erzähler,' vii, 173; and Charpentier, ZDMG, lxix, 321 ff.

⁴ Edited, as nr. 20 of Yashovijaya Jaina Granthamālā, by Shravak Pandit Hargovinddas and Shravak Pandit Bechardas, Benares, Virasamvat 2437 (A.D. 1911).

Jaina reveals other Čāntinātha Caritras: one by Sakalakirti (p. 88); another by Devacandrasūri (p. 84);¹ and a Čāntināthapurāṇa (p. 55). In the same way Hemacandra's brief account of the female Savior Mallinātha, the nineteenth Tīrthaṁkara, in 266 stanzas,² is followed by Vinayacandrasūri's Mallinātha Caritra in eight sargas containing no less than 3783 stanzas.³

The chief difference between Hemacandra and his successors is that the latter have taken to "enwombing"—garbhita as the Hindus say⁴—more or less lengthy stories from the general stock of Jaina fiction, in illustrating the moralities which the Arhats and others are made to preach in the course of their spiritual careers. These rather extraneous stories often really make up the bulk of the book; the biography of the hero holds together these stories by a very slender thread. Thus the long story of Nala and Davadantī,⁵ illustrates samyaktva, or perfection, in all but the first four çlokas of the sixth Sarga in 561 çlokas of Vinayacandra's Mallinātha Caritra. My digest of Pārçvanātha shows up this habit very clearly.

But these texts differ also in style and literary pretentiousness. It is a far cry from the Mahākāvya style of Pradyumnaśārya's Čālibhadra Carita written in the most advanced alamkāra diction⁶ to the much later Pañcadāñdachattraprabandha,⁷ which is written in popular Sanskrit, much dashed with Prākritisms. The texts differ in this regard, as well as in the extent to which they employ popular words (*deçi*) or words and grammatical forms which they have drawn from Sanskrit koças and vyākaraṇas.⁸ And they differ also in the linguistic habits of the individual writers, of which Ajitaprabha's predilection for diminutive pronouns is a good illustration.

¹ Cf. the citation of two verses from the Čāntinātha Carita of Devasūri (p. 75), apparently the same text. It would appear from p. 339 that Devasūri translated his work from the Prākrit.

² Trisaṣṭi, Parvan vi, 201^b ff.

³ The Mallinātha Caritra of Shree Vinaya Candra Suri, edited by Shravak Pandit Hargovinddas and Shravak Pandit Bechardas. Benares, Veer-Era 2438 (A.D. 1912).

⁴ See the colofons at the end of several of the sargas of the Mallinātha of the preceding note.

⁵ So the Jainas call Damayanti; the story follows closely that of the Kathākoça, pp. 195 ff. of Tawney's Translation. See Winternitz, Geschichte der Indischen Literatur ii², 325.

⁶ See the author JAOS. xlivi, 262 ff.

⁷ Edited and translated by A. Weber, Abhandlungen der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1878.

⁸ See my article, "Some aspects of Jaina Sanskrit," in "Festschrift Jacob Wackernagel," pp. 226 ff.

The following texts and their sigilla are at the base of this exposition of the diminutive pronouns in Jaina Sanskrit which will doubtless be modified but little by further instances derived from the same sphere:

HEM. MALL. Hemacandra's *Mallinātha Caritra*. Page 201^b ff. of *Parvan vi* of *Triśaṣṭīcalākāpuruṣa Caritra*.

MAH. Hemacandra's *Mahāvīra Caritra*. *Parvan x* of *Triśaṣṭīcalākāpuruṣa Caritra*.

PAR. Hemacandra's *Sthavirāvalī Carita*, or *Parīṣṭāparvan*. Edited by Hermann Jacobi. Calcutta, 1891.

VIN. MALL. The *Mallinātha Caritra* by Vinayacandrasūri. Benares, *Vīrasamvat* 2438 (A.D. 1912). See above.

ÇĀNT. The *Çāntinātha Caritra* by Ajitaprabhasūri. Bhavnagar, 1917. See above.

PĀRÇ. The *Pārçvanātha Caritra* by Bhāvadevasūri. Benares, *Vīrasamvat* 2438 (A.D. 1912).

SAMAR. The *Samarāditya Saṃksepa* by Pradyumnācārya. Edited by Hermann Jacobi, Ahmedabad 1906.

ÇĀL. The *Çālibhadra Caritra* by Dharmakumāra. Benares, *Vīrasamvat* 2436 (A.D. 1910). Elaborated by the author, JAOS. xlivi, 257-316.

The following pronominal diminutives are gathered from these texts; they are to be considered in connection with forms found in Hindu Grammars, and also in *Bhadrabāhu Caritra*, below pp. 22-24, and see also the old Vedic pronominal diminutives which have been treated by Edgerton, JAOS. xxxi, 93 ff. Their relation to the Jain forms is discussed below:

First person: *mayakā* and *āvakābhȳām*.

Second person: *tvakam* and *tvayakā*.

Demonstrative *sa* and *ta*: *sakah*, *sakā*, *takam*, *takayā*, and *takāu*.

Demonstrative stem *ima*: *imakam*, *imakāih*, and *imikām* (fem.).

Demonstrative stem *adas*: *asakāu*.

Relative stem: *yaka*.

Pronominal adjective: *anyakat*.

GENERAL MATTERS

The primary use of a diminutive is, of course, smallness, but I have noted only one example of such use, to wit, Çānt. 6.264: *cīghram eva kumāreṇa prachannām jagrhe sakā* (sc. *suvarṇakiñkiṇimālā*), "As quickly as possible the prince surreptitiously grabbed that *small* (chain of golden bells)." Later on, sts. 267, 271, the chain of bells is expressly spoken of as *kiñkiṇimālikā*, a diminutive of which *sakā kiñkiṇimālā* is a paraphrase.

Comporting with the persistent moralizing drift of Jaina texts, the use of the diminutive pronoun is almost entirely mental or spiritual, being also largely connected with matters of Jaina religion. And the entire mass divides itself not unevenly into the two grand categories of pejorative and meliorative, that is, the diminutive pronoun expresses something bad or good. Two consecutive passages impose upon the relative pronoun *yaka* part of the burden of contrasting people who are able to resist the lure of the senses with people who succumb to their senses: the pronoun is used effectively at pretty nearly the opposite poles of spiritual quality.

Çānt. 3. 406: *pravrajyām pratipadyāpi syur yake visayāsiṇah . . . ghore te patanti bhavārṇave,*

“Even they who have wandered forth as ascetics, yet, *weak creatures*, seek the pleasures of the senses, fall into the gruesome ocean of (repeated) existences.”

Çānt. 3. 407: *syur yake nirapeksās tu viṣayev arhitā api . . . te 'tra bhavanti sukhabhājinah,*

“They who, even when tempted (solicited), remain *loftily* indifferent to the pleasures of the senses, partake here of bliss.”

One passage has two diminutive pronouns, one after the other, in different nuances, one of which clearly expresses blame (of one's self), the other praise of some sort:

Çānt. 3. 259: *mitrah provāca he subhru nātmārthām mayakā tvakam, ānitā kim tu mitrasyāmaradattasya hetave,*

“Mitra (Mitrānanda) said (to the princess): ‘Not for myself, O beautiful-browed lady, have I *perfidiously* carried you off, *noble lady*, but in behalf of my friend Amaradatta,’” For the story see Kathākoça, Tawney's Translation, p. 154.

PEJORATIVE USES OF THE DIMINUTIVE PRONOUN

These divide themselves, without hard and fast lines, into five kinds:

1. Execration of sin and improper conduct.
2. Execration of inherent or congenital depravity or evil.
3. Ineptitude, or unworthiness.
4. Self-depreciation, or modesty.
5. Misery, unhappiness, or ill-luck.

1. *Execration of Sin and Improper Conduct*

In this class are placed such cases as represent direct infraction of Jaina teaching. The sin that is reported furnishes a commentary on

the diminutive, or, vice versa, the diminutive adds a touch of scorn or reprobation to the narration of the sinful deed:

Çānt. 6. 321: viçvaste vyākule dīne . . . praharanti *yake* pāpā dhruvam te yānti durgatim,

“The *wicked* sinners who strike a confiding poor man in trouble certainly come to grief.” Pāpāh, after *yake*, shows what the pronoun really means.

Samar. 4. 330: tad api pratipannam ca kṛtam ca *mayakā* takā tadā baddham mayā karma pariṇāme sudārunam,

“I wickedly assented to that, and did thus; and established for my *sinful self* in consequence a grievously hard karma.” The speaker has been persuaded by his mother to eat of the flesh of a “dough-cock” which she has killed. *Mayakā* and *sudāruna* illustrate each other. For this extreme example of *ahiṁsā* see my “Life and Stories of the Jaina Savior Pārçvanātha,” pp. 195 ff.; Hertel, “Geschichte von Pāla und Gopāla,” p. 84.

Samar. 2. 278: uthito 'haṁ mūrchitam *takam* vikṣya kiṁkṛtyamūḍho 'sthām, viśād uparataḥ sa tu,

“Arising, I beheld that *vile person* in a faint, and was at a loss as to what to do. Then he died from the poison.” The person who dies has tried to poison the speaker by sprinkling one of two sweetmeats with poison. By mistake he has himself eaten the poisoned one.

Çānt. 1. 146: āha maṅgalo mantriṇam prati yady avaçyam idam kāryam *mayakā* karma nirghṛṇam . . .

“Maṅgala said to the minister: ‘If this heinous deed is unavoidably to be done by *villainous me* . . .’” (then I make the following stipulation). Note *nirghṛṇam* after *mayakā*.

Samar. 4. 201: tac chrutvā *mayakā* pr̄ṣṭah prabhuh, “Having heard this the Lord (a Muni) was asked by *wicked me*.” The person asking is a cruel man, devoted to *hiṁsā*, who has cried out, “Slay these wicked men,” when certain criminals are being led to execution. The Sage tells him that, in a former birth, he had calumniated an innocent ascetic.

Çānt. 6. 251: athavā kiṁ vikalpenādṛçyarūpo 'nayā saha, gatvāham api vikṣe tad yat karoty *asakāu* khalu,

“Why need I be in doubt? I shall also in invisible form go along with her, and find out what *that vile woman* is doing.” Prince Gunadharma suspects the princess Kanakavatī of Rāksasī-practices.

Samar. 4. 141: hṛtā trāilokyasārākhyā ratnāvalyā āgasāmunā . . . vadhyas tena stena *ivāsakāu*,

“The necklace named Trāilokyasāra has been robbed by that villain . . . therefore *that wretch* must be executed like any thief.”

Samar. 4. 513: baddhaṁ ṣṭiyapr̥thivyāṁ ca narakāyur na cāsakāu, dharmacintāmanīṁ mohaparāyattā prapadyate,

“Life in hell is ordained for her in the third earth; and *that vile woman*, overwhelmed by delusion, does not obtain the thought-jewel of religion.” The woman in question is the Queen Nayanāvalī who lives in adultery with a leprous slave, and trickily chokes to death her husband who is in a faint, pretending to fall upon him in grief over his condition. See my “Life and Stories of the Jaina Savior Pār̥çvanātha,” p. 196; Hertel, “Geschichte von Pāla und Gopāla,” pp. 84 ff.

Çānt. 3. 41: yah kaçcid avanīnāthāṁ jātayāmām¹ vadiṣyati, bha-visyati sako 'vaçyam akāle 'pi yamātithih,

“Whosoever shall say that the King is superannuated, *that rascally person* unfailingly, even tho his allotted time has not yet come, shall become Yama’s (Death’s) guest.” From a proclamation forbidding reference to grey hair on the king’s head.

Çānt. 6. 1056: punah pr̥ṣṭā vadhuṭī tāih kim bhadre twayakā saha, roṣasya kāraṇām kiṁcin na jātam dayitasya te,

“They again asked the wife: ‘Did not, O good woman, some cause for anger arise between your beloved (husband) and *your refractory self*?’” Question put to a wife who has been left by her husband.

2. *Execration of Inherent or Congenital Depravity or Evil*

In a smaller group of cases the evil or wickedness that is excoriated by implication of the pejorative pronoun lies in the very nature (*svabhāva*) of the subject: there is no infraction of any religious tenet. The subject acts badly because he is bad and cannot be otherwise:

Çānt. 6. 411: daṣṭah creṣṭhisuto nāgāiç caturbhīr imakāiḥ saha,

“The merchant’s son was bitten by these four *evil* serpents at the same time.”

Çānt. 3. 463: dadhāve khaḍgam ādāya pr̥ṣṭhe kopaparāsakāu,

“That *wicked* (Siren) with a sword ran after (the two adventurers) in high dudgeon.” A siren running after two escaping merchants, to kill them.

Çānt. 5. 282: athānena (sc. sarpeṇa) samādiṣṭā tadarthām paksinī sakā, cañcvā kṛtvā mumocāinām nitvā kvāpi mahāhrade,

“That *evil* bird was bidden to that task; she took the frog into her bill, and left him in some spot of a great lake.” The bird co-operates with her mate, a serpent, and carries a frog, the serpent’s friend, to a great lake, whence he is to bring food (other frogs) to the serpent, which is perishing from hunger in his own pool that has dried up during a

¹ Emend jātayāmam to yātayāmam. Prākritic pronunciation.

drought. The bird-mate of the serpent (a *sārikā*) is naturally as base as her husband.

Par. 2. 231: *mātā provāca gaṇikām apatye vāirinī tava, yakābhyaṁ udarasthābhyaṁ mṛtyudvāre 'si dhāritā,*

“Her ‘mother’ said to the hetaera: ‘These two children of yours are your enemies, because *the vile creatures*, even when they were in your womb, brought you to the door of death.’”

Çānt. 6. 585: *apaninye sakā tena cīrortir mantravādinā,*

“That racking headache was removed by the spell-monger.”

3. Ineptitude or Unworthiness

In a fairly large number of examples the suffix expresses the qualities of the caption. The boundary line between this class and implications of impiousness or intrinsic deficiency is, of course, not always absolute.

Çānt. 4. 386: *mārgayāmāsa tān pañca kanān jyeṣṭhavadhūm tataḥ, palyāntarāt samāniyārpayāmāsa sakā pi tān,*

“(The merchant) asked the eldest wife for those five grains (of rice), and that *inept woman* took them from a sack and handed them to him.” From the “parable of the talents” in which the oldest daughter-in-law of a certain merchant fails to increase the grain intrusted to her keeping. Cf. my “Life and Stories of the Jaina Savior Pārçvanātha,” p. 120.

Mah. 1. 236: *tāiraçcamān mānuṣam divyām māithunām mayakā purā yat kṛtam . . . vyutsṛjāmi tat,*

“The sex-life that I, *poor creature*, have led as animal, human being or god . . . that do I repudiate.” The glossator knows no better than to say: *mayakā*, *mayā*.

Pārç. 1. 478: *kumāra mayakā putranirviçeṣe 'pi yat tvayi durjanāhivacastīvraviṣavihvalacetasaṁ viruddham idam ārebhe . . .*

“O prince, the hostility which has been practised *by foolish me* upon you, even tho you were like a son to me, because my mind was led astray by the strong poison of the serpent speech of a rascal (. . . that I will atone for).” *Vihvalacetasaṁ* shows just what *mayakā* means.

Pārç. 1. 419: *acintayac ca yad aho paksino 'piḍrī matih, upahartum tadā martyabhavे kim kṛtam anyakat,*

“(The merchant) then reflected: ‘Behold, if a mere bird (parrot) has such a disposition to do good, then what other *poor deed* (is fit for one) who is in the estate of man?’” The merchant has obtained a fruit of immortality from a beneficent parrot, and is deciding not to use it for himself, but to have it planted for the good of all mankind. See the sequel. The glossator merely says: *anyakat, anyat.*

Çānt. 3. 210: tataç cājñāpito rājñā raksakas *tvayakāçu* re, so 'tra baddhvā durācāro vanīg āniyatām iti,

“Then the king ordered the bailiff: ‘Sirrah, you wretch, promptly bind and bring the misbehaving merchant here!’” *Tvayakā* and re explain each other.

Hem. Mall., stanza 223: kathāç ca duhkathā eva bhavadgunākathām vinā, *yakābhīs* tittirir iva vāgbhir vipadam aqñute,

“All tales are poor tales if they leave out the tale of your virtues;— tales by whose *wretched words* one goes to destruction, like a (chattering) partridge.” From a stotra of the Savior Mallinātha.

Samar. 2. 185: tad vikṣya *mayakādhyāyi* . . . tad ito nipatāmy aham . . . patito amātra gātrabhañganipiditah,

“Seeing this, I, *poor fool*, thought . . . therefore I shall take a fall from here . . . : I fell, and am (now) here at home, afflicted with broken limbs.” An elefant (*mayakā*, the unlucky victim) is tricked by his enemy into taking the bhṛgupāta (suicide by throwing himself from a precipice), in order that he may rid himself from his animal existence and become a *Vidyādhara*.

4. *Self-depreciation, or Modesty*

Quite common are the instances in which the speaker states some act which is really worthy, but belittles or disavows his merit. He then resorts to the diminutive *mayakā*, in the sense of “by my humble self” (or German, “bei meiner wenigkeit”), and there is, as a rule, nothing else in the sentence to indicate this rather subtle touch. It would appear sometimes as if the real point were, to call attention to the speaker’s merit by an understatement which would naturally elicit precisely the opposite effect in the mind of the hearer. Thus:

Çānt. 4. 794: . . . itthām cāntijineçvarasya carite . . . aṣṭamah prokto 'yām *mayakā* bhavah,

“Thus the eighth existence (of the future Arhat) has been set forth in the chronicle of the Jina Lord Cānti (Cāntinātha) *by my unworthy self.*” Similarly 6. 1631: itthām cāntijineçvarasya *mayakā* prokto bhavo dvādaçah.

Pārc. 2. 874: svāmipādadadvayireñukañena *mayakāpi* yat . . . nirvyūdham,

“What has been planned *by my unworthy self* who am a grain of dust on the feet of Your Majesty.” In the speech of a minister who has managed well his kingdom during its king’s enforced absence. The compound preceding *mayakā* rivets its meaning.

Çānt. 2. 314: so 'vadat: *mayakā* devi kiṁ na prāptam mahītale, dṛṣṭe tvaddarçane punyarahitānāṁ sudurlabhe, "What object, O goddess, that can be gotten on earth have I, *unworthy person*, not obtained, in that I have beheld you who are very hard to reach by them that have no merit?" *Mayakā* and *punyarahitānāṁ* illustrate each other in this speech of a person who has appealed to a divinity.

Çānt. 3. 156: uvāca sūtrakṛc cakre prāsādo *mayakā* kila,

"The architect said: 'To be sure, this palace has been erected by *my unworthy self*.'" The palace is splendid: the architect deprecates his merit.

Çānt. 5. 313: eko 'vocan mayāivedam cāru ratnam upārjitam, dvitīyah smāha *mayakā* tvam lobham kuruse vṛthā,

"One (merchant) said: 'By me alone has this precious jewel been obtained.' The second said: 'By *my good self*: you show greed in vain.'" Two merchants quarreling over the possession of a jewel while on a river; both tumble in and drown.

Çānt. 1. 112: kuto 'py āniya *mayakā* mukto bhavati bālakah, sa mantrin bhavatā grāhyah,

"The boy has been taken by *my good self* from some place or other and left; you, O minister, must get hold of him." Speech of a divinity who finds a substitute boy for the minister's son who is leprous, but has been ordered to marry a princess.

Çānt. 6. 1455: akkādyā gṛeṣṭhinah putrah kaçcid atrāyayāu pure, arpitaṁ *mayakā* tasyopanadyugmam manoharam,

"Mother, to-day a certain merchant's son has come here to the city to-day: a fine pair of shoes was given him by *my good self*." The speaker, a shoemaker, trickily intends to cheat the merchant's son out of all his property in pay for the shoes. See for this story, Vin. Mall. 8. 735 ff.; Hertel, Indische Erzähler, vol. vii, pp. 122 ff.

5. Misery, Unhappiness, or Ill-luck

In this group the subjective element is altogether wanting: the person to whom the diminutive pronoun refers is not responsible for the evil indicated by it. This class of diminutives, then, implies pity, rather than criticism; nevertheless there are in it, here and there, fine shades of blame for neglect, improvidence, lack of foresight, etc. which are at the bottom of the sorry plight of the subject. Thus, from the point of view of the writer the pejorative touch is not altogether wanting: indeed, here as elsewhere, any strict compartmental grouping of shades of diminutives rests upon convenience rather than precision in the circumstances which give rise to its expression.

We may introduce this class with an example in which the *ka* of the pronoun is reinforced by another *ka* in the noun to which it belongs, to wit:

Vin. Mall. 8. 214: *sākhyad devemakam kāṣṭhavāhakam drutam* ānaya,

“She (the queen) said: ‘Your majesty, bring this *wretched* wood-carrier here quickly.’” The queen has recognized her husband in a former birth, who, in his turn, is passing his present existence as a low-caste man.

The following lists this rather large class:

Çānt. 6. 914: *tataç ca kathitā tena khadgavismṛtijā kathā, tathāpi dāñdito rājñānartha* dañde kṛte *sakah*,

“Then he (Samrddhadatta) told what had happened through his forgetting his sword, but even so *the unfortunate man* was punished by the king, the punishment being undeserved.” Samrddhadatta has forgotten his sword outside his house; thieves find it, commit murder with it, and suspicion fastens itself unjustly upon Samrddhadatta.

Çānt. 6. 919: *grāmaparsady upaviṣṭo yāvad āśit sako* ‘nyadā,

“As that *unlucky* (Samrddhadatta) was sitting once in the village hall.” The same Samrddhadatta as in the preceding item.

Çānt. 5. 377: *tataç ca devarājena bhūbhujā bhanito* ‘nujah, gantavyām *twayakānyatra* muktvā me viṣayām punah,

“King Devarāja said to his brother: ‘Go, *wretched youth*, to another country, moreover out of the reach of my senses!’” Devarāja is exiling his younger brother Vatsarāja for no other reason than that the people love him best.

Çānt. 5. 380: *devī provāca he vatsa yady evām twayakā saha, āgamis-yāmy aham api* . . . *dhruvam*,

“The queen said (to Vatsarāja): ‘If so, then I will go there with you, *poor child*.’” Sequel of the preceding: Vatsarāja’s mother (as well as Devarāja’s) proposes to share his exile.

Çānt. 5. 465: *āvakābhyaṁ adhanyābhyaṁ yad adyāpi sameśi na*,

“If even now you will not come with us *two wretched women*.¹” Āvakābhyaṁ and adhanyābhyaṁ in reciprocal comment.

Çānt. 6. 631: *iti prokte* ‘pi sā yāvat sulasām tyajati sma na, svayam evākkayā tāvad ity abhāni *sako* ‘nyadā,

“When (the hetaera), thus addressed, did not abandon Sulasa, then the bawd (mother) quite by herself spoke to that *wretched* (impoverished) man (namely, Sulasa) one day.”

Çānt. 6. 715: *svayām vipannasāiribhyāḥ* [sic; gloss, *mahiṣyāḥ*] *pucchām tasyārpayat* *sakah*,

“That *unhappy* (Sulasa) himself handed the tail of a dead she-buffalo to that (tricky conjuror who was plotting against him).”

Çānt. 3. 552: so 'vocan mayakā muktam . . . mogham abhūd idam,

“He (Damitāri) said: ‘This (discus) has been hurled by *unlucky me* in vain.’” In a duel between Damitāri and Triprṣṭha, in which the former is ultimately killed by the latter. Mogham and mayakā illustrate each other.

Çānt. 6. 328: bhayenāitasya mayakā vivāho nepsitah khalu,

“Out of fear I, *wretched girl*, do not at all desire to marry him.”

Bhayena and mayakā illustrate each other.

Çānt. 6. 1574: param caçāka no gantum pattihiḥ suniyantritah, evam asthāt tatra kālam kiyantam asakāu tathā,

“But he could not escape, because he was carefully kept confined by the soldiers, so that he abode there *miserably* for some time.” The subject is a Pulindra (Pulinda), a forest-dweller who has been taken to his palace by a king out of gratitude for an important service. The Pulindra longs for his native forest, and later makes his escape.

Çānt. 6. 1410: ekākṣah kitavah kaçcid atho ratnākarātmajam, ity uvāca sahasrena dravyasya mayakā kila, svanetram tvatpituh pārṣve muktam grahaṇake 'sti bhoh,

“A certain one-eyed gambler said to the son of Ratnākara: ‘I myself, *miserable man*, deposited my (other) eye as a pledge (for the loan) of a thousand with your father, O good Sir!’” Cf. Vin. Mall. 7. 726 ff.; Hertel, Indische Erzähler, vol. vii, pp. 122 ff.

Çānt. 6. 421: yady evamvidhayā kriyayāsakāu samtiṣṭhate tato jīvaty anyathā mriyate dhruvam,

“If that *unfortunate* man will engage in such (penitential) practice, then he will live; otherwise he will surely die.” Part of a conversion-story.

Çānt. 3. 612: anyedyur dasyunāikenātipracāṇdena māyinā, agrhyenālaksitena muṣyate sma purī sakā,

“One day a certain very cruel robber, who being skilled in magic could not be caught because he was not seen, plundered that *wretched city*.”

Çānt. 6. 344: ubbadhya taruçākhāyām ātmānam martum udyatām, imikām aham adrākṣām tvadviyogena sundara,

“I beheld *this wretched girl* who had hanged herself on a tree branch, determined to die on account of separation from you, O noble man!”

Çānt. 3. 39: iti cintāvisannāsyam patim drṣtvā sanarmavāk, uvācāivam punā rājñī tadbhāvāvidurā sakā,

“Thus, perceiving that her lord’s face was clouded with sad reflection, the queen pleasantly addressed him, not understanding his state of mind, she, *poor lady*.” King, son-less, has discovered a white hair in his head, and is afflicted by *vāirāgya*; queen, misunderstanding his state, dejectedly gives him advice that is not to the point.

Çānt. 6. 291: evam uktvāsakāu vāmakaranyastaçirodharā, cintayā vigatotsāhā babbhūvādhomukhī kṣanāt,

“Thus saying, *that unhappy girl*, her neck resting upon her left hand, weak from sorrow, for a moment cast her eyes to the ground.”

Çānt. 3. 682: vicikitsām imām kṛtvā mṛtvā cāyuhksaye sakā, sam-jātā yatra tāditah sthānam samkīrtayāmy aham,

“Having entertained this doubt (about Jaina religion) *that unhappy woman* died at the expiration of her life’s term. What station she was born in, that will I now relate.” The woman suffers much in her next existence. *Sakā* may here refer to impiousness, rather than to evil fate.

Vin. Mall. 7. 370: yakābhyaṁ eva karnābhyaṁ çrutam svaguna-varṇanam, re pāradārika iti tābhyaṁ eva hi çuçruve,

“With the very same *wretched ears* with which he had heard panegyrics of his virtues, with those self-same ears was now heard the cry: ‘O you vile pursuer of other men’s wives!’”

Vin. Mall. 1. 101: atrāivānaçanām kṛtvā paralokah sunirmalah, upārjanīyo bhāvena no kāryam mayakāparam,

“Right here I must fast to death and reach by meditation the wholly undefiled other world; *my poor self* cannot do otherwise.” The speaker has been told by a Vidyādhara sage that he has just five days to live, and he is looking for some one to recite for him the “Five-fold Obeisance” (namo ’rhadbhyaḥ etc.).

Vin. Mall. 7. 1052: sā tasthāu nyagmukhā bālā rajanyām iva padminī, uvāca çreṣṭhinīm mūlām āvayor duhitāsakāu lālanīyā pālanīyā,

“The (princess Vasumatī) stood with her eyes cast down, like a lotus by night. The (merchant Dhanavāha) said to his wife Mūlā: ‘*That poor child* must be petted and brought up by us as a daughter.’” The merchant has taken the princess from the slave market to adopt her as his child; see the digest of this remarkable story, Bloomfield, JAOS. xliii, 265, note 18.

Çāl. 5. 13: rājasarpaḥ prasarpantam yakam jegilyate . . . bhogilo-kam,

“The anaconda (double entente, royal serpent, meaning King Çrenīka) who devours the *miserable* serpent-folk (double entente, his people who are devoted to the senses).” See the author, JAOS. xliii, 277.

Pārç. 2. 409: *tatra yūyām tu no dr̄ṣṭāḥ pr̄ṣṭāç ca munayo na tāih,*
uttaram dattam ity ārtyā prayukto mayakāvadhiḥ,

“I did not see you there, and when I asked the Sages they gave no answer. Then, in distress, I, *miserable*, employed *avadhi* insight.” Ārtyā and mayakā illustrate each other.

MELIORATIVE USES OF THE DIMINUTIVE PRONOUN

Meliorative uses of diminutive pronouns are less common than the pejorative, but not less certain, or effective. For the most part the meliorative function is found at the opposite pole of the pejorative (pious: impious), but it produces also shadings of its own. The entire class may be treated under three heads:

1. Approval of piety or good conduct.
2. Expression of excellence of social station or character.
3. Conciliation or cajolery (*captatio benevolentiae*).

1. Approval of Piety or Good Conduct.

The two antithetic examples which reflect in two successive çlokas of Çānt. 3. 406, 407 *yake* in the sense of “what impious people,” and *yake* in the sense of “what pious people,” are stated in full, above p. 10. Other cases in which *ka*-diminutives imply approval of piety appear in the following:

Çānt. 6. 754: *sādhayanti yake sarvān yogān nirvāṇasādhakān, . . . tān bhadra sādhūn namaskuru,*

“Those *pious* men who acquire all the ascetic practices that secure emancipation (nirvāṇa) . . . them, my good sir, do you revere!” Here *yake* and *sādhūn* illustrate each other.

Çānt. 3. 324: *viçuddhaṁ pālayitvā tan mr̄tvāgād amarālayam, tataç cyuteyam saimjātā çreṣṭhiñ te duhitā sakā,*

“Having preserved her virtue, then died, she went to the abode of the immortals. Thence the *pious* woman fell and became your daughter O merchant!”

Çānt. 4. 791: *dharmaṁ tadtantike çrutvā pratibuddhaḥ sako 'pi hi, rājye çatabalaṁ putraṁ niveçya vratam ādade,*

“Having heard the Law expounded by him, that *pious* king was converted and placed his son Çatabala upon the throne, and also took the vow.”

Çānt. 6. 1495: *ciraṁ bhogaçriyāṁ bhuktvā jātaputraḥ sako 'nyadā, çuçrāva sadguroḥ pārçve dharmāṁ pravrajitas tataḥ,*

“Having enjoyed for a long time the bliss of the senses, having begotten a son, that *pious* man listened one day to the teaching of

the Law by a noble Teacher, and then went forth into the life of an ascetic."

Çānt. 6. 394: tarhi tān aham, krīdayiṣyāmi nāgāns tu madiyān krīdaya *tvakam*,

"Then I shall make these serpents perform, and do you, *holy Sir*, make mine perform." Nāgadatta is addressing a Muni (*tvakam*) who has come to convert him. The serpents are the four *kaśāyas* (sins): anger, pride, guile, and greed.

Çānt. 6. 1621: tasyām cīlāyām kālenā bahvyaḥ samyatakoṭayāḥ, siddhāc cakrāyudhāñhribhyām *yakā* pūrvam pavitritā,

"Upon that *holy* (*yakā*) mountain which had been previously sanctified by the feet of (the Sage) Cakrāyudha, as time passed, many crores of ascetics obtained bliss."

2. Expression of Excellence of Social Station or Character

We may introduce this class fitly with a description of the siddhi, or personified "bliss," the state of the soul after it has been freed from the round of existences:

Çānt. 6. 1553: piṇḍe ca yojanāny aṣṭāu madhyabhāge *sakā* punah, jāyata makṣikāpatratanvī cānte,

"And the *noble* (siddhi, emancipated soul) is, as regards her frame, eight yojanas in the extent of her middle, and at her end thin as the wing of a fly." Previously, 6. 1550, the question is asked, *kīdrgrūpā* siddhir bhavaty asāu, "Of what form is that siddhi?"

The remaining cases are of considerably varied character: they deal with noble station, noble character, and heroism:

Çānt. 4. 7: kathitās te mahībhartuh . . . suputrajanmakathanāt tenāpy āhlāditā *sakā*,

"(The queen) told her (fourteen dreams) to the king, and *that noble lady* was gladdened by him by telling her that she should bear a glorious son."

Çānt. 6. 8: tasmiṇ ca samaye devī sukhasuptā caturdaça mahāsvapnān dadarça . . . *sakā*,

"And on that occasion the *noble* queen, sleeping blissfully, saw the fourteen great dreams (which herald the birth of a Tīrthaṅkara)."

Çānt. 3. 623: svasamīpe samāyāntām nanāma sa mahīpatih, kutah sthānād āgato 'sity ālalāpa *sako* 'pi tam,

"That king revered the ascetic who had come to his presence, and courteously asked him whence he had come."

Vin. Mall. 2. 96: atha rājye 'sakāu nyasto bhūpo 'bhūt padmaçekharah, punyāni sahacāriṇi videče 'pi mahātmanām,

“Then that noble Padmaçekhara was placed upon the throne, and became king. The virtues of noble men accompany them even to a strange land.” Padmaçekhara, sleeping under a tree, is selected by the minister Subuddhi as successor to a king who has died without heir.

Çānt. 6. 1138: *tato rājasamādiṣṭacetiḥbhiḥ snapitā sakā*,

“Then that noble lady was bathed by tire-women appointed by the king.”

Vin. Mall. 5. 79: *antaḥpuravadhūlokāir muditāiḥ snapitāsakāu*,

“That lovely (princess) was bathed by the delighted women-folk of the zenana.” Her father, the king, afterwards asks the guardian of the zenana, whether he has ever seen so lovely a girl.

Çānt. 6. 1284: *sāpatyāpy amunā sakā . . . nītā purārakṣasya mandire*, and, 6. 1285: *sā nīnye rājamandire*,

“That noble woman with her child was taken to the palace of the city guardian,” and, later, “She was taken to the king’s palace.”

Çānt. 3. 530: *āmeti takayā prokte tāv abhūtāṁ svarūpiṇāu, dṛṣṭvā jagāda sā cāham yuṣmadājñākari khalu*,

“When the lovely (princess Kanakaçrī) consented, the two (princes Anantavīrya and Aparājita) showed themselves in their true form. The (princess) seeing them told them that she was entirely at their disposal.” The princes have been disguised as nautch-girls; Kanakaçrī is in love with Anantavīrya.

Çānt. 3. 544 (in alternate reading in foot-note): *tāni ḡastrāṇi tasyācu pratiṣṭastrāir mahābhujāu . . . viphalicakratus takāu*,

“These weapons of him (Damitāri) these two great-armed *heroic* (princes) quickly made futile by means of counter-weapons.”

Çānt. 3. 480: . . . *valitā vyantārī sātha yakṣo 'pi valitāḥ sakāḥ, kṣāmitāḥ kṛtakṛtyena ḡreṣṭhiputrena bhaktitāḥ*,

“The Vyantārī (Siren) returned, and so did the *kindly* Yakṣa who had been conciliated by proper performances by the merchant’s son (Jinapālita) in devotion.” The Yakṣa here, as elsewhere in fiction, figures as a benefactor.

Çānt. 4. 697: *uttisṭhottisṭha he tāta yāty adyāpy asakāu narah, athāsyā pṛchāto 'darci tena chāyā ḡarīrajā*,

“Rise, rise, O Father! That *good* man is going to-day also. Then, when (the father) asked, he showed him his own shadow.” The father has previously been led by that same son to suspect that a strange man is visiting his wife; see Hertel, *Indische Erzähler*, vii, 130 ff.

Vin. Mall. 5. 14: *tasyāḥ strīratnamukhyāyā āyurgranthāu mahipate, vidhīyate sako 'py uccāir niḥsīmaḥ puṣpamudgarah =*

Hem. Mall., stanza 62: *tasyāḥ strīratnamukhyāyā āyurgranthāu*
vidhiyate, sa puṣpamudgarah ko 'pi yādr̥k svarge 'py asaṁbhavī.

The glossografer to Hem. glosses *puṣpamudgarah* by *puṣpagucham*,
and āyurgranthāu by *āyuḥsūcikāyāṁ* *granthirūparekhāyāṁ*.

The passage from Vin. Mall. may be rendered, "In the life's knot of this foremost jewel among women, O king, that *wonderful*, grand bouquet of flowers is clearly formed." Hem. adds that such a bouquet does not exist even in paradise. The minister Subuddhi says this to King Pratibuddhi partly in praise of the maiden Mallī, the future Tīrthaṁkara Mallinātha: *saka* and *niḥsima* illustrate each other.

3. Conciliation or Cajolery (*captatio benevolentiae*)

The cases are few, but their special shading quite obvious:

Çānt. 3. 182: *punah sā bhanītākkayā sarvathā sevanīyo 'yam he*
putri tvayakā narah,

"Again the bawd (akkā = *kuttā* or *kuttī*) told her (the hetaera Vasantatilakā): 'By every means that man (Mitrānanda) must be cultivated by you, *my good girl.*'"

Çānt. 3. 189: *mitrānando 'vadat tarhi tadagre kathaya tvakam,*
bhadre guṇotkaraḥ . . . yasya çrutas tvayā,

"Do you, *my good girl*, relate to her (the princess Ratnamañjari) the many virtues which you have heard about him (Amaradatta)." Mitrānanda is trying to bring together his friend Amaradatta and the princess Ratnamañjari, the object of Amaradatta's desire.

Çānt. 6. 1405: *idam asya hi mülyam yad vastubhis tvayakoditāih,*
yānam te pūrayisyāmo gachato nagaram nijam,

"This indeed is the price (we shall pay for your ship's load), namely, we shall fill your ship with goods designated by *your good self.*" See Hertel, *Indische Erzähler*, vii, 121.

RARE INSTANCES IN THE CLASSICAL LANGUAGE

The Western Lexicons quote or cite diminutive pronouns practically only from the Veda, on the one hand, or the Hindu Grammarians on the other hand. I presume it is Leumann that has contributed a number of such words to the Lexx. from the late Jinistic Bhadrabāhu Carita, which is not at hand: *ahakam*, 1. 109, which does not appear in my collection, but is known to the Grammarians, below; *mayakā*, 2. 49; *tvakam*, 1. 64; *tvayakā*, 4. 9; and case-forms from stem *taka*, 4.22, 151. The form Prākrit *tayam*, = Sanskrit *takat*, occurs in the Māhārāṣṭri tale of Agadadatta, Jacobi, *Ausgewählte Erzählungen*, p. 85, line 37 (stanza 320), in the sense of "this *damnable* (act)." J. J. Meyer,

Hindu Tales, p. 286, note 1, quotes another case of tayam from the Kālācārya Kathānakam. Both texts are Jinistic. Judging from my own experience as well as from the Lexicons, the Classical language shows them so rarely, as to render them well-nigh negligible for the entire period that lies between the Veda and the writings of Hemacandra. Bö., in the smaller Pet. Lex., Nachträge (vii, p. 314), quotes asakā from Çīçupālavadha 7. 53; Sāhitya Darpaṇa 49.

DIMINUTIVE PRONOUNS IN THE HINDU GRAMMARS

The Hindu grammarians treat familiarly a quite remarkable assortment of diminutive pronouns, some of which coincide in form and use with those listed above from the Jaina texts. They range over all the personal and demonstrative stems and some of the pronominal adjectives. Pāṇini's general treatment of the diminutive suffix *ka* is at V, 3, 71 ff.: first person singular: *ahakam* and the stem-forms *makat-* and *matka-* in *makat-pitrka* or *matka-pitrka*; see Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya* I, 1, 6 (p. 97 of Kielhorn's edition) on Pāṇ. I, 1, 39. The instrumental sg. *mayakā*, very frequent in the Jaina texts, and the solitary instrumental dual *āvakābhyaṁ* (p. 16) are not referred to, but Bö. Nachträge 5, quotes *ahakam* from Bhadrabāhu Carita I, 109.

Second person singular: *tvakam* and the stem forms *tvakat-* and *tvatka-*, in *tvakat-pitrka*, *matka-pitrka*, *Mahābhāṣya*, loc. cit. The stem *saka* figures, along with *eṣaka*, at Pāṇ. VI, 1, 132 schol., where the statement is made that their nominatives are *sako* and *eṣako* in external eufonic combinations, in which the non-diminutive forms appear as *sa* and *eṣa*. This is borne out unfailingly, as far as *sako* is concerned, by the Jaina texts. Note that the feminines *sakā* and *yakā* are the only exceptions to the rule that the feminine secondary (*tad-dhita*) suffix *ka* does not change the a- stem of a noun combined with it to i (*ikā*); Pāṇ. VII, 3, 45; Vop. 4, 6. This is borne out negatively by the pair *imaka*, but *imikā* in the Jaina texts above.

From the stems *eṣa*, *eta*, the Petersburg Lexicon, at the end of its article *etad*, and Böhtlingk's Lexicon under *etaka* and *eṣaka*, cite the unquotable feminines *eṣakā* and *eṣikā*; *etakā* and *etikā* with reference to Pāṇini VII, 3, 47, and his commentators. No diminutive forms from *eṣa*, *eta* have thus far come to light in Jaina Sanskrit.

Pāṇini VII, 1, 11; 2, 112 and his commentators and successors permit the stem *imaka* (also *amuka*) to form all cases except the nominative *ayakam*. The forms mentioned are, *imakena*, *imakayoh*, and *imakāḥ*. He does not refer to the fem. *imikā*, which is, however, implied in sūtra VII, 3, 45. Forms from masc. *imaka* and fem. *imikā* are

fairly frequent in the texts above. The instrumental plural *imakāih* is, however, to be appraised as the direct diminutive of the Prākritic form *imāih*, which is peculiarly frequent in Jaina Sanskrit: *Par.* 8, 520; *Pārç.* 1, 885; 6, 767; 7, 398; *Samar.* 4, 508, 619; 6, 385; 8, 520; *Çānt.* 6, 411.

The nominative *asakāu*, very frequent in the Jaina texts, appears in the *vārttikā* to Pāṇ. VII, 2, 107; but *amukāih*, which appears in the company of *imakāih* in Pāṇ. VII, 1, 11, schol., has so far not turned up in my texts.

The various derivatives in the Jaina texts from stem *yaka* are supported not only by Vedic instances, but also by Pāṇ. VII, 3, 45 (with *saka*); Vop. 4, 6.

Of stem *anyaka* (Vedic and Jaina, above) the grammarians take no note; but the masculine plural *sarvake* (with *viçvake*), Pāṇ. V, 3, 71 (schol.), and the fem. *sarvikā* in the comments to Pāṇ. VI, 3, 35; VII, 3, 44, Vop. 4, 6, are supported by the diminutive *sarvakam*, Av. I, 3, 6.

Max Müller, *Sanskrit Grammar for Beginners* (London, 1870), p. 131, section 274, referring to Pāṇ. V, 3, 71, and *Siddhānta Kāumudī*, vol. I, p. 706, groups together, as denoting contempt or dubious relation the forms *twayakā*, *yuvakayoh*, *asmakābhīh*, *ayakam*, and *asakāu*.

It is possible that some of these grammatical forms, as well as some of the Jaina forms, are retrograde Sanskrit forms, based upon Prākrit models. Prākrit forms of *aham*, such as *ahaam*, *hage*, *hagge* (*hake*, *ahake*), listed by Pischel, *Grammatik der Prākrit-Sprachen*, section 415, presuppose *ahakam*, but this form is too solitary to be the basis of the entire movement. There goes with it no indication of diminutive function. Quite beguiling is the form *imiā* = **imikā* in Hemacandra (*Siddhahemacandram*) 3, 73; but this *ka*-form from stem *ima* is also too isolated to permit correlation with the free *imaka* formations of the Jaina texts and Pāṇini's full set of case-forms.

CONCLUSION

Professor Franklin Edgerton, in his excellent Johns Hopkins doctor's dissertation, "The K-Suffixes of Indo-Iranian," *JAOS.* XXXI, 93 ff., has treated exhaustively the diminutive uses of this suffix in the Veda (pp. 125 ff.) including, very observantly, the diminutive pronouns. He has, however, for various reasons, not extended his researches to Classical Sanskrit. From the negative evidence of the Lexicons and western grammars the occurrences of diminutive pronouns in the Classical speech must be, at best, exceedingly rare. Between the far-off Veda and the Jaina texts lies the native grammar,

which treats, as we have seen, the diminutive pronoun as a familiar fact without any indication that it is practically restricted to the Veda (*chandasī*). What, then, is the basis of the Jainistic usage?

There seems but one answer likely: The Jaina writers have restored the diminutive pronoun to literature. In my paper, "Some Aspects of Jaina Sanskrit," *Festschrift Jacob Wackernagel*, pp. 226 ff., I have shown that Jaina writers make copious use of the *Vyākaraṇa* and *Koṣa* literature.¹ I repeat a remark made there, namely, that words which occur in Jaina texts and, besides, only in Lexicons and Grammars, are no more "quotable" than the grammatical forms of the *Bhāṭṭikāvya*. As an additional illustration, I may mention the common Jaina use of the pronominal adjectives in *kīna*, *māmakīna*, *tāvakīna*, *āsmākīna* and *yāuṣmākīna*. They are treated in *Pāṇ.* IV, 3, 1-3, but there are only a very few forms of that kind quotable,² beginning with the somewhat different *mākīna*, *Rv.* VIII, 27, 8. On the other hand, a small group of Jaina texts yield the following:

māmakīna: *Vin.* *Mall.* 7, 560; *Çānt.* 1, 287; 2, 299; 4, 298; 6, 1465.

tāvakīna: *Vin.* *Mall.* 7, 124; *Çānt.* 2, 312; 6, 1154, 1404.


āsmākīna: *Vin.* *Mall.* 7, 677.

yāuṣmākīna: *Par.* 1, 153; *Vin.* *Mall.* 7, 34, 917; *Çāl.* 6, 25.

The Jainas use these words familiarly, not because they know them from literature; their recrudescence is due to the Jainas' large control of grammatical and lexical science. In the future study of the native *vyākaraṇa* and *koṣa* literature, the Jaina texts will take a large, almost controlling part, because they have revived much that is lost in Classical literature.

¹ Indeed, Jaina scholarship to this day keeps its grip on these subjects as stoutly as did the great Hemacandra. Of recent missives from India, through the kindness of their Pontiff, Jainacharya Shri Vijaya Indra Suri, I may mention a beautiful edition (with word-index) of Hemacandra's *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*, elaborated by those two wonderfully productive, scholarly Pandits, Shravak Pandit Hargovindas and Shravak Pandit Bechardas, published as no. 41 of the Yashovijaya Jaina Granthamala, Bhavnagar, Veer Era 2441 (A.D. 1915); and the *Dharmadīpikā* by Nyaya Visharad Nyaya Tirtha Upadhyaya Mangal Vijayaji, Bhavnagar, Virasamīvat 2451 (A.D. 1925).

² See the Western Lexicons.



NOTES ON JAINA MĀHĀRĀSTRĪ

By FRANKLIN EDGERTON

IN the course of a number of years of class-work on Jacobi's *Ausgewählte Erzählungen in Māhārāstṛī*, I have collected the following notes on matters mainly of etymology or interpretation, which now seem sufficiently numerous to justify publication for the benefit of other users of that admirable and useful manual, and of students of Prākrit in general. Except in a few cases where the contrary is specifically indicated, they all concern matters which seem to me insufficiently or incorrectly explained both in Jacobi, and in J. J. Meyer's English translation entitled *Hindu Tales*. I refer to Jacobi by the initial J.

1. "Vedisms" in *Māhārāstṛī*

kambha "pillar" = Vedic *skambha* (J. *stambha*).

junna "old" = Vedic (RV.) *jūrṇa* (Skt. *jīrṇa*). The *u*-forms of this root are distinctly Vedic.

thāma "station" = Vedic *sthāman* (in Skt. the word means "power").

vasima "dwelling" = Vedic *vasman*.

Cf. also *tayam* below, under 2.

2. Semantic and Etymological Notes

ahiyāsei = *adhibrāsayati*, "cause (divine power) to dwell in (an image), invest" (see Edgerton, *JAOS* 33. 158 ff.). J. *adhyāsayati*, "ertragen."

ābhoeūna "having experienced," from *ā+bhuj* "enjoy" and so "experience."

ucchaliya "sich erheben" = Skt. *uc-chal* (root *śal*). J. *utthal*°.

uvvaddha-piṇḍio = Skt. *ubaddha-piṇḍika* "with stout, swollen calves"; the identical Sanskrit compound occurs, *Tantrākhyāyika* p. 64, line 7. J. *udvṛddha-* "kräftig"; Meyer has the correct etymology but does not note the actual occurrence of the word in Sanskrit, which determines the meaning precisely and indubitably.

kammaṇa 56.31 = *karman*, "medical treatment"; so in Caraka. See below under *mūli*.

karana 37.5 "Gericht"; in this sense I think the word is a back-formation from *kāraṇika* (Pkt. *kāraṇiya*) "judge," which is in actual fact a derivative from Skt. *kārana*, "cause," and not from *karana*.

khāmei 25.15, causative of *kṣam*, means "say good-by," literally "excuse oneself"; cf. Russian *prostit's'a*, literally "excuse oneself," the regular Russian expression for "say good-by."

gosa "morning" is derived from *go* and a derivative of the root *si* (RV. *sāyā* "unloosing" etc.), and equals Skt. *go-visarga*, literally "time of letting the cows loose."

cojja = Skt. *āścarya*; I would explain the phonetic development thus: *āścarya* > *accejja* > (*ac*)*cojja* by dissimilation of *e* to *o* before *jj*. (J. gives the correct etymology, of course, but does not call attention to the interesting case of dissimilation.)

tayam = *takat*, 85.37. Meyer notes the etymology but fails to observe the clearly deprecatory or imprecatory use of the suffix *-ka*, which may almost be called a Vedism. The use of the "diminutive" *-ka*, particularly in pejorative senses, with pronominal stems, is especially characteristic of some phases of Vedic diction. See Edgerton, *The K-Suffixes of Indo-Iranian*, p. 45 f.

tavorahāna 61.17 "excellent asceticism"; J. translates "Askese" and does not analyze the word. The second member is clearly *upa-dhāna* = *viśeṣa*, "excellence."

niyanta "sehend, beobachtend" (not explained in J.) is simply a pres. ppl. to the root *nī*, with meaning influenced by *netra*, *nayana*, "eye"; because of these familiar derivatives, the root *nī* is felt as meaning "to see."

nirūvei with *saraṇam*, 63.20, = "meditate on your (religious) refuge," "call on your sectarian deity," that is "prepare to die." See now Edgerton, "The Hour of Death, its importance for man's future fate, in Hindu and western religions," *Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute*, 8. 219-249, esp. p. 224.

payai 26.5 = Skt. *prakṛti*, "minister" or "power" of a king (a technical Arthaśāstra term); J. derives from *padāti*.

paraddha 7.35 = *pralabdhā*, "seized" (with regret, *pacchāyāva*-); J. "gequält" (DK. *pīḍita*); Meyer "seized," no doubt understanding the word as I do, but without statement of etymology.

pulaiya, H. *pulaei* = *drś*, is an interesting case of vowel-metathesis; it is evidently Skt. *pralokayati* (Pischel §§ 104 and 130) with metathesis of the vowels of the first two syllables.

bhandana "Streit" 13.28 = Pāli *bhandana* and Buddhistic Skt. *bhāndana*.

manahara-kāla 78.25 (metr. gr. for *mano*) = "night" ("pleasant time").

māri 35.24 = "pestilence" (Skt. *māra* and lex. *māri*). J. "Mörder."

mūli 56.31 = Skt. *mūlin*, “root-doctor.” The sentence *ālavāṇam pi hu cheyāṇa kammanām kiṁ ca mūlihim* means “the conversation of the clever, I tell you, is true physicking (see *kammanā* above), and what is the use of root-doctors?” J. renders *mūli* by “reich.”

lajjhai: on this passive to *labh* see now Tedesco, *JAOS* 43.368.

lambei = Skt. *lambayati* “hang up, post,” 18.21, 24. J. “verbreiten”; Meyer “supply,” which is bad; but Meyer in a footnote suggests as an alternative the interpretation which I give.

vaccai “gehen, wandern” seems to me clearly Skt. *vṛtyate*, passive to root *vṛt*.

vaccha-thala = Skt. *°sthala*, “place.” J. *°tala*.

saccaviya 13.32, 15.19, 27.32, “seen,” is not explained etymologically by Jacobi, who separates it from the other *saccaviya*, the p. p. p. of *satyāpayati*, “bewahrheiten.” But it is obviously the same word as this; for the development of meaning cf. German *wahrnehmen*.

sulasā, n. pr., is not explained by J.; of course it is Skt. *Sudṛśā*.

sūra = Skt. *śūra* seems to me used at 56.2 as an abstract, “heroism”; Skt. *śūra* is so used in Ind. Spr. 5756.

hakkai 16.22, 75.23 is given by J. as meaning “hindern, abwehren,” quoting Hem. 4.134 *nisedhati*. But Hem’s. definition is inexact, or rather, free; the word is based on the onomatopoetic *hakka*, a call used in stopping an elephant: 16.22 *hakkio kumārena kari*. Originally “to call ‘whoa!’” it comes to mean “to call, yell at” in general; so in 75.23 a thief is the object of the shouting. (Meyer here renders “call,” though at 16.22 he follows Jacobi, “warded him off.”) See the next.

hakkārai has the same meaning as the preceding, and a like derivation; it contains of course the element *-kāra* (as in *humkāra* etc.). Perhaps contraction or haplology has taken place in it (from *hakkakāra*, cf. *andhāriyam*, 22.3, = *andhayāriyam*, Skt. *andhakāritam*); but more likely the original exclamation was simply *hak!* In Sanskrit *hak-kāra* is quoted lexically. In 71.33 this word is used of an elephant (*hakkārio gaindo*), but it also, like *hakkai*, is used by extension of human beings (63.19 and 33; 72.20). The word has, of course, nothing to with *ākārayati* (J.).

3. Omissions in Jacobi’s Glossary

Most of these are perfectly simple and obvious words, their omission being clearly due to mere accident. In some cases Meyer has noted the omission. Some of them, however, appear to be due to errors of interpretation.

āñā = Skt. *ājñā*, “command,” 63.6.

kalaha = Skt. *kalabha*, "elephant" (Meyer), 81.34.

kalla, kallam, "morgrig, morgen," 50.20, 60.29 (Meyer). J. only "gestrig, gestern."

caranya, "good conduct, morality," 3.15 (tatsama).

calana, "foot," 23.25 (tadbhava).

cetthai, 59.22, 27, probably = *cittai*, Skt. *tīṣṭhati* (rather than root *cēṣṭ-*); so clearly at 59.27 where it is resumed by the participle *thio* in the next line.

taniya 86.18, acc. to Meyer = *tanīyas*, compv. to *tanu*.

panta = Skt. *prānta*, "last, extreme," 33.29.

pavara = *pravara*, by a slip labelled "ts" (tatsama) in J.

pāgaya = Skt. *prākṛta*, "commonplace," 2.28.

maṇunna = Skt. *manoñña*, "charming," 4.16 (Meyer).

vajjai = Skt. *vādyate*, "is made to sound," 40.21.

vibhāṣā 65.8 acc. to Meyer ts.; but perhaps rather *vibhāṣā?* Uncertain.

sāmanna 13.25 "gewöhnlich" is placed by a slip under *sāmanna* = Skt. *śrāmanya*.

suhi = Skt. *suhṛd*, "friend," 84.7 (where J. wrongly emends to *sahi*) and 82.36 (where he interprets it as = *sukhin*). Meyer has the correct interpretation in both places.

4. A few Emendations

At 59.14 read perhaps *sūlāhi* (with v. l.) "on spits," for *mūlāhi*.

At 39.16 read *uvavāiyam* (with v. l.; = Skt. *upapāditam*) for *uvāiyam*.

At 37.27 read probably *janaya-kkhao* = Skt. *janaka-kṣaya*, "parricide," instead of *jana*°, supposed to mean "people-slayer, murderer" (but the use of the word *jana* in such a connexion seems curious). Kara-kaṇḍu at this point was about to attack his own father, though he did not know it. It is a version of the Hildebrand motif. The speaker wishes to avert the horror of (unwitting) parricide.

MISCELLANEA PĀLICA

BY DINES ANDERSEN

I. KANTA

The following verse is found *Ja VI*, 370 containing a riddle:

*Hanti hatthehi pādehi mukhañ ca parisumbhati
sa ve, rāja, piyo hoti kan tena-m-abhipassasi?*

Fausböll's edition has two misprints in this passage: *rājā* for *rāja*, and *abhipassati* for *abhipassasi* (cf. pp. 376, 15; 377, 4; 378, 9-28). The English translation of Cowell and Rouse renders the last two sentences everywhere with the words: "he is dear, and grows dearer than a husband"; and at the same time adopts the reading *kantena*, instr. of *kanta*, m. "a husband." It is not easy to see how the translator understood *abhipassati*, but the translation is probably taken from the words of the Commentary p. 376, 25: *iti so tassā evarūpe kāle piyataro hoti, tathā pituno*. But it is to be observed that *pituno* may be genitive, parallel with the preceding *tassā* (genitive feminine), hence: "dearer to her, as also to his father." This translation is made necessary by *tathā*, which renders the two members parallel: *tassā* and *pituno*. — *kanta* (masculine, feminine, neuter) = "lovely, charming," is never found in Pāli as a masculine noun (= a husband), and the emendation *kantena* for *kan tena* must be rejected, all the more as *kan tena abhipassasi* gives exactly the right meaning. *Passati* = videre, but *abhipassati* = intelligere, mente percipere, explicare, interpretari, etc.; therefore we must translate: what do you understand by that? (quid illud interpretari putas?) (Answer: the child in his mother's lap.)

2. NANTE

In connection with the above it is interesting to look at *kante*, *Ja V*, 486, 13 (= *santike*, Comm.) which the English translator of *Ja V* (Francis) fairly correctly renders: "at man-eater's hand [I] go forth to die" (= *gacchām' aham porisādassa kante*, v. l. *ñatte*). PTS's Dictionary, which has also adopted the emendation *kantena*, *Ja VI*, 370, proposes here a very astonishing conjecture: *porisādassak' ante* (!!). But the correct reading is evident: v. l. *ñatte* is simply to be read *ñante*, just as the parallel passage *Ja V*, 26, *a* shows; *ñante* is Sanskrit *nyante*, ind. = near to = *santike*. *Abh.* 706 has by mistake *ñattam* instead of *ñantam* (also Childers).

3. ISSA (ĪSA)-PHANDANĀ

Jātaka No. 475 (IV, 207) contains the story of a wild animal (*kālaśīha*) and a Phandana-tree (*spandana*). In the *Gāthā*'s this animal was called *īsa*, m. (cf. *Abh.* 612 *issa*, “a bear, a sort of lion,” sa. *r̥cya*, *r̥sya*). There is doubtless an allusion to this fable in *Dhp-a* I, 50, 13: *issa-phandanānam viya*, *kālaśūkānam viya*, which is rendered by Buringame, *Bu. Leg.* I, 174, as follows: “like the Snake and the Mongoos, who trembled and quaked with enmity, like Crows and the Owls” (with a reference only to *Pañcatantra* V). It appears clearly from the parallelism between the two expressions that the translation should be: “like [the enmity of] the Bear and the Phandana-tree [or] like [that of] the Crows and the Owls.” The translation of *issa-phandana* (PTS's Dictionary s. v. *phandana*) is therefore inadequate, the translation of Rouse (*Ja* V, 131), on the other hand, is correct.

The following stanza is found *Ja.* I, 464:

4. VYĀHARATI

*Yathā vācā va bhūñjassu
yathā bhuttañ ca vyāhara,
ubhayam te na sameti:
vācā bhuttañ ca, Kosiye!*

The English translation renders this as follows: “You may act or eat; which shall it be? for you can't both, my Kosiya,” the German translation has: “So wie du sprichst, so iss jetzt auch, und wie dein Mahl ist, handle auch; denn beides nicht zusammen passt, die Rede, Kosiya, und das Mahl.” — Both translations miss the verb *vyāharati*, which, on the basis of Comm's periphrastic explanation: *gehe kattabba-kammañ karohi*, is rendered in the German translation with “handeln” (arbeiten). But this meaning of *vyāharati* cannot be found anywhere in Pāli literature. It always means: “to say, tell, speak, pronounce;” a confusion with *voharati* (*vy-avaharati*), in the original meaning of this verb, is hardly possible. On the other hand, *voharati*, through *vohāra* (which is both = *vyāhāra* and *vyavahāra*, and means among other things “usage” (as to language) but not “pronunciation” has also acquired the meaning of *vyāharati*, but we never find the reverse development. *Vyāharati* therefore means “to say,” — but not “arbeiten,” and that fits the thought of the stanza perfectly: the Brahman woman's talk about her bad stomach is in contradiction to her over-indulgence in sweets (*yā ca te ayañ vācā 'vātā māñ vijjhanti' ti yañ ca te idam paññata-bhōjanāñ bhuttam, idam ubhayam pi tuyham na sameti*); therefore the


words *vācā* and *vyāhara* are in the same relation as *bhuttam* and *bhuñ-jassu*.

Either eat, as you speak, or speak, as you eat! Both do not go together: your complaints and your way of eating, my girl.

5. ĀPAKATAÑÑU (A[P]PAKATÑÑU)

The Pāli word *a-kataññu* (ungrateful) is lacking in PTS's Dictionary, but — to this Helmer Smith has called my attention — through a curious misunderstanding it is inserted as *a-pakataññu* (p. 50) = “ungrateful” (*Vin* II, 199, 9). This form is just as chimerical as “un-prograteful” [!]. It is of course to be understood as *a-pakata-ññu* (sa. *aprakṛta-jñā*) = “who does not know the matter in question.” Also the translation in SBE XX, 256 “ignorant of what he had in hand” is somewhat obscure. Trenckner quotes in addition *Vin* IV, 112, 7: *bhagavatā sikhāpadam apaññattam, te vā bhikkhū appakataññuno*; *Dhp-a* I, 143, 2: *Vajjiputtakehi navakehi appakataññūhi* (novices having little gratitude” [!], Burlingame's translation); *Vin.* I, 312, 22: *gocare appakataññuno* (opp. *pakataññuno*, concerning newly-arrived monks); *Ps.* II, 430, 13: *vinaye appakataññu*.

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L'INSCRIPTION DE MAHĀNĀMAN À BODH-GAYA

ESSAI D'EXÉGÈSE APPLIQUÉE À L'ÉPIGRAPHIE BOUDDHIQUE

PAR SYLVAIN LÉVI

J'AI déjà eu l'occasion, il y a vingt-cinq ans, d'appeler l'attention sur une inscription de Bodh-Gaya qui avait été publiée par J. F. Fleet en 1886 dans l'*Indian Antiquary*, et de nouveau éditée par lui dans le beau recueil des *Gupta Inscriptions* en 1888 (No. 71). Cette inscription commémore, en vers sanscrits d'une facture savante, la fondation d'une chapelle du Bouddha, dans le voisinage du Bodhi-māṇḍa, par un moine nommé Mahānāman, originaire de Laṅkādvīpa; Mahānāman y expose sa généalogie spirituelle en remontant de proche en proche, par Upasena, Mahānāman, Upasena, Rāhula, jusqu'à Bhava. La date, exprimée en symboles numériques, est l'an 269 d'une ère qui n'est pas autrement précisée. L'éditeur de l'inscription, Fleet, après avoir interprété cette date en prenant pour point de départ l'ère Gupta 318/319 (269 = 588/589 A.D.) a finalement hésité entre cette ère et l'ère Kalacuri de Cedi 249 A.D. (269 = 539/540 A.D.). Je crus pouvoir contester ces deux interprétations, et je proposai de ramener la date donnée à l'ère saka 78/79 (269 = 348/349 A.D.).

J'avais en effet découvert, dans une compilation chinoise du VII^e siècle, un fragment de la Relation du voyageur chinois Wang Hiants'e qui visita l'Inde plusieurs fois au milieu du VII^e siècle; ce fragment raconte comment, au temps du roi Samudragupta, deux moines de Ceylan envoyés par le roi Śrī Meghavarṇa avaient accompli le pélerinage de Mahābodhi; l'un des moines s'appelait Mo-ho-nan, traduit en chinois "Grand nom"; l'autre Ou-po, traduit en chinois par "enseignement, prophétie." Le premier porte donc le même nom que le moine de l'inscription datée 269; le second, Upa, peut-être sous une forme normalement réduite, un Upasena. Il est tentant de supposer que le Mahānāman de l'inscription, disciple d'un Upasena, et disciple à la seconde génération d'un autre Upasena, est identique au Mahānāman qui vint en compagnie d'un Upa-, de Ceylan à Mahabodhi sous le règne de Samudragupta. Vincent Smith, dans un article de l'*Indian Antiquary* (*The Inscriptions of Mahānāman at Bodh-Gaya*, April 1902, pp. 192-197), s'éleva contre l'hypothèse que je proposais; il lui

opposait des raisons chronologiques et des raisons épigraphiques. Samudragupta était bien sur le trône en 269 śaka = 348/9 A.D., mais Meghavarṇa était mort depuis quinze ans, si on admet la chronologie singhalaise. Sur ce point, Vincent Smith s'est plus tard rectifié lui-même: dans une note de son *Early History of India*, 3^e édition, p. 288, il assigne au règne de Meghavarṇa les dates 352-379. Après avoir péché par excès, l'hypothèse pécherait en ce cas par insuffisance. Je n'insisterai pas, et je m'arrêterai plutôt aux raisons paléographiques, qui sont graves. L'aspect des caractères employés dans l'inscription de Mahānāman suggère une date plus basse que le IV^e siècle.

Je ne reprendrai pas ici une discussion vouée d'avance à la stérilité, faute d'un fait nouveau. Mais je voudrais, en m'aïdant des progrès accomplis dans la connaissance du bouddhisme depuis quarante ans, revenir sur certains détails de la traduction donnée par Fleet, signaler des questions qui ont dû lui échapper, et proposer à la critique des solutions nouvelles.

L'inscription débute, comme il convient, par une stance en l'honneur du Bouddha:

*vyāpto yenāprameyah sakalaśāśirucā sarvvataḥ satvadhātuh
kṣunñāḥ pāṣāṇdayodhāḥ sugatipatharudhas tarkaśastrābhīyuktāḥ
sāmpūrnno dharmakośāḥ prakṛtiripuṛtaḥ sādhito lokabhūtyai
śāstuh śākyai kavandhor jjayati cīrataram tad yaśassāratantram*

Fleet traduit: "Victorious for a very long time is that doctrine, replete with fame, of the Teacher, the chief kinsman of the Śākyas, by which, lustrous as the full-moon, the inscrutable primary substance of existence has been pervaded in all directions; by which the warriors, who are heretics, obstructive of the path of beatitude, have been broken to pieces, being assailed with the weapon of logic; (and) by which the whole treasure of religion, that had been stolen by the enemy which is original nature, has been recovered for the welfare of mankind!"

La traduction est irréprochable, à ne considérer que les mots; mais le sens suggéré (*dhvani*) est l'âme de la poésie indienne, et nous sommes ici en présence d'une composition poétique, où le versificateur manie avec une élégante aisance les complications du mètre *sragdharā*. Dans une stance bien faite, la suggestion se précise par des touches successives, et le dernier mot doit à la fois porter l'ensemble et en fournir la clef. Le poète a manifestement choisi à dessein pour cette place le mot *tantra*, qui est particulièrement riche en évocations. Le Dictionnaire de Pétersbourg n'énumère pas moins de 18 significations (sans y faire entrer en ligne le féminin *tantrī*). Au sens propre, c'est l'instrument à

tisser: le métier ou l'ensouple, ou la chaîne; il en dérive des sens secondaires dont les principaux sont, selon l'interprétation des lexicographes sanscrits *svarāṣṭracintā* "les préoccupations de la royauté," *kutumbakṛtya* "les affaires de famille," *pradhāna* ou *mukhya* "principal, essentiel," *paracchanda* "dépendant," *itikartavyatā* "règle à suivre," *siddhānta* "doctrine, école," *śāstra* "traité technique," *śāstrabhedā*, *śrutiśākhāntara* "traité spécial, branche particulière de la tradition sacrée"; dans ce sens, le mot a pris une valeur très précise; il s'applique à une catégorie extraordinairement abondante d'ouvrages où la mystique et la magie se combinent et qui a fleuri dans la bouddhisme non moins que dans le brahmanisme. Fleet a, parmi toutes ces significations, légitimement choisi celle de "doctrine"; mais il faut observer pourtant que *tantra* ainsi entendu implique par un lien intime le "traité," le "livre" où la doctrine est énoncée. Justement le mot *dharmaśā*, à la troisième ligne, semble préparer par anticipation un double sens de ce genre. Fleet l'a traduit par "treasure of religion," et c'était son droit; l'expression a ce sens par exemple dans *Manu I*, 99:

*brāhmaṇo jāyamāno hi prthivyām adhi jāyate
iśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānām dharmakośasya guptaye.*

Mais dans le domaine du bouddhisme, le mot ne peut manquer d'évoquer le titre d'un ouvrage célèbre, admis comme une autorité canonique par toutes les écoles, l'*Abhidharmakośa* de Vasubandhu. Que les deux termes puissent alterner, je n'en veux pour preuve que ce seul fait: j'ai eu la chance de découvrir à Katmandou, lors de mon séjour en 1922, un manuscrit incomplet des *Kārikā* de l'*Abhidharma*-*kośa* (du I^e au IV^e kośasthāna); le feuillet initial portait l'indication: *Dharmakośa*, et sur la foi de ce titre, le Pandit Siddhiharṣa, détenteur de ce manuscrit qu'il n'avait jamais lu, s'était imaginé que l'ouvrage était un vocabulaire des termes techniques du bouddhisme, à la façon du *Dharmasamgraha*. Mais l'auteur de l'*Abhidharmakośa*, dans la *vṛtti* qu'il a lui-même écrite pour expliquer les *kārikā*, interprète ce mot ainsi: "L'ouvrage s'appelle *Abhidharmakośa*, parce que l'*Abhidharma* y est, quant au sens, introduit pour l'essentiel; ou bien parce que l'*Abhidharma* en est le contenant" *idam tu śāstram katham Abhidharmakośam iti. tasvārthato 'sminn iti yathāpradhānam antarbhūtaḥ* *atha vā etasyāśrayabhūtaḥ*.¹ Le commentateur *Yaśomitra*² glose en ces termes: "Le démonstratif (*tasva*) désigne le traité technique qui porte le nom d'*Abhidharma*, et qui va être énoncé immédiatement; quant

¹ *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, ed. de la *Bibliotheca Buddhica*, I, 10.

² *Ibid. ad locum.*

au sens (*arthataḥ*), non point quant à la lettre; le sens y est incorporé, mais non pas la totalité; c'est ce qu'il indique par l'expression "pour l'essentiel" (*yathāpradhānam*); il est incorporé (*antarbhūta*), introduit. C'est pourquoi ce traité que je compose tient lieu de kośa au sens, est comme un kośa pour lui; dans ce cas, le mot est un composé du type *tatpuruṣa* fondé sur un rapport de génitif. *Abhidharmakośa* veut dire alors: le kośa de l'*Abhidharma*. Le kośa (le fourreau) dans lequel entre l'épée est le kośa de celle-ci. Ou bien encore l'*Abhidharma*, c'est à dire le *Jñānaprasthāna* et autres textes analogues, est le contenant de ce traité que je compose. De cet *Abhidharma* canonique, mon traité en a été tiré, quant au sens, comme il a été dit plus haut. En ce cas, *Abhidharmakośa* est un composé du type *bahuvrīhi* qui s'explique ainsi: L'*Abhidharma* est le kośa de ce (livre-) ci; ce d'où on tire l'épée est le kośa de celle-ci; mon livre a pour kośa (fourreau) l'*Abhidharma*. Il indique par là qu'il a rendu intelligible le sens général de cet (*Abhidharma*) "Nous voilà bien loin du sens vague et flou dont Fleet avait dû se contenter: "trésor de la religion"; nous avons affaire à un livre connu, célèbre, considéré comme l'exposé classique de la doctrine bouddhique au point de vue philosophique. Trouverons-nous dans le contexte de nouvelles suggestions qui confirment celle-ci? L'auteur de l'*Abhidharmakośa* est *Vasubandhu*; ce nom est généralement rendu en chinois par 世親見 "apparenté (par alliance) au monde," quelquefois aussi par 天親見 "apparenté (par alliance) à (des) dieu(x)." En tibétain, il est rendu par *ubyig gñen* "apparenté au(x) trésor(s)"; *ubyig*, qui rend ici le sanscrit *vasu*, a aussi le sens de *sāra*, *hiranya*, *vajra* d'après les dictionnaires tibétains sanscrits. L'élément *bandhu* paraît à la quatrième ligne de l'inscription, dans le mot *Śākyakabandhoḥ* qui y est employé pour désigner le Bouddha. Le moins qu'on puisse dire de cette appellation, c'est qu'elle est étrange. Le Bouddha reçoit fréquemment, même dans les textes canoniques, l'épithète *d'Ādityabandhu*, en pali *Ādicca*° "apparenté au Soleil," quelle que soit l'interprétation qu'on soit tenté de donner à cette appellation chargée d'un long passé de mythologie. Mais je ne me rappelle pas d'exemple de *Śākyabandhu*, et je ne puis me défendre d'une impression de surprise à rencontrer ce mot. Le Bouddha est bien le *Śākyā* par excellence, le sage des *Śākyā* (*Śāmuni*), le lion des *Sakya* (*Śāsimha*), le taureau des *Śākyā* (*Śāpumgava*); tous ces termes lui assignent une place d'honneur dans le clan. Mais à le désigner comme "le parent, le parent unique des *Śākyā*," il me semble que les valeurs se renversent, comme si l'honneur lui venait d'être apparenté à ce clan. Je suis donc amené à croire que le poète a introduit cette périphrase parce

qu'il avait dans l'esprit un autre nom où figurait l'élément *bandhu*. Le terme *loka*, dans le composé *lokabhūtyai* qui précède, évoque la traduction consacrée en chinois du nom de Vasubandhu: "apparenté au monde." Et c'est encore une autre des valeurs usuelles de *vasu* que suggère le mot *sāra* accolé à *tantra*; *sāra* correspond au tibétain *dbiyig* "objet de valeur" qui rend le mot *vasu* dans le nom de Vasubandhu. En outre il évoque tout naturellement, comme son voisin *tantra*, une idée d'ordre littéraire. *Sāra* est le correspondant indien de la "somme" médiévale que Littré définit: "Titre de certains livres qui traitent en abrégé de toutes les parties d'une science"; et nous avons vu que l'auteur de l'*Abhidharmakośa* pour justifier ce titre allègue que son ouvrage est un abrégé de l'ensemble de l'*Abhidharma*.

Dans l'hypothèse que je propose, les autres traits viennent se coordonner sans effort autour de l'équivoque centrale. Le Bouddha, "lumineux comme la lune en son plein, a pénétré de toutes parts le monde des créatures qu'on ne peut mesurer." L'*Abhidharmakośa* qui donne une description physique et psychologique de tous les êtres (*sattva*) dans tous les mondes (*dhātu*) a droit au même éloge. Le Bouddha "a écrasé les soldats de l'hérésie qui barraient le passage à la Bonne Destination, en les assaillant avec les armes du raisonnement." L'éloge, ici, convient parfaitement à l'oeuvre de Vasubandhu; le philosophe y réfute chemin faisant les thèses condamnées par l'orthodoxie; le dernier chapitre se présente même expressément comme une "Réfutation" dirigée contre les doctrines qui adhèrent à la personnalité (*pudgala*). Le mot *sampūrṇa* "rempli" qui accompagne l'expression *dharmakośah* n'est pas moins suggestif; c'est le terme qui marque régulièrement la fin d'une composition, d'un manuscrit. Quant à l'épithète *prakṛtiripuhrtaḥ*, je ne crois pas que Fleet l'ait interprétée exactement: "stolen by the enemy which is original nature"; je ne vois pas que le bouddhisme ait dénoncé la Nature comme l'ennemi; c'est un trait propre au *Sāṃkhya*, et que le bouddhisme ne lui a pas emprunté. Le Grand Véhicule a même fini par enseigner que les êtres sont de nature (*prakṛtyā*) en état de *Nirvāṇa*. Le sens le plus simple de *prakṛtiripu*, c'est "ennemi naturel"; les ennemis naturels du salut, sans doute *Māra* et ses auxiliaires, avaient détruit le Trésor de la Loi, puisque la Loi est condamnée à disparaître au bout d'un intervalle fatal après chacun des Bouddhas successifs. Le Bouddha a réussi à retrouver (*sādhita*) ce trésor pour le bonheur du monde. Mais il est probable que l'épithète *prakṛtiripuhrtaḥ* doit aussi s'appliquer à l'*Abhidharmakośa*; on peut supposer que l'*Abhidharma*, le système et aussi la littérature de ce nom, avait après la grande époque des ou-

vrages classiques: Jñānaprasthāna etc. . . . passé par une éclipse d'où le génie de Vasubandhu l'avait dégagé. Ainsi d'un bout à l'autre, la ststance se déroulerait comme il convient en deux couches parallèles de significations; en exaltant le Bouddha, elle exalterait aussi ce maître salué couramment comme un Bodhisattva, Vasubandhu, et la question de la date prendrait une nouvelle importance en présence des opinions divergentes sur la date de Vasubandhu.

La seconde ststance est un éloge de Mahākāśyapa; ici, nous sommes sur un terrain plus sûr, et la traduction de Fleet aura à subir de fortes retouches. Le texte porte:

*nairodhīm śubhabhāvanām anusṛtaḥ samsārasaṃkleśajin
Maitreyasya kare vimuktivāśitā yasyādbhutā vyākṛtā
nirvāṇāvasare ca yena caranau dṛṣṭau muneḥ pāvanau
pāyād vah sa munīndraśāsanadharah stutyo Mahākāśyapah*

Fleet traduit: "May he, Mahākāśyapa, who is worthy of praise, protect you, — he who observed the precepts of (Buddha) the chief of saints; who practised that auspicious habit of abstract meditation which is of the nature of a trance; who overcame the anguish of successive states of existence; whose wonderful subjugation of the passions in final emancipation (is to be) displayed in the hands of Maitreya, and by whom the two pure feet of (Buddha) the saint were behold at the time of attaining Nirvāṇa."

Les deux dernières lignes de cette ststance sont parfaitement claires, ou presque; l'épisode évoqué par la troisième ligne est bien connu: c'est Mahākāśyapa qui a vu les pieds du Maître à l'occasion du Nirvāṇa; le bûcher qui devait consumer les restes sacrés ne pouvait pas s'allumer avant que le grand disciple "le fils aîné du Bouddha" comme l'appelle le Vinaya des Mahāsāṃghika, ne fût venu saluer respectueusement les pieds du Bouddha.¹ C'est un épisode commun à toutes les traditions, Mūlasarvāstivādin, Sthavira (pāli), Mahāsāṃghika. A la quatrième ligne, l'épithète *munīndraśāsanadharah* que Fleet traduit: "he who observed the precepts of (Buddha) the chief of saints" a certainement une valeur mieux définie. L'adjectif *dhara*, combiné avec les noms qui désignent les parties intégrantes du Canon, indique une compétence spéciale dans telle ou telle branche: on est Vinayadhara si on possède à fond le Vinaya, Mātikā (Māṭrīkā) dhara si on connaît les rubriques de l'Abhidharma, Dhamma (Dharma) dhara, si on est versé dans l'ensemble. Mais Mahākāśyapa dispose d'une connaissance

¹ Cf. Przyluski, le Parinirvāṇa et les Funérailles du Buddha, dans Journ. Asiat. 1920, I, 19-20.

incomparable: il connaît tous les textes sacrés, et c'est à ce titre qu'il est désigné à l'unanimité pour présider le concile qui fixe pour la première fois le Canon. L'épithète de *Śāsanadharah* rappelle expressément cet honneur privilégié qui est échu à Mahākāśyapa.

La seconde ligne fait allusion à un incident qui n'a pas échappé à Fleet, quoique le passage, il l'avoue, lui paraisse obscur. Fleet rappelle en note, *ad locum*, que "le Buddha, sur le point d'atteindre le Nirvāṇa, a remis à Mahākāśyapa sa robe jaune (kāśāya), en le chargeant de la transmettre à Maitreya, quand celui-ci atteindrait la condition de Bouddha," et il renvoie à la traduction de Hiuan-tsang par Beal.¹ L'étude des légendes du Bouddha Maitreya a fait de notables progrès depuis la publication des Gupta Inscriptions. Mr. Matsumoto Bunzaburo a publié en 1911 une remarquable monographie sur la Terre Pure de Maitreya (*Miroku jodo ron*) qui a été savamment analysée, discutée et complétée par Noël Péri dans le Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient, tome XI, 1911, pp. 439-457. M. Przyluski a réuni divers textes sur le Nirvāṇa de Mahākāśyapa dans un article sur "le Nord-Ouest de l'Inde dans le Vinaya des Mūla Sarvāstivādin, Jour. Asiat. 1914, II, 522 sqq. M. Ernest Leumann a publié une longue étude sur un ouvrage rédigé en Asie Centrale, "Maitreyasamiti, das Zukunftsideal der Buddhisten," 1919, 2 fasc.; dans l'introduction il a résumé les principaux textes de la littérature maitréyenne du Canon chinois, p. 11-23. M. P. Demiéville, en rendant compte de ce travail dans le Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient, tome XX, pp. 158-170, a lui-même apporté de nouveaux documents. Un autre ouvrage originaire de l'Asie Centrale, le *Maitreyasamiti-nāṭaka*, connu par des fragments découverts à Tourfan, a suscité plusieurs travaux dus à MM. Sieg et Siegling et à M. F. W. K. Müller, et publiés dans les Comptes-rendus de l'Académie de Berlin, 1908 et suiv.

Si nous acceptons la traduction de Fleet pour la seconde ligne de la strophe, il est juste de nous demander comment "la merveilleuse subjugation des passions (de Mahākāśyapa) dans l'émancipation finale (doit être) étalée dans les mains de Maitreya." Le geste de Mahākāśyapa remettant au nouveau Bouddha la robe de son prédécesseur Śākyamuni, ne suffirait pas à "manifester cette merveilleuse subjugation." D'ailleurs, un détail de philologie nous avertit ici d'une erreur probable. Le mot *vyākṛtā a*, comme toutes les formations tirées du verbe *vyākar*, une valeur spéciale et bien définie dans la langue du bouddhisme; il s'agit toujours en ces cas de prophéties dues au Bouddha, et qui révèlent l'avenir d'un individu, d'une localité etc.

¹ Buddh. Rec. West. World, II, 142 sqq.

La carrière de Maitreya, y compris sa visite à Mahākāśyapa, est toujours énoncée, puisqu'elle appartient à l'avenir, sous la forme d'une prédiction communiquée par Śākyamuni à ses disciples. Il n'est donc point douteux que, dans le passage en question, *vyākṛta* doit recevoir son sens spécifique "prédit"; on aurait alors pour la ligne entière: "Dans la main de Maitreya, la subjugation des passions (de Mahākāśyapa) dans l'émancipation finale a été prédite (par le Bouddha)." La traduction obtenue est absurde et s'élimine d'elle-même.

Arriverons-nous à un sens meilleur par la voie de l'expression *vimuktivāśitā*. La *vaśitā* est la maîtrise absolue exercée par le saint, Arhat ou Bodhisattva selon les Véhicules, sur des catégories déterminées de domaines. La Mahāvyutpatti (XXVII) donne une liste des 10 *vaśitā* des Bodhisattva; la *vimuktivāśitā* n'y figure pas, mais on y relève un mot très analogue à *vimukti*, l'*adhimukti* qui constitue la sixième des dix *vaśitā*. Sommes-nous en présence d'une alternance de termes? Un passage curieux de l'Abhidharmakośa, maintenant ouvert à la curiosité des chercheurs par le labeur intrépide de M. de Lavallée-Poussin, semble le suggérer. Au livre VII, 52 Vasubandhu institue précisément une discussion sur le cas de la survie de Mahākāśyapa; il vient d'examiner les conditions d'existence des êtres suscités par magie (*nirmita*); ils durent grâce à l'*adhiṣṭhāna* de celui qui les a créés. M. de Lavallée adopte le mot "protection" pour traduire *adhiṣṭhāna*; je cite sa traduction, p. 120: "Ce n'est pas seulement pour la durée de sa propre vie que le créateur est capable de 'protéger' une chose de telle manière qu'elle dure; sa 'protection' peut faire aussi que la chose dure jusqu'après sa mort. C'est ainsi que par sa protection (*adhiṣṭhāna* ou *adhimokṣa*, résolution) Kāśyapa le Grand a fait que ses os dureront jusqu'à l'avénement du Bhagavat Maitreya. Non pas à l'endroit de ce qui n'est pas dur. C'est seulement la chose dure qui est susceptible d'être 'protégée' pour une longue durée. C'est pourquoi Kāśyapa le Grand ne 'protège' pas sa chair. D'autres maîtres disent: Non. — Le corps protégé par la force de la 'résolution' (*adhimokṣa*) n'est pas capable de durer au-delà de la mort. Si les os de Kāśyapa durent, c'est par la 'protection' (*adhiṣṭhāna*) des dieux."

L'alternance *adhiṣṭhāna-adhimokṣa*, indiquée par M. de Lavallée sans autre explication, est fondée en fait sur la Vyākhyā de Yaśomitra encore inédite pour cette partie du texte. Mon manuscrit lit (p. 272b): *āryamahākāśyapādhiṣṭhāneneti. āryamahākāśyapādhimokṣenety arthaḥ.* Ainsi c'est la vertu de l'*adhimokṣa* de Mahākāśyapa qui fait durer ses os, et ses os seulement sans la chair. M. de Lavallée, si familier avec l'ensemble de la littérature bouddhique, n'a pas manqué de citer en

note sur ce passage une ligne du Divyāvadāna, 61: *Maitreyah. . . Kāśyapasya bhikṣor avikopitam asti hisaṃghātām dakṣinena pāñinā grhītvā. . .* "Maitreya, prenant dans sa main droite l'assemblage des ossements du bhikṣu Mahākāśyapa qui n'avaient pas bougé. . ." Ce détail saisissant coincide de manière frappante avec les termes de notre strophe: "En ce qui concerne la main de Maitreya, la maîtrise absolue de survie (de Mahākāśyapa) a été prédicta (par Śākyamuni)." Le passage fait partie, dans le Divya, du Maitreyāvadāna; en réalité, ce récit prophétique de la carrière de Maitreya a été découpé dans le Vinaya des MūlaSarvāstivādin; il y est inséré dans l'Oṣadhibhāṣṭi, Chap. VI de la version chinoise:¹ Maitreya, arrivé à la Bodhi complète, entouré d'une foule de disciples, se rendra au mont Gurupāda, où la masse des ossements de (Mahā) kāśyapa le bhikṣu reste sans bouger; la montagne s'ouvrira pour Maitreya; alors Maitreya prendra dans sa main droite l'assemblage des ossements du bhikṣu Kāśyapa qui n'ont pas bougé, il les posera sur sa main gauche, et c'est ainsi qu'il enseignera la Loi."

La coïncidence de l'inscription avec le Vinaya des MūlaSarvāstivādin est frappante; elle l'est davantage encore quand on constate que dans la littérature maitréyenne, pourtant abondante, le détail ne reparaît nulle part ailleurs. Dans un certain nombre de récits, Mahākāśyapa tiré de son recueillement par l'arrivée de Maitreya, lui remet le vêtement (*samghātī*) du Bouddha que le Maître lui avait donné pour le passer à son successeur;² l'épisode manque dans la version abrégée mise aussi sous le nom de Kumārajīva;³ il manque aussi à la rédaction versifiée traduite par Yi-tsing (et dont j'ai retrouvé l'original sanscrit: *Maitreya-vyākaraṇa*);⁴ dans le Koan Mi-le p'ou sa hia cheng king, traduit par Tchou Fa-hou⁵ Maitreya, parvenu en présence des restes de Mahākāśyapa, prend lui-même la *samghātī* que celui-ci avait reçue du Bouddha; le Vinaya des MūlaSarvāstivādin enregistre aussi cette forme de la légende dans la section du Kṣudrakavastu, chap. 40; Tok. XVII, 2, 94a col. 3; M. Przyluski a traduit ce morceau du Vinaya dans le Journal Asiatique, 1914, II, 527; c'est aussi cette forme qui a été incorporée dans l'Aśokāvadāna; v. Przyluski, La Légende de l'Empereur Asoka, p. 334.

¹ Tok. XVII, 4, 21b, col. 5; texte tibétain dans le Dulva, vol. II.

² Mi-le ta tch'eng fo king, trad. Kumārajīva Nj. 209; Tok. IV, 546b, col. 3.

³ Mi-le hia cheng king, Nj. 205; Tok. XXV, 9, 31b, col. 6.

⁴ Mi-le hia cheng tch'eng fo king, Nj. 207; Tok. IV, 5, 50-51.

⁵ Nj. 208; Tok. IV, 5, 48b, col. 12 = Tseng-yi A-han (Ekottarāgama) chap. 44; Nj. 543; Tok. XII, 3, 34b, col. 16.

Les deux formes de la légende se ramènent peut-être à la confusion, accidentelle ou volontaire, de deux mots très voisins: dans un cas, il s'agit de la *saṃghāṭī*, la robe (du Bouddha); dans l'autre, il s'agit d'un *saṃghāṭa*, ou plutôt d'un *saṃghāṭa*, un assemblage (d'ossements) ou une charpente (d'ossements); le texte du *Divya* donne *saṃghāṭa*, mais *saṃghāṭa* ne serait pas moins correct, et le pāli dans l'expression *atthi-saṃghāṭa* a normalement la cérébrale. J'ai déjà signalé, et aussi dans le *Divyāvadāna*, et dans un morceau qu'il a également emprunté au *Vinaya* des *MūlaSarvāstivādin*, une confusion analogue¹ dans l'énoncé du 82^e *sikṣāpada*, l'expression *anīrgatāyām rajanyām* correspondant à *anikkhantarājake* du *pācittiya* 83 dans le *Vinaya pali*; *rajanī* "la nuit" a remplacé *rājaka* "la personne royale."²

J'ai admis jusqu'ici la substitution du mot *adhimukti* au mot *vimukti* dans le texte de l'inscription. La lecture donnée par Fleet est cependant exacte. Mais la lettre *v* ne se distingue de la lettre *dh*, dans l'écriture des *Gupta*, que par un petit trait horizontal tracé au sommet de la panse commune aux deux caractères. Une confusion, du fait du scribe ou du graveur, est toujours possible. L'*a* initial du mot *adhimukti* doit s'élier après la finale du mot *kare*. Mais même si on écarte cette correction, l'alternance *vimukti-adhimukti* peut se justifier par de nombreux textes. *Vasubandhu* lui-même se sert de l'un des termes pour définir l'autre.³ La *vimukti* "délivrance" est de deux sortes, composée ou simple. L'*adhimokṣa* est la *vimukti* "composée," et la *Vyākhyā* de *Yaśomitra* glose: *adhimokṣaḥ saṃskṛtā vimuktir iti dhātvarthaikatvāt* "parce que la racine (*muc*) a le même sens (dans les deux mots)." La *Vibhāṣā*, dans un passage cité par *Lavallée Poussin*, porte:⁴ "Le *Bhadanta* dit que les *vimokṣa* sont ainsi nommés parce qu'ils sont obtenus par la force de l'*adhimokṣa*." Ailleurs encore,⁵ *Lavallée Poussin* cite *Samghabhadra*, pour l'explication du mot *adhimukti*: "D'après d'autres maîtres, *adhi* signifie" supériorité, souveraineté, "mukti signifie *vimokṣa*." Il serait oiseux de multiplier ces témoignages.

Qu'est-ce donc que l'*adhimukti* ou *adhimokṣa*? M. de *Lavallée Poussin* a réuni et discuté plusieurs définitions tirées des traductions chinoises; mais nous avons maintenant l'avantage de pouvoir utiliser dans son original une définition donnée par *Vasubandhu* lui-même, et

¹ *Makandikāv.*, p. 543 *sq.*

² *Kuchean Fragments*, p. 361, dans R. Hoernle; *Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature found in Eastern Turkestan*.


³ *Abhidharmakośa VI*, 76ab.

⁴ *Ibid.*, VIII, 32d, p. 207.

⁵ *Ad II*, 24, p. 155.

dans l'ouvrage classique qui passe pour couronner sa carrière. La vṛtti sur la kārikā 10 de la Trimśikā dit: *adhimokṣo niścīte vastuni tathaivāvadhāranam. niścītagrahaṇam anīścītāpratiṣedhārtham. yuktita āptopadeśato vā yad vastu asamdigdham tan niścītām yenaivākāreṇa tan niścītām ity aduhkhādyākāreṇa tenaivākāreṇa tasya vastunaś cetasy abhiniveśanam evam etan nānyathety avadhāraṇam adhimokṣaḥ. sa cāsaṁhāryatādānakarmakaḥ. adhimuktipradhāno hi svasiddhāntāt para-pravādibhir apahartum na śakyate.* “*Adhimokṣa*, c'est à propos d'un objet décidé, l'affirmation qu'il est exactement ainsi. Il dit ‘décidé’ pour éliminer tout ce qui n'est pas décidé. Décidé veut dire un objet qui est hors de doute en vertu d'un raisonnement ou en vertu d'une autorité compétente. De quelque nature que cet objet ait été décidé, par exemple exempt de douleur etc. . . , la certitude ancrée dans l'esprit que cet objet est précisément de cette nature-là, c'est l'*adhimokṣa*. Il a pour effet de donner l'inébranlabilité. Celui chez qui l'*adhimukti* domine ne peut pas être détaché de sa doctrine par les champions d'autres doctrines.” Yaśomitra, dans sa Vyākhyā sur le Kośa II, 24, p. 154, rapporte d'autres définitions qui ne s'écartent pas sensiblement de celle-ci. *Adhimokṣa* est donc la “conviction.” Un exemple frappant de ce qu'est l'*adhimokṣa* est fourni par le Samyuttanikāya I, 116:¹ *ākankhamāno ca pana bhante Bhagavā Himavantam pabbatarājām suvannām ty eva adhimucceyya, suvannāñ ca pan' assā ti.* ‘Bhagavat, pour quelque fin, était convaincu que l'Himavat est en or, la montagne serait en or.’ Et de même Kathāvatthu II, 608: *āyasmā Pilindavaccho rañño Māgadhassa Seniyassa Bimbisārassa pāsādām suvannāñ teva adhimucci suvanno ca pana āsi.* ‘L'āyasmā Pilindavaccha eut la conviction que le palais du roi de Magadha, Seniya Bimbisāra, était en or, et le palais fut en or.’ La conviction d'un saint ne saurait être fausse, et c'est ainsi que Mahākāśyapa s'étant convaincu qu'il devait attendre l'arrivée du futur Bouddha avant d'entrer dans le Nirvāna, ses ossements se sont maintenus intacts (*avikopita*). La première épithète de Mahākāśyapa va maintenant à son tour se préciser: *nairodhīn śubhabhāvanām anusṛtaḥ*. Fleet traduisait: “who practised that auspicious habit of abstract meditation which is of the nature of a trance.” Mais chacun da ces termes a sa valeur technique. *Nairodhīm* est un adjectif dérivé de *nirodha*; le *nirodha*, c'est le “barrage” de l'intellect et des dharma de l'ordre de l'intellect (*cittacaittā-nām nirodhah*). L'exercice spirituel (*bhāvanā*) de l'ordre du *nirodha*,

¹ Samyuktāgama, Tok. VIII, 4, 28, col. 1; cf. aussi Mahāyānasūtrālāmikāra XVIII, 83.

c'est la *nirodhasamāpatti*, état analogue au Nirvāṇa (*nirvāṇasadr̄śa*),¹ mais qui s'en différencie parce qu'il est susceptible de rechute; la conscience verbale (*saṃjñā*) et la conscience de sensation (*vedanā*) ont alors disparu. Il constitue le dernier terme de la chaîne des *vimokṣa* qui sont au nombre de huit;² et l'exercice des *vimokṣa* a pour fruit, entre autres, "le pouvoir par lequel un saint transforme ou fait durer (*adhiṣṭhāna*)";³ Yaśomitra, dans son commentaire sur ce passage, introduit le terme *adhimokṣa* cette fois encore pour glosser le mot *adhiṣṭhāna* du texte: *tathādhimokṣād adhiṣṭhānam sthirasya vastunah iyantam kālam avatiṣṭhatām iti.*; ainsi la *nairodhī bhāvanā* de Mahākāśyapa précède en fait, comme dans la strophe, sa *vimuktivāśitā* (*adhimō*). Qu'il s'agisse, dans le cas particulier de Mahākāśyapa, de la *nirodhasamāpatti*, c'est ce qui est prouvé par le texte du Maitreyavyākaraṇa traduit par Kumārajīva.⁴ A l'arrivée de Maitreya dans sa grotte, Mahākāśyapa sort  "de la méditation de totale extinction"; c'est là exactement la traduction consacrée du terme *nirodhasamāpatti*.⁵ Le terme *śubhabhāvanā*, employé *metri causa*, est une périphrase exacte de *saṃāpatti*, car *bhāvanā* est expliqué par Vasubandhu comme *saṃāhilaṁ kuśalam*⁶ "le bien à l'état de recueillement"; chacun de ces deux termes est un équivalent assez exact de chacun des deux termes: *śubhabhāvanā*. Il n'est pas jusqu'au mot *anusr̄taḥ* d'apparence assez anodine pourtant, qui ne semble exprimer une notion d'ordre technique. Un adjectif dérivé du verbe *anusarō* se combine avec *śraddhā* et *dharma* pour désigner les deux premiers degrés de la sainteté *śraddhānusārin* et *dharmaṇusārin*:⁷ le stade suivant est le *śraddhādhimukta*, puis vient le *dṛṣṭiprāpti*, et ensuite le *kāyasākṣin* lequel a réalisé la *nirodhasamāpatti*. On voit clairement que la suite des épithètes s'enchaîne dans une relation de causalité conforme aux exigences de la théorie ascolastique.

Le reste de l'inscription est essentiellement narratif; je ne retiendrai que le premier mot, mis en tête de la strophe qui suit l'invocation à Mahākāśyapa. Les disciples de ce saint y reçoivent l'épithète de *Samyuktāgaminah*. Fleet traduit "endowed with a connected tradition of doctrine." Le sens attribué à *saṃyukta* par Fleet est pour le moins douteux. Mais *Samyuktāgamin* ne peut manquer, dans un texte d'inspiration bouddhique, d'évoquer le nom sacré du Samyuktā-

¹ Abhidh. Kośa II, 44d.

⁴ Nj. 207; Tok. IV, 5, 46b.

² Abh. Kośa VIII, 33.

⁵ Cf. p. ex. Mahāvyutpatti CIV, 67.


³ Abh. Kośa VIII, 34.

⁶ Kośa, IV, 123 c. d.

⁷ Abh. Kośa VI, 29 et 62-63.

gama correspondant au *Samyutta nikāya* du pali, un des quatre *Agama* (en pali *Nikāya*) qui constituent les plus anciens recueils de *sūtra*. Ainsi les disciples de *Mahākāsyapa* établis à Ceylan se réclament du *Samyuktāgama*; le trait n'est pas assez caractéristique pour préciser leur école; les *Mahāsāmghika*, les *Sarvāstivādin*, les *MūlaSarvāstivādin* sont d'accord pour placer en tête des *Āgama* le *Samyukta*, que les *Sthavira* classent seulement en troisième ligne. Il y a là toutefois un indice de plus pour nous empêcher de ranger sommairement *Mahānāman* parmi les *Theravādin*, Ceylan, nous le savons par plus d'un témoignage, était loin d'être le domaine de cette école exclusivement dans les premiers siècles de l'ère. Au reste, la question de l'Āmradvīpa où *Mahānāman* est installé en résidence (*adhivāsin*) est loin d'être résolue. Fleet avait admis sur la foi d'une communication de Cunningham que "le nom d'Ile de la Mangue est un autre nom de Ceylan, qui aurait été désignée ainsi à cause de sa forme semblable au fruit du mangueur." J'ignore s'il s'agit là d'une fantaisie personnelle de Cunningham; je n'ai jamais rencontré cette désignation d'Āmradvīpa dans aucun texte pali ou sanscrit. Mais je ne puis m'empêcher d'observer que si on admet ce sens pour ce passage, l'épithète *Lankādīpī-prasutah* "originaire de l'île de *Laṅkā*" paraît tout à fait oiseuse. Mais je ne veux pas m'engager ici dans cette discussion d'ordre géographique. Je me suis proposé seulement de montrer, par un exemple choisi, à quel point l'épigraphie bouddhique est inséparable de l'étude des textes, quelle lumière elle peut en recevoir et aussi leur apporter. Je suis heureux de dédier cette tentative à mon très cher ami Ch. R. Lanman à qui l'indianisme et les indianistes doivent tant d'obligations, le maître de Henry Clarke Warren, l'éditeur de cette magnifique Harvard Oriental Series qui a débuté par la *Jātakamālā* de Kern et qui vient encore de nous donner en trois beaux volumes la traduction du commentaire du *Dhammapada* par E. W. Burlingame.

COLLÈGE DE FRANCE.



THE DATE OF THE ĀMOHINI VOTIVE TABLET OF MATHURĀ

By EDWARD JAMES RAPSON

IN MY chapter on the "Scythian and Parthian Invaders" in the *Cambridge History of India* (Vol. I, pp. 563-585), I accepted without hesitation "year 42" as the correct reading of the date in the Āmohini votive tablet, which was inscribed while the Çaka ruler Çodāsa was governing Mathurā as Great Satrap; and I noted (page 576, note 1) that Bühler also had originally been inclined to read the decimal figure as 40,¹ but had subsequently changed his opinion and preferred to regard this symbol as representing 70.² From a careful examination of the photo-lithograph which illustrates Bühler's edition of the inscription in *Epigraphia Indica* (Vol. II), I was convinced, as I am still convinced, that Bühler's first reading was correct, and that the sign in question should be read as 40.

Professor Sten Konow in his article on the Takht-i-Bāhi inscription³ says: "Professor Rapson has evidently overlooked the important article by Professor Lüders, *Ep. Ind.*, IX, pp. 243 ff., where it has been conclusively proved that the numerical symbol used in the inscription stands for 70 and not for 40."

It was evidently undesirable in a work like the *Cambridge History of India* to discuss minute points of scholarship; and I contented myself, therefore, with an expression of my own opinion and that of the editor of the inscription concerning this much debated point. But the views of a distinguished epigraphist like Professor Lüders deserve serious consideration; and I am glad of an opportunity of explaining why in this particular instance I feel unable to agree with him.

I have now most carefully studied the article of Professor Lüders, with the result that, while admiring the accurate and scholarly manner in which he has collected and arranged all the relevant evidence, I cannot accept the conclusion which he draws from this evidence.

The Brāhmi numerals for 40 and 70 which occur in the inscriptions of the Çakas and the Kuṣāṇas either very closely resemble the Brāhmi *akṣaras* ፪ = *pta* and ፫ = *pū*, or they are conventionalized (cursive) forms which are manifestly derived from them. The *akṣaras* them-

¹ *Epigraphia Indica*, ii, 199.

² *Ibid.*, iv, 55.

³ *Acta Orientalia*, iii, 57, n. 1.

selves agree in their upper portions (= *pa*); but they are so very different in their lower portions, that it would be surprising to find precisely similar forms derived from each.

Böhler, to whose great work, *Indische Palaeographie*, we all owe so much, seems to have overlooked this necessary consequence of his statements on page 76: “40 = *pta* . . . der mitunter cursiv in ein Kreuz . . . verwandelt wird”;¹ and on page 77: “70 = *pū* . . . neben dem cursiven Kreuz.”² The two cursive forms here cited are, as represented in the Plate, practically identical. Each is what Professor Lüders very conveniently calls “a St. Andrew’s cross.” It is difficult to believe that there can have been in use in the same script and at the same period forms for 40 and 70 which were so similar as to be almost indistinguishable.

Professor Lüders, limiting his observations to those Brāhmī inscriptions which come from the neighborhood of Mathurā says (page 244): “There are two symbols, the St. Andrew’s cross and the *pta*, one of which must represent 70 and the other 40.” But surely this does not follow as a necessary consequence. It is at least possible that the St. Andrew’s cross may be, as I suppose it to be, merely a cursive form of the *pta*.

As a record of the history of Brāhmī numerals the coins of the Western Kṣatrapas are most instructive. They supply us with a remarkably continuous sequence of dates ranging from 1[oo] to 31[x]. On them we have numerous examples of the numeral 40 during the decades 140–149 and 240–249, and of the numeral 70 during the decades 170–179 and 270–279;³ and there is never any possibility of confusion between the two symbols, as the dates of the rulers who struck the coins are well known. In my volume of the British Museum Catalogue of Indian Coins, *Andhra Dynasty*, I give the normal form for 40 as  and the normal form for 70 as  (Introduction, page ccviii). It is evident that the 40 still resembles  = *pta*; and it is evident also that, if the two constituent elements of this or any other form of *pta* the *pa* and the *ha*, were made more angular, a figure resembling a St. Andrew’s cross would be the result. In the 70, on the other hand, while the *pa* of the  = *pū* remains recognizable, the bend of the stem to the left and the horizontal stroke to the right, which together represent *ū*, have become a loop. And this loop on the coins is characteristic of

¹ Taf. ix, Col. v, A.

² *Ibid.*, Col. vii.

³ British Museum Catalogue of Indian Coins: *Coins of the Andhra Dynasty, the Western Kṣatrapas, etc.*, Plates XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVII.

70. It never appears in 40 or in any other numeral except 70; and on well struck coins it is never wanting in 70.

It is quite certain, then, that the St. Andrew's cross is never used to represent 70 on the coins. What evidence is there to prove that it is sometimes so used in inscriptions?

After examining minutely the instances quoted by Professor Lüders in support of his view, so far as they can be tested by the photo-lithographs given in the *Epigraphia Indica*, I am persuaded that there is no certain evidence.

Professor Lüders relies, in the first place, on the "Mathurā Stone Inscription, dated Samvat 74" which he edited in *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. IX, pp. 241 ff. In note 5 of his remarks on the text he observes (page 242):

"Owing to a flaw in the stone, a small portion of the lower left cross-bar of the symbol has disappeared. In the impression somebody has tried to restore the missing portion by adding in pencil a hook turning upwards; but there is nothing to warrant this restoration. There can be no doubt that the symbol had the shape of a plain St. Andrew's cross, just as in the other inscriptions."

The photo-lithograph "from a damaged rubbing" unquestionably shows either that there is a break in the stone, or that the rubbing has failed, on the lower left of the decimal figure in the date, and that someone in attempting to fill the lacuna has traced a portion of the curve which, if continued, would make a loop such as is characteristic of the numeral 70 on the coins. But is it certain, as Professor Lüders seems to assume, that the restorer, whoever he may have been, had no authority for his restoration? Is it not more probable that he felt justified by traces visible on the stone but not reproduced in the rubbing? Unfortunately it appears not to be possible at the present time to decide this point from an inspection of the actual inscription.

The date of the inscription must undoubtedly, as Professor Lüders rightly points out (page 244), be Samvat 74, since the name of the king begins with Vāsu—, and any date including the decimal 40 would fall in the reign of Huviska; but I cannot agree that he has "conclusively proved" that 70 is here represented by the St. Andrew's cross. To me it seems more reasonable to regard the sign as a mutilated specimen of the looped form which is seen very distinctly in the "Mathurā Inscription of Samvat 79,"¹ and which is essentially identical with the undoubted form for 70 found on the coins of the Western Kṣatrapas.

¹ *Ep. Ind.*, vol. ii, p. 204, no. 20 and Plate; Professor Lüders (p. 245) reads the decimal figure as 40; but I think the evidence of the coins is quite decisive on this point.

Professor Lüders quotes seven inscriptions from Mathurā or its neighborhood, in all of which he proposes to regard the St. Andrew's cross as representing 70, and not 40 as had been supposed previously by himself and other scholars. There is, so far as I can judge, no internal evidence in any of these which will enable us to determine this question beyond possibility of doubt. But, as Professor Lüders himself observes (page 245), one of the inscriptions (his number 4) "mentions the *mahārāja rājātirāja devaputra Hūviṣka*, but not in connection with the date, the inscription simply recording a gift to the *vihāra* of that king." Evidently this affords no proof, but there is, I think, some probability that the donation recorded may have been made to a *vihāra* recently founded by the reigning sovereign. To this extent, even in the absence of other considerations which I consider to be far more cogent, I should rather prefer the reading 40 which would give a date in the reign of Hūviṣka.

On the whole, therefore, I consider that the case for 70, though pleaded with great learning and much ingenuity, has failed; while I think that the forms for 40 and 70 on the coins of the Western Kṣatrapas afford a safe criterion by which we may distinguish these numerals in the inscriptions. The St. Andrew's cross is easily and naturally explained as a cursive form of 40, that is, of ፲ = *pta*, or of its modification, ፳ , which appears on the coins. I find it hard to believe that it can possibly be a cursive form of 70, when it lacks all traces of the stem bending to the left with its horizontal stroke on the right which are the distinguishing features of the ፳ = *pū*, or of the loop at the base which has taken their place in its numismatic representative ፳ .

Accordingly my faith in the correctness of the reading "year 42" = B.C. 17-16 on the Āmohini inscription is still unshaken. Much of the perplexity which scholars have found in their attempts to arrange the chronology of the Çakas and the Kusāṇas seems to me to be due to the belief caused by the reading "year 72," that the Great Satrap Çodāsa ruled thirty years later, that is to say, so late as the second decade of the first century A.D.

REMARKS ON A KHAROṢTHĪ INSCRIPTION FROM THE KURRAM VALLEY

By STEN KONOW

IN the Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India 1917–18, pp. 31 f., we read: “The only epigraphical discovery made in the Frontier Circle was an inscribed copper relic casket, the property of one of the sons of the Nawab of Landi. It is stated to have come from the Kurram valley and is shaped like a miniature *stūpa* with *harmikā* and umbrellas, all complete. The inscription consists of four lines in the Kharoṣthī script of the second century A.D., punctured on the four sides of the base of the casket, and is dated on the 20th day of the month of Āśvina, the year being doubtful. In the opinion of Mr. V. Natiā Aiyar, Archaeological Superintendent, Frontier Circle, the record refers to the enshrinement of relics of the Buddha Sākyamuni in a monument belonging to the Sarvāstivādins.”¹

During my stay in Peshawar in March, 1925, I examined the photographs of the casket in the museum, which were quite sufficient for determining the reading of the greater portion of the record. Some few passages were, however, illegible, and as the record seemed to be of some importance, I called on the owner, the Arbab Muhammed Abas Khan, who kindly allowed me to take the inscribed portion of the casket to Taxila in order to get it reproduced. In Taxila I showed the inscription to my friend Sir John Marshall, and we both went through it together and checked my provisional reading.

There are, as has already been stated, four inscribed sides, which I designate as A, B, C, D, respectively. A and D each contains four, B and C each three lines of Kharoṣthī letters, executed by means of punctured dots, as in several other inscriptions of the Indo-Skythian period. The arrangement of the epigraph is such that l. 1 of A is followed by l. 1 of B, and so on. From Dⁱ we have to turn to Aⁱⁱ, and thence we proceed on till Dⁱⁱⁱ, after which comes D^{iv} (and finally A^{iv}).

The beginning of Aⁱ is defaced, but Sir John agrees with me that there cannot be any doubt about the actual reading. There is a hole in the casket at the beginning of Cⁱ, where three or four *akṣaras* have been lost. In other respects the inscription is in an excellent state of preservation.

¹ Cf. Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey, Frontier Circle, 1917–18, p. 2, and N. G. Majumdar's List of Kharoṣthī Inscriptions, No. 26, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, N. S., xx, 10.

The characters are *Kharoṣṭhī* of the *Kaniṣka* period, and only the shape of the letters and their transliteration necessitate some few remarks. I have explained elsewhere why I render the sign which is usually considered to be the common *Kharoṣṭhī* sign of the aspirated voiceless palatal as *kṣ* and not as *ch*. In the first place it only occurs where the corresponding Sanskrit word presents *kṣ*, and in the second place another *Kharoṣṭhī* letter is used where we have to do with an old or derived *ch*. I do not suppose that any epigraphist would think it likely that we should have two letters for one and the same sound, and since an examination of all the passages where the two signs occur in Indo-Skythian inscriptions and in the *Kharoṣṭhī* manuscript of the *Dhammapada*¹ shows that they are always correctly distinguished, we have no right to transliterate both in the same way. I look on such words in which the letter corresponding to Sanskrit *kṣ* occurs as Sanskritisms, that is, as loan-words. For it seems to me that the regular development in the North-Western *Prakrit* was from *kṣ* to *kh*.²

A peculiarity of the *Landi* record is a slanting vertical above the letter *k* in *samkara* Bⁱⁱ, *kanḍhasa* Dⁱⁱⁱ. In both cases *k* is derived from *sk*, cf. Skr. *samskāra* and *skandha* respectively. We have very unsatisfactory material for judging about the treatment of the compounds containing a *k* preceded by a sibilant in the old North-Western *Prakrit*. The *Dhammapada* manuscript has *sakhaca*, Skr.* *satskrtya*, O 3; *kanhaṇa*, Skr. *skandhānām*, B 13; *puṣkara*, O 21; *nīkhamadha*, Skr. *niṣkrāmata*, Aⁱⁱ 4; *nskhama*, Skr. *naiṣkramya*, B 25. In the inscriptions we have, if we abstract from foreign names such as *Kaneṣkasa* in the *Māṇikyāla*, *Kaniskasa* in the *Zeda*, [*Ka*]neṣkasa in the *Kaniska* casket, *Kaneṣkasya* in the *Sue Vihār* and *Hoveṣkasya* in the *Wardak* vase epigraphs, *perkarī* in the *Pathyār* and *Jukarāṇī* in the *Kaldarra* records. *Kadhavaro* on the *Mathurā* Lion Capital is uncertain, because we do not know whether this word represents a Skr. *skandhāvāra* or, as suggested by Professor Lüders, contains the noun *kantha*, town. We get the impression that a sibilant tends to aspirate as following *k*, but that this aspiration is so little pronounced that it is frequently left unmarked. I would therefore transliterate the vertical as *h* within

¹ I quote this important text after the edition of M. Senart, *Journal Asiatique*, xi, xii, 1898, 192 ff., marking as O the fragment published by S. Oldenburg, St. Petersburg, 1897.

² Cf. from the *Dhammapada* manuscript *bhikhu*, Skr. *bhikṣu*, B9, &c.; *pradimukhe*, Skr. *prātimokṣe*, B 17; *cakhuma*, Skr. *cakṣusmat*, Aⁱⁱⁱ 4. In face of suchforms I think that we must consider *bhikṣave*, B 53; *bhikṣari* Aⁱⁱ 5; *ksaya* Aⁱ 3; *cakṣuma*, Aⁱⁱⁱ 3; *ksiravayo*, Skr. *kṣirapāka*, B 54, as foreign loans and transliterate the letter in question as *kṣ* and not as *ch*. In ordinary speech *kh* was probably substituted.

parentheses and see in this sign the mark of a slight aspiration. In favour of this transliteration I may add that a similar vertical apparently marks an aspiration also in other cases.

The sign which is usually transliterated as *f* in *Gudufara* in the so-called Takht-i-Bahi inscription and elsewhere consists of an ordinary *v* with a slanting vertical attached at the upper end to the right, and Professor Lüders was probably right in suggesting¹ that it be transliterated as *vh*. The consonantal compound which is usually transliterated as *st* has a vertical rising from the cross-bar in the Hidda inscription and in some instances in the Central Asian Kharosthī records, where Messrs. Boyer, Rapson and Senart transliterate *sth*.

I therefore provisionally transliterate *samk(h)ara*, *k(h)aṁdhasa*, respectively, but I willingly admit that this rendering is far from being certain.

A similar remark holds good with reference to the curved line found above *s* in *tasa* Aⁱⁱⁱ. A similar curve is not infrequently used in the Dhammapada manuscript, where old *dhy* is, to take an instance, sometimes represented by *jh*, sometimes by *j* and sometimes by *j* with a curved line above; thus *padivijhu*, Skr. *pratividhya*, B 29; *jai*, Skr. *dhyāya*, B 4, 34; *jaṇa*, with the curve above *j*, Skr. *dhyāna*, B 16. It seems probable that the curve marks a slightly pronounced aspiration, and I therefore transliterate the word in Aⁱⁱⁱ *taṣ(h)a*, supposing it to have been spoken with a slightly aspirated *ṣ*.

The reading of the inscription does not present great difficulties. It runs as follows:

- Aⁱ [Saṁ 20 masa]sa Avadunakasa di 20 iśa kṣunammi
- Bⁱ Śvedavarma Yaśaputra tanuayaṁmi rañña mi-
- Cⁱ . . . mi acaryana Sarvastivadana pari-
- Dⁱ grahaṁmi thubammi bhagravatasa Śakyamunisa
- Aⁱⁱ śarira pradīthavedi yatha uta bhagravata
- Bⁱⁱ avijapracagra saṁk(h)ara saṁk(h)arapracagra viñana
- Cⁱⁱ viñanapracagra namaruva namaruva pracagra ṣadaya-
- Dⁱⁱ [dana] ṣadayanapracagra phaṣa p[ḥ]aṣapracagra
- Aⁱⁱⁱ vedana vedanapracagra taṣ(h)a taṣ(h)apracagra uvadana
- Bⁱⁱⁱ uvadanapracagra bhava bhavapracagra jadi jadipracagra
- Cⁱⁱⁱ jaramaranaśograparidevadukhadormanastauvagrasa
- Dⁱⁱⁱ evam asa kevalasa dukkak(h)amdhasa samudas bhavati
- D^{iv} sarvasatvana puyas aya ca paticasamupada
- A^{iv} likhida Mahiphatiena sarvasatvana puyas.

¹ JRAS., 1909, pp. 655 ff.

It will be seen that no cerebral *ṇ* is used in the record, and further that the penultimate in the locative termination *ami* is always followed by an *anusvāra*. Thus *kṣunammi* Aⁱ, *tanuayammi* Bⁱ, *parigrahaṇammi* Cⁱ, *thubammi* Dⁱ. For the latter reason I do not think it likely that the final three *akṣaras* of Bⁱ should be read as one word and explained as the locative of *rañā*, which might represent a Skr. *aranya*. I would take *rañā* as the equivalent of Skr. *rājñā* and see in *mi* the beginning of the Rājan's name. It is, of course, impossible to say which letters have stood in the beginning of Cⁱ, where there is now a hole in the casket. We might think of some such thing as *rena kataṇ*, so that the whole would be *ran'a Mirena kataṇmi*, made by the Rājan Mira, and compare the name of the Mira Boyaṇa mentioned in the Gudufara inscription. But it is of little use to make guesses.

With regard to the reading, I would mention that there are distinct traces of *sam* and 20 in the beginning of Aⁱ, and the reading of the month is absolutely certain. The photographs in the Peshawar Museum seemed to point to the reading *aṣadasa* instead of *Sam 20 masasa*, but an examination of the original has convinced me of the correctness of the reading adopted above. I absolutely fail to understand how Mr. Naṭiśān could read the name of the month Aśvina.

The reading *Svedavarma* in the opening of Bⁱ seems to be certain, but *d* is probably miswritten for *t*.

The form *sarvastivadana*, of the Sarvāstivādins, Cⁱ, should be compared with forms such as *sarvastivatana* and *sarvastivatasa*¹ on the Mathurā Lion Capital.

It will be noticed that the context is interrupted in the midst of Aⁱⁱ and only taken up again in D^{iv}. The intervening space is occupied by a quotation from the Buddhist scriptures, viz., the famous formula of contingent origination. The writing is consistent throughout, only *p* has by mistake been written instead of *ph* in the second *phaṣa* Dⁱⁱ. This shows that the orthography is not absolutely reliable, so that *Svedavarma* Bⁱ may be miswritten for *Svetavarma* and *Mahiphatiena* A^{iv} for *Mahipatiēna*.

The interpretation of the record presents few difficulties. The era used is the so-called Kaniṣka reckoning, for which Dr. van Wijk and myself have tried to establish that its initial point was A.D. 134.² The month *Avadunaka* is, of course, the Macedonian *Αὐδυνάτος*, corresponding roughly to December, which has not formerly been met with in

¹ The Sarvāstivādin Budhita is said to be *khalula* for the purpose of teaching the foremost Mahāsāṃghikas *pramā*; read *prama* *ñavitave* as two words.

² *Acta Orientalia*, iii, 54 and ff.

Kharosthī records. Other Macedonian months occurring in Indian inscriptions are Πάνεπος in the Patika plate, Δαλσικος in the Sue Vihār inscription and Ἀπρεπίστος in the Wardak Vase and the Lahore box lid epigraphs.

The only word which is not immediately intelligible is *tanuayaṇṇmi* B¹. There can be little doubt that it is the same word which occurs as *tanuvae* in the Taxila silver scroll inscription of Sam̄ 136. Sir John Marshall¹ explained *tanuvae* as the name of a locality, and M. Boyer² saw in it a form corresponding to Skr. *tanuryaya*, while I³ interpreted it as the genitive of a female name *Tanuva*. The new inscription shows that none of these explanations is likely to be correct. We do not know from which locality the Landi casket originally came, but it cannot have been the Bodhisattvagrha excavated by Sir John. An original *tanuryaya* would become *tanuvaya*, and the *v* could not have been dropped. And, finally, *tanuvas* must be the locative singular, and not the genitive of a female base, as proved by *tanuayaṇṇmi*. It seems necessary to explain *tanuvaya*, *tanuaya* as adjectives qualifying the locality where relics were deposited, and I therefore think that the word is derived from *tanu* and means "containing a *tanu*, a relic." I therefore translate the record as follows:

Anno, 20, the 20. day of the month Avadunaka, at this instant Śvedavarman, the son of Yaśa, deposits a relic of the Adorable Śākyamuni in the relic *stūpa* (erected by King M. . . .), the property of the Sarvāstivāda teachers — as it has been said by the Adorable one: contingent on ignorance (are) the forces, contingent on the forces perception, contingent on perception name and form, contingent on name and form the six senses, contingent on the six senses contact, contingent on contact sensation, contingent on sensation thirst, contingent on thirst grasping, contingent on grasping existence, contingent on existence birth, contingent on birth age, death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, downcastness and despair. Such is the origin of this entire mass of misery — in honour of all beings. And this contingent origination has been written by Mahiphatika in honour of all beings.

The record is of interest in more than one respect. It falls within the reign of Kaniṣka, but we are not informed about the identity of the local ruler who held sway in the locality where the Stūpa was situated, nor about the position of this locality. The historical and geographical information which can be gleaned from the record is accordingly small.

¹ JRAS., 1914, 973 ff.

² JA., xi, 1915, 281 ff.

³ Ep. Ind., xiv, 288.

We learn a little more about Buddhist literature in North-Western India about the middle of the second century A.D. We knew before now that a version of the *Dhammapada* in a vernacular belonging to that part of the country existed in a comparatively early time. Now the Landi inscription brings what is evidently a quotation from another canonical work written in practically the same language. Have we a right to infer that extensive canonical texts in that form of speech were in existence? And with which Buddhist sect should they be connected? From the mention of the *Sarvāstivādins* in this as in other *Kharoṣṭhi* records, such as the *Mathurā* Lion Capital and the *Shāh-jī kī* Dheri casket, we might be inclined to think of them. But then we know that their canon was later written in Sanskrit. It may however be possible that they had, at the same or at an earlier period, also canonical books in the North-Western Prakrit. The Landi inscription raises this question afresh.

Its chief interest, however, rests with the fact that it is comparatively long and thus allows us to judge about some features in the dialect.

We have every reason for assuming the existence of a fairly uniform language spoken in North-Western India in the Indo-Skythian period. It is represented by a number of *Kharoṣṭhi* inscriptions and also by the *Kharoṣṭhi* manuscript of the *Dhammapada*. Nobody has as yet attempted to give an exhaustive sketch of this form of speech, and it would not be possible to do so within the limited space of a contribution to a complimentary volume. But I should like to offer some remarks about such details which are further elucidated by the new inscription.

I said that the language is fairly uniform. That does not, however, exclude the existence of minor dialectic variations, and as a matter of fact such appear to exist both in inflexional forms and in phonetical features.

To the first class belongs the nominative singular of masculine *a*-bases. In the *Dhammapada* manuscript it regularly ends in *o*, which *o* is shown by the metre to be long. If we turn to *Kharoṣṭhi* inscriptions we find the same *o*-form in inscriptions hailing from the country to the east of the Indus, and also in those found about Mount Banj (Dewai, Kala Sang, Mount Banj, Shakardarra, Yākubi). In the West, on the other hand, in Āra, Zeda, Machai, Panjtar, Pāja, Peshawar, Chārsadda, Jamalgarhi, Lorigān Tangai, Bimaran, Hidda, we find *e* to be the termination. In the Wardak vase inscription we find *yo aṁdajo*, which might seem to point to *o*-forms, but the words are probably

neuter and not masculine, and *a priori* we should expect Khawat, where the vase was found, to belong to the *e*-group. The Landi inscription is also of the western variety, cf. *samadae*, that is, *samadayaḥ*, Dⁱⁱⁱ.

The new record contains quite a series of locatives ending in *ammi*: *kṣunammi* Aⁱ, *tannayammi* Bⁱ, *parigrahāmī* Cⁱ, *thubammi* Dⁱ. Similar forms are found in inscriptions hailing from Hidda, Wardak, Āra, Ohind, Panjtar, and also from Taxila, where the silver scroll of Sam 136 has *gahami*. In the Patika plate, on the other hand, we apparently have *imasi* in l. 5. This latter form is quite common in the Dhammapada manuscript, where we find forms such as *asvi*¹ *loki parasa yi*, in this world and the other one. The form *asvi* in collocation with *parasa*, i.e., as shown by the metres *parassi*, shows that these forms are derived from such ending in *asmī*, just as is the case with the *ammi* forms. The manuscript shows that *sm* quite regularly became *sv* and further *ss*; thus *svadi*,² Skr. *smṛti* A^{iv} 2, C^{ro} 42; *tasa*, Skr. *tasmāt*; *yasa*, Skr. *yasmāt*, O 16; *sadaṇa*, Skr. *smṛtānām*, C^{ro} 43, etc. The change of *sm* to *mh* in *samhaṣadi* B 13 seems to belong to a different stratum.

Now the locative forms in *mi*, or rather, as shown by the writing *mri* in the Wardak Vase inscription, *mhi*, presuppose this very change, and one would be inclined to think that we are here again faced with dialect varieties within the North-Western vernacular. There are, however, some considerations which seem to make such an assumption unlikely. The locative in *asi* is apparently used in the Taxila plate of Patika of Sam 78, while the termination *ami* is found in the silver scroll of Sam 136 coming from the same locality. Moreover forms such as *kṣunammi* are of frequent occurrence in the dated Kharoṣṭhī records from Niya. We cannot, accordingly, find any geographical delimitations of the spheres of each form. On the other hand it is difficult to think that one and the same termination *asmī* can sometimes become *amhi* and sometimes *assi* within the same period and in the same dialect. Moreover the change of *asmī* through *asvi* to *assi* seems to be in best agreement with the phonetical system of the North-Western tongue. We must therefore, I think, assume that the *amhi* forms are a later development of new *asmī* forms, reintroduced in the barbaric Sanskrit of another sect, at a time when *sm* no more became *sv*, *ss*, but *mh*.

¹ M. Senart reads *asmī*, but the sign which means *sv* in *svaga*, i.e., *svarga*, O 5, cannot be transliterated otherwise than *sv*.

² For the reason stated in the preceding footnote I cannot accept M. Senart's reading *smati*.

There is also another feature where we are apparently justified in speaking of a phonetic development within the dialect. There has been, as is well known, some doubt about the distribution of the dental and the cerebral *n* in Kharoṣṭhī records. In the Aśoka inscriptions the two sounds are clearly distinguished, and also in later inscriptions the late Professor Bühler never confounded them in his transliteration. Several scholars, however, have been accustomed to transliterate both the *n*-letters as *n*, and M. Senart in his edition of the Dhammapada manuscript and Messrs. Boyer, Rapson and Senart in their Niya inscriptions use the dental *n* throughout. In my paper on the Kharoṣṭhī manuscript in the *Festschrift Windisch*, pp. 85 ff., I showed that *n* and *ṇ* are, in the Dhammapada text, distinguished according to a definite rule, which is also traceable in a series of modern dialects: every initial *n* and every doubled *n* remains as a dental, but every single uncompound *n* becomes *ṇ* between vowels.

This seems to be an old characteristic of the dialect, and it can be traced in some Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions. We find the two *n*-sounds correctly, or approximately correctly distinguished in the Patika plate, where the exceptions to the rule, the words *Panema* and *mahadanapati*, can be explained as loan-words: in the Māṇikyāla inscription of Saṃ 18¹ and the Shakardarra epigraph of Saṃ 40. But in most cases the rule is not observed. The Mathurā Lion Capital, the Hidda inscription and the record on the Kaniṣka casket use the dental *n* everywhere, both as initial and between vowels, just as the Landi casket. The case seems to be similar in the Ohind, Yākubi, Pālāṭū Dherī jars, and Jamālgarhī stone inscriptions, where no initial *n* occurs.

On the other hand the Taxila silver scroll, the Dimarva and the Wardak Vase records use the cerebral *ṇ* both as an initial and as medial, and the same letter is also in exclusive use in several epigraphs where there is no instance of an initial *n*: those from Tirath, Pāja, Takht-i-Bahi, Kaldarra, Panjtar, Dewai, Zeda, Machai, Kala Sang, Fatch Jang, Skārah Dherī, and others. In the Āra inscription the dental *n* occurs only in the proper name *Kaniṣka*.

Finally *ṇ* and *n* seem to be used promiscuously in the same word *dana*. In the records from Chārsadda, Loriyan Tangai and Janliā, and also in the Kharoṣṭhī records from Niya and neighboring oases the distinction between the two sounds seems to have been largely discarded.

¹ The form *daṇḍanayago* can owe its *n* to the uncompound *nayago*; *apanage* can, in a similar way, be explained as *alpanāge*, and *etraṇana* may be one word, the genitive plural of an adjective *etraṇa*, formed with the suffix *āna* from *etra* and having the same meaning as Skr. *atsatya*.

From this state of things we can draw only one inference: the difference between the two sounds was felt no more by those who drafted the inscriptions. If we now bear in mind that the oldest record where they are confounded, the Mathurā Lion Capital, is a Śaka epigraph, and that the language of the Śakas or their Iranian cousins in Chinese Turkistan did not distinguish *n* and *n̄* as in the manuscript, we must, I think, infer that the phonetics of the North-Western dialect became modified in the mouth of the Indo-Skythians.

In such circumstances we might ask ourselves whether it would not be just as well to follow those eminent scholars who do not make any distinction in their transliteration of the two Kharoṣṭī letters. I do not think, however, that such a procedure is justified. It would come to a suppression of evidence, and the history of the Dhammapada manuscript shows how careful we must be in venturing on such undertakings.

With regard to the treatment of intervocalic stops some inference can be drawn from the forms occurring in the Landi inscription, which partly corroborate, partly modify the results derived from the Dhammapada manuscript.

In the latter text an intervocalic *k* sometimes remains, is sometimes dropped and sometimes replaced by *y*. Thus *moyaka*, Skr. *mocaka*, B 31; *śavaka*, Skr. *śrāvaka*, A^{iv} 4 ff.; *ujuo*, Skr. *rjuka*, A^{iv} 1; *muyamadia*, Skr. *mrgamātrkā* Aⁱ 6; *sagaraudasa*, Skr. *samkārakūṭe*, C^{ro} 3; *kṣiravayo*, Skr. *kṣīrapāka*, B 54.

It is difficult to think that all these writings correctly render the actual sound, and though the surrounding sounds may have something to do with the different representations, and though Sanskrit and other Prakrits may have exercised a certain influence, we should expect to find a fairly consistent treatment and be inclined to see in the different resulting letters various attempts at rendering a sound which was not covered by any of the usual *akṣaras* of the alphabet.

It may be of interest to compare the treatment of intervocalic *g* in the manuscript, because we know the general Prakrit tendency to soften intervocalic surds. I abstract from a form such as *bahojagaru*, Skr. *bahujāgara*, Aⁱⁱⁱ 15, because the *g* of this word has also been preserved in other Prakrits. If we do so, it will be seen that the rule is that *g* in such position is written *k*. Thus *naḍakara*,¹ Skr. *naḍāgāra*, Aⁱⁱ 4; *parakada*, Skr. *pāragata*, B 4; *raka*, Skr. *rāga*, B 35; *urako*, Skr. *uraga*, B 41 ff.; *vikaya*, Skr. *vigāhya*, B 42. In the word *muyamadia*,

¹ M. Senart reads *nalagarā*, but I have no doubt about the correctness of my own reading.

Skr. *mṛgamātrkā*, quoted above from Aⁱ 6 we have the same change to *y* as in the case of intervocalic *k*. In other words, intervocalic *k* and *g* are both treated in the same way.

If we now further compare forms such as *idria*, Skr. *indriya*, B 17; *svihao*,¹ Skr. *sprhayan*, B 20; *dhoreka*, Skr. *dhaureya*, C^{vo} 31; *udakaraya*, Skr. *udayavyaya*, B 13, C^{ro} 18, it will be seen that ancient intervocalic *y* seems to be confounded with intervocalic *k*.² We must, I think, infer that the sound in question was a spirant with a slightly pronounced guttural timbre.

It is evidently the same sound which is intended by the writings *kr* in *bhakravato*, Skr. *bhagavataḥ*; *nakraraasa*, Skr. *nāgarakasya*; *samanumotakra*, Skr. *samanumodaka*, on the Mathurā Capital, and *gr* in *bhagravada*, *bhagravatra*, Skr. *bhagavataḥ*, on the Bimaran Vase; *gaḍigrena*, Skr. *ghaṭikena*; *kadalayigra*, Skr. *kṛtālayika*; *ṇatigrāmitra-sambhatigraṇa*, Skr. *jñātikamitrṛṣambhaktikānām*, etc., on the Wardak Vase.

The Landi casket furnishes several instances of the treatment of intervocalic *k* and *g*.³ The state of things is evidently exactly the same as in the manuscript, except that the writing differs, *gr* having taken the place of *k*. The new inscription also shows that intervocalic *y* was pronounced in a similar way, just as was the case in the manuscript. Thus we find *pracagra*, Skr. *pratyaya*, Bⁱⁱ ff.; *uvagrasa*, Skr. *upāyāsa* Cⁱⁱⁱ, both in quotations from the Canon. It is evident that we are faced with a common feature in the enunciation of the North-Western language, at least of the form which had become used in Buddhist scriptures.

With regard to stops we may still note the treatment of intervocalic *p*. It becomes *v* in *namaruva*, Skr. *nāmarūpa* Cⁱⁱ, just as in other Prakrits. In *thubammi*, Skr. *stūpe*, Dⁱ, however, it is replaced by *b*. We might dismiss this form as a simple miswriting, if it were not for the fact that we also find it elsewhere, viz. in the Hidda, Wardak and a Taxila copper-plate inscription, while the Mathurā Lion Capital, the Māṇikyāla stone and the Sihila Vase have regular forms with *v* instead. It is therefore evident that there was a dialect from *thuba* in addition to *thuva*.

The form *ruva* shows that the different treatment cannot be due to

¹ M. Senart's reading *smihao* cannot be upheld.

² Cf. also *babaka*, Skr. *bālbaja*, C^{vo} 31, where the Pāli *pabbaja* is due to misunderstanding of an old *babbaja*.

³ Cf. *avadunakasa* Aⁱ; *Mahipatiēna* A^{iv}; *śogra*, Skr. *śoka*, Cⁱⁱⁱ; *bhagravata* Aⁱⁱ; *bhagravatasa* Dⁱ.

a difference in the surrounding sounds, because these are identical in *rūpa* and *stūpa*. On the other hand *b* cannot well be explained as representing *v*, because the two sounds are carefully distinguished in Kharoṣṭhī.

I cannot see more than one explanation of the form *thuba*: it represents *ihumba* and is derived either from *thumwa* or from *thumpa*, with the well-known substitution of a nasalization for a long vowel. The only question is whether the form has been derived from an older *thīva* or a *thūpa*. Both explanations seem *a priori* to be possible.

We know that *mv* occasionally becomes *mb* in the North-Western dialect. Thus we find *sambatśare*, *sambatśarae*, for *sañvatsare* in the Takht-i-Bāhī, Āra and Hidda epigraphs, but *sañvatśare* in Sue Vihār, *sañvatśarays* in the Patika and Pāja inscriptions. Similarly *va*, Skr. *iva*, regularly becomes *ba* after an *anusvāra* in the Dhammapada manuscript. Thus *siha ba*, Skr. *siñham iva* A¹ 6; *nañkara ba*, Skr. *nañgāram iva*, Aⁱⁱ 4.¹ On the other hand *mv* becomes *v*, that is, probably a doubled nasalized *v* in forms such as *savaso*, Skr. *sañvāsa* C^o 37; *savasi*, Skr. *sañvaset*, Aⁱⁱ 2.

If we examine the possibility of deriving *thuba*, that is, *thumba* from *thūpa* and not from *thīva*, we apparently have full justification for doing so in a prominent feature of the language of the Dhammapada manuscript, in which a nasal produces certain modifications in a following stop. The general rule is that voiceless stops become voiced, while voiced ones more or less coalesce with the nasal. The details are, as follows:

nk appears as *g*; thus *alagido*, Skr. *alañkṛtaḥ*, B 39; *sagapa*, Skr. *sañkalpa*, Aⁱⁱ 5, etc. In the latter passage the metre shows that both the first and the second syllables are long. *Sagapa* accordingly stands for *sañgappa*,² in other words *nk* becomes *ng*. In the same way *ṇkh* becomes *gh*, that is, *mgh*; thus *saghai*, Skr. *sañkhyāya*, B 27; *saghara*, Skr. *sañskārāḥ*, Aⁱⁱⁱ 1ff.; *ta gu*, Skr. *tañ khalu*, B 21;

¹ It is evident that such features are of great importance for the interpretation of the text. Thus it is impossible to explain *avalaśa va* Aⁱⁱⁱ 15 as representing *abataśvam iva*, though the Pāti text has *abalassam va*. The form *avalaśa* must be the accusative plural, and the passage shows that the common source was written in a language where the accusative singular could not easily be distinguished from the same form of the plural in masculine *a*-bases, that is, the latter form ended in a nasalized *a*, as seems to have been the case already in Vedic dialects. Cf. Wackernagel, Altindische Grammatik I, (§ 279, *ba*).

² Here as in numerous other instances the metre shows that Sir George Grierson was not right in doubting the existence of doubled consonants in the North-Western Prakrit. See his paper in the JRAS., 1913, pp. 141 ff.

ng appears as an ordinary *g*, that is, as *mg*, in *sagamu*, Skr. *samgrāmāḥ*, C^o 6, where the *r* after *g* accounts for the preservation of the *g*. Also in *kadigaru*, Pāli *kalingaro*, C^o 14, the ordinary *g* is used, but here *ng* seems to be derived from *nk*; cf. *kaḍāṅkara*, Panini V. i. 69. In all other instances the letter *g* has been modified. In *ṣaga*, Skr. *sanga*, B 3, 37, and in *astagachadi*, Skr. *astamgacchanti*, O 14, it is provided with a hook at the bottom, and in *aṭhagio*, Skr. *aṣṭāṅgikāḥ*, Aⁱⁱⁱ 4, there is a hook above the *g*. The result of old *ng* cannot, accordingly, be an ordinary *mg*. Similar hooks are, as we have already seen, used to mark an aspiration or a spirantic pronunciation, and we are therefore probably justified in inferring that a voiced guttural became spirantic after a nasal, the more so because *ṅgh* is treated in the same way. Thus we find *sagha*, that is, *samgha*, with a curve above *g* in A^{iv} 6, and *saghi*, with a hook to the right of the bottom in C^o 13;

ñc becomes *j*, that is, *ñj*, and *ñj ñ*, that is, *ññ*; thus *paja*, Skr. *pañca*, B 37; *kiji*, Skr. *kiñcid*, O 15; *kuñaru*, Skr. *kuñjarah*, Aⁱ 5, ⁱⁱ 4;

ñd becomes *ṇ*, that is, *ṇṇ*; thus *dann*, Skr. *danda*, B 39, O 18, 28; *panidu*, Aⁱⁱⁱ 16, where the metre proves the first syllable to be long;

nt becomes *d*, that is, *nd*, and *nd n*, that is, *nn*; thus *anadara*, with long syllable before *d*, Skr. *anantara*, O 13; *miyadi*, Skr. *mriyante*, Aⁱⁱⁱ 12; *nivinadi*, Pāli *nibbindati*, Aⁱⁱⁱ 1; *china*, Skr. *chinda*, B 37. Similarly *ndh* appears as *nh*; thus *bamha*, Skr. *bandha*, O 27; *kanhaṇa*, Skr. *skandhānām*, B 13;

mp becomes *b*; that is, *mb*; *mb m*, that is, *mm*, and *mbh bh*, that is, *mbh*, or *mh*; thus *sabaśu*, Skr. *sampaśyan*, C^o 26; *aṇuabisa*, Skr. *anukampināḥ*, C^o 16; *avaramu*, Skr. *apālambāḥ*, A^{iv} 2; *udumaresu*, Skr. *udumbareṣu*, B 40; *sabhamu*, Skr. *sambhava*, Aⁱ 2 f., O 17; ¹ *gambhira*, Skr. *gambhīra*, B 6. We would *a priori* be inclined to consider the latter orthograph the more correct one.

Now we naturally expect to find similar rules prevailing in the Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions of the Indo-Skythian period, the more so because M. Jules Bloch has been able to point to a parallel development in modern North-Western vernaculars.² An old *thūpa* might accordingly become *thumpa* and further *thumba*. In order to judge between the two possibilities it will, however, be necessary to examine the state of things in the North-Western inscriptions.

The materials for such an investigation are rather meagre, but, so far as I can see, decisive.

¹ The latter passage shows that M. Senart's explanation of the word as representing Skr. *sambhrama* cannot be accepted.

² JA., x, xix, 1912, 331 ff.

We have already seen that Skr. *samskāra* appears as *saghara*, that is, *saṃghāra*, in the manuscript, a form which shows that the modification of the guttural after a nasal is of more recent date than the development of the earlier *sk* to *kh*. The same word occurs, as we have seen, as *samkara*, with a vertical above *k*, in the Landi inscription. There does not, accordingly, here appear to be any trace of a softening after the nasal.

The only other instance of a guttural preceded by a nasal in the inscriptions is the word *saṃgha* and its derivatives, where everything points to the conclusion that *īgh* was pronounced as in Sanskrit.¹

If we turn to palatals, we find *paṃcame* in the Patika plate; *paṃ[cada]śe* in the Pāja inscription; *Rajula* on the Mathurā Lion Capital.

Of cerebrals we have *daḍanayago* in the Māṇikyāla inscription; *a[m]dajo* and *avaṣadīgāṇa*, Skr. *āpāṣāṇḍikānām*, on the Wardak Vase.

With reference to dentals we may compare *puyayaṇto* in the Patika plate; *a[m]tara* on the Wardak Vase; *Balanamdi* in the Sue Vihār plate; *Dharmanadisa* in Jauliā; *k(h)amdhana* Landi D¹¹¹, and *kadhabaro* on the Mathurā Lion Capital, whether this form is derived from Skr. *skandhāvāra* or contains the word *kantha*, a town. The form *Mumjanamda* side by side with *Mujavada* on the Bimaran Vase is doubtful, the latter form being probably the correct one.

Of labials we have *nirvanasaṃbhara*s in the Hidda and *sambhatigrana* in the Wardak Vase inscription.

It will be seen that nothing seems to point to a state of things similar to that of the manuscript. We must therefore abandon the explanation of *thuba* as representing *thumba* from *thumpa*, *thūpa*, and derive the form through *thumva* from *thūva*.

The preceding examination will have shown that the North-Western dialect is not absolutely uniform, and that the Dhammapada manuscript stands alone in its treatment of stops after nasals. The existence of corresponding features in modern North-Western vernaculars prevents us from simply ascribing the state of things in the manuscript to the influence of the old Iranian tongue of Chinese Turkistan, where we find identical rules prevailing. But it is possible that this influence has been instrumental in regulating a tendency inherent in the dialect. In connection with the nominative in *o* and perhaps also the locative in *assi* such features will some day enable us to localize the Dhammapada dialect with greater precision within the territory once occupied by the North-Western Prakrit.

¹ Cf. *saṃgharama* in the Patika plate and on the Kaniṣka casket; *saghasa*, *saghama* and *mahaśaghiana* on the Mathurā Capital, etc.

Such minor dialectic differences which may be traced in our materials are, however, of minor importance, and in one important feature all North-Western varieties agree and make the language stand out as a clearly defined individual Prakrit: in the treatment of old sibilants. The three *s*-sounds are distinguished throughout, and every attempt at interpreting a Kharosthī record which does not pay due attention to this fact is bound to be a failure.¹

In the manuscript we have some mistakes, owing to the fact that it is translated from a different dialect and probably written in a locality where the home tongue was an Iranian form of speech. Thus we find *ṣa* for *sa* in *pacha ṣa*, Skr. *paścāt sa* C^o 39 (but correctly *pacha su* Aⁱⁱ 3), where the Iranian home tongue has *ṣa*, and *ṣaga* for *sanga* B 3, 37; *Frāgm. Cxxxvii^{vo}*, where I cannot give any satisfactory explanation. Similarly we always find *suyi* instead of *śuyi* for Skr. *śuci*, where the original cannot have distinguished between the different *s*-sounds, so that the translator was led astray and connected *suci* with the prefix *su*. That the original did not distinguish the dental from the palatal *s* is evident from the etymological play in *samairya śramano di vucadi*, O 16, which is meaningless in a dialect which distinguishes *s* and *ś*.

The Landi inscription again shows that the three *s*-sounds are carefully distinguished.² It also corroborates certain inferences about the changes undergone by certain compounds containing a sibilant, which can be drawn from the manuscript and other inscriptions.

There are no instances in the record of the compound *śr*, but we know from other sources that it became *ṣ* or rather *ṣṣ*; thus *ṣameṇo*, Skr. *śramaṇah*, B 39, and similar forms in several other passages and in inscriptions. Writings such as *Śravaṇasa* in the Pāja, Kaldarra and Panjtar records are Sanskritisms. The corresponding change of *rś* to *ṣ*, *ṣṣ*, on the other hand, which we know from forms such as *phuṣamu* Skr. *sprśāmaḥ*, B 25; *phaṣai*, Skr. *sprśati*, Aⁱⁱⁱ 10, etc., is illustrated by the form *phasa*, Skr. *sparṣa*, Dⁱⁱ.

Of compounds containing an old *ṣ* we have perhaps the well-known change of *ṣy* to *ś* in *iṣa* Aⁱ, if this common form contains the pronominal base *i* and the element *syā*. *Ṣṇ* becomes *ṣ* in the manuscript.³ I have

¹ E.g., the attempt made by some eminent scholars at explaining the *akṣaras* which I read *ya yetiga* in l. 5 of the Wardak inscription as *ṣaṣetiga* and further as *sam-svedaja*. Such a development is entirely against the dialect.

² Cf. *Śakyamunisa sarira* Dⁱ f.; *ṣadāyadana* Cⁱⁱ f.; *sarvartivadana* Cⁱ, etc.


³ Cf. *taṣa*, Skr. *trṣṇā*, B 45.

already mentioned the corresponding *taṣ(h)a* in the Landi inscription, Aⁱⁱⁱ, which seems to show that the resulting *ṣ* was slightly aspirated.

Of *s*-compounds we have *sk* in *samk(h)ara* Bⁱⁱ; *k(h)amdhasa* Dⁱⁱⁱ; *st* in *sarvartivadana* Cⁱ; *thubam̄mi* Dⁱ; *pradīthavedi* Aⁱⁱ; *sy* in *masasa avadunakasa* Aⁱ, etc. The form *dormanasta* in Cⁱⁱⁱ cannot, accordingly, be derived from *daurmanasya* but must contain the suffix *tā*.

On the whole the Landi inscription is of considerable importance for our knowledge of the North-Western Prakrit and also of the history of the Buddhist Canon, and a preliminary account may, I hope, interest my distinguished American colleague and friend, to whom this volume is dedicated.

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DAS VIPĀNAM IM RIGVEDA

BY KARL F. GELDNER

ES IST ein allgemeiner Glaube der Inder, dass gewisse Vögel — es werden der Kruñc (eine Reiherart) und besonders der Hamsa (Schwan und indische Gans) genannt — die Geschicklichkeit besitzen, aus einer Mischung von Wasser und Milch die Milch allein als das Bessere herauszuschlürfen und das Wasser übrig zu lassen. Diese Fabel, denn etwas anderes ist es nicht, obwohl irgendeine reale Beobachtung zu Grunde liegen mag, diente Dichtern und Philosophen oftmals als Gleichnis. In einem ebenso feinsinnigen wie gelehrten Aufsatz im *Journal of the American Oriental Society* xix, 2, 151–158 sucht der Jubilar, Professor Lanman, diese Fabel auf ein natürliches Faktum zurückzuführen, und er verfolgt ihre Spur durch die ganze Literatur rückwärts bis in die Zeit der vedischen Schriften. Nur vor der allerletzten Pforte, vor dem Rigveda macht er Halt und verweist auf die Autorität Bloomfields.

In der alten Literatur wird diese fabelhafte Kunst, Milch aus dem Wasser herauszutrinken, durch *vi-pā* und *vipāna* ausgedrückt. *vi-pā* bedeutet zunächst: mit Unterschied trinken, im Trinken einen Unterschied herausfinden, so Ait. Br. 3, 29, 5, oder die Essenz von etwas trinken, wie RV. 3, 53, 10 *ví pibadhvam kuśikāḥ somyám mádhu*. Dort geht im ersten Stollen der Vergleich mit den Hamsas voraus und der selbe Vergleich schwebte vermutlich auch im letzten Stollen bei *ví pibadhvam* dem Dichter noch vor.

In 7, 22, 4 wird dasselbe Verb figürlich vom Presstein gebraucht, der Somapflanze und Somasaft scheidet, letzteren gleichsam aus der Pflanze heraustrinkt. Und darnach ist auch 4, 16, 3 zu verstehen. Die wichtigste Stelle ist aber 10, 131, 4–5:

*yuvám surāmam aśvinā námucāv āsuré sácā /
vipipānā śubhas patī īndram kármasv āvataṃ //
putrám iva pitárāv aśvínobhén̄dráváthuḥ kávyair dāmsánābhiḥ /
yát surāmam vy ápibah śácibhiḥ sárasvatū tvā maghavann abhiṣṇak //*

Es steht fest, das diese beiden Strophen in enger Beziehung zur sogenannten Sautrāmani-Feier stehen, bei der statt Soma vielmehr die Surā, d. h. der Branntwein eine Rolle spielt. Beide Strophen haben nach Āsv. Ss. 3, 9, 3 in dem genannten Ritual ihre feste Stelle. Damit ist aber nicht gesagt, dass sie schon von vornherein für dieses gedichtet

seien, wie Oldenberg annimmt. Sie sind vielmehr aus dem RV. in das spätere Ceremoniell übernommen worden, weil sie auf eine alte Sage anspielen, an der sich jenes Ceremoniell anrankt. In dieser Sage kommt eben der Surā eine besondere Bedeutung zu. Durch die Anlehnung an das RVI-Lied hat jenes Opfer von dem dort in Str. 6 genannten *īndraḥ sutrāmā* seinen Namen erhalten. Im RV. aber steht das Strophenpaar in anderem Zusammenhang. Das Lied beginnt mit der Bitte um Schutz gegen Feinde (1) und um Verteilung von deren Besitz (2). Dazu muss man Indra zum Freund haben (3) — diese Freundschaft des Indra wird A. V. 3, 3, 2 in Verbindung mit der Sautrāmanī erwähnt — wie Indra selbst in dem Namuci-Handel an der Freundschaft der Aśvin und der Sarasvatī einen Halt fand (4–5).

Die Sage, welche die Ritualtexte zur Begründung des Sautrāmanī-Opfers mitteilen, ist der Kampf zwischen Gott Indra und dem Dämon Namuci. Die ausführliche Darstellung dieses Mythos in Sat. Br. 12, 7, 1fg. verknüpft die Namucisage unmittelbar mit dem ebenso bekannten Konflikt der beiden Götter Indra und Tvaṣṭar, nach der Ermordung des Tvaṣṭarsohnes Viśvarūpa durch Indra. Ob diese Verknüpfung alt ist, mag dahingestellt bleiben. Tvaṣṭar brüskiert Indra, dieser begeht in Erwiderung ein Sakrilegium und büsst zur Strafe seine unbezwingliche Kraft ein. Gerade in diese Zeit seiner Schwäche fallen seine Händel mit Namuci. Der Dämon merkt, dass Indra sich noch nicht erholt hat (Sat. Br. 12, 7, 1, 10) und beschliesst den Indra jetzt ganz zu Fall zu bringen, indem er durch Branntwein seine Kräfte und seinen Somatrunk wegnimmt (ib. 12, 7, 1, 10; 12, 7, 3, 1). Indra erleidet einen völligen Zusammenbruch und unterliegt im Ringkampf gegen Namuci. Er muss sich infolge des Betrugs zu jenem Entwaffnungs- und Sicherheitspakt verstehen, der auch in TBr. 1, 7, 1, 6fg. genau erzählt wird. Die Götter wenden sich an die Aśvin als Ärzte und die Sarasvatī als das Heilmittel mit der Bitte, ihn zu heilen (Sat. Br. 12, 7, 1, 11) und ihm die verlorene Kraft und den Somatrunk wiederzubringen (ib. 12, 7, 3, 1). Bei diesem Punkt scheinen nun die oben zitierten Strophen des RV. einzusetzen.

Das Sat. Br. erzählt 12, 7, 3, 3fg. den weiteren Verlauf der Geschichte, den Ersatz des im Vertrag verbotenen Vajra Indras durch Schaum. Indra schlägt darauf dem Namuci das Haupt ab. Dadurch wurde und blieb der von Namuci weggetrunkene Soma mit Blut vermischt. Die Götter (Indra, die Aśvin, Sarasvatī) ekelten sich davor und erfanden das *andhasor vipānam*, das Sondertrinken der beiden Flüssigkeiten, und machten auf diese Weise den Soma wieder rein und schmackhaft.

Das ganze Material der Namucisage hat in unerreichbarer Gründlichkeit Bloomfield im JAOS. 15, 146fg. zusammengestellt und kritisch beleuchtet. Ich pflichte Bloomfield darin durchaus bei, dass das Schlagwort *surayā* der Brähmanastelle (Sat. Br. 12, 7, 1, 10, vgl. 12, 7, 3, 1) nicht zu übersetzen ist: zusammen mit dem Branntwein, sondern: mit Hilfe des Branntweins. Namuci macht den Indra durch dieses ihm ungewohnte Getränk total betrunken.

Wenn dann weiter (a. o. o. 153) Bloomfield den Satz aufstellt, dass die Gesamtheit der vedischen Bücher eine Einheit bildet und stets die Brähmanas und Sūtras sowie das gesammte rituelle Spruchmaterial für die Erklärung der vedischen Hymnen heranzuziehen ist, so wird jeder Verständige diesen Satz im allgemeinen billigen. Bloomfields Arbeiten sind in dieser Hinsicht geradezu vorbildlich. Aber auf mythologischem Gebiet darf dieser Satz doch nur *cum grano salis* gelten. Die mythischen Erzählungen der Brähmanas sind Epigonendarbeit, die zwar meist noch den Kern des Mythos richtig erfasst, im Einzelnen aber vieles missdeutet oder umdeutet. Der Rigveda steht sagengeschichtlich betrachtet auf älterer und höherer Stufe. Die Göttergeschichten lebten in dem Gedächtnis der Dichter noch gestalt- und gehaltvoller als bei den Epigonen. Nur schade, dass diese aus ihrer intimeren Kenntnis so spärliche und abgerissene Mitteilungen machen. Die Namucisage des RV. ist ein weiteres Beispiel hierfür.

Bloomfield verlegt nun Rv. 10, 131, 4 in den Schlussakt der Namucigeschichte, wobei er sich ganz an den Gang der Erzählung im Brähmana anschliesst. Deren einzelne Phasen sind; 1. Surārausch des Indra und Verlust seiner Stärke; 2. Pakt mit Namuci. Wiederherstellung Indras durch die Aśvin und Sarasvatī, und Umgehung des Vertrags und Tötung des Namuci; 3. Zurückgewinnung des weggenommenen Soma und dessen Reinigung durch die Sarasvatī. Bloomfield kann sich dabei besonders auf Mahidharas kurze Analyse der Sage in dessen Kommentar zu VS. 10, 33 berufen.

Die hauptsächliche *crux interpretum* bleibt das nur in den beiden RV. Strophen belegbare Wort *surāmam*. Bloomfield nimmt Roths spätere Deutung im kürzeren Petersburger WB. an. Nach Roth ist *surāma* Kompositum aus *surā* + *āma* = Surākrankheit, die üblichen Folgen des zu starken Branntweingenusses. Und zwar bezieht Bl. diesen *surāma* in der einen Str. auf den ersten Akt der Namucisage, in der anderen aber auf deren Schlussakt, und übersetzt (a. a. o. 148):

“Ihr beiden Aśvin habt, indem ihr bei Āsura Namuci euch selbst eine Surā-Überladung antrankt, dem Indra bei seinen Taten geholfen, ihr Herren des Lichtes.”

“Wie Eltern dem Kind so haben beide Aśvin, o Indra, dir mit ihren Zauberkünsten geholfen. Als du, o Maghavan, mit aller Macht Surā bis zur Erkrankung getrunken hattest, da kurierete dich Sarasvatī.”

Nach Bloomfield handelt es sich eigentlich um zwei verschiedene Vorgänge. Indra trinkt sich unabsichtlich bei Namuci einen bösen Rausch an in Surā, die ihm sein Trinkgenosse Namuci im Beginn der Geschichte beigebracht hat. Die Aśvin tun dasselbe absichtlich, um den im toten Namuci verunreinigten Soma zu reinigen, und ihn so dem Indra wiederzugeben (a. a. o. 159, Mahidhara zu VS. 10, 33). Daher, so meint Bl., steht *vi-pā* das eine Mal im Med. das andere Mal im Akt. Der Unterschied zwischen Med. und Akt. ist aber lediglich durch die verschiedene Konjugation bedingt. *vi-pā* nach der seltenen Präs. Klasse 3 ist Med., vgl. *vipipīya*, *vipipīte* Jaim. Br. 3, 228, dagegen ist *vi-pā* nach Kl. 1 (*pība*) ausser RV. 3, 53, 10 stets Akt.

Hart ist auch das Auseinanderreissen der beiden Vorgänge in den zusammenhängenden RV. Str. und die Beziehung der Worte *nāmucāv āsurē sācā*, auf den toten Namuci, während der Lok. bei *sācā* in Verbindung mit *pā* und ähnlichen Verben stets den Gast- und Opfergeber bezeichnet: *pība* — *tūgrye sācā* 8, 32, 20; *śrūṣṭigau sācā* 8, 51, 1; *āyāu mādayase sācā* 8, 52, 1; *kṛpe mādāyase sācā* 8, 4, 2; *kānveṣu sū sācā pība* 8, 4, 3. Der Fehler aller Interpreten ist eben in *vipipānā*, *vyápi-bah* zu suchen, das nichts anderes ist als das spätere *vi-pā*. Das hat schon Oldenberg (Nachr. der Göttinger Ges. 1893, 343) geahnt, ohne klar zu sagen, wie er die Stelle verstanden haben will. Als Schlagwort der Namucisage wird es ausdrücklich in Sat. 12, 7, 3, 4 durch *andhasor* *vipānam* bezeugt, ist aber in der späteren Fassung der Sage nur noch halbverstanden und an die falsche Stelle gekommen. Das *andhasor* *vipānam* in Sat. ist dasselbe wie *andhaso* *vipānam* Tānd. Br. 14, 11, 26, wo wohl gleichfalls *andhasor* zu lesen ist. Dazu bestätigend *andhasī* *vipipīte* Jaim. Br. 3, 228. Die beiden *andhas* sind nach der letzten Stelle das *daivyam* und das *mānuṣam*, also jedenfalls Soma und Surā. Und so ursprünglich auch in der Namucisage.

Damit fällt aber Roths geistvolle Deutung von *surāma*. *Surāmam* bezeichnet jene eigentümliche Mischung von Soma und Surā, die Namuci dem Indra vorsetzte, und die in Erinnerung an jene Sage im späteren Ritual nachgeahmt wurde, VS. 19, 1 (*he sure, tvāṁ somena samyojayāmi* Mahidhara). Auch das hat Oldenbergs Scharfsinn (a. a. o. 343) herausgefunden, aber seine Deutung des Wortes ist verfehlt. Um zu einem brauchbaren Sinn zu gelangen bietet sich eine doppelte Erklärung. Es kann aus *surā* + *ama* zusammengesetzt also Bahuvrīhi sein: die heftige Wirkung des Branntweins habend, durch Branntwein

stark gemacht, vulgär 'geschnapst.' Dann ist *somam* zu ergänzen. Man kann in diesem Falle *sura-ama* oder *surā-áma* zerlegen. Ersteres nach Wackernagel II, 1, § 113bβ, letztes nach § 115c. Oder *surāma* ist kollektiver *Dvandva* und eine Kürzung aus *surāsoma*, das dann dem *andhasī* entsprechen würde. Diese Erklärung kommt der von J. Brune bei Oldenberg zu RV. 10, 131, 4 vorgeschlagenen nahe. Nun mehr übersetze ich:

10, 131, 4: "Ihr Aśvin habt bei dem asurischen Namuci den starkgeschnapsten (Soma) durch Trinken geschieden, ihr Herren der Schönheit, und so dem Indra bei seinen Taten beigestanden."

"Wie die Eltern dem Sohne so standet ihr Aśvin (dir), o Indra, bei mit euren Erfindungen und Meisterkünsten; als du mit Geschick den starkgeschnapsten (Soma) durch Trinken sondertest, da heilte dich, Maghavan, die Sarasvatī."

Die Strophen spielen auf eine Episode im Namuci-Indra-Streite an, die sich im RV. sonst nicht wiederfindet und aus eigener Kombination oder Phantasie, wie man es nennen will, vervollständigt werden muss. Es fragt sich zunächst, wo diese Episode im Zusammenhang der ganzen Namucierzählung einzuordnen sei. Doch wohl vor der eigentlichen Katastrophe, ungefähr bei Sat. 12, 7, 1, 11–12, da wo die Aśvin und Sarasvatī zum ersten Male angerufen werden, aber noch vor dem völligen Zusammenbruch des Indra.

Göttergeschichten sind nur das Spiegelbild menschlicher Verhältnisse. Indra und Namuci, der stärkste Gott und der stärkste Asura seiner Zeit, zwei grosse Rivalen und innerlich spinnefeind, versuchten zunächst sich auf diplomatischem und gesellschaftlichem Tone äusserlich gut zu stellen. Jedenfalls haben nicht nur die Kommentare sondern auch das Epos recht, wenn sie von der Freundschaft beider sprechen (s. Bloomfield a. a. o. 147). Sie luden sich zu Gast und Namuci versuchte dem Indra durch Alkohol ein Bein zu stellen, indem er in den Soma den Branntwein mischte, in das göttliche Getränk das dämonische. Die List gelang nicht sofort. Die göttlichen Wundermänner, die Aśvin, machten dem Indra die Kunst vor, aus der Trankmischung den Soma allein herauszutrinken (Str. 4). Indra tut das Gleiche, täuscht also den Namuci und Sarasvatī heilt die üblichen Folgen (Str. 5). Wie es schliesslich doch noch zur Katastrophe kam, bleibt dann eine ungelöste Frage. Es wäre darum in engerem Anschluss an die Brähmanaerzählung, auch möglich, dass Indra gleich anfangs dem listigen Gifttrank des Namuci erlag, und dass dieser nicht nur eine bestimmte Somalibation, sondern den Somatrunk überhaupt mit Surā vergiftet hatte, die Aśvin aber nach der Rekreierung Indras durch

Sarasvati diesem vor dem entscheidenden Kampfe die Kunst des Vipāna beigebracht haben. Denn für diesen Entscheidungskampf brauchte Indra seine volle Stärke und den Soma. Dann bleibt aber der Ausdruck *námucau sáca* hart. Klarheit ist nicht mehr zu erreichen.

Zum Andenken an dieses bedeutsame Ereignis, an die Rekreierung Indras und die Reinigung des Soma wurde die Sautrāmanīfeier gestiftet als ein Reinigungsopfer, das besonders von einem entthronten König (Kāty. Šr. 19, 1, 3) zu begehen ist und von einem, der sich in Soma übernommen (ib. 2), also modern ausgedrückt, sich eine Alkoholvergiftung zugezogen hat.

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ON THE REAL MEANING OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN YĀJÑAVALKYA AND MAITREYÎ

By CARLO FORMICHI

EVEN a superficial reader of the *Upanishads* knows the famous dialogue between Yājñavalkya and his wife Maitreyî and is ready to quote it as one of the loftiest passages in the whole religious literature of ancient India. But the meaning of the sage's words is far from being clear: "Behold, not indeed for the husband's sake the husband is dear, but for the sake of the self, the husband is dear. Behold, not indeed for the wife's sake the wife is dear, but for the sake of the self, the wife is dear. Behold, not for the sons' sake the sons are dear, but for the sake of the self the sons are dear." And so on, in the text the thought is emphasized that everything dear to us. as property, brahmanical or *kshatriya* dignity, heavenly worlds, Gods and creatures are not dear in and for themselves but only for the sake of the self.¹

Two such distinguished and authoritative interpreters as Deussen and Oldenberg are at variance in the rendering of the meaning of the text. The former states: "dies ist nicht etwa die Proklamation des Standpunktes eines extremen Egoismus, sondern bedeutet (da der Ātman das erkennende Subjekt in uns ist), dass wir alles in der Welt nur insofern erkennen, besitzen, lieben können, als wir es als Vorstellung in unserm Bewusstsein tragen."²

Quite opposite to this explanation is the one given by Oldenberg: "wir lieben, sagt Yājñavalkya, in Wahrheit allein unser Selbst: alle andre Liebe fliesst aus dieser Liebe und dient ihr: wobei das in der Tat deutlich genug ausgesprochene Bekenntnis zur Selbstliebe doch wohl aufgefasst werden darf als vertieft durch den mitklingenden Gedanken, dass das eigne Selbst das Allselbst ist."³

I think that great help may be drawn from the following passages:

"The ātman is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than any other thing, because what is inmost is the ātman; and whosoever, to one saying anything else is dearer than the ātman, declares: "you will lose

¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upanishad*, II, 4, 5; IV, 5, 6.

² *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*, p. 415.

³ *Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus*, p. 197.

this your dear thing," he lordly proclaims what will necessarily happen. Therefore one should worship as dear only the *âtman*, for who worships as dear only the *âtman* to him no dear thing is any longer perishable."¹

"When brâhmaṇas know the *âtman*, then freeing themselves from the desire of offspring, from the desire of wealth, from the desire of heavenly worlds, they lead the life of wandering mendicants, for desire of offspring means desire of wealth and desire of wealth means desire of heavenly worlds."²

"Who knows the *âtman* becomes a *Muni* and wanders about in search of Him alone as in search of his own world. This is why the former sages did not desire offspring and said to themselves: 'what is the use of offspring to us for whom the *âtman* is the whole world?' Freeing themselves from the desire of offspring, from the desire of wealth, from the desire of heavenly worlds, they led the life of wandering mendicants, for desire of offspring means desire of wealth and desire of wealth means desire of heavenly worlds."³

Yâjñavalkya, who has known what the *âtman* is, gives up all mundane affections and resolves to lead the life of a wandering mendicant. What he says to his wife is a truism that is constantly met with in the *Upanishads*: there is only one reality, and this is the indescribable, transcendent *âtman* which knows no change, no sorrow, no death, no to-day, no to-morrow, no here no there, and he who for the sake of this one reality forsakes the world and its illusions will transform all perishable things dear to his heart into unperishable ones.

I agree with Oldenberg that in Yâjñavalkya's words there is no trace of the *âtman* being *das Subject des Erkennens* and as such *der Träger dieser ganzen Welt*, as Deussen maintains, but at the same time Oldenberg's assertion that, according to Yâjñavalkya, we love only our self and every other love flows out from this love, seems to me strongly objectionable. At any rate, Yâjñavalkya's acknowledgment of selfishness would be a most strange one. Can a man be called selfish for renouncing the world, living on alms and aspiring to a supreme reality which, though not personified, appeals to his heart as strongly as any personal God to the hearts of his worshippers? In the *Upanishads* the word *âtman* always means something that is even above the Gods, and to attach to it the idea of selfishness is to forget what the *Upanishads* try constantly to demonstrate: the ineffable transcendency of the *âtman*.

¹ *Bṛhaddr. Up.* I, 4, 8.

² *Ibidem*, III, 5, 1.


³ *Ibidem*, IV, 4, 22.

There is, accordingly, no relation at all between Yâjñavalkya's expressions and those contained in the Saṃyutta Nikâya, I, 75, where to the question, "Is anything dearer to you than your own self?" twice, "No" is given as answer.¹

No religion has hitherto dared to acknowledge selfishness as its basis, and the Upanishads make no exception to the general rule.

¹ Oldenberg, op. cit., p. 351, n. 124.

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THE DATE OF VASUBANDHU, THE GREAT BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHER

By JYAN TAKAKUSU

IT is more than twenty years ago that I proposed a probable date for Vasubandhu, the author of the *Abhidharma-kośa* (realism) as well as of the *Vijñānamātratā* (idealism), in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (January, 1905). The date of Vasubandhu then proposed by me was A.D. 420-500. M. Sylvain Lévi at first proposed a later date than mine, namely, the first half of the sixth century. He has, however, since abandoned that date, in his translation of the *Sūtra-alaikāra*, published in 1911, and has expressed his view that Asaṅga's activity covers the whole of the first half of the fifth century. As in those days literary activities in India seem to have been at once reflected in China, the dates of the Chinese translations of Indian works will serve as a reliable guide in fixing dates in Indian religious or philosophical history. Acting upon this conviction, I first published a translation of Paramārtha's *Life of Vasubandhu*, and, as an appendix to it, Kuei Chi's version of the controversy between the Buddhist and the Sāṅkhya philosophers in the *T'oung Pao* (1904), and subsequently proposed in 1905 the date just mentioned.

Since then several scholars have taken up this question. Our lamented friend M. N. Peri,¹ after a minute investigation, suggested A.D. 350 as the date of Vasubandhu's death, while Professor U. Wogihara² proposed A.D. 390-470 for Vasubandhu, and A.D. 375-450 for Asaṅga. In the meantime the dates were vigorously discussed by several scholars in Japan. Professor B. Shiio proposed a still more early date (A.D. 270-350) than that of M. Peri, whereas Professor R. Hikata satisfied himself with the date given by Professor Wogihara.

Only lately Professor T. Kimura, taking a different basis of discussion for his investigation, confirmed the date given by me. Still later, Professor H. Ui, while discussing the existence of a philosopher called Maitreya besides the would-be Buddha of that name, sheds a side-light on the dark points of several important questions, though

¹ "A propos de la Date de Vasubandhu," *Bulletin de l'École Française d'extrême Orient* (1911), p. 339.

² Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, ein dogmatischer Text der Nordbuddhisten. Leipzig, 1908.

his own date for Vasubandhu is A.D. 320-400, or one hundred years earlier than mine. There are yet several other savants standing at opposite poles, the one being Professor S. Funabashi, who advocates the earlier date (fourth century, before Kumārajīva), and the other, the group including Professor E. Mayeda (after Kumārajīva, who was in China 383-414), Professor S. Mochizuki (between 433-533), and G. Ono (415-515), who favors a later date, somewhat later than even my own. Now we can well draw our discussions to a conclusion, as we have almost exhausted our examination of the materials at our command. Besides, we may perhaps look forward to some fresh internal evidence, now that new material has been discovered in Nepal and is being prepared for publication by M. Sylvain Lévi. I mean the Sanskrit text of Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptitriṁśaka*, with Sthiramati's commentary on it. As for ourselves we shall now sum up our studies and see if we can settle the question once for all.

My arguments rest chiefly on evidence adduced, first, from some Chinese biographers; secondly, from travellers from or in India, and especially from the life of Vasubandhu written by Paramārtha; and thirdly from the dates of translation of the works of Vasubandhu and his contemporaries.

1. Kumārajīva (383-414 in China), who wrote or translated the biographies of Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, and Āryadeva, did not write the life of Vasubandhu, though one catalogue mentions by mistake the life of Vasubandhu.

2. Fa hien (399-414 in India) does not seem to know of our philosopher, none of whose works is found among his translations.

3. Paramārtha (500-569; 539 invited from India, 546-569 in China) is the first who wrote a biography of our philosopher. He himself is an idealist philosopher and mentions the death of his predecessor at the age of eighty, at Ayodhyā, which must have occurred before 539 (the date of invitation to China), or, at the latest, before 546 (the date of his arrival in China). This fact alone made M. Sylvain Lévi's first proposal impossible. Besides, Vasubandhu's Mahāyānistic works, which were written in the last part of his life, are subsequent to his conversion to the Mahāyāna and the death of Asanga, which occurred at the age of seventy-five. If his elder brother was seventy-five, his age would be about seventy or more. During about ten years of his conversion, he seems to have written nineteen works as I pointed out in my *Life*. Some may hold the ten years as incredible, but as he said himself that he was too old to dispute with Saṅghabhadra while he was as yet Hīnayānist, the remaining years of his life could not have

been much more than a decade. Many of his works were translated into Chinese as early as 508, 509, 508-511, 508-538, 529, 550, 563, and by Bodhiruci (A.D. 508-535 in China), Paramārtha (A.D. 546-569 in China), and others. The compilation of these works was naturally earlier than the dates of translation.

I thought it quite reasonable to take A.D. 500 as *terminus ad quem* and to fix his date as covering three quarters of the fifth century. Consequently A.D. 420-500 was proposed as a possible date for Vasubandhu. This hypothesis of mine does not conflict with any date from the *Life* itself, namely, a controversy between the Buddhist and the Sāṅkhya philosophers (Buddhamitra *versus* Vindhya-vāsa (Īśvarakṛṣṇa); a patronage of the King Vikramāditya and Balāditya; a dispute with Vasurata, a grammarian of the Candra school, also with Saṅghabhadra, Vaibhāṣika philosopher and the author of the *Samayapradīpikā*. Paramārtha's date given for Kātyāyanīputra and Aśvaghoṣa is "in the 500 years of Nirvāṇa" (that is, 500-599), while that given for Vārṣaganya and Vindhya-vāsa (Īśvarakṛṣṇa), the elder contemporaries of Vasubandhu, is "in the 900 years of Nirvāṇa" (that is, 900-999). These two dates too are not made impossible by any statement in the *Abhidharma-kośa* itself.

In the *Abhidharma-kośa* it is said: "When we know that the life of the Buddha's Law is about to end, reaching almost the throat, and that it is the time when vice is in power, seek your deliverance, be diligent." This would mean that the life of the Buddha śāsana, which lasts for 1,000 years, is about to breathe its last. According to Yaśomitra,¹ the original is: *Evam kanthagataprāṇam viditvā munisāsanam, malānām balakālām ca na pramādyam mumukṣubhiḥ.* ("It being known that the life breath of the teaching of the sage [is about to go out and] reached to the throat and it is the prevailing time of vices, those who seek deliverance should be diligent.") The *Vyākhyā* of Yaśomitra does not explain it. But Hiuen tsang's explanation puts the duration of the saddharma as definitely one thousand years. We can thus assume that we are nearing the end of the period, that is to say, we have passed nine hundred years and more since the Buddha's Nirvāṇa. This is in perfect agreement with Paramārtha's statement "in the nine hundred years," which means neither "within nine centuries" nor "in the ninth century." We may better express it as "in the years nine hundreds," that is, from 900 onward till it reaches 1,000.

¹ *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, traduit et annoté*, by Professor de la Vallée Poussin (1925), chap. viii, 40, p. 224, note 1.

Now as to the calculation of the Nirvāṇa Era. That a comparatively trustworthy tradition as to the date of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa was current in India among the Buddhists about Paramārtha's time can be seen from another source, quite independent of Paramārtha's *Life*. The famous "Dotted Record" of Indian sages, which was brought to China by Saṅghabhadra, indicated 975 dots from the Nirvāṇa to A.D. 489, one dot having been added every year to the *Vinaya* *piṭaka* after the Varṣa ceremony was over.

Saṅghabhadra translated Buddhaghosa's *Samantapāśādikā* in A.D. 489 in Canton, and kept his Varṣa retreat there, thereby adding the last dot to the Record. According to this Record, the date of the Nirvāṇa would be B.C. 486.¹ The 500 years after Nirvāṇa as the date of Aśvaghoṣa would mean some time falling between A.D. 14 and A.D. 113, while the 900 years after Nirvāṇa as the date of Vasubandhu would fall somewhere in A.D. 414–513. This is an additional corroboration which cannot be rejected without some incontrovertible fact.

Now M. Peri took up all the books of a dubious nature, which I purposely rejected as such, and proposed an earlier date for Vasubandhu. His arguments are divided into eight heads: (1) Bodhiruci and Chin kang sien lun; (2) the list of patriarchs; (3) the Mahāyāna-avatāra and Sthiramati; (4) Chronology; (5) the Śata śāstra; (6) Bodhicittotpāda śāstra; (7) Kumārajīva; and (8) Disciples and commentators of Vasubandhu. These titles alone seem to indicate that he has exhausted nearly all evidence that can be adduced from the Chinese side. Though his painstaking research incorporates many of the discussions then going on in Japan, and is marked everywhere with a high scholarship in Japanese as well as Chinese Buddhist literature, nevertheless there are no points, I am sorry to say, which really compel us to accept his date.

For my part I have been trying for some time to carry on anew my research into the materials hitherto not sufficiently examined by myself. The deeper I go into the matter, the more I feel convinced that, after all, my date of Vasubandhu is nearest the mark. So instead of laying a lengthy discussion before my readers, I shall confine myself to giving a few important points that tend to undermine the foundation of all earlier dates proposed for Vasubandhu. Among others there are three important facts on which the proposition of earlier dates is based and in face of which my date seems to fall to the ground at once.

¹ For the details of the Dotted Record, see my "Pali Elements in Chinese Buddhism," *J. R. A. S.*, July, 1896.

First, the *Chin kang sien lun*, a work on the *Vajracchedikā*, either translated or written by Bodhiruci (A.D. 508-535), which M. Peri, Professors Shiio and Ui make very much of. Secondly, the *Bodhisattva-bhūmy-ādhāra*, a portion of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, translated by Dharmarakṣa (A.D. 414-421), along with the *Bodhisattva-bhadraśīla*, also a portion of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, translated by Gunavarman (A.D. 421), on both of which the arguments of Professors Wogihara, Shiio, and Hikata are based. To the same category belongs the *Sūtrālankāra*, said to be composed by Asanga, the original of which was published by Professor Sylvain Lévi, who based upon it a new date for Asaṅga. Thirdly the *Samyukta-abhidharma-hṛdaya*, by Dharmatrāta, translated by Saṅghavarman (A.D. 424). The name of Vasubandhu contained in the work was and is still a centre of dispute, especially among the Japanese savants.

Let us now examine these points. First as to the *Chin kang sien lun*. The work is said to be a commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, written by a man named Chin kang sien (perhaps Vajrarsi in Sanskrit), who is supposed to have been a pupil of Vasubandhu, and translated into Chinese by Bodhiruci (A.D. 535). At the end of volume 10 of this work there is a *paramparā* of transmission to the following effect:¹ "Maitreya composed a commentary on the *Vajracchedikā* and the *Bodhisattva-bhūmy-ādhāra*, and handed them down to Asaṅga, who in transmitted them to Vasubandhu. The latter again wrote a sub-commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, and handed it down to Chin kang sien (perhaps Vajrarsi). Then Chin kang sien to Wu tsin yi (Akṣayamatī), Wu tsin yi to Cheng tsi, Cheng tsi to Bodhiruci, thus transmitting it successively without interruption until to-day for about two hundred years." Such a *paramparā* would be very important if it came down from Bodhiruci himself, or if we knew anything about the names to verify the truth. But it seems to be all in the negative. First of all, the work is stated to be the translation of an Indian original; but that it is not a translation can easily be seen by a perusal of its content. If it is not an Indian work, it can only be a compilation in China, either by Bodhiruci or by some other hand. In any case the work was in existence soon after Bodhiruci, because it was quoted by Ki tsang (A.D. 548-623) and Hui yuan (died A.D. 589). Ki tsang's quotation in the commentary on the *Vajracchedikā*, however, differs somewhat from what we have in the present text of the *Chin kang sien lun*. The work may have undergone an alteration by a later hand. In the style of composition and the method of annotation we notice

¹ My edition of the Chinese *Tripitaka*, vol. XXV, no. 1512, p. 874.

many points that give the work the stamp of Chinese authorship. As to the authenticity of the work there was some dispute among Chinese savants of old, and the learned Ki,¹ a pupil of Hiuen tsang, finally passed a sentence saying: "As to the śāstra Chin kang sien (Vajraruṣi), it is said that he [Chin kang sien] was a man of Wu in the southern section [of China], and his work is not a true sacred teaching." This means that Chin kang sien was not an Indian but a native of Wu in the south, and is not giving us a true teaching. It would amount to saying that the work is a Chinese forgery. As we know that learned forgeries were rather habitual early in the Six Dynasties and Sui Dynasty, and that quotations from forged works can be found even in some serious books, we can almost safely assume with the learned Ki that the work in question belongs to this category. Apart from this, the paramparā itself is of a dubious character. Between Asaṅga-Vasubandhu and Bodhiruci only three names are given, and yet a period of two centuries is said to have elapsed. This is hardly credible, as Mr. Ui rightly thinks. Besides, those three transmitters are mere names unidentified with any known personages in India or elsewhere. Not one of the catalogues of the Chinese *Tripiṭaka*s, thirteen in number, has recorded the work either as a translation or as a Chinese compilation. Having these facts before us, we can in no way utilize a work like this as a basis of proposing a date, even if I may be too harsh in regarding it as a forgery.

Next as to the *Bodhisattva-bhūmy-ādhāra* and the *Bodhisattva-bhadrāśīla*, translated into Chinese A.D. 413-421 and 431 respectively. These two are, doubtless, portions of the large *Yogācāra-bhūmi*. If Asaṅga is the actual author of all the three texts, a date anterior to that of the translation will be suitable for him, and my date for Vasubandhu ought to be given up at once. From this point of view Professor Wogihara proposed A.D. 390-470 for Vasubandhu and A.D. 375-450 for Asaṅga, though the reason why he puts the difference of twenty years of age between the two brothers by the same mother is not quite clear to me. Professor Sylvain Lévi, too, on this account abandoned his former date and proposed a new date, holding that Asaṅga's activity covers the whole of the first half of the fifth century, as referred to above. Concerning the authorship of these four books just mentioned, Professor Ui rendered us a great service in his research

¹ Ki is the youngest but most learned pupil of Hiuen tsang. Formerly I called him Kuei Chi and M. Peri, Kouei ki, but we were mistaken; his real name being simply Ki. His words here quoted are from his commentary (Tsan shu) on the *Vajracchedikā*.

on Maitreya, in which he concluded that Maitreya was the actual author of these works, not simply an inspirer of Asanga. I have made an abstract of Mr. Ui's research from his *Study of Indian Philosophy*, and give it here as a supplement to this article. According to him most of the works hitherto assigned to Asanga, inspired from above by the Bodhisattva Maitreya, are in reality to be attributed to Maitreya himself. In that case Asanga would be only a transmitter, direct or indirect, of Maitreya's *Mahāyāna* doctrine. Chi yuan,¹ who went to India with Fa hien and Pao yun (A.D. 399-414), invited Buddhabhadra to China, and on his return home translated several Sanskrit texts. As he had some doubt as to the Vinaya practice, he started once again for India by sea some time after A.D. 427, and after his arrival in India he saw several Arhats and inquired about his doubt. No one, however, could give a decisive answer. Thereupon an Arhat ascended, while engaged in meditation, to the *Tusita* heaven and inquired of Maitreya living there as to Chi yuen's doubt, and found that the latter was right in his understanding. He was satisfied with it, and on his way home he reached Ki pin (Kaśmīra), where he died without a disease, aged seventy-eight. If Maitreya lived on earth at all, he ought to have been in activity about that time. Some of the five Dharmas which are attributed to Maitreya in Tibet are assigned to Śāramati in China. Whether Śāramati can be identified with Maitreya or not remains to be seen. If, in any case, a scholar named Maitreya be found to be the author of those works hitherto attributed to Asanga, then the date of the latter ought to be shifted later, at least by one generation, if not more. The ground for an earlier date for Vasubandhu should give way altogether.

Thirdly, as to Dharmatrāta's *Samyukta-abhidharma-hṛdaya*, Professor T. Kimura has shown in his *Study of the Abhidharma Literature*, I think, with a successful issue. According to him, Vasubandhu systematized Dharmatrāta's work just mentioned, and developing it with the Sautrāntika views, wrote the *Abhidharma-kośa* as a textbook of the realistic school. Dharmatrāta's work mentions the name "Vasubandhu," who represents a philosophical tenet of his time. This Vasubandhu is explained to be an older Vasubandhu by Fu kuang, a pupil of Hiuen tsang; but those who advocate an earlier date will hold it to be a mistake on the part of Fu kuang.

Fortunately, however, this point can be traced in Yaśomitra's *Abhidharma kośa vyākhyā*,² which takes that old Vasubandhu to be a

¹ "Chu san tsan chi tsi" (Nanjio, 1476) vol. XV, s. 7.

² Professor de la Vallée Poussin, *Vasubandhu et Yaśomitra*, pp. xix and 159.

Sthavira and the Upādhyāya of Ācārya Manoratha, who is, according to Paramārtha's *Life of Vasubandhu*, an elder contemporary of Vasubandhu. According to the internal evidence adduced by Mr. Kimura from the Abhidharma literature, a succession of these principal Abhidharma works is to be assumed, and Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa* is to be placed at the concluding period, and has to come subsequent to Dharmatrāta's work, which was translated thrice — A.D. 418, 426, and 434. Had there been in existence Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa*, which is ever so much clearer than Dharmatrāta's work, why should they translate the latter work so often, one after another, one Chinese (Fa hien) and four Indian (Buddhabhadra, Iśvara, Gunavarman, and Saṅghavarman), all well up in things Indian, having been engaged in it. As for further detail, the reader is referred to Professor Kimura's discussion, an abstract of which is also given here at the end.

The above three points made clear, it will be quite sufficient for our purpose, because all other chronological data from the Chinese sources are often contradictory to each other, and the lists of transmission of the Idealistic school, from Vasubandhu down to Bodhiruci or Dharmapāla, are also in conflict with each other. What remains for me to do is to translate all the important materials and to lay them before my readers, a task too heavy for me at present. The present article is to indicate simply that the date proposed by me some twenty years ago still holds good, now that so many scholars have been in the arena and so many earlier dates have been proposed. It is gratifying to me to see that Professor R. Garbe, in the second edition of his *Sāṅkhya Philosophy* (p. 74), follows my date throughout, giving a reason why he does so. The following lists of Indian philosophers may help us to see that the interval between Vasubandhu and Bodhiruci or Dharmapāla can in no way be so wide as two centuries.

I

LISTS OF TEACHERS, SHOWING THEIR RELATIONS TO VASUBANDHU

TEN COMMENTATORS OF VASUBANDHU (*Vijñānamātratā*)

1. Bandhuśrī, contemporary and commentator of Vasubandhu, *circa*, A.D. 420–500.
2. Citrabhānu, contemporary and commentator of Vasubandhu, *circa* A.D. 420–500.
3. Guṇamati, his *Lakṣaṇānusāra*, translated by Paramārtha (came to China A.D. 546). Teacher of Sthiramati (4); *Of Late Years*, Itsing, A.D. 671–695.
4. Sthiramati, elder contemporary of Dharmapāla (6) A.D. 528–560; pupil of Guṇamati (3); *Of Late Years*, Itsing.
5. Suddhacandra, contemporary of Sthiramati (4); commentator of Vasubandhu's *Paramārthasaptati*.

6. Dharmapāla, died A.D. 560, aged 32; teacher of Śilabhadra whom Hiuen tsang met at his advanced age of 106, A.D. 633; *Of Late Years*, Itsing.
7. Nanda, teacher of Jayasena known to Hiuen tsang A.D. 629-645 in India; commentator on the *Yogācārabhūmi*.
8. Viśeśamitra, pupil of Dharmapāla (6); commentator of Maitreya's *Yogācārabhūmi*; otherwise called Jinamitra by Nanjio.
9. Jinaputra, pupil of Dharmapāla (6); commentator of Maitreya's *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.
10. Jñānacandra, pupil of Dharmapāla (6); living in Tilaḍha vihāra in Itsing's time, A.D. 671-695.

N.B. Of the above names, Nos. 1 and 2 are said to have lived in the 900 years P.N., at the same time as Vasubandhu; while Nos. 3 to 10 lived after 1100 years P.N. The long interval is utterly unaccountable. Either one or the other is a mistake. As to Dharmapāla, Itsing makes him a contemporary of Bhartṛhari who died forty years before him, that is, *circa* A.D. 630-650. This seems to be an error.

II

(a) POINTS OF DISPUTE

1. Bandhuśrī.
3. Guṇamati, deriving his idea from Bandhuśrī, asserts two divisions of mental function.
4. Sthiramati, pupil of Guṇamati (3); one division of mental function.
7. Nanda, two divisions of mental function.

(b) POINTS OF DISPUTE

2. Citrabhānu.
- (a) Diśnāga, deriving his idea from Citrabhānu (2), asserts three divisions of mental functions; authority of *hetuvidyā* (logic).
6. Dharmapāla, four divisions of mental function; pupil of Diśnāga (according to Tibetan tradition).
 - (b) Saṅkarasvāmi, pupil and successor of Diśnāga (a) in *hetuvidyā* (logic).
 - (c) Praśastapāda, Vaiśeṣika philosopher defending himself against Diśnāga's *hetuvidyā* (logic); asserts nine *guṇas* of Atmā.
 - (d) Paramārtha, died A.D. 569, aged 71; quotes nine *guṇas* of the *Vaiśeṣika*; writes the Life of Vasubandhu; translates two works of Diśnāga (a) and one work of Guṇamati (3).

(c) POINTS OF DISPUTE

- (e) Candrapāla, admits only pūrva-vāsanā in the ālaya-vijñāna.
7. Nanda, asserts nava-vāsanā.
- (f) Jayasena, follower of Nanda (7); asserts nava-vāsanā.
6. Dharmapāla, admits pūrva-vāsanā as well as nava-vāsanā.

III

LIST OF OPPONENTS OF VASUBANDHU

- (1) Saṅghabhadra, opponent in Abhidharma; *Of the Middle Age*, Itsing; two works against the *Abhidharma-kośa*.
- (2) Bhāvaviveka, opponent in Prajñāpāramitā; *Of the Middle Age*, Itsing.
- (3) Vasurata, opponent in Vyākaraṇa; one work against the grammar of the *Abhidharma-kośa*.
- (4) Iśvarakṛṣṇa, opponent in Sāṅkhya; against his *Sāṅkhya-saptati* Vasubandhu wrote *Paramārtha-saptati*.

IV

CHINESE THREE SCHOOLS OF IDEALISM (*Vijñaptimātratā*)

- I. Ti lun tsung (Daśabhūmi school). Founded by Bodhiruci from North India (A.D. 508 to China); probably representing the North school of the idealistic philosophy.
- II. Shueh lun tsung (Mahāyāna-samparigraha school). Founded by Paramārtha from Ujjayinī, West India (A.D. 539 invited to China); probably representing the famous Valabhi school of the idealistic philosophy.
- III. Hu fa tsung (Dharmapāla school). Founded by Hiuen tsang (A.D. 629–645, in India); representing the then flourishing Nālanda school, instituted by Dharmapāla; with the appearance of this school the two old schools became well-nigh extinct.

V

THREE PREDECESSORS OF VASUBANDHU'S REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

- I. Dharmottara (or Dharmāśri). His work on realism, *Abhidharma-hṛdaya* (Nanjo, 1288; translated A.D. 343–344 or 384).
- II. Upaśanta. His work, *Abhidharma-hṛdaya* (enlarged) (Nanjo, 1294; translated A.D. 563).
- III. Dharmatrāta. His work, *Samyukta-abhidharma-hṛdaya* (Nanjo, 1287; translated [1] A.D. 397–418; [2] 426–431; [3] 434).
- IV. Vasubandhu. His work *Abhidharma-kośa* (Nanjo, 1269; translated A.D. 563–567; 1267, A.D. 654; 1270, A.D. 651).

N.B. For further details, see Professor Kimura's supplement.

VI

TARANĀTHA'S PARAMPARĀ OF TEACHERS

- I. Vasubandhu.
- II. Diśnāga, pupil of Vasubandhu.
- III. Dharmapāla, pupil of Diśnāga.

THE DATE OF VASUBANDHU SEEN FROM THE ABHIDHARMA-KOŚA

THE FOUR TEXTS

BY TAIKEN KIMURA

THE earliest epitome of the Vaibhāṣika philosophy is the *Abhidharma-hṛdaya*, written by Dharmottara or Dharmaśrī (Nanjo, 1288). It treats of important questions of the abhidharma philosophy, yet it is, as a system of philosophy, nothing but a crude writing in form and content. Then comes Upaśānta's *Abhidharma-hṛdaya* (Nanjo, 1294). It is a new work, enlarged and developed from the above text. Next we have Dharmatrāta, who again enlarged on and developed Upaśānta's text. His work is called the *Samyukta-abhidharma-hṛdaya* (Nanjo, 1289). This work was again revised and developed by Vasubandhu, then a great realistic philosopher, and is what we know as the *Abhidharma-kośa* (Nanjo, 1269, 1270). For a detailed discussion, see Kimura's *Study of the Abhidharma Literature*, part 5. Now let us examine the dates of the Chinese translations of the above four texts which have appeared one after another.

CHINESE TRANSLATIONS OF ABHIDHARMA HṛDAYA AND OF ABHIDHARMA KOŚA

I

Dharmottara's *Abhidharma-hṛdaya* (Nanjo, 1288).

Translators: Sanghadeva and Tao an.

Dates variously given: A.D. 343-344 (see Nanjo, 1688, vol. V); A.D. 384 (see Nanjo, 1476, vol. II); or A.D. 391 (see Nanjo, 1288).

II

Upaśānta's *Abhidharma-hṛdaya* (Nanjo, 1294).

Translators: Narendrayaśas (A.D. 557-568), and Dharma prajñāruci (an assistant).

Date: A.D. 563.

III

Dharmatrāta's *Samyukta-abhidharma-hṛdaya* (Nanjo, 1287).

There are three translations:

(a) The earliest translation (now lost).

Translators: Fa hien, A.D. 399-414 (in India), and Buddhabhadra, A.D. 398-421 (in China).

Date: A.D. 397-418.

(b) The second translation (now lost).

Translators: Īśvara (A.D. 426-431), 10 chapters, and Guṇavarman (A.D. 431), last 3 chapters.

(c) The third translation (Nanjio, 1287).

Translator: Sanghavarman (A.D. 433-442).

Date: A.D. 434.

IV

Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa*.

(a) The first translation (Nanjio, 1269).

Translator: Paramārtha, author of the *Life of Vasubandhu*.

Date: A.D. 563-567.

(b) The second translation (Nanjio, 1267).

Translator: Hiuen tsang.

Date: A.D. 654.

(c) The *Abhidharma-kośa-kārikā* (Nanjio, 1270).

Translator: Hiuen tsang.

Date: A.D. 651.

Among these four treatises, which successively develop the former, one, that by Dharmatrāta (III), with its three translations, is most important for ascertaining the date of Vasubandhu, for it existed immediately before the work of Vasubandhu, and was translated by five competent priests who were versed in things Indian of that period, that is to say, A.D. 400-434. Fa hien, who, as we all know, traveled in India about fifteen years (A.D. 399-415), does not mention even the name of Vasubandhu; and had he known of such an authentic text as the *Abhidharma-kośa*, why should he have translated Dharmatrāta's imperfect work instead? The remaining four of the translators, who were all from India, arriving in China between 390 and 433, did not even speak of Vasubandhu or Asaṅga and, themselves translating the imperfect text of Dharmatrāta, did not bring to light the systematized work of Vasubandhu. There would be no reason whatever to translate three times one and the same older text, had there been before them a new revised work of our great philosopher.

TWO VASUBANDHUS

We know from the *Life of Vasubandhu* that Vasubandhu had two brothers, Viriñci-vatsa Vasubandhu and Asaṅga Vasubandhu, and we have to acknowledge the existence of yet another teacher named Vasubandhu anterior to our Vasubandhu, the author of the *Abhidharma-kośa*.

In the preface to the *Samyukta-abhidharma-hṛdaya* of Dharmatrāta, it is said: "Several teachers have written *Abhidharma-hṛdayas*, which are not similar in scope, either extensive or concise. The work

of Dharmottara (or Dharmasrī) is extremely concise, while that of Upasānta is much larger, being of eight thousand *ślokas*. Yet there was another teacher whose work consisted of twelve thousand *ślokas*. These two are said to be extensive ones. Vasubandhu annotated the *dharma* in six thousand *ślokas*, and his work was wide in extent and deep in meaning, not being inclined to one of the *Tripiṭakas*. Such was the *Asaṃskṛta-ākāśa-śāstra*." Vasubandhu here referred to must be an earlier teacher of that name, and not the author of the *Abhidharma-kośa*. He must be anterior to Dharmatrāta, who quotes him, and to the dates of translation of Dharmatrāta's work, that is, A.D. 418, 426, and 436, as we have seen above. M. Peri considers that "six thousand *ślokas*" here may be a mistake for "six hundred *ślokas*," because the *Abhidharma kośa* of our Vasubandhu contains only so many, he not being aware of the fact that it in reality referred to another older Vasubandhu, as Pu kuang hinted. M. Peri's proposition thus falls to the ground as soon as we recognize Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa* to be subsequent to Dharmatrāta's work. For convenience sake we will call the author of the *Asaṃskṛta-ākāśa* the old Vasubandhu, and the author of the *Abhidharma-kośa* the new Vasubandhu.

In the *Abhidharma-kośa* itself (Chapter 9) we come across a sentence explaining Avidyā in the following words: "It is said by another commentator that the unreasonable *manaskāra* as mentioned in other sūtras is the cause of Avidyā." . . .

The words "another commentator" here are rightly explained by Pu kuang, a pupil of Hiuen tsang, as the older Vasubandhu. Further, Yaśomitra too, in his *Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā*, explains it in the following words: "Sthaviro Vasubandhur Ācārya Manorathopādhyāya evam āha." . . . See Professor de la Vallée Poussin, *Vasubandhu et Yaśomitra*, page 159. Thus the old Vasubandhu, so-called by Pu kuang, was, according to Yaśomitra, the *upādhyāya* of the Ācārya *Manoratha*, who was a contemporary of our Vasubandhu and was quoted, though without giving his name, in our Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa* itself. So we can assume with perfect safety that Vasubandhu, the author of the *Asaṃskṛta-ākāśa*, quoted by Dharmatrāta, Vasubandhu, a *sthavira* and the *upādhyāya* of *Manoratha*, mentioned by Yaśomitra, and Vasubandhu, hinted at in the words "another commentator" by the new Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharma-kośa* and explained by Pu kuang as the old Vasubandhu, are one and the same personage, and one and all refer to the old Vasubandhu, quite different from our Vasubandhu. So we should be very careful not to assign a date to Vasubandhu without discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Judging from the dates of translation of the Chinese *Abhidharma* texts, we can say that the *Abhidharma-kośa* was not yet in existence in A.D. 430, and consequently during this period the new Vasubandhu had not yet entered upon his career as the author of either the Realistic school or the Idealistic school. Those who assign him a date in the third or fourth century are, I think, confusing the old with the new. I, for my part, consider the date A.D. 420-500 to fit our great philosopher best.

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THE DATE OF VASUBANDHU SEEN FROM THE HISTORY OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

By GENMYO ONO

THE theory of the three persons (*kāya*) of Buddha and the eight faculties of mind were developed and brought into perfection by Vasubandhu. These theories may be taken as peculiar to him. In old days, as in the present day, a new thought current in India used at once to be reflected to China. The translating of an Indian original was at the same time the transplanting of the idea set forth in it. Vasubandhu's two theories just referred to cannot be traced in the works, either *sūtras* or *śāstras*, translated prior to the commencement of the fifth century. In the *Mahā-parinirvāna-sūtra* (Nanjo, 113), translated by Dharmarakṣa A.D. 414-421, and the *Śrīmālī-siñhanāda-sūtra* (Nanjo, 59), translated by Guṇabhadra A.D. 436, we have for the first time the discourse about the nature of Buddha (*Buddhasvabhāva*) and the embryo of Tathāgata (*Tathāgata-garbhā*). There are, however, as yet no theories of the three *Buddha-kāyas* or the eight *vijñānas*. In the *Suvarṇa-prabhāsa-sūtra* (Nanjo, 127), also translated by Dharmarakṣa, A.D. 412-426, and the *Tathāgatagarbhā-sūtra* (Nanjo, 384), translated by Buddhabhadra A.D. 420, no theories of Vasubandhu are found as yet. It is true there exists in the former a section, *Trikāya vibhāga*, which treats of *Buddha-kāyas*. This section, however, is a translation interpolated by Paramārtha, A.D. 548-569. We have for the first time an enumeration of the eight *vijñānas*, in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* translated by Guṇabhadra A.D. 443, though the functions of *vijñānas* are not clearly defined. In the works translated by Bodhiruci and Ratnamati A.D. 508-535, we see the idea gradually ripened and are confronted often with the three *kāyas* and the eight *vijñānas*, though the theories are not yet systematized. Such treatises are the *Sandhi-nirmocana-sūtra* (Nanjo, 246), the *Pu tsang pu chien sūtra* (Nanjo, 524), the *Daśabhūmi śāstra* (Nanjo, 1194), the *Vajracchedikā śāstra* (Nanjo, 1168), and the *Saddharma-pundarīka-śāstra* (Nanjo, 1233), the latter three being Vasubandhu's own works.

Finally, those treatises of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu more or less professing to set forth the theories were translated by Paramārtha, Buddhaśānta, Gautamaprajñāruci, and others, A.D. 531-563. These are the *Mahāyāna-samparigraha* (Nanjo, 1184), of Asaṅga, the *Vi-*

jñapti-mātratā (Nanjo, 1238), the *Karma siddhi* (Nanjo, 1222), the *Buddha svabhāva* (Nanjo, 1220), the *Mahāyāna-samparigraha-sāstra* (Nanjo, 1171), the *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (Nanjo, 1248), all of Vasubandhu; the *Daśa-bhūmi-sāstra* (now lost) of Maitreya, the Trikāya section in the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*, and the *Wu shang i sūtra* (Nanjo, 259), the latter five being the translations by Paramārtha, A.D. 548-569. With these works we are first introduced to the systematized theories of Asanga and Vasubandhu, especially with regard to the three *kāyas* and the eight *vijñānas*.

To sum up, the theory of the eight *vijñānas* is established out of the idea of the *Buddha-gotra* and the *Tathāgata-garbha* and with the development of the eight *vijñānas* the theories of the *tri-kāya* and the *caturjñānas* are completed. If we examine the whole of the translated texts, we find no trace at all during the fourth century. At the beginning of the fifth century, we notice some germs of them appearing; but from the middle of the fifth century down to the beginning of the sixth century, we feel the ideas fully developed and ripened. Since the systematization of the theories belongs to Asanga, and especially to Vasubandhu, their activity may be considered to cover the middle of the fifth century and after.

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MAITREYA AS AN HISTORICAL PERSONAGE

By HAKUJU UI

THE Bodhisattva Maitreya was probably an historical person at the beginning, and afterwards was believed to be the coming Buddha. This belief seems to be pretty old, but the Maitreya here alluded to is the instructor of Asanga, especially in the doctrine of Yogācāra, namely, Vijñānamātratā. We shall restrict our discussion to this personage. For convenience' sake we shall use the name Maitreya without any title for the instructor of Asanga, and therefore a historical person; while we shall add the title Bodhisattva for the would-be Buddha, who may be considered a fabulous person. I presume that scholars will generally believe with me in the historical existence of Maitreya; yet nobody from our side until to-day has set forth his opinion expressly on this point, and consequently the authorship of many a work assigned to Maitreya, or to Asanga, is not quite settled. This is a serious question in the history of the development of Buddhism in India, which, if settled once for all, will clear up a dark passage in the origin of idealism and its development and will enable us to fix the age of activity of Asanga and Vasubandhu.

Generally speaking, those who speak of the relationship of Asanga with Maitreya are Asanga himself and Vasubandhu. Those who handed down such a tradition are three: first, Bodhiruci, who came to China in A.D. 506 and stated that Maitreya composed the commentary on the *Vajracchedikā* and the *Bodhisattva-bhūmy-ādhāra*, and taught them to Asanga; secondly, Paramārtha (499-509), who reached China in A.D. 546 and compiled the *Life of Vasubandhu*, and thirdly, Hiuen tsang (600-664), who started from China in A.D. 629 and on his return home in A.D. 645 compiled his travels, *Si yu ki*. In Tibet there are traditions much later than those handed down by these travellers. According to the *Life of Vasubandhu*, by Paramārtha, Asanga was a native of Puruṣapura (Peshwar), and joined the order in the Sarvāstivāda school. Learning of the doctrine of Void of the Hinayāna, and being unable to comprehend it, he determined to kill himself. Pindola of the east Videha came and instructed him in it. Not being satisfied with it, he went up to the Tuṣita heaven, where he was initiated into the doctrine of Void of the Mahāyāna by Maitreya. Afterwards he now and again went up to the heaven to learn the Mahāyāna sūtras, and on descending he preached them, but people would not believe

him. He asked Maitreya himself to come down and preach the Law. Thereupon the latter made a descent on earth and lectured on the *Sapta-daśa-bhūmi* (*Yogācāra-bhūmi*) for four months. During the lecture no one but Asanga could approach him, though all could hear him from afar. Asanga in the daytime repeated and explained the lecture of the night before. Then people began to believe the Mahāyāna. Asanga could through the power of meditation understand even that profound *Avataṃsaka-sūtra*. According to Hiuen tsang, he joined the order in the Mahiśasaka school, but was afterward converted to the Mahāyāna. While in a *saṅghārāma* near Ayodhyā, he often went up to the Tuṣita heaven at night and learned from Maitreya the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, the *Sūtrālankāra*, and the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*, and in the daytime he repeated and expounded them.

Tāraṇātha's tales, mythological as they are, give similar traditions as to Maitreya's instruction, Asanga's lecture and his compilation of *śāstras*. These three traditions agree in substance, making Asanga receive instruction from Maitreya. But who is Maitreya, a teacher or a Bodhisattva? Naturally we had to presume that the tradition would contain an historical fact, and Maitreya was the actual teacher of Asanga. We shall now examine what we are told emanated from Maitreya.

I

THE YOGĀCĀRA BHŪMI (Nanjo, 1170)

The *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, said to have been preached by Maitreya, was translated by Hiuen tsang, A.D. 648. This text was partially translated in an earlier period, as a separate sūtra, as follows:

(a) *Bodhisattva-bhūmy-ādhāra sūtra* (Nanjo, 1086); translated by Dharmarakṣa, A.D. 414-418 (vol. xxxv, chap. 1, vols. xl, l, chap. 5, of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*).

(b) *Bodhisattva-bhadra-śīla sūtra* (Nanjo, 1085); translated by Guṇavarman, A.D. 431 (the same chapters as above of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*).

(c) *Bodhisattva-śīla-karmavāca* (Nanjo, 1197); translated by Hiuen tsang A.D. 649 (vols. xl, xli, xlvi, chap. 10 of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*).

(d) *Bodhisattva-prātimokṣa* (Nanjo, 1096); translated (1) by Dharmarakṣa, A.D. 414-421; (2) by Hiuen tsang, A.D. 649 (the same chapters as above of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*).

(e) *Chie ting tsang* (*Nirṇaya Saṅgraha*), (Nanjo, 1235); translated by Paramārtha, A.D. 550-560 (vols. li-lvii, chaps. 1-7 of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*).

(f) *Wan fa chang li* (*Rāja-dharma-nyāya*), (Nanjio, 1200); translated by Hiuen tsang, A.D. 649 (vols. lviii-lxi, chaps. 1-4 of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*).

All these six are portions of the large *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, and most of them are said to have been expounded by Maitreya for Asanga.

Only one of these is said to have been composed by Maitreya. Hiuen tsang himself alludes to the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* in his *Si yu ki* (vol. x), and says that it was composed by Maitreya. The internal evidence, too, indicates that the whole of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* existed first, and extracts were drawn from it afterwards, thereby making them separate *sūtras*. In Asanga's *Hsien yang shang chao lun* (Nanjio, 1177), he says expressly that Maitreya is the propounder of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, and adds: "Formerly I, Asanga, heard it from him, and now setting together the important points of the *Bhūmi* will here illustrate the holy teaching." . . . This shows again that this *śāstra* is a compendium of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* propounded by Maitreya. The compendium is Asanga's work, while the original from which it was abridged could not have been his own. Therefore the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* must be a work of Maitreya, himself. Both Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Mahāyāna-samparigraha* and Jinaputra's commentary on the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* praise in their opening verses Maitreya as the expounder of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*. Thus no one has ever regarded Asanga as the author of the whole or a part of that work. The *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, one hundred volumes in all, is divided, the principal portion of it into seventeen *bhūmis*, and the rest into three chapters concerning the *Tripiṭaka*.

Therefore the text is often called *Sapta-daśa-bhūmi-sūtra*, or *śāstra*. Bhāviveka called the *vijñāna-mātra* philosophers by the name of *Saptadaśabhūmi* *śāstrin*, while Paramārtha names the work itself *Sapta-daśa-bhūmi-sūtra*. The *Bodhisattva-bhūmy-ādhāra* (Nanjio, 1086), a portion of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, as we have seen, is the most important of all the seventeen *bhūmis*. This text is quoted twice by Asanga in his commentary on the *Vajracchedikā* (Nanjio, 1167, 1208), which was again commented on by Vasubandhu. This clearly indicates that the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* was known to Asanga and Vasubandhu and was in existence before them. Thus we can safely conclude that neither the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* nor the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* is the work of Asanga. They can only be the works of Maitreya, who transmitted them directly or indirectly to Asanga.

II

THE YOGA-VIBHĀGA-ŚĀSTRA (now lost)

This text does not exist either in Sanskrit or in Tibetan or in Chinese, but from the quotations found in the *Mahāyāna-samparigraha* (Nanjo, 1183, chap. 4), the *Abhidharma-saṅgīti* (Nanjo, 1197, chap. 6), and the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* (Nanjo, 1197, chap. 9), we well know that it existed in those days. The purport of the passages quoted is actually found in the *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (Nanjo, 1244, chaps. 1, 4, 5), which also belongs to Maitreya. As a similar passage exists also in the *Yoga-vibhāga* section (chap. 6) of the *Sandhi-nirmocana-sūtra* (Nanjo, 246, 247), we may assume that it was composed by Maitreya on the same basis as *sūtra*.

III

THE MAHĀYĀNA-SŪTRALĀNKARA (Nanjo, 1190)

For this work we possess fortunately both Sanskrit and Chinese texts. According to the catalogue *Kai yuen lu* (Nanjo, 1485, A.D. 730), and the Chinese editions of Sung, Yuen, Ming, and Kaoli, it was composed by Asanga. Sylvain Lévi, the editor of its Sanskrit text, probably following these traditions, attributed it to Asanga. The mistake was originated by the *Kai yuen lu* catalogue, and it comes as follows: Prabhākara mitra, who was a pupil of Śilabhadra in Nālanda, and was well versed in the Yogācāra, came to China, leaving his pupils, Prajñādhara varman and others, behind, and was engaged in translation of Sanskrit texts till A.D. 633. A translation of this text was finished A.D. 630–632, and presented to the Emperor Tai tsung in 633, in which year the translator died, aged 69. Hiuen tsang was in India, and just in that year saw Śilabhadra, at the advanced age of 106, in Nālanda. Li pai ye wrote a preface to the translation by the Imperial order, and stated in it that it was compiled by the Bodhisattva Asanga. I do not think that he meant to say that Asanga was the actual author of the text. He had probably indicated by the word “compiled” that Asanga heard it from Maitreya and afterward arranged what he had heard, as was generally believed. Hiuen tsang, too, tells us exactly so. If so, the statement of the *Kai yuen lu* that Asanga “composed” it is an error on the part of its author. Hui chao, a pupil of Hiuen tsang, in the commentary on the *Vijñāna-mātratā*, says expressly that the *Kārikā* was composed by Maitreya and the commentary by Vasubandhu.

Hui chao (*circa* A.D. 690) is much anterior to the author of the *Kai yuen lu* (A.D. 730), and we can take it to have been derived from his teacher, Hiuen tsang. Sthiramati, in his *Mahāyāna-avatāra* (Nanjio, 1243), says toward the end: "Thou shouldst know that the *Mahāyāna* is the original teaching of Buddha as it is expounded in the *Sūtrālankāra* of Maitreya." Thus, according to Sthiramati, the text is by Maitreya, not by Asanga. A similar tradition is handed down in the Dharma lakṣana school in China, though whether the authorship of the commentary belongs to Asanga or to Vasubandhu is still a question.

IV

THE MADHYĀNTA-VIBHĀGA (Nanjio, 1245)

The *Kārikā* of the *Vibhāga* was composed by Maitreya, while the commentary is by Vasubandhu. This existed therefore, like the other extracted texts, before Asanga and Vasubandhu. No explanation is wanted as to its being first propounded by Maitreya to Asanga, who in turn handed it down to Vasubandhu.

V

THE VAJRACCHEDIKĀ-PĀRAMITĀ-ŚĀSTRA (Nanjio, 1167, 1168)

I-tsing says in the appendix to his translation (1231): "According to a tradition in India, Asanga received from Maitreya the *Kārikā* of 80 verses and Vasubandhu commented upon it." It is thus a work of Maitreya. Bodhiruci (A.D. 508) attributes the *Kārikā* as well as the commentary to Vasubandhu, while I-tsing (A.D. 711) assigns only the commentary to Vasubandhu. I-tsing puts in the text Asanga as the composer of the *Kārikā* but this contradicts his own statement above quoted. So we ought not take the word 'composer' in its strict meaning.

VI

THE ABHISAMAYA-ALĀNKĀRA

Though it is not known in China, there exists both in Sanskrit and in Tibetan the *Abhisamaya-alānkāra*. The Sanskrit text is found in Professor Takakusu's collection, besides Professor Wogihara's copy. The authorship evidently belongs to Maitreya (Kritir iyam Arya-Maitreya-nāthasya), but few notice the colophon. It is attached to the commencement of the 25,000 *Prajñā-pāramitā*, and was pointed

out by Hara Prasād Sāstri, who discussed the question of the historical character of Maitreya. Having obtained a hint from his article, I searched through all Chinese texts emanating from Maitreya. In the Tibetan traditions the *Abhisamaya-alankāra* is sometimes attributed to Asanga and at other times to Maitreya. But the Tibetan catalogue assigns it definitely to Maitreya and makes it have no connection whatever with Asanga.

Besides the above six texts, there are two Tibetan texts attributed to Maitreya, namely, the *Dharma-dharmatā-vibhāga* and the *Mahāyāna-uttara-tantra*. Vasubandhu wrote a commentary on the former, while Asanga wrote that on the latter. Of these two a translation of the latter by Ratnamati, A.D. 508, is found in the Chinese *Tripiṭaka* (Nanjo, 1236), in which the *Kārikā* is said to be by Maitreya and the commentary by Asanga. Fa tsang (died 699) in his commentary on the *Wu cha pieh lun* (*Aviśeṣa-śāstra*, Nanjo, 1258), says:

“According to an Indian tradition handed down by Devaprajña, the translator of the *śāstra*, the author of the *Mahāyāna-uttara-tantra*, is Sāramati (Kien hui), who also wrote the *Wu cha pieh lun*. Yen tse, a Korean pupil of Hiuen tsang, in his commentary on the *Sandhi-nirmocana* (Nanjo, 247), speaks of Sāramati as the author of the *Uttara-tantra*.”

On this point this commentary is quite different from the Tibetan tradition, in which the above two texts are classed among the five *dharmas* of Maitreya.

I have now taken up almost all the texts that are connected with Maitreya, and shown that seven of them are by the hand of Maitreya himself.

If he has so many works to his credit, there can be no doubt whatever as to his historical existence. Moreover, Asanga never quotes any other *śāstras* than those of Maitreya, quotes by name the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* (a portion of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*), the *Yoga-vibhāga*, the *Mahāyāna-sūtra-alankāra*, and the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*, in his work, *Mahāyāna-samparigraha* (Nanjo, 1183, 1184), and uses them as the foundation of his own discussion. He would not use his own work as a basis of his own theory.

Accordingly the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* and other works above referred to were not composed for the first time by Asanga, but had existed as separate works before Asanga and Vasubandhu. Maitreya, a worthy human philosopher, wrote several works on his own idealism, and taught Asanga probably personally. Asanga further systematized his own philosophy on the basis of his teacher's instruction. This being

the case, it would not be very difficult, especially in India, to derive his doctrine from the Tusita heaven, where the Bodhisattva Maitreya is believed to live, thus identifying Maitreya with the coming Buddha. The idea of the heaven-descended philosophy would add great weight to the Mahāyānistic faith, for the faith in Maitreya in the Tusita heaven was already established both in India and in China. Tao an (A.D. 314-385) is said to have had such belief, and hoped for a birth in the Tuṣita heaven.

Though Asanga's authorship of these works has been shifted to Maitreya, it would by no means lessen the greatness of Asanga, who remains still the author of eleven works of importance. His figure will come all the more to the front, for his position as an idealistic philosopher is thereby clearly defined, from his predecessor Maitreya and his successor Vasubandhu. The lineage of the Vijñāna-mātra school would be thus without any fabulous element: first, Maitreya, second, Asanga, third, Vasubandhu—with these three generations the systematization of the idealistic school came into completion.

As to the approximate date that can be proposed for Maitreya, the dates of translation give us a clue. The *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* was translated by Dharmarakṣa, A.D. 414-418. We can reasonably assume that the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* was in existence before A.D. 400. Sthiramati's *Mahāyāna-avatara*, which quotes Maitreya's *Sūtrālankāra*, was translated, according to one account, by Tao tai, A.D. 397-439, but according to another, by Tan Yao, A.D. 462. Tao tai went to the west of the Onion range and obtained the text of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, which he is said to have translated with Buddhavarman, A.D. 437-439. But a preface by Tao ting puts the time of translation as A.D. 425-427. The *Mahāyāna avatāra*, then, must have been translated after it, and this falls probably in A.D. 427-437; but the text must have been obtained before his return home, about A.D. 425. We can assume that the *Yogācāra bhūmi* and the *Sūtra-alankāra* had existed before A.D. 350. From these facts we can fix the *terminus ad quem* for the date of Maitreya at A.D. 350.

NOTE

Professor Ui's date is too early. The date of translation is A.D. 414 and after, and the compilation of the original is not necessarily to be put back so far as 64 years. Even if it be reasonable to put it back so far, it is only the *terminus ad quem* for the two works, not for Maitreya. Hereafter Professor Ui goes on to discuss the dates of Asanga and Vasubandhu. His dates are as follows: Maitreya, 270-350; Asanga, 310-390; Vasubandhu, 320-400; about 100 years earlier than mine. He acknowledges 150 years between Vasubandhu and Dharmapāla, instead of the 200 years of Peri. If there be an error of calculation, it must lie in the length of this interval. See the lists of teachers above.

J. TAKAKUSU

THE WELL—TO ET

By C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS

MY teacher Croom Robertson was one who often walked hand in hand with pain. And he would say, when lecturing in ethics on happiness — say it too with a wry quarter-smile as one of ‘them who know’ — ‘Some say, why look ahead to pleasure or a neutral object? It is sufficient to be wanting riddance of pain. We can resolve to do without positive pleasure, but we cannot live with pain. Much of our action is to avoid pain, and no “calculus” is necessary here.’¹

This is to word ‘the well’ negatively. For pleasure, happiness is but the feeling accompanying the state of being well. When we are well, the body is in a pleasureful state, the mind, the will, is in a happy state, affairs, our little world, are in a prosperous state. But there is the ‘man,’ who is neither those instruments nor that little world, the ‘man’ of whom those are adjuncts, vehicles, and these the occasion, the arena, the medium of self-expression, self-direction. It is the very man, the very ‘he’ of whom we can most truly say, he is well, he is better, he is unwell, he seeks to be well, he *wills the well*.

Now Buddhism, in its old Pali scriptures, worded *tau ev* very largely in that negative way. Its spiritual hygiene is mainly taught in negative terms. That its code of moral fundamentals was negative is not a distinctive feature. Even to-day we do not word a Christian code of them in accordance with the teaching of Jesus: ‘Ward thy fellow-man as thyself. Ward his property as thine own. Ward a woman’s husband as brother, a man’s wife as sister and mother; ward the young as brethren. Let speech be truthful, kind, courteous, useful. Keep sober.’ But the Buddhist use of the negative term for the things making for man’s ‘will’ goes far beyond the ‘sīlas.’ Here are some, all of which are leading terms in the holy life:

The goal, the *summum bonum* is *Nibbāna, nissaraya, (bhava-)nirrodha, amata, khaya, anuppāda, vimutti, akuppā, akutobhaya*. The way is *niyyānika, nekkhamma, pahāna, nibbidā, alobha, adosa, amoha, avyāpāda, anabhijjhā, animitta, suññata, appanihita*. The saints are *nibbuta, anāsava, khīnāsava*, without *chanda, paripunnasankappa, katarakarṇīya, brahmacariyavussitavant, pannadhaja, ohitabhāra, mittanha*, and more might be added. All might be considered as summed up in

¹ *Mind*, January, 1893.

the phrase *sammā dukkhass' antakiriyāya* — 'for the perfect making an end of pain.' Once or twice the founder is recorded as summing up his teaching, and once it is in these words: 'Both in the past and now do I, even I, declare just this: pain and the destroying of pain.'¹ And that which he was said to have beaten out under the Bo-tree was the making-to-cease (*nirodha*) the coming-to-be (*samudaya*).

Earnest disciples were taught that ending of ill could only be ending of becoming (*bhava*). The word 'life' was neither appreciated nor depreciated; it was not used doctrinally. The thing to make cease was the being reborn and the being redead. These were the milestones of the woes of all the worlds. And the man who has spiritually 'rejected, cut-down at the root, the body' of his desires and craving, 'made it like the stump of a palm tree, made it something that has ceased 'to become, so that it cannot grow up again in the future' — he alone is happy. So are the Arahants happy — not because before them lay well-warded the way of the worlds toward the goal — in that it was the way of and to the divine Well-Willer. Safety ahead was merely the outlook of the convert, the entrant, the First Path wayfarer. His was the slogan: *Khīnanirayo 'mhi*: perished for me is purgatory!² not that of the saint: *Khīnā jāti*: perished is birth! The saint had done with the Four Ways, he had 'crossed over.' His was the happiness of Lucretius's coast-spectator. He was safe, but his view was seaward at what he had come through. He was not looking landward at what now lay before him. That 'before' was as 'the track of bird in air untraceable.'³

This that doth ne'er grow old, that dieth not,
 This never ageing never-dying Path —
 No sorrow cometh there, no enemies,
 Nor is there any crowd; none faint or fail,
 No fear cometh, nor aught that doth torment.⁴
 To this, the Path Ambrosial have gone
 — Full many . . .

He was in Nirvāna; of the 'beyond' he did but say, it was utter Nirvāna: *parinibbāna*. For:

Nowhere is measure for one gone to oblivion.
 That whereby we speak of him — that exists no longer.
 Wholly cut off are all forms of our knowing,
 Cut off the channels of speech, every one.⁵

¹ Majjh. i, 140.

² Samyutta, ii, 70, etc.

³ Dhp. ver. 92; Theragāthā, ver. 92.

⁴ Therigāthā, ver. 512.

⁵ Sutta-Nipāta, ver. 1076.

His happiness was on the one hand so retrospective and on the other so barred from any forward view into the future, that it might have served Croom Robertson as a fit instance of a well-being in terms of riddance of pain. It may have been with such 'as with one who after long toil and much peril reaches home, and is content with that for the day, whatever life may yet give or ask for on the morrow. They had won up out of the maelstrom of *samsāra* . . . to something ineffable, that now is, but is not to be described in terms of space or aftertime; and resting they sang. We will leave it at that.'¹

It will be said: This is the 'well' held up in the teaching for the few, for those whose faces were set toward the highest, for those who, after ages of slow maturing, were near maturity. Of these I have said quoting Emerson: 'of immortality the well soul is incurious. He is so well that he is sure it will be well.'² But, the objector goes on, the teaching for the many, for the believing layman is more positive, less austere, more human, more suited to those who have not turned their back on the world that they know, on life as they know it.

This is true.³ No creed on earth may be said to sit so lightly and pleasantly over man's conduct and ritual observance as the Buddhist layman's *sāsana*. It may seem the creed of world-orphans. It is so. Yet is it less so than it seems. He too seeks the Unseen Warding, for is not the quasi-deified Teacher one in a chronic process of ever-warding Buddhas? Is not the Teaching, in some way not understood but accepted in faith, a world-gift to man for his salvation? Are not the holy almsmen, albeit very unequal as to holiness, an ever-present influence warding off ill, producing merit? The layman could afford to word 'the well' positively. Worlds lay before him, but by a worthy life here, he could earn guarantees that they would be 'bright,' not 'dark.' He could afford to speak of things pleasant as pleasant, and not as in truth painful.⁴ He could speak calmly of death, for it was not the end-all, but just the common lot.

All this we know. And if the worthy Buddhist layman is not always consistently cheerful over the last-named matter, neither are we when we, like him, find nothing better to comfort ourselves withal. Small blame to the inconsistency. The blameworthy thing for him and us is to find nothing better.

¹ *Psalms of the Sisters*, ver. 511, 512.

² *Psalms of the Brethren*, xlvi.

³ De la Vallée Poussin emphasizes this distinction, so vital to a just appraisement of (early) Buddhism as a whole. *Nirvāṇa*, 1925.

⁴ *Sukham sukhato*, Sutta Nipāta, ver. 759, transl. in *Buddhist Psych.*, p. 86.

But there is one point about this layman's gospel that we forget to bring out. It worded 'the man' more worthily than did the monk, the bhikshu. There is no denial of 'the man,' no *anatta*, in such discourses to laymen or laywomen as that to Sigāla, to the thirty kumāras (who were advised to seek 'the man'),¹ to Visākhā, to Citta and other 'gamanis', to Anāthapindīka. There was no robbing the word man (*puggala*) of having any reality, of being a merely conventional label. There was no whittling down the word to 'a naming of something that exists (body and mind) by something that does not exist.'² The layman was reminded that things are transient and that ills abound; but the third monkish slogan *anatta* — a word not of mondial import, but derived (and misused) from a local, a temporary protest in early Buddhism, was not brought into his gospel, to worry and undermine his conviction that there *was* really and truly 'a man' who worked karma of thought, word and deed, and who reaped the harvest thereof here and hereafter.

And with this more direct, less sophisticated, worthier wording of 'the man,' the Buddhist lay-sāsana, be it noted, worded more rationally 'the well' of the man than did the monk. This lay in seeking his good (*hita*) and that of others, his advantage (*attha, ānisamsa*) and that of others (*parannañ ca*) both here and hereafter. Before him lay the two 'goings,' the well-bourne and the evil-bourne (*sugati, duggati*). Neither was eternal, though either probably lasted long. Certainly the former, the *sagga loka*, did. And how far Nibbāna — word as vague as our 'heaven' — was in any way distinct therefrom he did not ask. Not till Milinda made out a case of a distracted mankind in suspense about it³ do we come across any worrying over the subject.

Nor had that other word for the monk's ideal, *vimutti*, liberation, any charm for the layman. Negative term though it be, it has come to appeal strongly to us, who are the heirs and the record-reading witnesses of ages of struggles for liberty, national, religious, social. Scarce any word thrills us more strongly than just this word of riddance:

*Liberté, liberté chérie!*⁴

It could thrill the monk, the nun no less. The positive thing they had got rid of was so fearfully positive — awful even as fire in the turban,

¹ Vinaya i, 23.

² *Vijjamānena avijjamānassa paridipitā*. Abhidhammattha-sangaha, viii, 14.

³ Mn. 323. That there was any worry in the simply put query of Samyutta, iv, 251, 261, is not clearly implied.

⁴ The 'Marseillaise.'

fire in the house, fire in the jungle — that the very riddance itself stood for salvation, for peace, for 'the well.' The more usual Indian 'riddance-word' of salvation as purity (*suddhi*) does not reverberate in the early Dhamma as does the paean of liberty.

But it did not appeal to the Indian layman. As a religious slogan it does not appear in the 'three' Vedas. *Mokṣa* is a later development, due either to the influence of Buddhism, or to that which caused Buddhism to develop.¹ That other religions make little of it is deeply significant, maybe, of their more positive outlook.² It is true that Aryans in general can thrill to a negative shibboleth, witness *amṛta*, ambrosia, immortal, but the idea of being spiritually set free is too unworldly to come to the front in any world save that of the recluse.

Well then, we have put forward these two features in the gospel of the Buddhist recluse: man is not worthily worded; man's well is not worthily worded. The one and the other are negatively worded. The one is declared to be a fiction; the other 'is,'³ but is entirely ineffable.

And let the apologist of the dual gospel in Buddhism remember this: It is the gospel of the recluse which is and will be looked upon by people of other lands and other creeds as the original, the venerable, the genuine "Buddhism." Not because the layman's gospel is not very worthy, or some later developments no less so. But the Pali canon holds the field yet as the archetype in Buddhist literature. And in it the life, the welfare, the world, of the monk outweighs and dwarfs altogether the life, welfare and world of the 'manyfolk.' With monks as recorders, as compilers, as editors, as 'libraries,' nothing else could well have been expected.

There is yet another defect in wording, intimately bound up with those other two defects. But it is a feature in both gospels. Man *wills* his 'well.' But in Pali there is no fit appraising of 'will' such as our European Aryan tongues enable us to make. There is the significant approach to it in classing all man's self-expression — deed, word, thought — as activity, as work (*kamma*). But when the factors of that 'self' are analyzed, dynamic terms, approaching 'will' in meaning, fall into the background, and no discernment is shown of this: that to teach religion as a Path to a Goal to be trodden by each man, we must, to *make it intelligible*, show man as choosing, as willing to walk therein.

¹ We only find the notion, as developed, in the Śvet. and Maitri. Up.

² Cf. Ency. Religion and Ethics on its absence. The article *Mokṣa* was inserted by special suggestion made to the editor.

³ Mñ. 270: *atthi nibbānam*....

But into this defect I have gone elsewhere.¹ Let us keep here to those first two defects.

(1) In the tenet called *anatta* man is not worthily worded. The doctrine was in the first instance a protest, not without reason, against what had become a distorted emphasis in the brahmanic teaching. The 'man,' namely, worded more usually as self or soul, was in fixity, immutability, divinity, identical with the world-soul. Hence he had, not to grow, to *werden*, to become; he had to come-to-realize. Hence he was not so much a growing plant, as a jewel or star to be cleared of all that hid or dimmed.

But in time this doctrine of protest degenerated into the harmful dogma, never worthily reasoned out,² that the 'man' is, not only not immutably divine, but non-existent; that there is no one who thinks, speaks, acts, but that there is only thinking, speaking, doing. It is not just to say, as do some apologists, that this denial of the man was part of the early protest. I venture to hold that the early protest was, after a wavering start, the position taken by the founder³ *without the denial*. But there can be no doubt about the much more negative attitude that grew up among the after-men for one who reads, in a historic perspective, what they came to say.

We must read both what they said and between the lines of what they said. Pali literature is for us still a very new study. There is too much taking up or rejecting *en bloc*. The evolution of the brahmin as an animate book, the evolution of the mantras he handed on as such — we cannot get at the base and back of these. But the evolution of the Pali canon, the evolution in its *animate libraries* — this is of more recent growth. Mainly we can only surmise, yet we can get nearer to the conditions under which the phenomena of Order and of Piṭakas came to be and to grow. And we can be more discerning accordingly.

We can discern, in the stereotyped, inadequate, ill-fitting *anatta riposte*,⁴ something like an extinct coal, an archaic corpse. It belongs to the early protest, but it is applied to the later denial of the 'man.' It is no more alive; it cannot meet the query of the puzzled listener,⁵ as Gotama would have met it *had he indeed been* the teacher on that occasion. We can discern, how needful it became, to the maintenance

¹ Bulletin of London School of Oriental Studies, 1926: Buddhist Studies, ed. by B. C. Law, 1926.

² There is an almost Humean approach to such an attempt in *Samyutta*, iii, 230.

³ Cf. *Vin.*, i., p. 23 with p. 18; *Majjh.*, i, 232; *Samy.*, iii, 66.

⁴ Cf. among many repetitions, e.g., *Samy.*, iii, 94.

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 88. *Majjh.*, iii, 19 f.

of this unworthy wording of the man, to buttress it about and around with every stone of support that could be brought together.¹ We can discern in Buddhaghosa's Commentaries how this succeeded, how argument had died and dogma stood firm. We see the man, who is central in the early gospel as the way-farer, 'you and I' 'faring on, running on' from world to world, the man who to body and mind is as the forest to the faggots, borne thence to the fire, the man who grows or sickens in his karma and who stands after death before Yama (his fellow-man, as were all devas) to be confronted with that karma and judged by it,² this man, the very Thou, neither body nor mind: — we see him, in those commentaries, whittled away into a momentary complex of five khandhas. We see the current word for his personality: *attabhaṭṭa*, 'self-state,' treated as a mere concession to the conventions of the multitude, the 'many-folk.'³

(2) And in the tenet called *nibbāna*, *nibbānadhātu*, or *asa·khatā dhātu*, we see 'the well,' the *summum bonum* unworthily worded. However the word be interpreted, it remains a negation and indicates a tendency away from the positive, a tendency to which so many other Buddhist terms bear witness. We may, we should appreciate the reserve in early Buddhism which refused to commit itself to any description of that Goal. Who, at this time of day, is content with the worth of such descriptions in other scriptures? But it does not follow that the ineffable is fitly worded only by a negation. We may rest too easily complacent in the contentment shown by the Indian over his *neti*, *neti!* It hints at that racial weakness which found no word for 'will,' whence we derived our 'well,' which never developed its Aryan root *war* in the way we developed the twin root *wal*.

In other words, what man wills strongly, he *tends* to name positively. He does not cry 'No-land!' when he sights the longed-for sea. That contentment with the notion of riddance rather than with the notion of what we were to put in place of the things got rid of — that contentment said 'not-diseased,' *aroga*, *ārogya*, where our stronger positive words say *īyieia*, *salus*, health, *santé*. And it found a complement to that negation about man's body in a negation about the very man, soul or self, when utterly well. In *nibbāna* is implied extinction of the heat of spiritual fevers. Even the slightly more positive *sītibhaṭṭa*, the coolness of the saint, does but indicate riddance of fever. There is no fit word for the state that is won. 'Growth' we meet with

¹ Esp. in *Kathā Vatthu*, i; cf. *Bud. Psychology*, 1924, ch. XIII.

² *Devadūta Sutta* (M., iii; A., i).

³ Asl. 308; cf. *Vis. M.* 310.

here and there; the notable causative of *werden*, *bhāvanā*, we also meet with. But when the long work in all that process is consummated, when the man becomes that which he has *willed to be*, — 'well,' — for this word, daughter of will, we find no name. We do not even find a forced use (as in the Greek *τὸ εὖ*, and my 'the well') of *su*, to wit *su-bhāva*. *Sotthibhāva* does occur, but very rarely, and not with emphasis. Arahatta is weakened to 'worthiness to receive offerings'!

Men cannot eviscerate religion of so much as did Theravāda Buddhism and yet preserve the kernel. That 'will' was badly worded was a national defect which Buddhism did what it could to remedy. But unworthy wording of 'the man' and of his goal was a mistake of its own making. In the far East more positive conceptions somewhat remedied matters. But in Theravāda Buddhism the double negation has survived. And certain features it presents to-day are deepened in significance when we consider them as possible consequences of that survival. For is not this true, that if 'the man' be unworthily worded, the will by which he seeks the ultimate 'well' will certainly be unworthily worded, and that 'well' will be worded no better, will be practically blotted out?

Consider! Theravāda Buddhism negated man, the willer through body and will, and negated any concept of 'well' as willed by a Willer — source, worker, end — of the man. To-day we witness how it has gone on losing substance as a religion, how it has become practically a system of ethics on the one hand and, on the other, a system warding a dead world — dead social cleavage, dead language, dead literature.

For the way of the worlds, the larger life of both the seen and the unseen has faded out of its perspective. Its ancient gospel threw open the gates to the long vistas:

Apārutā tesam̄ amatassa dvārā!

Around and about its votaries, devas, no longer deities, but fellowmen of other worlds, stood warding, watching, advising, praising, reprobining. Clairvoyance, clairaudience — to see and hear as could those devas — were not banned as devilish, but were welcomed by it as means of access to fellowmen here and over there. Man was shown as wayfarer in a Way, a way not only of present 'best' living, but a four-staged way leading to the goal.

All of these opportunities and vistas — all that made his cult a very living religion: that is, the having heed to the unseen — the Theravādin has virtually laid on the shelf among the venerable things of his

past. His attention, as layman, is concentrated on this one only of his many lives. The just-so-much as was given him of the way of the worlds in which we are wayfarers he has lost, and he has learnt nothing since wherewith to word it more worthily, more truly.

Or, if he be monk, his forward view is otherwise blurred. For as monk, he has ever worded not only 'man' and his 'goal' unworthily, but 'life' as well. He never had any hope of the life of the worlds, for everywhere that meant rebirth, redeath of the body. And body, he held, was, with mind, essentially 'the man.' Hence birth and death stood out over-large, over-fearful. He believed in growth only when the life had been cut off from the general life of the worlds. But surely the growth of 'the man,' is not the way of the growth of any of his bodies. It is the slow advance toward that immortal adolescence, in the consciousness of which growth our worthiest septuagenarians will say: 'I would not exchange my seventy-five for your twenty-five!'

May the faithful and kind scholar-friend, to whom we herewith will well of youth eternal, gladly echo Lord Haldane's recent birthday saying!

Life, man, will, well: herein was weakness, herein lay a falling behind. In all four words we have worthier beacon-lights than early Buddhism had. How are we letting them shine?

What are we doing with our word 'life'? We feel after the life of the race, but we measure the whole life of 'the man' by this one little earth-span and its body. With that body we grow old, and the will, compliant servant, ages with it when 'we' are not even 'grown up.'

What are we doing with our word 'man'? In the school and academy we have thrust him out, replacing him with his instruments, body and mind, measuring his growth by these. In the churches, in the world we speak of him as 'having' a soul, or not, as if *he* were something else. And when we bury body, we call it him!

What are we doing with the word 'will'? We have put it, in the school, on the shelf. Or we have screwed it down to mean conscious resolve. We refuse to admit that man-as-acting in any way whatever is using will; we do not discern that man's only way to 'the well' lies in will. For will is coming to be, not only coming to do.

What have we done with the word 'well'? We have not, even, with our wiser European neighbors, put it on its own feet as noun. We buttress it up with affixes: well-being, wel-fare. Then, taking from the meaning where we add to the letter, we tie it down to the body, we tie it down to earth-life, we tie it down to race-betterment. But this is

not so unintelligible a cosmos that we must see in only a stage of race-betterment the uttermost, perfected well of 'the man.' To do this is to reason, believe, hope with our forward view limited to earth. The man, it is true, can only grow towards the immortal youth of his Well by work for the betterment of men. But in all men is 'the man.' And in the perfected well of each man and the way thereto lies the welfare of men.

CHIPSTEAD, SURREY.

BUDDHISTIC MYSTICISM

By E. WASHBURN HOPKINS

IN considering the question of Buddhistic mysticism it will be well to clear the ground by a preliminary examination of two factors which appear to be of mystical character. But these factors, of which both form essential parts of saintly training and one at least is indispensable to perfection, imply in their turn a belief in Karma, that is, in the ineluctable recurrence of transmigration as conditioned by a severe ethical standard, a standard applied not only to physical acts but to thoughts and ideas, though, to the Buddhist, thought itself is physical and, so to speak, a thing.

But there is nothing mystical in the doctrine of Karma itself. It is a combination of popular belief in metempsychosis, adapted to a system that recognizes no psyche (for which reason the term metempsychosis should be reserved for Brahmanism, while the Buddhist notion is better expressed by transmigration or rebirth) and the equally popular pre-Buddhistic belief in a theory of future rewards and punishments, adapted to a system that recognizes no divine judge of morality competent to assign rewards and punishments. For general use in the Buddhistic Brotherhood Karma became an automatic ethical force of nature and apparently it was in this form an unquestioned dogma. The implication of ordinary ethics is indeed greatly refined in the case of the saint or Worthy (Arahat) who "passes beyond good and evil"; but it is by no means set aside, for even the most exalted saint is still under the influence of an ethical Karma, though it must be remembered that to the Buddhist, as to the Hindu generally, wisdom and knowledge are moral qualities. But mysterious as appears to us the whole Karma process and incredible as it seems that such a moral power of nature should have been accepted without discussion and even made an imperative article of faith (for faith in Karma and its workings is as explicitly demanded of the Buddhist as is faith in Buddha), there is yet no more mysticism in the belief than there is in the Brahmanic assumption of God and soul. But since the machinery of Karma affects the discussion of mysticism, there remains the important point as to whether Karma was thus accepted as an article of faith from the very beginning, that is in Buddha's own formulation of his creed.

It will probably be conceded that the early discussions and dialogues called Suttas are committed to the belief in Karma and that the

later literature is steeped in the same theory, ostentatiously promulgated in the Jātakas (stories of rebirth as conditioned by previous morals), the Cariyā Pitaka, Peta-vatthu, and so forth; but it has been pointed out that in the most ancient exposition of original Buddhism, that is, in the statement of the Four Noble Truths, there is no explicit mention of Karma and that in the certainly antique theory of the scheme of causation (the Chain or Wheel) there is the same silence. From this has been drawn the rash conclusion that Karma was a theory added on to Buddhism as expounded by Buddha and was not an essential of the founder's own system.

From that conclusion a careful examination of the facts must compel one to dissent. The earliest texts we possess contain, in the same form as was accepted later, the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths and scheme of causation and, if the texts are accepted as they now stand, the scheme of causation is as primitive as the Four Noble Truths, although it would still be possible to argue that it was borrowed and adapted from Sāṅkhya philosophy by Buddha himself. The theory of causation explained in this scheme is, however, absolutely incomprehensible, it is even meaningless, without the implication of ethical transmigration. All attempts made to fit it to a single life or to see in it a cosmic analysis have failed utterly. The only possible explanation of the schedule, which begins with ignorance and ends with birth and death, is that it involves the passing over of certain elements of one existence (cause) into another (effect), or, in other words, the doctrine of rebirth. With that doctrine it becomes at least, faulty as it is, a would-be logical series leading from one life to another by a thread of persistent unethical ignorance.

But no less clearly do the Four Noble Truths imply belief in Karma, even if the theory be not mentioned: Birth and life are suffering; suffering springs from craving; extinction of craving causes extinction of the suffering entailed by birth and life; this extinction is attained by following the Eightfold Path, of right views and so forth. If this were a solution of the problem how to live one morally excellent life, "birth" might well have been omitted from the list of woes which the disciple (already born) is here schooled to evade. But, quite apart from this, the whole trend and meaning of the Four Noble Truths are explicitly to prevent the repetition in a future life of the suffering entailed by craving in the present. The existence of an otherwise unending Samsāra or round of births is the reason given for the scheme when it is promulgated and this reason cannot logically or historically be disjoined from it. The trance, in which, incidentally, one may see one's

“Previous births,” implies the words of Buddha when, envisaging his own demise, he declares that they may be uttered by everyone who holds the Mirror of Truth: “Hell is destroyed for me and rebirth . . . I am no longer liable to be reborn in a state of suffering.” And equally cogent is the statement made by Buddha on proclaiming the Four Noble Truths and in closest connection with them: “It is through not understanding and grasping the Four Noble Truths that we have had to run so long, to wander so long in the weary path of transmigration, both you and I . . . By not seeing the Four Noble Truths as they really are, long is the path traversed through many a birth. When these are grasped, the cause of rebirth is removed; the root of suffering is uprooted and there is no more rebirth” (MPS. DN. ii. 91). Again, in the Dhammacakkappavattana, the origin of suffering is given as craving for pleasure and life, which causes “renewal of existence” and the *ariyo atthangiko maggo* or Eightfold Path (called Aryan or Noble) is expressly invented in order to destroy the craving which causes renewed existence. It is impossible to cut these texts to pieces, take out something subjectively regarded as “older” and reject as “later added” whatever does not suit the theory that Karma is an after-thought of Buddhism. Without Karma there would have been no Buddhistic “plan of salvation.”

In that plan, morality is indispensable, but only as a preliminary to the age-long effort to eradicate vital misery altogether, not the misery of one life but of countless lives in repeated rebirths. To Buddha salvation was the escape from new existence as animal, man, or godling, for the fate of spirits and gods is to pass away and die like human beings. Their supreme happiness on dying is to be reborn as men, that they may become disciples of Buddha and so be saved from all future existence. At the core of all this lies the conviction that the suffering of life entailed by craving (evil craving, usually, but sometimes moral craving, as for chastity),¹ is, to the sage, not the mere unease or discomfort typified by “not getting what one desires” and the distress of poverty or disease, but the absence of any settled condition, of any abiding resting-place. “Impermanent are all the beings that come into being, for inasmuch as they arise they must pass away.” There is no persistent entity underlying phenomena; nothing has substance. To cease from impermanent being, from the incessant becomings typified by rebirths, this is the salvation preached from the beginning by Buddha.

¹ Itiv., 54.

In the course of the training necessary to the attainment of this salvation, the would-be saint or Worthy acquires (this also apparently is the belief of Buddha himself) certain mysterious "accomplishments" and these are the factors referred to above as not really mystical. They are the powers known as Iddhis and those involved in the trances or raptures called Jhānas. The first might well be called magical powers or even divine, since they are expressly said to be the same powers that are exercised by fairies, gods, and so forth, and they are supernatural in that they are above the natural powers of ordinary man, though natural to gods and attainable by superior men. They are not powers restricted among men to the Buddhists, whose saintliness or Worthiness endows them with these faculties, but they are practised, though not so capably, by other religious wizards, who also in part command this "Angelic wisdom."¹ Buddhist adepts can fly through the air, go through earth, on water, turn themselves into other shapes, enter another's body, and so forth. Yet these powers are attainable in their highest form only by Buddhistic training in will, effort, thought, and investigation, through a process of "thinking, developing, practising and accumulating" the power involved, that of mind over matter. There must be, to gain this end, earnest and cogent meditation and a constant "struggle against evil." In other words, we have here a refinement on the common superstition arising from exaggerated belief in the mind's control of the body, the superstition that a man of great spiritual (psychic) power must necessarily possess power over matter, usually exploited by a show of physical feats. This belief was current among Brahmans and Buddhists, as it was a commonplace of European belief that a wizard could ride the air and a great saint could do supernatural deeds. Later Buddhism disapproved of the public exercise of these powers, even if properly gained. When used, they tend to make the user vain; they are valueless except for occasional opportunities to impress the multitude with religious marvels (when a Buddha might profitably show off his accomplishments), or for the strengthening of one's own mental growth. Like the Eightfold Path they are a proper subject of meditation.² In the closing scene of Buddha's life it is intimated that he might have utilized the ability to prolong his own earthly existence, if he had been requested to do so in good time. Probably the popular belief was that such accomplishments were not so much attained by conscious effort as they were the habitual concomitants of superior wisdom or saintliness, just as the ideal spiritual king possesses

¹ *Gandhabba-vijjā*, e.g., *Thera G.*, ix, *Therī G.*, vs. 232, and *Kevaddha S.*

² *Thera G.*, vs. 595.

“accomplishments” essential to his nature, though these are but the Iddhis of attractiveness, longevity, good health, and universal popularity. In this and other cases, noted by Rhys Davids, the Iddhis are not supernatural; but ordinarily they are powers above the range of common men and shared with gods. As such, in later works, they are joined with the supernatural powers of the “divine ear,” of “knowing the thoughts of others,” of the remembrance of previous births, and of the “divine eye,” as one group under the designation “superior knowledges,” *Abhiññās*, a group attainable by any deeply religious and mentally competent Buddhist (who, at the same time, extirpates all sinful taints). Of one such we read that he became anxious as to his religious qualifications and “strove and wrestled” until he acquired the *Abhiññās*. Another Brother, by virtue of the same powers that he had acquired, picked up two men as they fell from a tree and set them down unharmed. By his Iddhi, Buddha made a boy actually present disappear and then, “by withdrawing Iddhi,” made him reappear.¹ Such powers were regarded as the natural outcome of the religious life. Thus Mātanga’s son² took orders under Buddha and “seeing the powers wielded by the Brethren he aspired to the same and by practising exercises won the *Abhiññās*.” It is only in very unusual cases that the exercises can be dispensed with. Sumana, “a child of seven but of ripe insight” got the powers, so that he could fly through the air cross-legged, as Buddha flies, or at will crosses water “by Iddhi.”³ Moggallāna, one of Buddha’s chief disciples, was at first averse from mental toil, inclined to take the recommendation of silent meditation as excuse for sloth, but being sharply reproved by Buddha with the caustic remark that “laziness is not synonymous with thoughtfulness,” he devoted himself to earnest thought and exercises, so that in the end he was pronounced “foremost in Iddhi” by Buddha himself. He could “create living shapes,” that is, transform himself into other shapes,⁴ and he had “visions of the future and of all the present world.”⁵ like a god’s, as Anuruddha, who by Iddhi could remember fourteen precedent births, says of his own power, “My vision, like a god’s, is clarified.” He then identifies these powers, exemplified by the divine eye, with those of the trance in which one sees beyond mortal ken:

I know the destinies of other lives,
Whence beings come and whither they will go,
Life here below or other-where of life —
Steadfast and rapt in fivefold trances sunk.⁶

¹ *Thera G.*, clxii and ccxxvii. ² *Ibid.*, clxxiv. ³ *Ibid.*, ccix and vs. 1104.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vs. 901 (the “body wrought of mind”).

⁵ *Ibid.*, vs. 1183.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vss. 916, seq.

The Suttas give the "six supreme knowledges" as follows: 1. Being one he becomes many, becomes invisible, goes without obstacle through a wall, through solid ground, on water, in the sky, touches sun and moon, reaches to the heaven of Brahmā. [These are the usual eight or nine Iddhis.] 2. With the divine ear purified and surpassing that of men he hears sounds heavenly and human, far and near. [So by his "ear divine" Buddha hears a conversation miles away.] 3. He understands with his mind the minds of other persons and beings and knows the passionate, the bound, the freed, as such. 4. He recalls in all details the various temporary states in which he lived in preceding births. 5. With the divine eye he discerns beings faring according to their deeds. 6. He lives in the attainment and realization of sane freedom of heart and mind. These six *Abhiññās* should be realized by the Worthy, as is said, for example, in the *Dasuttara Suttanta*.

No check is put upon the exercise of such powers in so far as they subserve the cause of training and are helpful to oneself or to others. The eye divine must itself be purified to give the vision of other worlds and of beings not born of parents (*Pāyāsi S.*), as Buddha when dying saw spirits innumerable crowding so close before him that many occupied the "space of a hair-tip." For edification Buddha in the *Pāṭīka Sutta* performs wonders; but he knows the deadly peril of such exhibitions in the case of ordinary men and so is made to say: "I see danger in the practice of these accomplishments; I loathe and abhor and am ashamed of them" (*Kevaddha S.*); the true "accomplishment [he adds] is that of self-mastery." In the same vein, the *Vinaya* lays it down as a law of the order that a Brother "should not display before the laity the wonders of Iddhi surpassing the power of ordinary men; to do so is to be guilty of an offense." Perhaps, as the late master of Buddhism, Rhys Davids, suggested in connection with this passage, the feeling against the use of wonder-powers was only gradually brought to a point where the practice was forbidden. He might have instanced the parallel in Brahmanism, where it is only the later Yogi who is exhorted not to make a display of his similar powers: "To possess the power is noble; to show off is ignoble."

The "divine eye," instead of being acquired by effort, may in extraordinary cases be an innate power resulting from Karma. Thus in the first Buddha, Vipassi, whose name suggests vision, is said to have been manifested the divine eye at birth, for it was "born of the result of his Karma, by which he could see as far as a league by day and by night" (*Mahāpadāna S.*). This is not, as compared with other examples, a very remarkable power, but it is noteworthy in that it is obvi-

ously merely a physical strong sight that is here lauded, whereas usually the divine eye is mental, connoting clairvoyance, and is thus distinguished from the "third eye," which may be rendered "insight." As early as the Upanishads there appears the notion of the "eye turned inward," of which perfected insight is the full capacity and salvation is the result of using it. This corresponds to the Buddhistic "eye of wisdom": "Knowledge is born as the eye of wisdom and by the attainment of this eye one is freed from misery."¹ With the divine eye one "discerns the pageant of beings faring according to their deeds," but with the eye of wisdom one acquires the final absolute knowledge of those Worthies who

Discern what is from what has been,
See how to pass beyond the seen
Of loathed existence, who desire,
As something better, something higher,
The end of all existence, where
Substance nor birth nor being are.²

This insight is again to be distinguished from that "suffusion of consciousness" whereby one comprehends the thoughts of others. As explained in the Dasuttara S. and elsewhere, this is the power recognized (or denied to-day) as telepathy, the ability to read the minds of others at a distance. If one chooses to call clairvoyance and telepathy mysticism, or to apply the same term to religious faith (in Buddha, and so forth), or to see it in the trance-vision of "infinite space," then there is nothing more to be said. But if one confines the use of mysticism to the meaning of oneness with reality and the power (or desire) to effect it, then it is obvious that these *Abbiññās* are not powers belonging to mysticism but rather to a simple faith on the one hand and to a groping experimentation with scientific facts on the other. All these powers are developed through a severe course of mental training. They are not mystical gifts but "accomplishments" painfully gained, on a par with the trance-knowledge which begins with a pleasurable intelligence and passes by degrees into rapt indifference. Final felicity in the trance is attained not by union or communion but by "the knowledge that after this present world there is no beyond."³ In its primitive form the trance adds nothing to the adept's previous knowledge though it leads to higher realms of consciousness. It is only in the later psychology that these higher states begin to be grouped around a more persistent ego than is admitted in the earlier texts. The trance is never involun-

¹ Itiv., 61.

² Itiv., 49.

³ DN. ii. 68.

tary obsession or seizure or cataleptic swoon leading to union with higher reality or Power, during which knowledge is revealed. The adept "enters spheres of space and reason regarded as infinite" and goes on to "the sphere of nothingness" and beyond that to the sphere "where there is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness," and so finally to a state of suspended perception and feeling, every stage being mastered in order and then in reverse order, so that the saintly adept can "lose himself in any one of them and emerge from any one of them whenever he chooses and for as long as he chooses," as is stated in the summing up of the *Mahānidāna S.* The final trance is one of absolute equanimity devoid of the sense of *sukha* and *dukkha* (well-being, ill-being). A seven-day exercise in this trance-absorption is recommended as bringing the assurance of Worthiness, or at least the assurance that one will not be born again on earth.¹

The ancient (Vedic) asceticism, which tormented the body to insure spiritual power, is thus replaced by mental discipline. Meditation, designed from the beginning of the course of training to attain the result of mastering phenomena, becomes finally a tranquil absorption. In the first stage, the subject experiences a state of "pleasurable interest," with his mind still applied and active. In the second, this merges into a state devoid of pleasure but not without happiness, though now without application of mind. In the third stage, a state of serenity supervenes, with "happiness and fixedness of thought" (*sukha* and *cittakaggatā*, without *pīti*, pleasurable interest). In the fourth, there is left a neutral state of sublime indifference. Each successive state is (in general) produced by eliminating the inferior elements of the preceding. The pleasurable interest of *pīti* is lost in the succeeding happiness (well-being) of *sukha* and, as the second stage eliminates mental application, leaving only three elements, so the third is characterized only by happiness and attention, and the fourth, devoid of pleasure and happiness, remains as a state of fixed but indifferent attention (the first trance is sometimes subdivided, making five in all).

The effect of this course of trances is first to extinguish all craving; then to consolidate knowledge and produce unlimited happiness (one has part in others' bliss); and finally to bestow absolute tranquillity. Before this final result, are manifested the powers, such as the *dibbasota* and *dibbacakkhu* (the divine ear or hearing and divine eye or sight). An ecstatic contemplation devoid of reasoning merges into a sort of intuition (the power of seeing things as they really are) before passing into the deep indifferent neutral state. There are no physical limita-

¹ *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna S.*, D. N. ii. 314.

tions that the adept cannot ignore at will. He not only sees things as they are mentally, but he sees things in earth and heaven and hears all sounds, understands all thoughts, knows the past and present and even (in the case of Buddha) knows the future. He can perform all the "accomplishments" and destroys all evil taints in himself. It is a marvelous and purifying process, but at no point in this discipline or in the exercise of the "accomplishments" does the adept seek either to realize any union with a higher power or to "merge subject and object into one." Not only is no attempt to do this perceptible in the voluminous disquisitions on the trances but it is impossible that the adept should make the attempt, because Buddhism does not admit that there is any subject! The adept waits on no impulse from any exterior power to enter into the meditation called *Jhāna*. He himself chooses his time for meditation, enters upon it by means of a mechanical fixation of mind (staring at a circle while sitting in a certain pose and the like), determines in advance when to begin, how to follow out each trance-state, and how to invert the process, coming back from the fourth (or fifth) trance to the first, and so to come out of his trance-state altogether. Each trance in its several stages is a self-induced state of hypnosis, the end of which is settled before it begins and the content of which before it arrives is already well known. The adept orders himself, before entering the trance, to quit it at a certain time, so many hours or days ahead, and is aware of what will happen in each stage before he enters upon it.

The perfect peace of the final stage is entirely negative. It is the absence of all that makes life worth living, the passing away of all that binds to life, a foretaste of "salvation from existence," of *Nibbāna*. The only mysticism is that of hypnotism, which, finally is not incumbent on the Worthy; it is a practice which may be dispensed with, though recommended. That the primitive Buddhist seeks to free himself from earthly or worldly bonds in order to "unite with the One," or to unite with reality by sinking back into the stream of life is an explanation later than primitive Buddhism. It combines the soul-idea with the idealism of a time when Buddha had become a metaphysical abstraction, an Absolute. Even as late as the third century B.C. there is no such theory, only the idea that Buddha was a supernatural being and that man, despite all that Buddha had preached to the contrary, had a sort of soul or persistent individuality. In the Buddhism of the Great Vehicle, a development of the heresies of the Great Congregation of *circa* 300 B.C., is found the real mysticism of metaphysical theology, Gautama the man being one with a Holy Spirit, who is a form of the

Absolute. But in the records of the primitive Congregation there is no mysticism and nothing to warrant any discussion of the early Buddhist as a mystic seeking to realize himself in a new and wider world. The only mysticism is found in the trance, which is pre-Buddhistic, is not a necessary exercise, and is not really mystic (it connotes no "union with reality" on the part of the subject).

Yet it is commonly accepted that, as Professor Hocking puts it, "Buddha referred all desire to the single craving which he described as the craving for individuality or separateness of being"; that, again, in Buddhism the love of power of the Vedantist "has taken the form of an aspiration for metaphysical status with all the power over one's own destiny (and over other men's minds) therein implied," to which Professor Bennett objects that the aspiration seems rather "to be real — without qualification."¹ But it is a Buddhistic scholar who has emphasized most strongly this interpretation of the Buddhistic ideal as the overcoming of all "separateness" in mystical union with the One. Rhys Davids in his "American Lectures" says: "It is a belief common to all schools of the Buddhists that the origin of sorrow is precisely identical with the origin of individuality. Sorrow is in fact the result of the effort which an individual has to make to keep separate from the rest of existence. . . . The unity of forces which constitutes essential Being must sooner or later be dissolved. . . . Wherever an individual has become separate from the rest of existence, then immediately disease, decay, and death begin to act upon it. Wherever there is individuality there must be limitation; wherever there is limitation there must be ignorance. . . . Men overlook the fact that they are really no more separate than a bubble in the foam of an ocean wave is separate from the sea. . . . It is not separateness you should hope and long for, says the Buddhist, it is union — the sense of oneness with all that now is, that has ever been, that can ever be. Leap forward without fear. You shall find yourself in the ambrosial waters of Nirvana and sport with the Arahats who have conquered birth and death."²

Now it is quite true that the Buddhist urges one to renounce the idea of Me and Mine and destroy the false notion of an individuality based upon a permanent substance in the Me. But the Buddhist speaks only of impermanence: "There is no substance, no permanence in any being." To know this is to destroy for one's own good what seems to be permanent, the well-nigh ineradicable root of individuality.

¹ W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, pp. 75 and 334; C. A. Bennett, *A Philosophical Study of Mysticism*, p. 52.

² Rhys Davids, *Buddhism* (American Lectures), pp. 124-129.

The apparently logical conclusion that individuality implies a sense of separateness and that separateness must again imply desirable union with the rest of existence, oneness with the All, as the goal of effort, is never drawn, and the outcome can be only that there was no such goal, was no such conclusion in the mind of Buddha or in the view of the primitive Congregation.

It is not a matter of logic, applied to what is really the Vedantic (not Buddhistic) view of the soul as a bubble thinking itself different from the sea, as the spark really one with the fire, which leads to the idea of the soul separated from the Real, from God. It is a question to be determined on the evidence of the earliest Buddhistic texts, of which a number of examples have already been cited to show that Karma underlies their thought. But these same texts show also that in the Buddhism of the primitive Congregation the desirable goal was not union but mastery over Being, to the end that the Worthy (Arahat) should cease to exist. There is no real subject; there is no percipient apart from perception. There is only a series of transitory states of consciousness. Before death one can by training acquire mastery of intellect and feeling through development of purpose, effort, and so forth. At or even before the death of the perfected Worthy all aggregates pass away (Karma no longer works), the elements of individuality cease to be. The destruction of individuality is the desired end because that destruction automatically destroys the pain of impermanent existence. There is no hint that individuality implies "separateness" of any sort. The limitations of individuality are of course those of a being conditioned, that is limited, but only by the process of Karma, not limited because separated from any universal One. The only One recognized was the one process of birth and death, the stream of being, and from that one the early Buddhist sought to free himself. There was too the idea of "separateness," but it is not a sad separateness from a One but a desired and toiled for separateness from the Karma-stream, detachment from the world in every sense (complete *viveka*). One of the means of becoming separate or detached was the practice of trances and the mastery over matter gained thereby. In the highest trance if anywhere there should be a premonition of the sense of mystic "union, oneness with all," of which Rhys Davids speaks, but, on the contrary, the adept in this final experience, when he is in a state of complete self-possession and equanimity, without pain and without happiness, "sits suffused with a sense of purification, of translucence of heart, so that there is no spot in his whole frame not suffused therewith," and in this state he simply enjoys the "accomplishments," that

is, he becomes invisible, duplicates his form, travels cross-legged through the sky, hears all the sounds of heaven and earth, with his divine ear, sees the hearts of others, remembers his previous births, sees with his divine eye other beings and their estate according to their Karma, knows the taints (lusts, and so forth) as they really are, and is thus "set free" and has knowledge of his freedom, his emancipation, and realizes that rebirth has been destroyed and that "after this present life there will be no beyond." This (Sāmañña-Phala Sutta) is one of innumerable passages in which is summed up the fruit of a well-spent life. Such a life leads to "the destruction of all rebirth."

There is not a word suggesting any mystic union with a One or an All. On the other hand, at the end of this discourse, which is solemnly repeated in the Kassapa-Sihanāda, there occurs the following statement: "This is the fruit of a Buddhist recluse and there is no fruit of his life higher and sweeter than this," or, as worded in the second discourse: "There is no other state of blissful attainment in conduct and heart and mind which is higher and sweeter than this," namely the attainment of subjugation of evil and of the five modes of intuition characteristic of the perfected saint. A description of the eight stages of deliverance (above) does no more than explain the states of consciousness as apprehension of space as infinite, of the non-reality of things, and so forth, till one reaches the summit of consciousness with the conviction that to think at all is an inferior status, and then sensations and ideas cease altogether. It is not soul that is functioning here but states of consciousness and, since all consciousness is impermanent, when all fleeting states of consciousness cease there can be nothing left to unite with anything.

In contrast with the limited created state of individual being the texts speak of the state of freedom as uncreated, *ajātam* and later psychology speculates in regard to consciousness in that state, just as some texts speak of the bliss of Nibbāna in contrast with the misery of bondage. Nibbāna was "a blissful cessation of misery"; hence it became a blissful state after death. It was partly this ingenuous playing with terms that helped to undermine the primitive faith, just as the natural hankering after continued life helped to reestablish the permanent ego under a veiled form, despite the gravity and clarity of the early texts, which refute this interpretation and emphasize the fact that there is no ego and that bliss is merely "freedom from all existence." The many Brahmans joining the first Congregation would perhaps unconsciously shape back to normal the abnormal notion of a life absolutely ending, as they succeeded in idealizing the subjective notion of

time and space countenanced by Buddha, who declares that consciousness has no existence independent of the body, which is impermanent, and that when the intellectual faculties cease, both the individual and the elements cease to be: "The world and the waning and waxing thereof is within this mortal body endowed with mind."¹

Again, it is not unusual to cite the Ten Indeterminates as proof that Buddha, after all, may have had a dim belief in the ten views which he refused to discuss. But Buddha was surrounded by sophists whose themes were these very problems, considered by him unfit for discussion, such as the duration of the world and of man's soul. In view of his own fundamental thesis that man has no soul, that nothing has any substance, *anatta*, it is certainly otiose to ask whether his scornful refusal to discuss soul with the sophists may be construed as a tacit admission that man may have a soul and a life after death. If forced to answer, he would have said that, when anyone save a Worthy dies, the elements making for future existence on account of Karma will result in a definite future life;² but at the death of a Worthy (who may have already enjoyed Nibbāna) nothing survives. He has "escaped the yoke" and is "devoid of hope"; he passes away "without desire for existence or for non-existence" and his Nibbāna is "deliverance from all ties."³ The destruction of misery can be attained only by him who comprehends the All; but of what nature is this comprehension? "He that comprehends the All, *sabba*, and whose thought about it is of renunciation and abandonment, can attain destruction of misery."⁴ The Buddhist concerns himself with the All only in the sense that he abandons all lusts "for the purpose of insight and thorough knowledge."⁵

The world of the All, as we know it, is itself but a temporary phenomenon, though it is divided into different parts as worlds of radiance, and so forth; but all, including the highest heavens, are transitory. The perfected sage passes out and beyond them all. The Agañña Sutta gives an early Buddhistic view regarding the world of men and its connection with other worlds and with human fate. "When after a very long period this world passes away," there comes later on a rebirth from the world of radiance, of beings born into the new world as human beings. They elect a man to keep them in order and so invent kingship. They settle down to various pursuits and so devise castes [not here as

¹ Subha S., Ang. N., ii, 48.

² Lohicca S.: "Wrong views lead to purgatory or animal rebirth."

³ Itiv., 53, 55, 102, *yogātīgo, nirāśo, sabbaganthapamocanam*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

the result of Karma], namely, priests, soldiers, tradesmen, slaves. When a member of any of these castes lives evilly and has false views (one defect is as pernicious as the other), he will be reborn in a temporary hell; but one who has lived a good life and held right views will be reborn in heaven (a bright and happy world); and one who has lived a life of mixed good and evil "will be reborn to suffer both joy and sorrow" (as beast or man), and if, as man in the next rebirth, he has what are called the "two and thirty lucky marks," these, according to the Lakkhana Sutta, are to be explained as caused by good deeds in the past (it is not, as usually said, the lucky marks that determine the future). By his inherent greatness Buddha himself, through previous Karma, was first reborn after death in a bright and happy world and then, reborn on earth, acquired the thirty-two lucky marks as the fruit of deeds in his former life; but now in this life, having freed himself from all ties, he says of himself: "The craving for future life of any sort is rooted out; that which leads to renewed becoming is destroyed and there is no more birth for me." And what this means is indicated by what was said when Buddha died: "He passed away in that utter passing away which leaves nothing whatever to remain." A common formula is that used above, "after this present life there will be no beyond." All parts and powers of a man dissolve and to bring them into this state "is bliss, that is Nibbāna." In a word, to cite another pregnant dictum: "Cessation of Karma is Nibbāna." Had aught remained in the future, any union or "self-realization," it is incredible that it should have escaped mention in these explanatory utterances.

The "misery" of life is often explained in the early texts as no more than simple unease. The modern mind is apt to stress the philosophical side of Buddhism or to make the mistake of interpreting early Buddhism in terms of an ethical code. It was indeed ethical, because there can be no true knowledge in an unethical nature. This unity of ethics and wisdom is common to all Indian thought (though occasionally denied by extravagant sophists) and is very beautifully formulated in the Sonadanda Sutta: "Where there is uprightness there is wisdom, and where there is wisdom there is uprightness; to the upright belongs wisdom, to the wise belongs uprightness; wisdom and goodness are declared to be the best thing in the world." And it was indeed philosophical, with its persistent elaboration of the thesis "all is impermanent." But it is noticeable how, in teaching men to escape from the condition of impermanence, the emphasis is laid not so much on the misery of impermanence as on the physical and mental suffering involved in living. The Four Noble Truths urge escape not from im-

permanence but from a permanent condition of bodily pain and sorrow extended through "transmigration's weary round." Karma itself is permanent till one escapes what it enforces, that is, a permanent condition of impermanency!

The three fundamental doctrines of Buddhism, formulated in the words *aniccam*, *dukkham*, *anattam* (impermanence, misery, unsubstantiality), are of course emphasized differently in different passages and it is true that one of these may remain unmentioned while another is propounded and that in general the three together seem to be implied in all statements of doctrine. Yet it is rather surprising to find the Four Truths explained in detail on their first promulgation in a form which suggests that the whole weight of Buddha's "discovery" lies in the annihilation of physical and mental misery. Birth, old age, grief, suffering, despair, not to get what one desires, all this is painful; all life is painful; a round of such painful lives is only linked misery long drawn out. It is nowhere hinted that one may rise to a higher plane of living devoid of misery. The only remedy offered is to stop living and so stop suffering. Incidentally, it may be added, it is nowhere suggested that life has anything to counterbalance its misery. The Buddhist sees no loveliness in the human body; he is bidden to study it as a disgusting mass of intestines. He never asks whether old age may not be happy, whether death is worth crying about, whether happiness is not as common as unhappiness. He sees only ills in life and ignores its joys, as he sees only human ugliness and despises its physical beauty.¹

Such a one-sided view of life was evidently not natural. This is shown by the persistence with which it is urged. The disciple had to be drilled into taking life at Buddha's estimate of it. The refuge would be suicide, but, with the implicit belief in Karma, this would be only to prolong the agony. Hence one must learn how to get the better of Karma, how to commit a suicide that would have permanent results; how to escape impermanency of being, which is perpetually reshaped to fresh misery. Thus impermanence of individuality became the greatest ill of all, because hardest to get rid of; but such an ill made its strongest appeal only to the sage. For the mass of humble Buddhist recluses the weight of argument remained rather in the ills of daily life, till the most lowly could solemnly recount that, finding it too wearisome to plough and reap, he gladly became converted to a life of monastic ease!² We may suspect that it was often these ills that appealed

¹ Cf. e.g., Therī G., 19, 380, 466.

² Thera G., vs. 43.

most to the lower orders. Yet it is still remarkable how the sage also treated life's ills as if they were of equal importance. Life is not worth living (*a*) because it is painful and (*b*) because it is impermanent. Even in the scheme of causation the note is the same. For instance, at D. N. ii, 32, where are omitted the two elements of ignorance and Karma and the scheme is set for a single life: "From cessation of birth comes cessation of decay, dying, grief, lamentation, ill, sorrow, and despair; such is the cessation of this entire body of ill" (that is, life). Other passages treat impermanence as the great ill; to put an end to impermanence is the goal: "Cessation from rebirth is the escape from what has come into being and is conditioned (because it) has arisen from a cause,"¹ a passage that illustrates also the fact that "conditioned" is not "limited by separation" from the All, but is equivalent to "bound in the causal nexus of Karma" (implying rebirth). On the other hand, the once-returner (a sage who has almost "laid low his burden" but has to be reborn once more) is not said to be near the goal of permanence but near the goal of "making an end of sorrow" (life's miseries). One might imagine that the practical pessimism of this attitude sprang from the uncertainty as regards the kind of rebirth, for one is liable to any one of the "five ways of destiny," that is, one may be punished in purgatory, or be born as an animal, or function as a spectre, or be reborn as a man or as a god. The decadent Buddhism of later centuries copied a leaf from Brahmanism and avoided any such uncertainty by teaching that a pious gift to a Buddhist or Brahman (the Brahman says a gift only to a Brahman) results in merit enough to escape any except the most desirable lot hereafter, a passage so philosophically naïve that it deserves to be cited complete: "A moral person may decide by aspiration upon his form of rebirth when he offers a pious gift. Such a person may give a gift to a Buddhist recluse or to a Brahman in the shape of food, drink, raiment, and so forth. He hopes to receive something for the gift. He sees a nobleman living luxuriously and he thinks, 'Oh, when I die might I be reborn as a wealthy nobleman.' He holds this thought fixed in his mind and expands it and this thought of his, set free in a lower range and not expanded to any higher range, conduces to the (desired) rebirth within that lower range. This applies only to a moral person; for the mental aspiration of a moral person succeeds because of its pure single-mindedness."² In the same way a moral person may become a god in the next life, if in this life he give a pious gift with this aspiration. But

¹ Dasuttara S.

² Sangiti S.

such puny rewards for earthly generosity are despicable to the sage and were probably a late invention even for the humble and ignorant who were likely to be tempted by them. The reward of course is only for the laity, an inducement to them to be generous to the Buddhist mendicants.

The Dasuttara Sutta gives nine "perceptions to be cultivated." One of them is of the ugliness of life and one is of impermanence and "of suffering in impermanence." The relative value of these perceptions may be judged better perhaps if one turns from the philosophical expositions, where *aniccam* and *dukkham* are apt to stand side by side, to the simpler cogitations of the hermits, as voiced in their pious verses. Here there is, as strikes the attention at once, a formal acceptance of the doctrine of impermanence. It is so formal in fact that it occurs repeatedly in the same phrase: "thereat arose in me the deeper view, attention to the fact and to the cause,"¹ followed by the statement that the misery of life then became manifest; and there are verses keeping the close connection between the ills of life in terms of pain and of impermanence:²

When one by wisdom doth discern and see
Th' impermanence of everything in life,
 Then one at all life's suffering feels disgust;
 Lo! herein lies the way to purity.

When one by wisdom doth discern and see
That everything in life is bound to ill,
 Then one (and so forth, *sabbe samkhārā aniccā . . . dukkhā . . . anattā*).

The hermit struggles to convince himself that "mind and body should be held to be ill"; then he adds "and understand impermanence to be ill" and cites the words of the Great Physician, who likens the heart (mind) to an ape leaping for fruit uncertainly from tree to tree, with this conclusion:

Many and sweet, entrancing, are the lusts
 Wherein the ignorant majority
 Entangled lie. They do but wish for ill
 Who seek to live again,
 Led by their heart to perish in the Pit.³

¹ See Thera G., vss. 269, 301, 318, 409, 464.

² *Ibid.*, vss. 676-677.

³ *Niraye*; *ibid.*, vss. 1111, *seq.* The poetical translations are taken wholly or slightly changed from Mrs. Rhys Davids' *Psalms of the Brethren* (*Theragāthā*).

The same poet in a subsequent stanza gives the essence of his thought thus:

Mountains and seas and rivers, earth itself,
The quarters four, the intervening points,
The nadir, yea, and e'en the heavens above —
All are impermanent and all forlorn.

Where canst thou then, my heart, find ease and rest.¹

Further on in his poem the recluse answers his query by saying that when his mind (or heart) is fully trained it will become "devoid of all craving for any form of future existence" and "pass beyond the stream of being," which means that he will rest happy in the knowledge that his life is absolutely ended for all time. Another poet² thus voices his decision (*bharen' amhi anathiko*):

There is no life that lasteth evermore,
Nor permanence in things from causes sprung.
The factors of our life to being come
And then dissolve. In that they pass away,
This is their ill. I seek no more to be!

He who has overcome craving, the poisoner of life, the giver of pain, sits free with mind intent, "rapt in ecstasy of thought; and no higher bliss is given to man than this," says Bhūta,³ whose whole "psalm" is a repetition of this phrase, the meaning of which is as obvious in its implication as in its express utterance: Man's highest felicity is to have the certainty that he will live no more after death. Here, of all places, would have been where one would expect some suggestion of a faith in a life beyond, had the poet who composed the verses been unorthodox enough to harbor hope of this.

Yet already such a hope was beginning to spring up, though for the most part veiled in negation such as that of the cheerful rake who squandered all his wealth on a harlot and being destitute repented and joined the Buddhists. He sings how he has given up all desire and is "now faring on to Nibbāna, where at our journey's end we grieve no more,"⁴ *gacchāma dāni nibbānam yattha gantrā na socati*. One sees, Nibbāna has become a place, as it were, to go to, a negation (of sorrow) conceived spatially. The one who renounces the world "destroys its grief and pain"⁵ and it was not a far cry to the thought of the "beyond" as another world where all is bliss. A little freedom of translation perfects this and Nibbāna is transformed into a comfortable heaven:

¹ *Ibid.*, vs. 1133.

² *Ibid.*, vss. 121-122.

³ *Ibid.*, vs. 519.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vs. 138.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vs. 195.

Oh, great, Oh wondrous is Nibbana's bliss,
 Revealed by Him, the Utterly Awake!
 There comes no grief, no passion, *haven sure*,
 Where ill and ailing perish evermore.¹

Litterally, "very happy indeed, as indicated by the perfect Buddha (awakened), is Nibbāna devoid of grief and passion, peace, where unhappiness disappears." But even to the Buddhist, whose notion in the early texts was never that of "entering" Nibbāna as a place, there must have been in such verses the reflection of a dim feeling that Nibbāna was not altogether the mere extinction of pain and of existence but had a more positive content. From having been the negation of a mortal life of sorrow it became gradually "the immortal not-sorrowfull," nay more, it became "the blissful" because it is "deliverance from sorrow" and "deliverance is bliss." As one who gains the bliss of Nibbāna never returns to sorrow it is natural to call Nibbāna "immortal." The verses of the third century B.C. (or perhaps a bit earlier, only not so old as the first discourses) show clearly the trend, and the Great Vehicle does but follow this trend when it even ventures to interpret Nibbāna as that flow of being which, as Samsāra, it was invented to avoid! A verse ascribed to Buddha but also allotted to a lesser authority² gives the original conception:

Whoso within this goodly discipline
 Shall come with diligence to know the truth
 He birth's eternal round shall put away
 And end all pain and suffering for aye.³

¹ *Ibid.*, vs. 227.

² *Ibid.*, vs. 257.

³ The text of verses 227 and 257 is as follows:

suṣukhaṃ vata nibbānaṃ sammāsambuddhadesitaṃ
 asokaṃ virajaṃ khemaṃ yattha dukkhaṃ nirujjhati (vs. 227)
 yo imasmin dhammavinaye appamatto vihessati
 paḥaya jātisamśāraṃ dukkhass' antaṃ karissati (vs. 257)

The usual description of Nibbāna is in terms of present insight and cool happiness or peace and security, *yogakhemam anuttaram, santi*, when it is not simply the extinction of craving and of life. The positive aspect refers, as may be seen from the Gāthās, to the state of mind attained before death by one confident of *post mortem* emancipation from further life, one who has "overcome existence." The sense of peace may have been heightened by the less philosophical but practical belief that "existence," if not overcome, entailed torment in hell; but this thought could not have affected the view of the "all but" perfected saints, though such passages as Therī G. 451 and 501 show that it was not without significance in their general estimate of life's misery.

The appeal here is simply to the feeling of relief from suffering; it offers no hope of future life or of any sort of existence, nor does it lay any stress on the motif of impermanence. A certain Gotama, not the Master, in another poem unites the two theses in their natural succession. He says that he became a Buddhist mendicant because he had often suffered of old (in previous lives) both in purgatory and as an animal, not to speak of existences in which he suffered as a spectre (a kind of spirit that is always famished), and after this, "glad enough to be reborn as a man" he still suffered in human form; and even as a god (after his human life) he was not satisfied, for though in successive turns he "lived in the realms between consciousness and unconsciousness," yet to him "all this becoming" (impermanent being) at last appeared "void of real value," so that, on being born as a man again, he turned to his sole refuge *santi, peace* (escape from rebirth), which is his Nibbāna.¹ The misery in life is recognized first, then the misery of living.

To the laity it was enough that the Master had said "transient are all existing things." They repeated this formula dutifully while still eagerly seeking "transient things," such as children and wealth. One of the good mendicants sneers at them for doing so, or, as the commentator says, he speaks compassionately of them, in verses which may be freely rendered thus (*kāmā aniccā iti*):

The word alone but not the thought the pious laity inspires,
Forever saying with their lips "transient are all the world's desires,"
The while they seek the very things they (logically) should despise,
Wives, children, wealth. Poor passion's slaves are they, unable to be wise! (vs. 187).

The doctrine of impermanence did not trouble the laity. They were taught to look for nothing better than a life hereafter in a "bright and happy world," whence they could return to earth again until their hearts were weary of change and they should seek the supreme joy of non-existence. To them apparently the sorrow of life did not overbalance the joy of living. The teaching of the Master in their case was confined to instilling moral rules and somewhat slowly inspiring them with a belief that life was sad rather than joyful. Until the impermanence-doctrine was grasped, the sorrow-doctrine was comparatively unavailing. But neither to the laity nor to the mendicant disciple was Buddha's teaching that of a mystic. In regard to all speculations concerning a future existence he said simply: In the case of the laity (the mentally untrained), if good, they go to heaven; but in the case of the

¹ *Ibid.*, vss. 258, seq.

wise who know the truth, there is no use in inquiring whether they exist hereafter, for "such questions implicitly assume the heresy of a substantial ego, of a real self (apart from states of transient consciousness); to believe that one has a self, a soul, permanent, lasting, eternal, which will continue after death, is to walk in the jungle of delusion, and bound in this delusion a man is not free, he is not wise, he is not emancipated from sorrow, he will still go on in the weary round of birth and death."¹

The highest praise given by Buddha to his contemporary Gavampati is that he was a "surpasser of becoming," that is, he had surpassed Karma and passed beyond the state of future existence, praise much higher than that accorded to him by the multitude, who acclaimed Gavampati because he had by his "accomplishment" prevented a river from overwhelming a Buddhist settlement (he stopped the river and "made it rear up like a mountain-peak.")² To conquer death and life and so to "abolish ill forever" was the goal of the early Buddhist, as Sarabhaṅga³ says: "The Buddhas who taught the law, and were themselves the law incorporate, showed the abolishment of ill, whereby one at death may become free from rebirth, wholly emancipated." The cessation of becoming is cessation of being, as Sivaka⁴ says: "Birth is but woe again, ever again . . . stayed in me now is all further rise of consciousness; blown to nothingness will it be even here" (before I die), words also attributed to Buddha (*vipariyādikataṁ cittam idh' eva vidhamissati*).

With this agrees the frequent image of the passions and life (for the future) of a perfected saint being "extinguished like a fire." An ingenious scholar, arguing for some spark of future life in the ideal of primitive Buddhism, has entered a plea for it on the ground that Nibbāna, the "blowing out," of the flame does not mean complete extinguishment, because the Brahman priest held that fire was an immortal god and when produced by the fire-sticks it was merely called into action again; the fire had been lurking in the fire-sticks. So the Nibbāna of the Buddhist may imply a lingering spark immortal still. But, in the first place, the Buddhist Nibbāna, as Rhys Davids has shown, refers primarily to the extinction of the very elements (lusts, and so forth) which the adept is bent on destroying utterly and, secondly, the flame of the Brahman's immortal fire is not lurking in a lamp but in the fire-sticks and Nibbāna refers only to a lamp. No Brahman priest ever thought that the flame of a lamp was not really out when it was "blown out." One of the Buddhist Sisters says (vs. 116), in order to visualize her final goal: "I press the wick right down

¹ *Sabbāsava Sutta*. ² *Thera G.*, vs. 38. ³ *Ibid.*, vs. 493. ⁴ *Ibid.*, vss. 183, seq.

[out goes the flame]; behold the lamp's Nibbāna!" She has attained freedom from craving, which lights the lamp of life. She certainly does not hope for re-illumination. Mrs. Rhys Davids says very truly of the Sisters: "Their verses do not seem to betray anything that can be construed as a consciousness that hidden glories . . . are awaiting them. There is nothing pointing to an unrevealed mystery." Negative evidence of this sort extending over all the earlier literature is a formidable argument against the assumption of primitive belief in any future state whatever in the case of the Arahat. He is *parinibbuto*, "completely extinguished," explicitly as to craving, implicitly as to future consciousness (the fruit of craving) and any state of being.

The temporary states of consciousness (replacing "soul") which represented individuality had to be dispersed in order to the attainment of the Buddhist's goal. At, or before, the final physical death the last element leading to any future life is extinguished. The fleeting states, hitherto forming the imagined ego, have ceased to be; the "hut of self" has been broken up. Thoughts and acts still exist in the universe but only as content of the momentary lives of others; they are not "mine"; no I exists to think or act. Remove the cause of "becoming" and the very existence of the ego ceases. In the flood of other existence can survive at most only the *disjecta membra* of the pseudo-ego. The individual exists no more; no higher Being exists with which a surviving consciousness could unite and there can be no consciousness (even were there such a Being) when once the maker of consciousness is annihilated. What was once regarded as the subject has been "blown to nothingness." The surviving *puggalo* of the later psychologists is an abortion born of the desire to fit primitive Buddhism into a system that practically asserts what Buddha categorically denied. Nibbāna is freedom and release and only as such does it have a positive content, release from grief and fear for one whose sorrow has been life and whose fear has been that life might continue:

mokkhamhi vijjamāne

idam ajaram idam amaram idam ajarāmarañapadam asokam

asapattam asambādhām alkhālitam abhayam nirupatāpam

"'Tis freedom (from desire), release from age, from death, from sorrow,
From rivals, crowds, and stumbling, fear, and hurt.¹

¹ Theri G., vss. 506, 512.

EXTASE ET SPÉCULATION

(*Dhyāna et Prajñā*)

PAR LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN

L'ĀNGUTTARA (iii, 355) contient un texte isolé dans la vieille littérature bouddhique mais très significatif: "Les moines qui pratiquent le recueillement ou extase (les *jhāyins*) blâment les moines qui s'attachent à la doctrine (les *dhammdyogas*), et réciproquement. Ils doivent au contraire s'estimer les uns les autres: rares en effet les hommes qui passent leur temps en touchant avec leur corps (c'est-à-dire, en connaissant d'une connaissance immédiate, en "réalisant," en "expérimentant," *realizing, experiencing*) l'élément immortel (*amatā dhātu*, c'est-à-dire, le Nirvāna); rares aussi ceux qui voient la profonde réalité (*atthapada*) en la pénétrant par la Prajñā (c'est-à-dire, par la connaissance spéculative qui discerne le caractère vrai des choses).

2. Il résulte de ce texte qu'il y eut conflit entre deux tendances, entre deux écoles, entre deux catégories de moines.

D'une part les hommes du recueillement (*samādhi*) ou de l'extase (*dhyāna*, *jhāna*). — Ils tiennent en médiocre estime la connaissance à proprement parler intellectuelle, le savoir discursif qui élabore une métaphysique, étudie la nature des choses, s'attache aux vérités bouddhiques de la douleur ou de la "production en raison des causes." Toute leur confiance est dans les visions et sensations mystiques qu'on obtient dans les états plus ou moins hypnotiques nommés "extases." Pour obtenir ces états, une diète sévère et des exercices d'ascétisme (contemplation du cadavre) et d'hypnotisme (fixation du regard, etc.) sont indispensables. L'ascète qui les pratique obtient, en même temps que les pouvoirs magiques, l'œil divin, la connaissance de ses anciennes existences, etc. Mais, bien plus précieux, élevé au dessus de humaine nature il entre en contact, au cours des recueilements les plus profonds ("recueillement de la cessation de la pensée et de la sensation") avec cette chose indéfinissable qu'on nomme Nirvāna.

Ce vaut là de grands avantages.

Les "hommes du *dhyāna*" se recrutent nécessairement parmi les moines le mieux placés pour entrer en recueillement: "forestiers," qui sont aussi des "hommes du cimetière" et des "pénitents": ces moines vivent à côté de la règle commune, pratiquement dispensés des cérémonies conventionnelles, de l'étude, du prêche.

Le danger, pour eux, est de chercher l'extase pour l'extase, et confondre l'extase avec l'hypnose. L'hypnose n'exige pas la purification de la pensée, la suppression du désir: des recettes mécaniques y suffisent — fixation du regard, suspension de la respiration, serrer les dents et coller la langue au palais. Beaucoup d'ascètes croient obtenir par ces procédés les pouvoirs magiques et la possession du Nirvāna: le plus grand nombre se fait illusion, car les pouvoirs magiques comme la possession du Nirvāna suppose la sainteté que l'hypnose ne peut donner.

3. Ainsi pensent sans doute les "hommes du dharma," moines fidèles à la discipline conventuelle, ennemis des exagérations ascétiques, qui récitent l'Ecriture, qui prêchent, qui refléchissent sur la nature des choses. Ces moines se souviennent que le Bouddha a défini la sainteté comme "suppression du désir," et expliqué qu'on supprime la soif en étudiant la nature douloureuse et impermanente des objets qui provoquent la soif.

Les hommes du Dharma ou "philosophes," condamnent donc les hommes du *dhyāna*, ou mystiques.

4. Le Bouddha met tout le monde d'accord. — Sans la Prajñā, connaissance des vérités bouddhiques, la sainteté et le Nirvāna sont impossibles. D'autre part, les exercices d'hypnose sont très bons: quand ils sont pratiqués par un homme détaché des choses sensibles, ils produisent l'extase (*dhyāna*). Dans l'extase l'ascète peut prendre contact avec le Nirvāna.

Le canon nous apprend qu'il y a deux espèces de saint: celui qui est "délivré par la Prajñā," qui, à la mort, entrera dans le Nirvāna; celui qui est "doublement délivré," c'est-à-dire, qui, étant déjà "délivré par la Prajñā," a cultivé les recueilements et pris, dès cette vie, possession du Nirvāna.

INTEGRATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN BUDDHISM

By JAMES HAUGHTON WOODS

DHARMAPĀLA'S comment (P. G. Mundine Piṭaka Press, Rangoon, 1909, p. 214) on *Visuddhi Magga*, Book vii. 203⁸, unpublished in America or Europe, throws light on the problem and method of the integration of consciousness as conceived by a Buddhist.

What is sought is an insight into the unity which is presupposed in change. A distorted vision of life results if it be assumed that existence consists of independent, momentary, and permanent entities separated by discrete units of time. Our hopes, our feelings, our perceptions, predispositions and activities are obstructive and painful if we clutch at them, as a man might snatch at grasses, reeds, creepers and shrubs which overhang a swift-flowing torrent in which he is swept along (*Saṃyutta*, xxii, 93–4, vol. iv, 139–140). Such inconsequential efforts prevent us from grasping the interconnection of all existence, and thus unifying our minds. A being who can comprehend the world without segregating it into groups which are incompatible and who can trace the transitions within and without such groups is like the lotus born in the water, standing in the water, yet unspotted by the water. This typical being is the Tathāgata who is unspotted by the world and not swept away by the stream. In ordinary beings there is the constant effort to attain stability, to overcome inner contradiction, and so to become more organized and more coherent. The Tathāgata is not disturbed by the succession of things. He is not caught in parts of the mechanism. For he discovers the nature of the mechanism and identifies himself with it. The order of nature stands (*Saṃyutta*, ii, 25), the interrelations are definite, each concretion consists of instances of relations. The Typical Being is fully enlightened and understands this and sets it forth and makes it plain. An ordinary being who can discern the Tathāgata discerns the orderliness and interpenetration of things in time. Keeping the law thus means not breaking the unity of things by errors of judgment. This retention of equipoise extends to internal balance of emotions, passions, and thoughts and to actions and words. Without the control of conduct there can be no equipoised mental event; and without poise no insight. The passage in Dharmapāla's comment shows how the interplay of thought, emotions, and actions is required in the higher types of personality.


Ettha ca vijjāsampadāya Satthu paññāmahattaj pakāsitaŋ hoti, caranāsampadāya karuṇāya mahattaj. Tesu paññāya Bhagavato dhammarajjapatti, karuṇāya dhammasaŋvibhāgo; paññāya saṃsāradukkhanibhidā, karuṇāya saṃsāradukkhasahanaŋ; paññāya paradukkhavijānaŋ, karuṇāya paradukkhaṭīkārārambho; paññāya parinibbanābhīmukhabhāvo, karuṇāya tadadhigamo; paññāya sāyaŋ tāraṇaŋ, karuṇāya paresaŋ tāraṇaŋ; paññāya Buddhabhāvasiddhi, karuṇāya Buddhakiccasiddhi; karuṇāya bodhisattabhūmiyaŋ saṃsārabhīmukhabhāvo, paññāya tattha anabhirati; tathā karuṇāya paresaŋ abhiññāpanaŋ, paññāya sāyaŋ parehi abhāyanāŋ; karuṇāya paray rakkhanto attānaŋ rakkhati, paññāya attānaŋ rakkhanto paray rakkhati; tathā karuṇāya aparantapo, paññāya anattantapo; tena attahitāya patipannādisu catusu puggalesu [A. ii. 95] catutthapuggalabhbāvo siddho hoti; tathā karuṇāya lokañāthā, paññāya attanāthā; karuṇāya c'assa ninnatābhāvo; paññāya uṇṇamābhāvo; tathā karuṇāya sabbasattesu janitānuggaho, paññāyānugatattā na ca na sabbattha virattacittatā; paññāya sabbadhammesu virattacitto, karuṇānugatattā na ca na sabbasattānugahatāya pavatto. Yathā hi karuṇā Bhagavato sinehasokavirahitā, evaŋ paññā ahañkāramamakāraviniñuttā ti aññamaññavisodhitā paramavisuddhā guṇavisesā vijjacaraṇa-sampadāhi pakāsitaŋ ti daṭṭhabaj.

Here again the range of the Teacher's wisdom is displayed in the perfection of his intelligence, and the range of his compassion by the perfection of his conduct. By this wisdom the Exalted One attains the kingdom of righteousness, and by this compassion he distributes righteousness. By wisdom he desires to be free from the distortions of the round-of-rebirths, by compassion he endures the distortions of the round-of-rebirths, by wisdom he understands the pains of others, by compassion he exerts himself to find remedies for the pains of others; by wisdom he sets his face towards final deliverance, by compassion he achieves final deliverance; by wisdom he saves himself, by compassion he saves others; by wisdom he attains to Buddhahood, by compassion he brings the actions of a Buddha to perfection. — By compassion while in the state of a Future Buddha he was facing the round-of-rebirths, by wisdom he takes no delight in that past life; likewise by compassion he refrains from producing any fear in others, by wisdom he himself feels no fear of others; by compassion while protecting others he protects himself; by wisdom while protecting himself he protects others; likewise by compassion he gives no torment to others, by wisdom he gives no torment to himself. Thus he attains to the state of the fourth type in such a list as that of the four types of man [A., ii. 95]. Similarly by compassion he becomes Lord of the World, by wisdom Lord of Self; by compassion he ceases to abase himself, by wisdom he ceases to feel pride. Likewise by compassion he does helpful acts towards all beings. Because compassion is combined with wisdom, he is not attached anywhere. By wisdom his mind is unattached to any thing. Because wisdom is combined with compassion, it operates in helpfulness to all living beings. For just as the compassion of the Exalted One is without all personal attachment or repulsion, so his wisdom is quite free from

vanity and self-reference. Thus we should understand that it has been shown that the peculiar excellences of the Exalted One are purified in the highest degree by the perfection both of his intellect and of his conduct.

This integration reaches such fullness and completion in the Typical Being that when one discerns the order of things and their interrelation one discerns Him, and when one discerns Him one is aware of the coherence of all existence.

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L'AUTONOMIE SPIRITUELLE SELON LA PENSÉE INDIENNE

PAR PAUL MASSON-OUREL

L'EUROPE scolastique a discuté sur la nature des "purs esprits"; elle a tout au moins admis l'existence d'un "esprit pur" — Dieu. En outre les théories de la liberté, depuis Plotin jusqu'à Sécrétan et Renouvier, ont eu à cœur de montrer ce qu'il faut enlever ou ajouter à l'homme empirique pour qu'il se réalise en sa véritable essence et, le cas échéant, pour qu'il fasse retour au principe divin.

Les deux problèmes ne s'imposèrent pas moins à l'Inde; comme en Occident la religion fraya la voie à la philosophie. Mais la religion fut plus une ascèse qu'une théologie, à l'inverse de ce qui se produisit chez nous, le christianisme s'étant moulé très tôt dans la dogmatique grecque.

Si le Bouddhisme n'eût implanté dans la pensée indienne l'obsession de l'esclavage qui résulte de la transmigration, la doctrine des *Upanisads* eût régné sans conteste: elle prétend rendre l'âme individuelle homogène à l'âme absolue par élimination des points de vue relatifs. S'il est permis de s'exprimer en termes spinozistes, disons que nous sommes Dieu non en tant que modes, mais en tant que substance; et le fait est que substantialité se dit *ātmatā*. "Celui qui sait" s'assimile à *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda*: l'être, la pensée, la bonté.

Mais l'idée de transmigration, extra-brahmanique par ses origines, introduisit une toute autre conception. Mérites et démerites acquis au cours des vies précédentes comme pendant cette vie rivent l'individu, selon les Bouddhistes exempt de substantialité, à une existence sans fin. Cependant le savoir, ici encore, ouvre la voie du salut. Il faut comprendre que la transmigration résulte du désir: chez qui ne désire rien le *karman* cesse de s'accroître et, par la simple usure du temps, il s'épuise. Les Jainas précisent que par l'ascèse on en "force," on en hâte la "maturation." D'où un absolu non plus statique et dogmatique comme l'*ātman* des brahmañes, mais dynamique et négatif, eschatologique et non théologique: le *nirvāna*. Ni être, ni non-être; encore moins action; mais absence d'égoïsme et par suite extinction de toute relativité. *Sat*, *cit*, *ānanda* n'offrent, pour décrire cet absolu, aucun sens.

Ces deux solutions extrêmes, mais pas si opposées qu'elles ne se concilient dans la notion de *brahmanirvāna* (*Gītā* II, 72; V, 24), mar-

quent les deux pôles de la spéulation indienne. La gamme des ontologies s'égrène, depuis l'idéalisme des *vijñānavādins* jusqu'au matérialisme des *cārvākas*, car il y a mille façons, inégalement réalistes, d'affecter par de la relativité — *upādhi*, *karman*, *carīra*, etc. — l'existence spirituelle. Pour celle-ci réaliser son intégrité, ce peut être, comme dans les dualismes jaina ou vaiçēsika, s'isoler de ce qui n'est pas elle, réaliser le *kaivalyam* des *Sāmkhyas*; et ce peut être échapper à l'illusion, soit parce qu'on s'y soustrait, soit parce qu'on la domine en la comprenant, soit parce qu'on aperçoit qu'on la crée soi-même par ce jeu divin, "la danse de Cîva," réplique hindouiste du *nirmānakāya* bouddhique.

L'ascèse des *yogins* mène également à l'une ou à l'autre des solutions extrêmes. Les simples ne voient dans l'affranchissement qu'une purification morale aboutissant, par maintes restrictions et rigueurs, à l'apathie. *Dhyāna*, *samādhi* sont des façons de vider la pensée, afin d'atteindre à la paix dans la vacuité. Il s'agit moins de sauver l'esprit que de le volatiliser. Mais les introspectifs dialecticiens, les *yogācāras* s'acheminent, à travers des difficultés toujours plus ardues, vers la conquête de "terres" toujours plus précieuses: ils défrichent un sentier sur lequel les porte une "méthode," un véhicule. Ceux-là n'isolent ni ne suppriment l'esprit; ils le réalisent. Ils parviennent au-delà du stade où cet esprit s'oppose à quelque chose d'autre; ils dépassent le bien comme le mal, le vrai comme le faux, mais sans arrêter le progrès dans l'établissement d'une transcendance. Ils n'estiment pas que la négation des oppositions marque le terme de l'effort libérateur: cet effort se poursuit en *sādhana*, en incorporation de l'esprit affranchi dans un monde par lui transfiguré, ou, si l'on préfère, dont il est l'auteur et qui donc est digne de lui. Le transcendant peut redevenir immanent — *dehin*, *garīrin*, etc. — car aucune boue ne saurait souiller le lotus.

Ainsi l'Inde envisage de différentes manières la question que nous lui posons: qu'est, ou que fait, ou que devient l'esprit érigé à la possession de sa véritable nature (*svabhāva*). La réponse est zéro, ou être plus qu'être, ou vacuité — ce qui ne veut pas dire néant, — ou fécondité infinie. Divergences d'ailleurs auxquelles le mystique se montre moins sensible que le logicien, car le plus humble *yogin*, qu'il soit brahmâne ou *mādhyamika*, se flatte de posséder tout ensemble la science de l'illusion et des pouvoirs surnaturels par la vertu de ses macérations.

L'Inde ne fut jamais assez bouddhique pour renoncer à poursuivre l'absolu; c'est même dans le Bouddhisme qu'elle en a cherché les plus audacieuses approximations. Elle ne fut non plus jamais assez bouddhique pour expulser radicalement de sa notion d'absolu l'idée du *karman*. Quoiqu'il soit surabondamment certain que c'est l'acte qui

asservit, il doit y avoir un acte qui n'asservit pas, mais au contraire traduit l'autonomie spirituelle. Au dire des Jainas c'est celui qui s'accompagne de la *lecyā* blanche, sans aucune coopération des facteurs matériels de vie. Selon les *Bhāgavatas* c'est le *svadharma* de chacun d'après sa caste, si on l'accomplit sans égoïsme, par amour pour Bhagavat. Dans les doctrines d'époques diverses apparues sur les confins iraniens, c'est la luminosité propre de l'âme, que de l'opacité peut voiler, mais que rien ne saurait éteindre, et qui, exaltée, devient splendeur immesurable, *amitābha*; en une transposition imagée des théories européennes sur l'argument ontologique, disons que cet éclat se manifeste lui-même en manifestant les ténèbres. Prestigieuse métaphore solaire, aussi indienne que gnostique, et qui symbolise à merveille l'efficace de la connaissance: l'*ātman* ou le *vijñāna*, comme le *voûs* d'Aristote, est en principe toutes choses, quoique des conditions de fait restreignent sa portée: les *Vaiçēikas* expriment cette vérité en compensant l'omnipotence de l'*ātman* par l'atomicité du *manas*, organe nécessaire de toute perception.

Sous ce biais coïncident l'être et la pensée en leur réalité suprême, comme l'existence sensible (*dharma*) est l'objet naturel de l'esprit empirique (*manas*). Tant vaut la connaissance, tant vaut l'être; l'une et l'autre sont des aspects de l'action. L'acte absolu est celui qui existe en droit, l'activité relative celle qui existe en fait. Asservis en fait, nous sommes libres en droit, si nous ne méconnaissons pas notre essence. Ce qui oppose, pour parler comme la philosophie européenne, l'existence à l'essence, c'est le poids du *karman* accumulé. Ce *karman*, à la différence du sémitique péché originel, s'use pendant que le temps s'écoule, quoiqu'à mesure il se reconstitue, sauf chez le délivré-vivant (*jīvanmukta*). D'autre part, à la différence de l'*ūλη* des Grecs, il ne représente nullement la contre-partie logiquement nécessaire de l'énergie propre à l'intelligible: alors qu'Aristote ne pouvait admettre de formes sans matière, l'Inde conçoit des *dharma*s immatériels; *çakti* ne recouvre pas *δύναμις*. Pour nous soulager du fardeau karmique vertu et intelligence suffisent, tandis qu'ailleurs seul un Dieu peut effacer la tare primordiale et faire de l'homme un élu. Pour amener à l'existence les phénomènes c'est assez qu'entrent en jeu les conditions de la pensée empirique, point n'est besoin d'une volonté divine qui se surajoutera à l'entendement parfait. Ces raisons dispensent la spéculation indienne d'élaborer une théologie, ou, lorsque les sectes en exigent une, inspirent une théologie autre que celle d'Occident. Toutes ces différences résultent de ce que l'esprit tel que l'Inde le conçoit, au lieu de combiner des "idées," des "images" relativement extérieures à lui, comme nous le

préjugéons traditionnellement depuis Socrate, Platon — et Démocrite, consiste en une fonction opératoire, créatrice de ses objets. *Artha* ne désigne-t-il pas le terme provisoire d'un processus, un but, une fin, au lieu de connoter une substance, une chose étrangère à l'intelligence? L'Inde se joue de la contradiction. De même qu'à ses yeux le *dharma* ne tend qu'à se rendre inutile, elle n'a dénoncé la servitude du *karman* que pour faire saisir quelle "vérité" appartient à l'acte par excellence, celui qui dans l'autonomie comprend et crée. Quelque information sur l'indianité fait croire que cette civilisation n'a en qu'une théorie négative de la délivrance; une initiation plus profonde montre que là-bas aussi, que là-bas surtout l'absolu fut liberté.

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MIMĀMSĀ UND VAIŚEṢIKA

BY HERMANN JACOBI

DAS Mimāṃsā Sūtra unterscheidet sich in einem wichtigen Punkte sehr wesentlich von den übrigen philosophischen Sūtras: während nämlich diese darauf angelegt sind, die betreffenden philosophischen Systeme vollständig darzustellen, finden sich nur wenige philosophische Grundsätze im Mimāṃsā Sūtra,¹ und zwar im ersten Adhyāya, vornehmlich in dessen erstem Pāda, der darum den Namen Tarkapāda führt; die übrigen elf Adhyāyas aber haben eine ganz andere Aufgabe: sie lehren die Grundsätze, nach denen aus den oft unbestimmten, ja zuweilen widersprechenden Vorschriften der Brāhmaṇas und Saṃhitās die richtige Darbringung des Opfers festgestellt werden soll. Es ist das keine Philosophie im eigentlichen Sinne. Die Mimāṃsā-Philosophie, wie sie als eins der sechs philosophischen Systeme bekannt ist, hat nicht den Verfasser des Sūtra zum Urheber, sondern ist durch die Tätigkeit seiner Kommentatoren ins Leben gerufen worden. Die Grundlage bilden die philosophischen Erörterungen des alten Vṛttikāra, welche Śabaravāmin im Bhāṣya zu M.S. i 1, 5 zitiert oder vielleicht nur im Auszuge mitteilt. Der Verfasser der alten Vṛitti ist nicht wie Keith meint,² Upavarṣa, da er diesen als eine Autorität anführt; wegen seiner Polemik gegen den Sūnyavāda muss er später als 200 n. Chr. geschrieben haben.³ Das vollständig ausgebaute System der Mimāṃsā-Philosophie gehört einer viel späteren Zeit an; es liegt in zwei Fassungen vor, die in manchen Einzelheiten von einander abweichen, als Gurumata des Prabhākaraguru, der etwa um 600–650 n. Chr. anzusetzen ist,⁴ und als Bhāttamata des Kumārilabhaṭṭa, der wahrscheinlich in der ersten Hälfte des 8. Jahrh. n. Chr. lebte.

Der Gegenstand des M.S., dem etwa 14 Fünfzehntel des ganzen Werkes gewidmet sind, ist, wie oben angedeutet, eine technische Disziplin der Opferpriester. Diese Disziplin muss sehr alt sein, so alt wie das vedāṅga Kalpa; denn ohne die in ihr entwickelten Grundsätze der Auslegung der Brāhmaṇa und Saṃhitā zur richtigen Ausführung

¹ Als Sigel für die philosophischen Sūtra bediene ich mich hier wie in J. A. O. S. xxxi, p. 1 ff., der Anfangsbuchstaben ihrer Namen Mimāṃsā Sūtra, Brahma Sūtra, Vaiśeṣika Darśana, Nyāya Darśana, Yoga Sūtra.

² The Karma Mimāṃsā, p. 7 f.

³ J. A. O. S., xxxi, p. 24.

⁴ Keith, l. c., p. 9, n. 2.

des Opfers hätten die Kalpasūtra nicht abgefasst werden können. Thibaut (Arthasamgraha, p. vi) definiert diese Disziplin: "as a body of rules enabling us to construct on the ground of the Veda a Kalpasūtra or prayoga." Diese Arbeit war aber bereits geleistet vor der Zeit unseres M.S.; denn dasselbe erörtert i 3, 11–14 (im Kalpasūtra-svatahprāmānyādhikarana), die Frage, ob das prayogaśāstra autoritativ sei, und entscheidet dagegen. Daraus folgt, dass das M.S. weniger einem praktischen Interesse dient, als einem theoretischen. Dies zeigt sich auch darin, dass in ihm nicht wie in anderen vedischen Disziplinen die Lehrsätze einfach vorgetragen, sondern nach einem feststehenden Schema (*pūrvapakṣa*, *uttarapakṣa*, *siddhānta*) diskutiert und bewiesen werden. Diese Methode der Diskussion im M.S. prägt der Mimāṃsā den Stempel einer spekulativen Wissenschaft auf, die wohl Anspruch darauf machen konnte als eine Art von Philosophie betrachtet zu werden. So ist es verständlich, dass ihre Anhänger den Antrieb empfanden, die wenigen philosophischen Grundsätze im M.S. zu einem vollständigen philosophischen System auszubauen.

Wenn wir nun untersuchen wollen, welche Stelle die Mimāṃsā in der Entwicklung der indischen Wissenschaften einnimmt, müssen wir in erster Linie unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf die philosophischen Lehren richten, die im 1. Adhyāya des M.S. erörtert werden und die theoretische Grundlage des Ganzen bilden. Es handelt sich zunächst um folgende zwei aufs Engste miteinander verbundene Grundlehren: (1) Zwischen dem Worte und dem, was es bedeutet, besteht eine uranfängliche (d. h. nicht zeitlich erst eingetretene) Verbindung i 1, 5 *autpattiḥ śabdasyā 'rthena sambandhaḥ*. (2) Das Wort (und überhaupt der Ton) ist ewig; d. h. das Wort ist immer und überall latent vorhanden und wird, wenn es ausgesprochen wird, nicht allererst zum Dasein (durch *utpatti*), sondern nur zur Erscheinung (durch *abhi-vyakti*) gebracht, i 1, 6–23.

Ich erwähne hier noch ein weiteres sprachliches Problem, nämlich ob das Wort das Individuum (*dravya*) oder die Species (*ākṛti*) bedeutet, welche Frage i 3, 30–33 erörtert und im letzteren Sinne entschieden wird.

Aus den beiden ersten Grundsätzen, welche die Ewigkeit des Wortes und seiner Verbindung mit dem, was es bedeutet, lehren, folgt, dass der Veda von Ewigkeit zu Ewigkeit besteht, gewissermassen als das ewige Weltgesetz. Das begründet die unbedingte Gültigkeit seiner Vorschriften, auf denen der *dharma* beruht (*codanālakṣaṇo dharmah* i 1, 2). Die Autorität des Veda wird durch seine Ewigkeit gewährleistet und nicht etwa dadurch, dass die höchste Gottheit, der

Iśvara, den die Mīmāṃsakas leugnen, sein Urheber sei. So dient also die Lehre von der Ewigkeit des Wortes als theoretische Grundlage für die theologische Disziplin, welche den eigentlichen Inhalt des M.S. bildet. Aber letzterer macht keineswegs jene Lehre notwendig. Denn auch bei der entgegengesetzten Theorie, nämlich dass der Iśvara den Veda verkündet habe, was die Yogins annahmen, würden die in Adhy. ii-xii des M.S. aufgestellten Regeln und Grundsätze für die Auslegung der Brāhmaṇa zur richtigen Darbringung des Opfers unverminderte Gültigkeit haben. Die technische Disziplin hatte offenbar schon lange bestanden; denn sie war unentbehrlich für die Opferpraxis. Erst nachträglich empfand man das Bedürfnis, sie auf eine theoretische Grundlage zu stellen. Und wir erfahren aus M.S. i 1, 5, dass es Bādarāyaṇa war, der sich zu der Ansicht von der ewigen Verbindung des Wortes mit seiner Bedeutung bekannte. Bedenkt man nun, dass die Interpretation der Brāhmaṇas zum Behufe der Opferpraxis den Ausübern dieser Kunst keine dringende Veranlassung gab, das metaphysische Wesen des Wortes zu ergründen, so liegt die Vermutung nahe, dass sie die Anregung zu derlei Spekulationen von anderer Seite empfingen. Nun finden wir dieselben oben angeführten Grundsätze, welche im M.S. aufgestellt werden, auch bei den Grammatikern. Kātyāyana beginnt sein Vārttika mit den Worten: *siddhe śabdārthasambandhe*; diese gibt Patañjali mit Auflösung des Kompositum also wieder: *siddhe śabde 'rthe sambandhe cē 'ti*,¹ und erklärt *siddha*, mit *nitya*. Der Sinn ist also: "Das Wort, seine Bedeutung und die Verbindung beider sind ewig." Im Saṃgraha, sagt Patañjali, werde die Frage diskutiert, ob das Wort *nitya* oder *kārya* sei, und zugunsten von *nitya* entschieden.² Kaiyaṭa bemerkt hierzu, dass der Saṃgraha ein besonderes Werk (*granthaviśeṣa*) sei, und Nāgeśa gibt an, dass Vyādi es in 100000 Śloken verfasst habe; Bhartṛhari im Vākyapadīya nennt das Mahābhāṣya *Saṃgrahapratikañcuka*.³ Am Schlusse seiner Diskussion im Mahābhāṣya⁴ entscheidet sich Patañjali dafür, dass *nitya* nicht nur das unveränderlich Ewige bedeute, sondern auch das Beharrende, dessen Wesenheit nicht zugrunde gehe: *tad api nityam, yasmiṃs tattvam na vihanyate. Kim punas tattvam? tadbhāvas tattvam. ākṛtāv api tattvam na vihanyate.* "Auch die Species (ākṛti) als solche geht nicht zugrunde." Dies führt uns zur dritten der oben angeführten Lehren im M.S., nämlich, dass das Wort die Species bedeute. Kātyāyana erörtert zu i 2,

¹ Mahābhāṣya, ed. Kielhorn, vol. i, p. 6, l. 2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 6, l. 21.

³ S. K. Belvalkar, Systems of Sanskrit Grammar, p. 31, n. 9.

⁴ *L. c.*, p. 7, l. 21 f.

64 v. 33-59 die Frage, ob das Wort das Individuum (*dravya* = *vyakti*) oder die Species (*ākṛti* = *jāti*) bedeute. Die erstere Ansicht vertrat Vyādi (v. 45), letztere, der Kātyāyana zustimmt, Vājapyāyana (v. 35).

Es steht also fest, dass die Lehren bezüglich des Wesens und der Bedeutung des Wortes sowie der Verbindung beider bei den Grammatikern mit den in M.S. vorgetragenen durchaus übereinstimmen. Dafür, dass sie bei den Grammatikern entstanden seien, lässt sich anführen, dass sogar schon vor Yāska die Frage, ob das Wort ewig oder nicht ewig sei, diskutiert worden zu sein scheint. Er erwähnt nämlich und verwirft die Ansicht des Audumbarāyaṇa, nach der das Wort *indriyanitya* sei, innerhalb des Sinnesvermögens (des Menschen) Bestand habe, d. h. nur in dem hörbaren Laute.¹ In der grammatischen Literatur zwischen Pāṇini und Kātyāyana, die nach des Letzteren Andeutungen ziemlich bedeutend gewesen zu sein scheint, wurden die betreffenden Probleme weiter erörtert und Patañjali zieht dann das oben angegebene Fazit. Die Vermutung liegt nahe, dass die Fragen über das Wesen des Wortes zuerst von den Grammatikern aufgeworfen worden sind. Aber dass die Mīmāṃsakas die betreffenden Lehren von jenen entlehnt haben, kann nur eine genauere Untersuchung wahrscheinlich machen. Zunächst lässt sich zeigen, dass zwischen beiden genannten Gelehrtenkreisen eine engere Beziehung, bestehend in der wechselseitigen Rücksichtnahme der einen auf die Begriffe der anderen, obgewartet habe. Einerseits nämlich werden im M.S. i sprachliche Fragen mit besonderem Interesse erörtert; ausser den anfangs hervorgehobenen drei Grundsätzen wird in i 3, 24-29 über die *apabhramśas* und Kasusverwechslungen, i, 3, 8-10 über Mlecchawörter, i 1, 24 ff. über die Entstehung des Satzsinnes gehandelt. Darum werden die Mīmāṃsakas, die in ihrer speziellen Disziplin es nur mit *vākya* zu tun haben, dennoch als *padavākyapramāṇajna* bezeichnet. Anderseits berücksichtigt Kātyāyana Vorstellungen der Mīmāṃsakas in seiner Erörterung über die Bedeutung des Wortes; so bezieht er sich zu i 2, 64 in v. 44 u. 47 auf die *codanā* (vedische Vorschriften) und in v. 39 auf das *Dharmaśāstra*.

Betrachten wir nun die Diskussion über die oben genannten Grundsätze bei den Grammatikern eingehender. Kātyāyana erkennt die Ewigkeit des Wortes an (*nitye śabde*), ohne sich näher darauf einzulassen. Durch Patañjali erfahren wir, dass dieses Problem im Samgraha, als dessen Verfasser Vyādi gilt, erörtert und entschieden worden sei. Da aber dieses Werk uns nicht erhalten ist, so bleibt natürlich unentschieden, ob die Diskussion in M.S. i 1, 6-23 auf ihm beruhte oder

¹ Liebich in ZDMG, Neue Folge Bd. 2, p. 211.

originell ist. — Die Frage nach der Ewigkeit der Bedeutung (*artha*) wird von Kātyāyana nicht unter diesem Titel behandelt; ihre Beantwortung ergibt sich aber aus seiner Untersuchung über die Bedeutung des Wortes i 2, 64 v. 35–59. Wie schon oben angegeben, stehen sich zwei Ansichten gegenüber, nach der des Vyādi bedeutet das Wort das Individuum, nach der des Vājapyāyana die Species. In der alten Terminologie, deren sich Kātyāyana durchaus bedient, sowie auch das M.S. an der betreffenden Stelle, wird Individuum mit *dravya*, Species mit *ākṛti* bezeichnet. Bei den Philosophen und überhaupt den späteren Schriftstellern sind dafür die Ausdrücke *vyakti* und *jāti* (*sāmānya*) üblich geworden. Es ist nun beachtenswert, dass sich Patañjali neben der alten auch der neuen Terminologie bedient. Das dürfte darauf hindeuten, dass er jünger als der Verfasser des M.S. ist.

Die Untersuchung über die Bedeutung des Wortes hat nun bei Kātyāyana folgenden Verlauf. Zuerst werden v. 35–44 für Vājapyāyana's Ansicht, dass das Wort die Species bedeute, mehrere Gründe geltend gemacht. Dann (v. 44) tritt der Verteidiger von Vyādi's Ansicht, dass das Wort das Individuum bedeute, auf mit zwei Gründen für dieselbe (v. 46, 47) und fünf Einwänden gegen die des Gegners, (v. 48–52), von denen der erste eine grössere Tragweite hat und sich gegen die selbständige Existenz der Species richtet. Dagegen zeigt dann der Anhänger Vājapyāyana's, dass die vom Gegner für seine Ansicht angeführten Tatsachen sich ebensowohl erklären lassen, wenn das Wort die Species bedeutet (v. 53–55), und widerlegt dann die gegen dieselbe erhobenen Einwände einzeln in derselben Reihenfolge (v. 56–59).

Viel kürzer wird derselbe Gegenstand in M.S. i 3, 30–35 behandelt. Im Pūrvapakṣa werden drei Gründe dafür angeführt, dass das Wort nicht die Species bedeute, sondern das Individuum, und diese werden im Uttarapakṣa widerlegt. Die Diskussion, für die nur die sūtras, nicht das viele Jahrhunderte jüngere Bhāṣya in Betracht kommen dürfen, bewegt sich ganz im Ideenkreis der Mimāṃsakas; die von Kātyāyana vorgebrachten grammatischen Gründe bleiben unberücksichtigt. Dem Verfasser des M.S. ist die Existenz oder Subsistenz der Species eine ausgemachte Sache; er scheint die Kontroverse vorgefunden und seinen Standpunkt gemäss seiner Lehre von der Ewigkeit des Wortes gewählt zu haben. Dagegen macht die Darstellung der Kontroverse bei den Grammatikern den Eindruck, dass sie auf ihre Urheber zurückgehe.

Die von Kātyāyana v. 48 erwähnten Gründe gegen und für die Annahme, dass die Species gesondert neben oder über den Individuen

bestehe und in ihnen zur Erscheinung gelange, haben für unsere Untersuchung ein besonderes Interesse, wie sich in weiteren Verläufe zeigen wird. Der Gegner macht v. 48 (*naī 'kam anekādhikaraṇasthaṁ yugapad*) geltend, dass, wenn es nur eine Species gäbe, sie doch nicht in allen ihr zugehörigen Individuen gleichzeitig erscheinen könne, was Patañjali damit erläutert, dass der eine Devadatta nicht gleichzeitig in Srughna und in Mathurā sei. Die Widerlegung dieses Einwurfs erfolgt in v. 56, das ich hier mit Patañjali's Erklärung in Text und Paraphrase wiedergebe. *naī 'kam anekādhikaraṇasthaṁ yugapad ity ādityavad viṣayaḥ*. ("Mit der Behauptung, dass) sich ein Ding nicht an mehreren Orten gleichzeitig befindet, damit verhält es sich wie mit der Sonne."

Patanjali: *na khalv apy ekam anekādhikaraṇasthaṁ yugapad upalabhyata ity ādityavad viṣayo bhavisyati; tad yathā: eka ādityo 'nekādhikaraṇasthaṁ yugapad upalabhyate.* — "viṣama upanyāsaḥ: naī 'ko draṣṭā 'nekādhikaraṇasthaṁ ādityam yugapad upalabhat." — *evam tarhi: iti 'ndravad viṣayaḥ.*

tad yathā: eka Indro 'nekasmin kratuśata āhūto yugapat sarvatra bhavati. evam ākrtir yugapat sarvatra bhavisyati.

"Dass nicht ein Ding an mehreren Orten gleichzeitig geschen werde, damit wird es sich verhalten wie mit der Sonne. Nämlich die eine Sonne wird an verschiedenen Stellen gleichzeitig gesehen. 'Diese Erklärung passt nicht auf unseren Fall; nicht ein und derselbe Beobachter sieht die Sonne gleichzeitig an mehreren Stellen.' Dann muss man (statt *ity ādityavad viṣayaḥ*) sagen: *iti 'ndravad viṣayaḥ*: damit verhält es sich wie mit Indra. Nämlich ein und derselbe Indra, der bei mehreren Hunderten von Opfern gleichzeitig angerufen wird, ist an allen gleichzeitig zugegen. So wird auch die Species gleichzeitig überall sein."

Daraus ergibt sich als die Sachlage folgendes. Man hatte den Genusbegriff nicht als eine Abstraktion aus den ihm untergeordneten Individuen erkannt, sondern dachte sich die Genera als transzendenten Wesenheiten von ewiger Dauer (generalia ante rem bei den Scholastikern). Jedes Genus (oder jede Spezies, was die in *ākṛti* liegende Vorstellungsweise besser andeutet), tritt mit allen Individuen in Verbindung und hat nicht in ihnen seinen Sitz (*avināśo 'nāśritatvāt* v. 57). Die Spezies, z. B. Kuh, ist nur eine, der individuellen Kuh gibt es zu allen Zeiten eine unbeschränkte Anzahl; wie ist es aber denkbar, dass die eine Species gleichzeitig mit allen in Verbindung stehe, also gleichzeitig an vielen Orten sei? Man verwies deshalb auf die Sonne, die auch nur eine ist, aber überall zu sein scheint. Mit dieser Erklärung gab sich Kātyāyana zufrieden. Patañjali aber fand, dass die Analogie

mit der Sonne zutreffend sein würde, wenn derselbe Beobachter die Sonne gleichzeitig an mehreren Stellen sähe. Das ist aber nicht der Fall, deshalb kann mit der Sonne das fragliche Verhältnis nicht erklärt werden, und darum erklärt er es mit Indra's gleichzeitiger Gegenwart an vielen Opferstellen. Der Punkt, auf den es hier ankommt, ist der, dass Kātyāyana einer Erklärung zustimmte, die Patañjali als unzutreffend beiseite schiebt.

Den eben behandelten Gedankengängen ganz ähnliche finden sich auch in der Mīmāṃsā, zwar nicht in der Untersuchung über die Bedeutung des Wortes, sondern in der über seine Ewigkeit. Gegen dieselbe wird im Pūrvapakṣa M.S. i 1, 9 (*satrāntare ca yaugapadyāt*) geltend gemacht, dass dasselbe Wort gleichzeitig an verschiedenen Orten gehört werde, es wäre aber unmöglich, dass, was nur an einem Orte wäre, an verschiedenen Orten erschiene. Das ewige Wort ist gerade so wie die Spezies nur eins und soll doch allerorten sein. Darum ist die Antwort auf den Einwurf dieselbe hier wie dort; *ādityavad yaugapadyam*, i 1, 15: "Mit der Gleichzeitigkeit verhält es sich wie mit der Sonne." Hier haben wir also die unklare, im einzelnen nicht durchgedachte Analogie, die auch dem Kātyāyana genügt hatte. Darum halte ich, namentlich in Verbindung mit den früher angeführten Indizien, die Folgerung für berechtigt, dass der Verfasser des M.S. und Kātyāyana derselben Periode angehören, und dass die Auffassung des M.S. nicht später als Patañjali anzusetzen sei, vielmehr etwa zwischen 200 und 300 v. Chr.

Zum Schlusse dieses Abschnittes muss noch eine Textschwierigkeit im Mahābhāṣya erörtert werden. Dieselbe Stelle des Mahābhāṣya zu i 2, 64, v. 56, die eben behandelt wurde, steht nämlich schon vorher p. 243. Doch lautet das vor dem bhāṣya stehende vārttika hier: *asti ca ī'kam anekādhikaraṇastham yugapat*, und die Worte *ī'ndravat viṣayah*, welche an der zweiten Stelle die von Patañjali vorgeschlagene Verbesserung enthalten, erscheinen hier nach Kielhorn's Annahme als zweiter Teil des vārttika, der also vom ersten durch ein Stück des bhāṣya getrennt ist. Das ganze vārttika würde somit lauten: *asti ca ī'kam anekādhikaraṇastham yugapad ī'ndravat viṣayah*. In dieser Form bietet das vārttika weder syntaktische noch sachliche Schwierigkeiten. Man versteht dann aber nicht, weshalb Kātyāyana es nicht auch an zweiter Stelle in dieser Form gebracht habe, sondern in einer, die mit jener verglichen eine entschiedene Unrichtigkeit enthält. Ich nehme darum an, dass an erster Stelle das vārttika (40) mit bhāṣya ein späterer Zusatz ist, vielleicht auch v. 41, sodass sich dann v. 42 in natürlichem Zusammenhange an v. 39 anschliesst. An zweiter Stelle

(v. 56) aber kann das *vārttika* nicht entbehrt werden, da es die Erwiderung auf den Einwurf in v. 48 enthält.

Der Lehre von der Ewigkeit des Wortes musste der Umstand ein besonderes Gewicht verschaffen, dass sich die beiden angesehensten Gelehrtenklassen des alten Indiens zu ihr bekannten. Die Grammatiker galten nämlich von je als die ersten Gelehrten (*prathame hi vidvāṁso vāiyākaraṇāḥ, vyākaraṇāmūlatvāt sarvarvidyānām.* Dhvanyāloka, p. 47), und die Mīmāṁsakas, denen man die ehrende Bezeichnung *padavākyapramāṇajñā* beilegte, dürften ihnen als Gelehrte im Range nicht viel nachgestanden haben; denn die streng wissenschaftliche Methode, wie man wohl ihre Erörterung der Gründe pro und contra zur Feststellung jedes Lehrsatzes nennen muss, handhabten sie mit gleicher Meisterschaft. Aber trotzdem erhab sich gegen die Lehre von der Ewigkeit des Wortes eine heftige, und abgesehen von den Grammatikern und Mīmāṁsakas überall siegreiche Opposition. Dieselbe ging aus, soviel wir sehen können, von den Naturphilosophen und Buddhisten. Erstere hatten die physikalische Natur des Schalles erkannt, womit die Lehre von der Ewigkeit des Wortes unvereinbar ist, und letztere stimmten ihnen bei, weil nach ihrer Grundüberzeugung es kein ewiges, unveränderlich Seiendes gibt (ausser den *asamkr̥tadharma*s: Raum und zwei Arten von *nirodha*¹). Die so aufgeworfene Streitfrage scheint lange die wissenschaftlichen Kreise Indiens aufs lebhafteste interessiert und erregt zu haben, wie sehr, ersieht man nach der zutreffenden Bemerkung von E. Abegg² schon daraus, dass in der indischen Logik eines der gewöhnlichsten Schulbeispiele für den Schluss der Satz von der Nichtewigkeit des Tones, und für den Fehlschluss der von seiner Ewigkeit bildet. Die Erörterung dieses Gegenstandes in dem M.S. hat noch, ich möchte sagen, einen akademischen Charakter, und vermutlich war es ähnlich auch im Samgraha des Vyādi gewesen, Aber den grossen Fortschritt in der Erkenntnis brachten erst die Untersuchungen der Naturphilosophen. Wir lernen sie zuerst kennen aus dem Vaiśeṣika Darśana des Kanāda. Bevor ich aber die einschlägigen Stellen des V.D. bespreche, muss ich eine Bemerkung über unser Verständnis dieses schwierigen Textes vorausschicken.

Die Erklärung des V.D. beruht nicht auf einer alten, ununterbrochenen Ueberlieferung. Die Bibliotheca Indica Ausgabe des V.D. von Jayanārāyaṇa Tarka Pañcānana (1861) enthält den Kommentar des Śankaramiśra (etwa 17. Jhd.)³ und den des Herausgebers. Ein

¹ Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 106.

² Festschrift für Wackernagel, p. 225.

³ Vgl. Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism, p. 35 f.

noch jüngerer Kommentar ist der des Candrakānta Tarkālankāra, Calcutta 1887. Alle diese drei Kommentare widersprechen einander in der Erklärung vieler sūtras, und Śankaramiśra weicht von der alten, nicht erhaltenen Vṛtti in manchen Punkten ab, wie er in seinem Kommentar an den betreffenden Stellen angibt. In schwierigen Fällen, die leider nur allzu häufig im V.D. sind, verlegen sich also die Erkläreer aufs Raten und folgen ihr Eingebung, offenbar weil kein autoritativer Kommentar nach Art von Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya zum Nyāya Darśana bestand. Und ebenso scheint es auch schon zu Uddyotakara's Zeit gewesen zu sein. Denn wenn ihm ein (fingierter) Gegner vorwirft, er setze sich in Widerspruch zu einem bestimmten sūtra des V.D., so ist seine stereotype Antwort:¹ "nein, weil Du den Sinn des sūtra nicht verstehst" (*na, sūtrārthāparijñānāt*). Uddyotakara würde wohl nicht eine falsche Erklärung dem Gegner in den Mund gelegt haben, wenn ein bhāṣya oder sonstwie betitelter Kommentar vorhanden gewesen wäre, woraus die richtige zu entnehmen war. Dagegen war jenes wohl möglich, wenn nur der Text der sūtras ohne Kommentar vorlag. Für dieselbe Annahme spricht die Tatsache, dass Praśastapāda sein Werk Bhāṣya nannte, obschon es kein Bhāṣya zum V.D. ist, sondern eine selbständige systematische Darstellung des Vaiśeṣika. Das würde er wohl nicht haben tun können, wenn bereits ein Bhāṣya oder eine Vṛtti zum V.D. bestanden hätte. Wir werden daher zu dem Schlusse gedrängt, dass die Erklärung des V.D. mündlich in der Schule der Vaiśeṣikas überliefert wurde, ohne in einem Kommentar schriftlich niedergelegt zu werden. Dazu scheint es überhaupt nicht gekommen zu sein, vermutlich weil das Auftreten der Naiyāyikas das Interesse der Naturphilosophen in neue Bahnen lenkte. Bei der Mimāṃsā scheint die Entwicklung anfangs ähnlich wie beim Vaiśeṣika gewesen zu sein. Der älteste Erkläreer des M.S., der namhaft gemacht wird, ist Upavarṣa; dass derselbe überhaupt der erste gewesen sei, lässt sich ebensowenig beweisen wie das Gegenteil. Aber ich bin durchaus geneigt zu der Annahme, dass die Erklärung des Sūtra sehr lange mündlich in der Schule der Mimāṃsakas überliefert wurde, ehe ein schriftlicher Kommentar entstand. Denn der *Wortlaut* der sūtras, namentlich im ersten Adhyāya, ist zuweilen unklar oder gar unverständlich, und wird dann auch selten von Śabaravāmin, dem ältesten uns erhaltenen Kommentar, erklärt, wohingegen er immer mit voller Bestimmtheit den Gedanken angibt, der in dem betreffenden sūtra angedeutet sein soll. Dieser stand ihm offenbar fest und war ihm oder schon seinem ältesten Vorgänger, dessen Werk er benutzte, durch die Tradition der

¹ Nyāya Vārttika (Bibl. Ind.), p. 103, 16. 222, 18. 320, 11. 346, 15.

Schule gegeben, weshalb der Kommentator es nicht für nötig hielt, den Gedanken aus dem sūtra selbst, als seiner autentischen Festsetzung, dadurch zu entwickeln, dass er die Worte des Sūtrakāra in dem fraglichen Sinne erklärte. Bei anderen älteren Sūtrawerken, solchen über Ritual, Dharma u. s. w., bei welchen der Stoff unverändert derselbe blieb, wie er vom Sūtrakāra dargestellt wurde, machte es nichts aus, wenn die Erklärung der mündlichen Ueberlieferung überlassen wurde, und sind zu ihnen sicher erst lange nach ihrer Abfassung Kommentare geschrieben worden. Aber philosophische Lehren tragen den Keim der Entwicklung in sich, und wenn sie nicht rechtzeitig schriftlich fixiert werden, dann ergeben sich die Schwierigkeiten, die wir beim Studium des V. D. und, in geringerem Masse, bei dem des M.S. empfinden. Jedoch ist es begreiflich, dass man auch bei diesen beiden ältesten philosophischen Sūtras nicht von der Schulpraxis, nämlich der ausschliesslich mündlichen Ueberlieferung, abwich, die bei jenen anderen älteren Sūtrawerken im Schwange war, bis die Periode der Kommentatoren-Literatur eingetreten war.

Doch kehren wir zu unserem Thema nach dieser Abschweifung zurück, die eben begründen sollte, weshalb ich bei der Deutung der sūtras im V. D. unbedenklich von den Kommentatoren abweiche, wenn der Zusammenhang der sūtras unter einander oder die Behandlung des Gegenstandes in anderen Quellen dies empfiehlt.

Die Frage nach der Ewigkeit des Wortes wird im Vaiśeṣika behandelt. Der Gang der Untersuchung ist folgender. V. D. ii 2, 23-25 wird festgestellt, dass der Ton weder eine Substanz (*dravya*), noch eine Kraft (*karman*), sondern eine Eigenschaft (*guna*) sei. Dann werden als Gründe dafür, dass er nicht ewig sei, angeführt: *sato lingābhāvāt* (26) "weil kein Anzeichen dafür vorhanden ist, dass er besteht (auch wenn er nicht wahrgenommen wird)" (vgl. M.S. i 1, 7 *asthānāt*) — *nityavaidharmyāt* (27) "wegen seiner Verschiedenheit von Ewigem (insofern er entsteht und vergeht)." *anityaś cā 'yaṁ kāraṇataḥ* (28) "der Ton ist vielmehr nicht ewig, weil er auf Ursachen beruht." — *na cā 'siddham vikārāt* (29). Und dass der Ton nicht-ewig, d. h. veränderlich sei, ist eine Tatsache, weil er sich wandelt; d. h. er kann bald lauter bald leiser sein — *abhivyaktau dosāt* (30). Nimmt man an, dass der Ton nicht hervorgebracht, sondern als etwas immer Daseiendes nur zur Erscheinung gebracht werde, so lassen sich die vorher angeführten Tatsachen nicht erklären. — Nachdem so die Nichtigkeit des Tones erwiesen ist, wird der Satz ausgesprochen: *saṃyogād vibhāgac ca śabdāc ca śabdāniśpatiḥ* (31). "Der Ton entsteht durch Verbindung (z. B. von Trommel und Schlägel), durch Trennung (z. B. beim

Spleissen von Bambus), und aus einem Tone (bei der Fortpflanzung des Schalles)."

Hiermit ist die physikalische Seite des Problems erledigt; es folgt die Anwendung des Ergebnisses auf das Wort. *lingāc cā 'nityah śabdāḥ* (32). "Das Wort ist nicht ewig, wegen seines charakteristischen Merkmals (nämlich, dass es aus Lauten, d. h. Tönen, besteht)." Es folgen nun durch *tu* in 33 als solche angedeutet die Einwände des Gegners: *dvayos tu pravrtyor abhāvāt* (33). "Es ist aber ewig, weil sonst Uebergabe und Annahme (des Veda) seitens des Lehrers bzw. Schülers nicht statthaben könnte," d. h. man kann nur etwas wirklich Vorhandenes einem anderen übergeben oder von ihm annehmen. — *prathamāśabdāt* (34). "Wegen der Benennung, "die erste," d. h. dreimal spricht er die erste samidheni-Formel, woraus sich ergibt, dass, was er dreimal spricht, ein und dasselbe, nicht immer wieder Neues ist. (Vgl. M.S. i, 1, 20: *samkhyābhāvāt*) — *sampratipattibhāvāc ca.* (35). "Und weil man es (Wort, Spruch, etc.) als dasselbe wiedererkennt, (wenn dasselbe später oder von einem anderen wiederholt wird)."

Nun erfolgt die Ablehnung und Widerlegung des eben Gesagten. *samdigdhāḥ sati bahutre.* (36). "Diese Gründe sind nicht eindeutig (vgl. iii, 1, 17), (weil dieselben Erscheinungen auch da eintreten), wo es sich um mehrere, wirklich verschiedene Handlungen oder Vorgänge handelt." Z. B. bei Tänzen: man lehrt, lernt und wiederholt einen Tanz; niemand hält aber darum den betreffenden Tanz für ein ewiges, transzendentes Seiendes, das durch die Aufführung nur zur Erscheinung gebracht (manifestiert) werde! (vgl. N. D. ii, 2, 29: *na, anyatye 'py abhyāsasyō 'pacārāt.*) — *samkhyābhāvāḥ sāmānyataḥ.* (37). ("In solchen Fällen erklärt sich) die Angabe einer Zahl aus dem Gemeinsamen"; d. h. das allen Aufführungen eines Tanzes etc. Gemeinsame, das einheitliche Schema, gilt als die Einheit bei der Zahl der einzelnen Aufführungen, d. h. bei ihrer Zählung, und ebenso gilt der identische Gedanke eines Spruches für die Einheit der Zahl der Wiederholungen desselben Spruches, und so weiter.

Es kann kaum bezweifelt werden, dass die Polemik in den angeführten sūtras des Vaiśeṣika sich gegen die Mimāṃsā richtet, und dass Kanāda die Darstellung desselben Gegenstandes in M.S. i 1, 6–23 gekannt hat. Aber eine direkte Beziehung derselben auf das M.S. lässt sich höchstens in seinem 37. sūtra erkennen, dessen Wortlaut *samkhyābhāvāḥ sāmānyataḥ* deutlich auf M.S. i 1, 20: *samkhyābhāvāt* hinweist. Wenn Kanāda nicht alle im M.S. aufgeführten Gründe einzeln widerlegt, so hat das wohl darin seine Ursache, dass das Problem zu seiner Zeit oft verhandelt worden war und er deshalb den pür-

vapakṣa nach dem damaligen Stand der Diskussion einrichten konnte. Ausdrücklich verdient aber hervorgehoben zu werden, dass die dem Vaiśeṣika eigene Argumentation, die physikalische Behandlung der Frage, dem M.S. und den Grammatikern völlig fremd ist. Dieselbe ist offenbar die Errungenschaft einer späteren Periode, die durch Kanāda eingeleitet wird.

Das hier Gesagte gilt auch für die Behandlung des Problems von der Verbindung des Wortes mit dem, was es bedeutet, die sich V. D. vii 2, 14–20 findet. Die Mīmāṃsā lehrt, dass zwischen dem Wort und dem, was es bedeutet, eine natürliche, ewige Verbindung besteht (vgl. oben p. 146 *autpattiḥ śabdasyā 'rthena sambandhaḥ* M.S. i, 1, 5). Die Widerlegung im Vaiśeṣika ergibt sich aus physikalischen Betrachtungen; denn das Wort ist, wie wir eben sahen, physikalisch ein Komplex von Tönen. Der Ton (*śabda*) ist aber eine Eigenschaft, die der Luft (ākāśa) inhäriert, er kann also ausserdem nicht noch eine zweite Inhärenz (*samavāya*), nämlich in der Bedeutung des Wortes haben. Aber auch *saṃyoga*, der andere physische *sambandha*, ist ausgeschlossen; denn da *saṃyoga* ein *guṇa* ist, und *guṇa* keinen *guṇa* haben kann (*agunavān* i 1, 16), so kann *śabda* (als *guṇa*) nicht *saṃyoga* (einen *guṇa*) haben. Das ist der Sinn von V. D. vii 2, 14: *guṇatvāt*. Zwei *guṇa* können nicht in Verbindung (*saṃyoga*) stehen; das müsste aber der Fall sein bei solchen Wörtern, deren Bedeutung ein *guṇa* (z. B. Farbe) ist. (*guṇo 'pi vibhāvayate* 15). Da ein *saṃyoga* durch Bewegung (*karma*) entsteht und das Wort als *guṇa* ohne *karma* (*niṣkriya*) ist, so müsste die Bewegung ausgehen von der Sache, die seine Bedeutung bildet; dann könnte es keine Wörter geben, deren Bedeutung Dinge sind, die nicht Sitz einer Bewegung sind wie z. B. ākāśa (*niṣkriyatvāt* 16). Und ebenso könnte es keine Wörter geben, die etwas Nichtseiendes bedeuten, weil eine Verbindung mit etwas Nichtseiendem undenkbar ist. (*asati nāstīti ca prayogāt* 17). Aus diesen Gründen ergibt sich, dass Wort und Bedeutung nicht in (physischer) Verbindung stehen: *śabdārthāv asambandhau*. 18, sondern es beruht auf Konvention, dass man ein Wort in bestimmter Bedeutung versteht: *sāmayikāḥ śabdad arthapratyayah*. 20. Die Kommentare fassen die sūtras 14–18 als pūrvavapakṣa, der jeden *śabdārthasambandha* leugne, und sūtra 20 als sidhānta, der als den betreffenden *sambandha* die Konvention (*saṃaya*) lehre. Die Sache scheint sich auf folgende Weise zu erklären. Mit *sambandha* scheint man ursprünglich das Verhältnis zweier tatsächlich zusammengehöriger Dinge (*svābhāvika* oder *prāptilakṣaṇa*) bezeichnet zu haben, also Verbindung (*saṃyoga*) und Inhärenz (*samavāya*) und das dadurch Bewirkte. Darüber geht der Gebrauch von *sāmbandha*

im V. D. nicht heraus. Im N. D. iii 2, 43 wird noch der *āśrayāśritasambandha* erwähnt. Dann aber wurde *sambandha* auch Bezeichnung von begrifflichen Verhältnissen überhaupt und die spätere Philosophie, namentlich die Scholastik, operiert mit zahllosen *sambandhas*, wovon man sich leicht durch den Artikel *sambandha* im Nyāyakośa überzeugen kann. Bei *śabda* und *artha* nimmt man so einen *vācyavācakasambandha* oder *pratyāyyapratyāyakasambandha* an. Die wirkliche Entwicklung wird durch Heranziehung einer parallelen Erörterung im N. D. ii 2, 53–54 klar, worauf ich daher hier eingehе.

In N. D. ii 2, 53 *pūraṇapradāhapāṭanānupalabdheś ca sambandhābhāvah* wird gelehrt, dass kein *sambandha* zwischen *śabda* und *artha* bestehe, weil sonst beim Aussprechen der Wörter "Speise," "Feuer" oder "Schwert" der Mund gefüllt, verbrannt oder gespalten werden müsse. Hier bedeutet zweifellos *sambandha* die materielle Verbindung des Wortes mit dem Gegenstand, den es bedeutet. Darauf sagt der Gegner: *śabdārthavavasthānād apratiṣedhah*. 54. "Dies ist kein Beweis gegen (das Bestehen eines *sambandha*), weil zu jedem Wort eine bestimmte Bedeutung gehört." Statt *sambandha* gebraucht der Gegner *vyavasthāna*, offenbar weil *sambandha* eine Bedeutung bekommen hatte, die hier unzulässig ist. Die Widerlegung des Einwurfs erfolgt im folgenden sūtra: *na, sāmayikatvāc chabdārthasampratyayasya* 55. "Nein, weil das Verständnis der Bedeutung des Wortes sich aus der Konventionalität ergibt." Der Wortlaut dieses sūtra stellt die Bezugnahme auf V. D. vii 2, 20: *sāmayikah śabdādarthapratyayaḥ* ausser Zweifel (die Ersetzung von *pratyaya* des V. D. durch *sampratyaya* ist durch N. D. ii, 1, 52 veranlasst). Vātsyāyana sagt im *bhāṣya* zu diesem sūtra: *na sambandhakāritam śabdārthavavasthānam kim tarhi samayakāritam*. "Die feststehende Zugehörigkeit des Wortes zu seiner Bedeutung wird nicht durch *sambandha* bewirkt, sondern durch Konvention (*samaya*). Hieraus erkennt man, wie das entsprechende Vaiśeṣika sūtra (20) gemeint ist, und dass die Kommentatoren mit ihrer Deutung desselben als pūrvapakṣa auf den Irrwege sind. Vātsyāyana fährt nach der angeführten Stelle fort: *yat, tad avocāma asyēdam iti* *saṣṭhīviśiṣṭasya* *vākyasya* *ṛthaviśeṣo* *'nujnātāḥ śabdārthayoh sambandha iti samayam* *tad avocāmē 'ti*. "Wenn wir sagten (im *bhāṣya* zu ii 1, 52): Die bestimmte Bedeutung des durch den Genitiv charakterisierten Ausdrückes *asya idam* (d. h. der Gebrauch des Genitivs¹ in diesem Ausdruck) gibt einen Zusammenhang (*sambandha*) zwischen dem Wort und seiner

¹ Der Genitiv drückt allgemein irgendeinen Zusammenhang (*sambandha*) zwischen zwei Begriffen aus. In vielen Fällen wird er dadurch erklärt, dass zwischen ihn und das regierende Wort *sambandhin* gesetzt wird.

Bedeutung zu, so meinten wir damit die Konvention (*samaya*).” Diese Argumentation ist nicht ohne Eindruck auf die Mīmāṃsakas geblieben, wenn sie auch natürlich an dem von Bādarāyaṇa gelehnten *autpattiśabdaśyā'rthena sambandha* festhalten. Der Vṛttikāra zu M.S. i 1, 5, p. 12 antwortet auf den Einwand, dass der *śabdaśyā'rthena sambandha* (siehe l. 12 mit deutlicher Beziehung auf N. D. ii, 1, 53), nicht ein (physischer) Zusammenhang sein könne, wie *kāryakāraṇabhāva*, *nimittanāimittikabhbāva*, *āśrayāśrayibhbāva*, *saṃyoga* u. s. w., folgendes: *yo hy atra vyapadeśyāḥ sambandhas, tam ekam na vyapadiśati bhavān: pratyāyyasya pratyāyakasya ca yah samjnāsamjnālakṣaṇa iti.* “Nur denjenigen Zusammenhang, der hier anzugeben wäre, gibst Du nicht an: denjenigen zwischen dem, was zur Erkenntnis gebracht werden soll und dem, was sie bewirkt, welcher besteht in dem Namen und dem Benannten.” Das ist aber des Vṛttikāra Weiterbildung der ursprünglichen Lehre; in dem Sūtra steht davon nichts.

Hier möge mir eine Bemerkung darüber gestattet sein, wie ich mir die Entstehung der paradoxen Lehre bei den Grammatikern und Mīmāṃsakas denke. Zu keiner Zeit konnte es zweifelhaft sein, dass das Wort mit seiner Bedeutung verbunden ist. Da man sich aber nur physische Verbindung vorstellen konnte, so nahm man eine solche auch zwischen dem Wort und dem, was es bedeutet, an. In unklarer Form, darum aber nicht minder wirksam, zeigt sich diese Vortsellungsart im primitiven Glauben bezüglich Zauberformeln u. s. w. Die ältesten Sprachphilosophen gaben dieser noch unklaren Vorstellung einen klaren, bestimmten Ausdruck und erklärten, dass das Wort und die dadurch benannte Sache, für die dann erst später die Species gesetzt wurde, in wirklicher Verbindung stehe; dass dieselbe übersinnlich sei, erregte keinen Anstoss, schien vielmehr selbstverständlich bei dem geheimnisvollen Wesen des Wortes und der Sprache überhaupt. Diese Denkart, die noch den Erörterungen bei Kātyāyana und im M.S. zugrunde liegt, wurde tatsächlich überwunden durch die erstarkende Naturphilosophie, die wir zuerst im V. D. und später nur in Einzelheiten weitergebildet im N. D. kennen lernen. Die späteren Anhänger der Lehre von der Ewigkeit des Wortes und dessen Verbindung mit seiner Bedeutung fanden sich mit den Feststellungen der Naturphilosophie durch einen Kompromiss ab, insofern dem ewigen Worte eine gleich ewige Fähigkeit (*śakti*), seine Bedeutung auszusagen, innewohnt; damit war der *vācyavācakasambandha* des Nyāya, von dem das M.S. noch nichts weiß, tatsächlich anerkannt.

Unsere bisherigen Erörterungen gingen von der so gut wie sicheren Annahme aus, dass Kaṇāda die Mīmāṃsā gekannt habe. Zur Stütze

dieser Annahme möge der Hinweis darauf dienen, dass er ihr seine Vorstellung über das *karma*, das in der Mīmāṃsā *apūrva* heisst, verdankt. Hierüber dürfte eine kurze Ausführung am Platze sein. Die Lehre vom *karma* ist als religiöse Theorie sehr alt und lässt sich bis in das Br̥hadāraṇyaka zurückverfolgen; aber erst durch die Mīmāṃsā ist sie zu einer "wissenschaftlich" erwiesenen Tatsache erhoben. Das *apūrva* wird durch die Opferhandlung hervorgebracht und besteht als das notwendig vorauszusetzende Bindeglied zwischen dieser und ihrem später, eventuell erst im Jenseits, eintretenden Lohne. Diese Theorie ist in der Mīmāṃsā ins einzelne ausgebildet, worüber Ganganath Jhā in der Einleitung zu seiner Uebersetzung des Ślokavārttika berichtet. Alles ist logisch deduziert, natürlich unter der Voraussetzung, dass der Veda absolute Autorität besitzt. An dieser zweifelt auch das Vaiśeṣika nicht. So konnte Kanāda das *adr̥ṣṭa* (= *karma*) als etwas Reales, über jeden Zweifel Erhabenes, betrachten und zur Erklärung selbst physikalischer Vorgänge verwenden, wo die rein physikalische Erklärung nicht ausreichte, wie Dasgupta¹ ausgeführt hat. Wenn dieser Gelehrte aber glaubt, dass das Vaiśeṣika eine alte Mīmāṃsā-Schule sei, so wird das folgende die Unhaltbarkeit dieser paradoxen Ansicht dartun. Auf seinen Versuch,² in V. D. ii, 2, 36–37 die Annahme der Ewigkeit des Tones hinein zu interpretieren, brauche ich nicht weiter einzugehen und darf meine oben gegebene Erklärung dieser beiden sūtras für sich selber sprechen lassen.

Die Ablehnung der Lehre von der Ewigkeit des Wortes hatte für Kanāda's Philosophie weittragende Folgen. Denn damit fiel auch der Satz von der Ewigkeit des Veda, auf den die Mīmāṃsakas die absolute Autorität des Veda begründeten,³ und statt dessen musste angenommen werden, dass er von einem Urheber stamme (*pauruṣeyatva* des Veda). Der Nachweis findet sich V. D. vi 1, 1: *buddhēpūrvā vākyakṛtir vede*. "Die Abfassung von Sätzen im Veda setzt einen vernünftigen Urheber voraus." Man beachte, dass *vākya* nicht bloss Satz in grammatischem Sinne (*khaṇḍavākya*) ist, sondern auch ein Komplex von Sätzen, die einen Gedanken zum Ausdruck bringen (*māhavākya*), daher die Mīmāṃsakas definieren: *apauruṣeyavākyam vedah*.⁴

Ein *vākya* setzt einen Verstand (*buddhi*) voraus, der den im *vākya* ausgedrückten Gedanken gedacht hat; *buddhi* ist aber ein *guṇa* des *ātman*, folglich stammt der Veda von einem höheren Wesen, und zwar einem allwissenden, weil sonst der von ihm geoffenbarte Veda keine

¹ A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. i, p. 283.

² L. c., p. 284, n. 1.

³ M.S. i 1, 27–32.

⁴ Nyāyakośa, p. 735.

absolute Autorität haben könnte. — Die Annahme von höheren Wesen wird folgendermassen begründet. In V. D. ii 1 wird gezeigt, dass der Wind (*vāyu*) kein sichtbares Indicium (*liṅga*) habe, sondern nur aus einem begrifflichen (*sāmānyato drṣṭat*) erschlossen sei, weshalb wir nichts Individuelles von ihm wissen (*aviśeṣa*, 16.), also auch keinen Namen für ihn hätten, wenn wir ihn nicht aus dem Veda erführen (*tasmād āgamikam*. 17). Dann fährt das Sūtra fort: *saṃjnākarma tv asmadviśiṣṭānām lingam* 18, *pratyakṣapraṛittatvāt saṃjnākarmaṇaḥ* 19. “Namengebung ist aber ein Beweis für höhere Wesen als wir, weil sie stattfindet auf Grund der Wahrnehmung (des zu benennenden Dinges).” Derselbe Gedanke kehrt V. D. vi 2, 2 wieder: *brāhmaṇe saṃjnākarma siddhilingam*. “Namengebung im Brähmaṇa ist ein Beweis für die Vollkommenheit (des Benenners).” Der Sinn scheint mir folgender zu sein. Der Urheber des Veda muss Verstand haben, weil er in Sätzen redet. In den Brähmaṇas finden wir Sätze wie *jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*; wer sie ausspricht, muss nicht bloss Verstand, sondern einen vollkommenen Verstand haben, weil er die über den Verstand der Sterblichen hinausgehenden Opferhandlungen er kannt und benannthat.

Das ist alles, was in dem V. D. über den Urheber des Veda direkt gesagt wird. Kanāda äussert sich nicht darüber, ob es eine absolute Gottheit, Īśvara, gibt, dem die Offenbarung des Veda zuzuschreiben wäre (Lehre des Yoga), oder ob der Veda in jeder Weltperiode aufs neue von einer zur Allwissenheit gelangten Seele verkündet wird (Lehre des Sankhya). Ich glaube aber, dass Kanāda letzterer Ansicht zugetan war. Die Entscheidung dieser Frage hängt ab, wie mir scheint, von der richtigen Erklärung der sūtra V. D. iii 2, 19–21, die über die Vielheit der Seelen handeln. Dieselben lauten:

20. *sukhaduḥkhajñānanispattyavivīśeṣād aikātmyam*. 19. *vyavasthāto nānā*.
 20. *śāstrasāmarthyāc ca*. 21. Nach dem ältesten Kommentar Śankaramiśra ist der Sinn des ersten sūtra folgender: es gibt nur einen einzigen Ātman; denn das *liṅga* des *ātman* sind *sukha*, *duḥkha* und *jñāna*, und diese entstehen gleichmässig in allen Seelen, für deren Verschiedenheit kein *liṅga* da ist. Wie also der *ākāśa*, dessen *liṅga* der Schall in verschiedenen Teilen desselben entsteht, doch nur einer ist, so sind auch die einzelnen Seelen nur Teile des einen *ātman*. Ähnlich Candrakānta; mit anderer Begründung, aber gleichem Resultat Jayanārāyaṇa. Nach Śankaramiśra und Jayanārāyaṇa ist dies der pūrvapakṣa, und das folgende sūtra enthält den siddhānta, während nach Candrakānta sūtra 19. lehrt, was der *ātman* (brahma) an sich ist, wogegen 20. die Vielheit der empirischen Seelen im *vyavahāra*-Zustand

erklären soll. Sūtra 19 ist klar: "Die ātmans sind von einander verschieden, weil jeder seine Besonderheit hat." Wenn das vorhergehende sūtra den von den Kommentatoren hineingelegten Sinn haben sollte, so müsste dem *nānā* in 20 entsprechend in 19 statt *aikātmyam* stehen *eka eva*; oder wenn *aikātmyam* = *ātmaikyam* sein soll, dann müsste es in 20 *nānātvam* statt *nānā* heißen. Aber *aikātmya* bedeutet hier auch nicht, dass es nur einen einzigen *ātman* gebe; denn das beweist doch nicht der für das *aikātmya* angeführte Grund, nämlich dass hinsichtlich der Entstehung von Lust, Leid und Wissen kein Unterschied obwalte (zwischen den einzelnen Seelen). Sondern es bedeutet hier wie auch sonst "Wesenseinheit," womit ausgedrückt werden soll, dass es zwar viele Seelen gibt, aber nicht verschiedene Arten von Seelen. Sūtra 19 übersetze ich daher: "alle Seelen sind gleichartig, weil unterschiedlich in allen Lust, Leid und Wissen entstehen können." Es gibt aber viele Seelen. Dafür wird in 20 die *vyavasthā*, und in 21 *śāstrasāmarthya* als Grund angeführt, Letzteres legen die Kommentatoren als eine Berufung auf die heiligen Schrift aus, als wenn das sūtra lautete: *śrutes ca*. Aber das kann *śāstrasāmarthyāt* nicht bedeuten; es ist dasselbe wie *śāstrārthavatvāt* B. S. ii 3, 33 und bedeutet: weil sonst das *śāstra* (vedische Vorschriften zu opfern, u. s. w.) zwecklos (*anarthaka*) wären, (*śāstram caivam anarthakam syāt*. M.S. vii, 2, 6) d. h. in unserem Falle: wenn nicht jede Seele ihre besondere Existenz hätte, so würde der Lohn ihrer Opferdhanlungen nicht ihr zugute kommen, und dann würde eine vedische Vorschrift wie *agniṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta* keinen Zweck haben. In ähnlichem Sinne wird B. S. iv, 2, 17 *vidyāsāmarthyāt* gebraucht: weil andernfalls "*anarthikaiva vidyā syāt*." — Wenn noch ein Zweifel übrig bliebe, ob nach Kanāda's Ansicht jedem *ātman* individuelles, ewiges Dasein zukomme, so wird er durch das weiter unten anzuführende sūtra V. 2, 18 gehoben; aus demselben ergibt sich, dass die Einzelseele in der Befreiung (*mokṣa*) fortfährt zu bestehen.

Kanāda lehrt also ausdrücklich, dass alle *ātmans* in ihrem Wesen (quā *ātman*) vollständig einander gleich sind. Wenn er auch höhere Wesen als wir sind anerkennt (V. D. ii, 1, 18 siehe p. 160), so handelt es sich dabei nur um verkörperte Seelen, wie aus der Diskussion über die verschiedenen Körper iv, 2, 5-10 hervorgeht: *tatra śarīram dvividham yonijam ayonijam ca* 5, worauf er dann mit fünf Gründen beweist, dass es Wesen gibt, die keinem Mutterleibe entsprossen sind: *santy ayonijāḥ*. Die höheren Wesen haben aber (siehe oben, ii 1, 18-19) vollkommen Erkenntnis, da ihnen alles direkt wahrnehmbar (*pratyakṣa*) ist. Unter ihnen könnte also auch der

Offenbarer des Veda sein, wenn nicht gar mit dem vieldeutigen sūtra iv 2, 11, *vedalingāc ca* dies ausdrücklich gemeint ist. Jedenfalls kam Kanāda mit der Annahme der Gleichheit aller *ātmans* zur Erklärung der von ihm anerkannten Tatsachen aus und steht soweit auf demselben Boden wie die Sāṅkhyas, welche ja auch die Gleichheit aller *puruṣas* lehrten. Aehnlich scheint die Sache auch noch im ursprünglichen Nyāya gelegen zu haben. Wie sich dann in ihm die Lehre vom Iśvara entwickelt hat und dieser erst spät als Urheber des Veda anerkannt wurde, habe ich an anderem Orte¹ dargelegt. Hier erwähne ich den Nyāya nur, weil er zeigt, dass ähnliche Vorstellungen über den oder die Verfasser des Veda wie im Vaiśeṣika auch noch lange nach der Abfassung des V. D. in Geltung standen.

Am bedeutsamsten aber ist der prinzipielle Gegensatz, in den sich das Vaiśeṣika hinsichtlich des *dharma*-Begriffes zur Mīmāṃsā gesetzt hat. Die Mīmāṃsā erklärt das, was der Veda vorschreibt, als *dharma*: *codanālaksano dharmah* i, 1, 2, was sich nach dem Bhāṣya etwa so paraphrasieren lässt: *dharma* ist ein Gut, dessen charakteristisches Merkmal der in vedischen Vorschriften liegende Antrieb zu Opfern etc ist. Diese Definition, die über das *Wesen* des *dharma* nichts aussagt, möchte den Theologen genügen, nicht so den Philosophen. Ihr setzt Kanāda eine andere entgegen: *yato 'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ, sa dharmah* (i, 1, 2). „*dharma* ist das, wodurch unser zeitliches Wohl und ewiges Heil zustande kommt“; und er fährt fort: *tadvacanād āmnayasya prāmāṇyam* (i, 1, 3) „Weil er ihn lehrt, hat der Veda Autorität.“ Das ist eine Umkehrung des Satzes der Mīmāṃsā: nicht weil der Veda absolute Autorität hat, sind seine Gebote *dharma*, sondern weil der Veda *dharma* lehrt, hat er Autorität! Nach Kanāda's Definition ist *dharma* die Ursache von *abhyudaya* und *niḥśreyasa*; der *dharma* im Sinne der Mīmāṃsā hat es nur mit *abhyudaya* zu tun, insofern alle Opfer nur zur Erlangung zeitlicher Güter, sei es in diesem oder einem späteren Dasein, verrichtet werden. Von dem ewigen Heile, *niḥśreyasa*, ist in der Mīmāṃsā überhaupt nicht die Rede, aber im Vaiśeṣika ist es gerade die Hauptsache, der Zweck seiner Lehre. Das sūtra 3 lautet: *dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānām padārthānām sādharmyavaidharmyābhijām tattvajñānān niḥśreyasam*.

„Durch eine besondere Art von *dharma* wird die richtige Erkenntnis der sechs Kategorien nach ihrer Aehnlichkeit und Verschiedenheit erlangt, und aus ihr geht das *niḥśreyasa* (die Erlösung) hervor.“ Insofern also, als die Vaiśeṣika-Philosophie zum *niḥśreyasa* führt, fällt sie unter den Begriff des *dharma*. Dass es Kanāda mit dieser Charak-

¹ Jacobi, die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern, Bonn, 1923, pp. 47 ff.

teristik ernst gemeint ist, ersieht man daraus, dass er im Adhyāya 6 einige *dharmas*, die zum *abhyudaya* führen, eingehend erörtert, ein Gegenstand, dessen Behandlung sonst in einem philosophischen System gar nicht am Platze wäre. Kanāda steht durchaus auf dem Boden der offenbarten Religion und kann den Anspruch auf vollständige Rechtgläubigkeit erheben; nur so konnte er die Berechtigung des *jñānamārga* gegen die Mīmāṃsā als Vertreterin des *karmamārga* zur Geltung bringen, weil auch sein Heilsweg sich unter den Begriff des *dharma* bringen lässt. Aber er verstand den *jñānamārga* doch nicht so, dass die Erkenntnis dessen, was er in seinem System als Wahrheit erwiesen zu haben glaubte, unmittelbar zum Ziele führe, vielmehr bedarf es dazu noch des *yoga*. Darüber handeln v 2, 16-18. *tadanārambha ātmasthe manasi duḥkhābhāvah, sa yogah* (16). "Wenn dies (nämlich der Kontakt, *samnikarṣa*, von *ātman*, *indriya*, *artha* und *manas*) nicht stattfindet und das *manas* nur mit dem *ātman* verbunden ist, dann ist der Leib leidlos: das ist *yoga*." Das folgende sūtra lehrt, dass der Auszug der Seele aus dem Leibe, ihre Einkehr in einen neuen Leib, die Verbindungen (d. h. Assimilation) von Speise und Trank und die von anderen Produkten (die *prāṇas*) durch das *adṛṣṭa* bewirkt werden. — *tadabhāve samyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaś ca mokṣah* (18). Wenn das *adṛṣṭa* aufgehört hat, dann tritt die Erlösung ein, welche in der vollständigen Abwesenheit jener Verbindungen und deren Nichtwiederhervortreten besteht." — Ueber die Bedeutung des *Yoga* für die Erlangung der Erlösung (*apavarga*) handelt ausführlicher N. D. iv 2, 38-47, worauf hier zur Erläuterung der Andeutung Kanāda's hingewiesen sein möge. Dass dabei wirklich an *Yoga*-übungen nach Art der im *Yogasūtra* gelehrt gedacht ist, beweisen deutlich N. D. iv 2, 42; *aranyaguhāpulinādiṣu yogābhyaśopadeśah*, und 46: *tadartham yamaniyamābhyaś, yogāc cā 'dhyātmarvidhyupācayaiḥ*. "Zum Zwecke der Erlösung soll die Seele gereinigt werden durch *yama* und *niyama* (cf. Y. S. ii 30, 31), und Ausführung der Vorschriften des *Yoga*, die auf das Selbst Bezug haben." (Nach dem *Bhāṣya* sind mit letzterem einige Uebungen gemeint, die nur zum Teil mit den Y. S. ii 29 aufgeführten *yogāṅgas* identisch sind.)

Ich fasse das Ergebnis der vorstehenden Untersuchungen kurz zusammen. Das System der Mīmāṃsā, wie es im M.S. vorliegt, entstand in derselben Periode, in welcher Spekulationen über das Wesen des Wortes die Grammatiker unter den Vorgängern Kātyāyana's aufs lebhafteste beschäftigten. Denn dieselben Probleme finden sich auch im ersten Adhyāya des M.S. Doch auch in formaler Beziehung hat die Mīmāṃsā ein näheres Verhältnis zur Grammatik als

irgend ein Zweig der älteren Literatur, insofern nur in jenen beiden Disziplinen die strenge Beweisführung mit Gründen pro und contra zur Festsetzung der Lehrsätze als Methode der Darstellung zur Ausbildung und steten Anwendung gelangt ist. Auch die Vorstellungswelt ist im allgemeinen noch die der vorausgehenden vedischen Periode. Eine neue Weltanschauung, die vom Lokāyata ausgegangen war, tritt uns im Vaiśeṣika entgegen; sie besteht in der natürlichen und realistischen Erklärung der physischen Erscheinungen und der abstrakten Begriffe, die in der Sprache zum Ausdruck gelangen. Dadurch tritt das Vaiśeṣika in einen Gegensatz zu dem alttümlicheren Mīmāṃsā-System, dessen Lehren von der Ewigkeit des Wortes und des Veda vom Standpunkt der Naturphilosophie aus betrachtet und abgetan werden. Aber in religiöser Beziehung sind beide Systeme einig, insofern auch das Vaiśeṣika auf dem Boden der offenbarten Religion steht. Jedoch macht sich seine freiere Richtung, natürlich innerhalb der Grenzen der Rechtgläubigkeit, durch eine veränderte Fassung des *dharma*-Begriffes geltend, wodurch auch seine Erlösungslehre (jñānamārga) Anspruch auf Orthodoxye gewinnt.

Es ist klar, dass zwischen der Abfassung des M.S. und der des V. D. ein längerer Zeitraum liegen muss, in dem sich die angedeutete Entwicklung vollziehen konnte. Wenn meine oben vorgetragene Ansicht, dass das M.S. zwischen 300 und 200 v. Chr. entstanden sei, richtig ist, dann dürfte das V. D. in das erste Jahrhundert vor oder nach Anfang unserer Zeitrechnung anzusetzen sein.

Nachtrag. Seitdem vorstehende Abhandlung wiedergeschrieben wurde, hat unsere Kenntniss der ältesten kommentaren-Literatur zur Mīmāṃsā eine bedeutende Bereicherung erfahren durch Professor Dr Krishnaswami Aiyangar (Madras) in seinem Aufsatz "A School of South Indian Buddhism in Kāñchī," der der Fourth Oriental Conference (Allahabad, November, 1926) vorgelegen hat. Es wird nämlich in dem anonymen *Prapanchahṛdaya* (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, No. 45, p. 39) folgendes berichtet. Ueber das ganze Gebiet der Mīmāṃsā, umfassend den *tantrakāṇḍa* (M.S.), den *devatākāṇḍa* und den *brahmakāṇḍa* (B.S.) verfasste Bodhāyana einen grossen Kommentar namens *Kṛtakoṭi*. Aus diesem hat Upavarṣa in dem seinigen einen Auszug gegeben. Upavarṣa's Kommentar ist dann von Devasvāmin weiter gekürzt und auf die beiden ersten *kāṇḍas* beschränkt worden. Auch Bhavadāsa schrieb ein "Jaiminiya-bhāṣya." Ihm folgte Sabarasvāmin, dessen *Bhāṣya* nur den ersten *kāṇḍa* umfasst. Hieraus ist nicht ersichtlich, ob der *Vṛttikāra* mit Devasvāmin oder Bhavadāsa identifiziert oder von ihnen unterschieden werden soll.

Mit den Angaben des Prapanchahṛdaya stehen aber weitere von Professor K. Aiyangar beigebrachte Zeugnisse über Kṛtakoṭi nicht in vollem Einklang. In dem alttamulischen Gedicht Manimekhalaī ist Kṛtakoṭi Name eines Autors, ebenso im Trikāṇḍaśeṣa, brahmavarga v. 19, 23., während in der Vaijayantī (Oppert's edition, p. 95, l. 308) Upavarṣa als Kṛtakoṭikavi bezeichnet wird.

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DANDIN AND BHĀMAHA

BY ARTHUR BERRIEDALE KEITH

ALL dates given in Indian literary history," wrote W. D. Whitney in 1879, "are pins set up to be bowled down again," and it seems not unfitting, in honor of one who took upon himself as a labor of love the completion of Whitney's version of the *Atharvaveda*, to seek to demonstrate once more the truth of this aphorism.

With his wonted acumen H. Jacobi¹ has lately sought to establish within narrow limits the dates of two interesting writers, Dandin and Bhāmaha. His results have been accepted by the learned historian of Sanskrit Literature, M. Winternitz,² as well as by Dr. S. K. De,³ to whom we owe a valuable exposition of Sanskrit Poetics. The dates suggested, therefore, may now be regarded as well on the way to definite acceptance, and it becomes necessary, accordingly, to submit to a careful investigation the evidence adduced, in order to ascertain whether we have now reasonably assured results or merely plausible combinations.

We certainly owe it to Jacobi that we have some definite evidence for the date of Bhāmaha, beyond the admitted fact that a commentary on his treatise on poetics was written by Udbhaṭa, who was a councillor of Jayapīda of Kaçmīr (779-813 A.D.). In his fifth chapter Bhāmaha takes occasion to discuss the nature of inference, a subject eagerly investigated by the contemporary Buddhist logicians, and he mentions as a definition of inference a doctrine thus expressed:

trirūpāl liṅgato jñānam anumānam ca kecana.

In Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* we have the definition: *tatra trirūpāl liṅgād yad anumeye jñānam tad anumānam*. Nor is this all; in verses 28 and 29 of the same chapter we find a reproduction in sense of three Sūtras (138-140) of *Nyāyabindu*, iii, and in them two verbal coincidences in definition. This is proof of a very strong kind that Bhāmaha knew Dharmakīrti's work, and Dharmakīrti certainly had not attained fame in the time of Hiuen Thsang, while I-tsing, whose stay in India dates from 673 to 695 A.D., notes him as one of recent fame. Jacobi further suggests, very ingeniously, that in iv, 7 Bhāmaha's ironical

¹ SBA., 1922, pp. 210 ff.

² *Gesch. d. ind. Litt.*, iii, 641.

³ *Sanskrit Poetics*, i, 63 ff.

words: *gurubhīḥ kīm vivādena?* are a reference to Prabhākara Guru, the famous Mīmānsaka, who was doubtless a predecessor of Kumārila.¹ In this case, however, the evidence is inadequate, and clearly must be disregarded in a serious consideration of the date.

On the other hand Jacobi dismisses, without adequate ground, the important observation of Pāthak² that Bhāmaha's reference in vi, 36 to a Nyāsakāra is an allusion to the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi on the *Kāśikā Vṛtti*, which may be assigned to c. 700 A.D. In doing so he relies on the impression of Kielhorn³ that the commentary in question used Haradatta's *Padamañjarī*, while tradition ascribes Haradatta's death to 878 A.D. There seems no real doubt that the recollection of Kielhorn was at fault, and it may be noted that Winternitz does not follow him in refusing to see in the *Çīçupālavadha*, ii, 112 a reference to the *Nyāsa*. Without claiming certainty in the case of Māgha's reference, it may fairly be said that the burden of disproving allusion to Jinendrabuddhi rests on Jacobi, and that his reference to Kielhorn is quite inadequate for the purpose. Skepticism in this case seems the more unjustified seeing that the dates accord so well; the use of Jinendrabuddhi and that of Dharmakīrti concur in suggesting 700 A.D. as the earliest period for the author.

When we come to the case of Dāṇḍin, we find ourselves deprived of any precise guidance. Jacobi readily accepts the suggestion of Pāthak⁴ that the threefold division of *karman* into *nirvṛtya*, *vikārya*, and *prāpya* set out in the *Kāvyādarça* (iii, 240) is derived from the *Vākyapadiya* (iii, 45-51) of Bhartrhari. But here we have a very different state of affairs from that in the case of the relation of Bhāmaha and Dharmakīrti; the probability that Dāṇḍin is simply adopting a current doctrine, not derived from Bhartrhari's work, is very great, and to render this impossible it would be essential to prove that the doctrine was originated by Bhartrhari. Neither Pāthak nor Jacobi establishes anything of the sort, and it is perfectly clear that, unless and until better reasons are adduced, this effort to fix an upper limit for Dāṇḍin must be pronounced without value. Equally without importance, as Jacobi in these cases recognizes, are guesses at the identity of the king Rājavarmaṇ or Rātavarmaṇ of *Kāvyādarça*, ii, 279, and efforts to solve the riddle in iii, 314 on the theory that it alludes to the rule of the Pallavas in Kāñcī. More serious is the proposal of Mahecandra Nyāyaratna⁵ to find use of Bāṇa's *Kādambarī* in the *Kāvyādarça*. A com-

¹ Keith, *Karma-Mīmānsā*, pp. 9 ff.

² IA., xli, 235. Cf. JBRAS., xxiii, 19 ff.

³ JRAS., 1908, p. 499.

⁴ IA., xli, 237.

⁵ Cited by Peterson, *Daçakumāracarita*, ii, 3, note.

parison, however, of the two passages yields no such result; the *Kādambarī* (p. 102) has

*kevalam ca nisargata evābhānubhedyam aratnālokokchedyam apra-
dīpaprabhāpaneyam atigahanam tamo yauvanaprabhavam.*

The *Kāvya*darça (ii, 197) has

*aratnālokasamhāryam avāryam sūryaraçmibhiḥ
drṣṭirodhakaram yūnām yauvanaprabhavam tamah.*

The assumption that the *Kādambarī* was the source of the verse in Dandin seems without possible ground, and none of those who have approved it have suggested on what point their claim of borrowing is based. If there is the relation of borrowing, every consideration suggests that Bāṇa is the person indebted, and that he has endeavored to elaborate and improve on his model. But it is really going too far to stress such a resemblance. In the world of Kavis long before 600 A.D. we may assume that many tried their hands on so obvious and tempting a theme as that enshrined in the verse and in the *Kādambarī*. Even were the verse the model of the *Kādambarī*, it would not throw decisive light on the date of Dandin, as it may not be more than a quoted verse, which Bāṇa used independently.

Still less attractive is the effort to show that *Kāvya*darça, iii, 302:

*ratnabhittiṣu samkrāntaiḥ pratibimbaçatair vṛtakah
jñāto Lañkeçvarah kṛcchrād Āñjaneyena tattvataḥ,*

is derived from *Çīçupālavadha*, ii, 4:

*ratnastambheṣu samkrāntapratimās te cakāçire
ekākino 'pi paritah pauruseyavṛtā iva.*

Jacobi himself candidly admits that a similar idea is found already in the *Kādambarī* (p. 131), and nothing is more unwise than to trust as evidential these variations of well-worn themes.

This completes Jacobi's proofs for an upper limit of date; he accepts the fact that Vāmana knew Dandin and used his work, and Vāmana he assigns to the reign of Jayāpiṭa. It follows, therefore, that for Jacobi the upper and lower limits of date for Dandin and Bhāmaha are much the same. From the arguments, however, adduced above against Jacobi's views, it follows that, while Bhāmaha cannot well have written before 700 A.D., the date of Dandin is wholly undetermined, and that there are no external criteria which induce us to bring him into close relationship in time with Bhāmaha.

Jacobi, however, claims that comparison of the doctrines laid down in the two works extant shows that Dandin was a critic of Bhāmaha, not Bhāmaha of Dandin, and he has in his favor the view of commentators on the *Kārvyādarṣa*, such as Tarunavācaspati, who here and there asserts that Dandin is criticising Bhāmaha.¹ It is, however, clear that, apart from the fact that the commentators are of late date, and are often clearly wrong in their explanations of Dandin, no stress can be laid on such assertions as evidence of date. What the commentators were interested in was not the chronological sequence of doctrines; when Dandin criticized something which occurred or appeared to occur in Bhāmaha, he was set down as criticizing that view without regard to the question whether Dandin had Bhāmaha before him or merely some forerunner who enunciated a view adopted by Bhāmaha. And, fortunately, we are not left in doubt as to the existence of a predecessor, whom Bhāmaha cites no less than twice, a fact significant of his importance. This authority, Medhāvin, has left no work for us; as usual in India, the more complete treatise has superseded the older, and it is lucky that we even know of his existence. Methodologically it is obvious that in any places where Dandin seems to criticize Bhāmaha we are bound to ask whether it is not rather a case of dealing with the views of Medhāvin or perhaps rather some other predecessor of Bhāmaha.

To assume that it must be Bhāmaha, simply because Bhāmaha expresses similar views to those criticized, is logically quite inadmissible, and, if actual use of Bhāmaha is to be established, it must be on the strength of precise parallels of very special quality. Such an example, for instance, exists in the case of Bhāmaha and the author of the *Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya*. Bhāmaha, writing of riddles, declares (ii, 20):

*kāvyanī api yadīmāni vyākhyāgamyāni cāstravat
utsavah sudhiyām eva hanta durmedhaso hatāh.*

Bhaṭṭi (xxii, 34) says of his own poem:

*vyākhyāgamyam idam kāvyan utsavah sudhiyām alam
hatā durmedhasaç cāsmin vidvatpriyatayā mayā.*

There can be no doubt as to borrowing here, and the borrower is shown decisively by the fact that the claim is as adequately motived by the character of Bhaṭṭi's work as it is artificial in the case of Bhāmaha's application of the idea to riddles. The instance is extremely informative; it proves absolutely that Bhāmaha was fond of using predecessors anonymously, and renders it as natural to expect to find imitation of

¹ Cf. Hari Chand, *Kālidāsa et l'art poétique de l'Inde*, p. 76.

Daṇḍin and criticisms of his doctrines as to trace allusions to Bhāmaha in Daṇḍin. Yet it may be noted, as indicating the complexity of arguments of this kind, that Sovani¹ regards the passage in Bhatti as an allusion to Bhāmaha, and K. P. Trivedī² interprets the passage in Bhāmaha not as a eulogy of riddles, but as a condemnation of lack of simplicity in poetry in general. It is clear, therefore, that no conclusions of value can be based on superficial investigation.

The passage which seems decisive to Jacobi is that in which Dandin enumerates the ten *Doṣas* of poetry. The list agrees verbally with that given by Bhāmaha, but the latter follows it up with (iv, 3):

pratijñāhetudṛṣṭāntahīnam duṣṭam ca neṣyate.

On the other hand Daṇḍin continues (iii, 126):

*pratijñāhetudṛṣṭāntahānir doṣo na vety asau
vicārah karkaçaḥ prāyas tenālīdhena kim phalam?*

Daṇḍin thus dismisses as unattractive and fruitless any discussion as to whether there should be recognized an eleventh *Doṣa* in the shape of a logical defect. He does not precisely refuse to recognize it; he accepts ten as certain and leaves the eleventh problematical. To Jacobi it seems clear that it was Bhāmaha, who, being deeply interested in matters logical, invented the eleventh *Doṣa*. The priority of Bhāmaha would thus be secure, but there seems no reason to accept the assertion which is not supported by any evidence. What is clear is that some authority proposed this new *Doṣa*, and that it was the subject, as every innovation is, of considerable discussion. Dandin thought the matter not worth pursuing, while Bhāmaha was interested in it; priority on either side seems excluded as a legitimate deduction from the evidence. Indeed, if we imitate Jacobi's own procedure³ in the case of the lists of *Alāmkāras*, we would ascribe to Medhāvin or some other predecessor of Bhāmaha this innovation, to which Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha should be deemed to have reacted in different ways, as in the case of the *Alāmkāra* lists. In that instance Jacobi holds that Bhāmaha followed generally his source, making chiefly an effort to simplify, while Daṇḍin developed new sub-division in order to display his critical power.

The second argument adduced by Jacobi for Bhāmaha's priority rests on the remark made by Daṇḍin (ii, 220) at the close of his illustrations of the figure *Atiçayokti*, hyperbole:

¹ Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, p. 393.

² Ibid., p. 411.

³ SBA., 1922, p. 218.

*alamkārāntarāñām apy ekam āhuḥ parāyaṇam
vāgīçamahitām uktim imām atīçayāhvayām.*

This he holds to be a sarcastic reference to the doctrine of Bhāmaha (ii, 85) which seems¹ to make out that hyperbole lies at the basis of every figure of speech (*vakrokti*).

*saiṣā sarvaiva vakroktir anayārtho vibhāvyate.
yatno 'syām kavinā kāryah ko 'lamkāro 'nayā vinā?*

Dāṇḍin, in Jacobi's opinion, rejected this doctrine of Bhāmaha on the score that he himself held the view that the quality, metaphorical expression, lay at the root of poetry (ii, 100).

*tad etat kāvyasarvasvām samādhir nāma yo gunah
kavisārthah samagro 'pi tam enam anugacchati.*

This doctrine of Dāṇḍin's, in his view, marks an advance from the point of view of supporters of the Dhvani theory of poetry from that of Bhāmaha, in so far as metaphor has for poetry the function of conveying to us what is not and what cannot be expressed in words.

The argument is ingenious, but scarcely capable of standing close examination. The suggestion that Dāṇḍin is attacking the doctrine that hyperbole plays a part in all figures by substituting for it the doctrine that metaphor lies at the root of poetry, has no foundation in Dāṇḍin's own words. There is no trace of any connection between the two ideas in his mind, still less of his feeling them to be repugnant. He merely mentions that some hold that hyperbole is involved in figures without either endorsing or denying the doctrine, and in a totally different context he exalts the importance of metaphor. Of the Dhvani doctrine he shows no knowledge. Jacobi² claims that he is referring to the Dhvanikāra in the first verse of his treatise where he alludes to earlier views in the words *bhāktam āhus tam anye*. But Trivedī³ is equally convinced that it is to Bhāmaha that the reference is made, relying on Ānandavardhana's observation⁴ regarding Bhāmaha's doctrine of hyperbole in its relation to figures generally. The only safe conclusion is that the passages in either author have no definite relation to the other; we must free ourselves from the delusion that what is preserved is all that existed, and remember that Dāṇḍin and Bhāmaha had before them a wide literature which for us is lost probably forever.

¹ See Ānandavardhana, *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 208.

² S.B.A., 1922, p. 225.

³ *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, p. 419.

⁴ *Dhvanyāloka*, pp. 207, 208, 211.

The danger of seeking to read Dandin in the light of Bhāmaha is strikingly illustrated by Dr. De's¹ interpretation of *Kāryādarṣa*, ii, 220, which he interprets as an effort to reconcile his views with those of Bhāmaha, a view disproved sufficiently by the fact that Dandin merely gives the view as one expressed by some, and thus does not make it his own.

A third argument at one time adduced² — perhaps now abandoned — by Jacobi rests on the remark of Dandin (ii, 363):

bhinnam dvidhā svabhāvoktir vakroktiç ceti vāñmayam.

which is, he holds, based on the dictum of Bhāmaha (i, 30):

yuktam vakrasvabhāvoktyā sarvam evaitad isyate.

But there seems no ground for this claim. The term *Svabhāvokti* in Dandin applies to a figure, indicating minute description by characteristics, as his definition (ii, 8):

*nānāvastham padārthānām rūpām sākṣād vivṛṇvatī
svabhāvoktiç ca jātiç cety ādyā sālamkrtir yathā.*

and still more his illustrations show. To suppose that he uses the term in ii, 363 in a different sense of ordinary speech generally is clearly illegitimate. In Bhāmaha, on the other hand, the usage is clearly other. We are definitely told (i, 36):

vakrābhidheyāçabdoktir iṣṭā vācām alamkṛtih.

and in ii, 93 the recognition of *Svabhāvokti* as a figure is given as by other writers:

*svabhāvoktir alamkāra iti kecit pracakṣate
arthasya tad avasthānām svabhāvo 'bhihito yathā.*

The two positions differ essentially, and Dandin's appears to be the older. Bhāmaha goes beyond the standpoint of Dandin; he insists that mere description, however truly it expresses the essentials, is not enough to make an *Alamkāra*. There is requisite an element of *Vakratā*, or from another point of view of *Atigayokti*; thus Bhāmaha preludes the position later laid down more completely, and now consciously, by the *Vakroktijivitakāra*, which finds in *Vakrokti* the essence of poetry. From his standpoint Bhāmaha is quite in order in denying to Dandin's figure *Svabhāvokti*, the name of a figure.

¹ *Sanskrit Poetics*, ii, 62, n. 21.

² ZDMG., lxiv, 755.

But Dandin represents a much more natural view, and one which may with practical certainty be regarded as earlier than that of Bhāmaha. The point is worth closer consideration because it has been obscured by Jacobi's treatment, and misapprehension of it has rendered less effective his discussion of *Vakrokti*.¹ He holds still² that Dandin and Bhāmaha use *Svabhāvokti* in two quite different senses. In the one sense it is merely ordinary description, in the other it is a form of *Alamkāra*. The nature of this form of *Alamkāra* Jacobi asserts to be *die Darstellung einer platonischen Idee*, supporting this view by the term *Jāti* which is also applied to it. But this really is not in accord with the much simpler view of Dandin, which fortunately is made clear by his examples as well as by his definition. He illustrates in sequence instances of *Jāti*, *Kriyā*, *Guṇa*, and *Dravya*, the first by a description of the characteristic features of parrots, the second by the movements of an enamoured dove, the third by the qualities of the contact with the beloved, and the fourth by a description of Civa with his characteristic marks, and he remarks that this sort of description prevails in Čāstras. What is meant, therefore, is nothing philosophical, but an exact description of essential characteristics. Why is this called an *Alamkāra* by Dandin? Because he has (ii, 1) a wide definition of *Alamkāra* which makes all things which lend beauty to a poem *Alamkāras*:

kāvyaçobhākarān dharmān alamkārān pracakṣate.

Dandin in fact is taking the natural view which suggests itself on analysis of any *Kāvya*. It must contain descriptions which do not substantially deviate from those in Čāstras, as well as what may be termed generically *Vakrokti*. Dandin, therefore, solves the problem of poetry for himself by acknowledging the plain fact; the stock in trade (*vāñmayam*) of the *Kavi* consists of *Svabhāvokti* and *Vakrokti*, and the two fall under the generic head of *Alamkāra*. In the former of the two divisions there is clearly no place for the use of *double entendre*, *Çleṣa*; in the latter it is specially appropriate as the first half of *Kāvyādarça*, ii, 363 tells us:

çleṣaḥ sarvāsu puṣṇāti prāyo vakroktiṣu çriyam.

Bhāmaha refines on this, and in him we find *Svabhāvokti* in a new light; he does not deny that *Kāvyas* must contain *Svabhāvokti*, but he has adopted a theory of *Alamkāra* based on *Vakratā* or *Atiçayokti*, which,

¹ Cf. ZDMG., lxiv, 751, 754, 758; Bernheimer, 588, n. 1.

² SAA., 1922, p. 225.

as we have seen, Dandin merely records as held by some, and, accepting this theory, he cannot adopt *Svabhāvokti* as an *Alamkāra*. This is an obvious and simple explanation of the facts and one which prevents us from holding that Dandin in the same book of his work, and writing on the same topic, uses *Svabhāvokti* in two perfectly different senses without warning to the reader. Moreover we escape the necessity of reading into Dandin's *Svabhāvokti*, as Dr. De¹ must do, a refined interpretation which is not suggested by Dandin, and which is plainly quite incompatible with his examples.

It is due to this misunderstanding that Jacobi² claims, as a fourth clear case of borrowing by Dandin, *Kāryādarśa*, ii, 235:

hetuṣ ca sūkṣmaleṣau ca vācām uttamabhūṣanam.

as compared with Bhāmaha, ii, 86:

hetuṣ ca sūkṣmo leṣo 'tha nālamkāratayā mataḥ.

Here, however, there is obviously no evidence of borrowing by Dandin, and Jacobi later seems to regard the treatment of these figures by the two authors rather as instances of different reactions to an older list with which both dealt in their special ways. As a matter of fact, however, great importance attaches to the words which follow in Bhāmaha and give his reason for rejecting the figures in question:

samudāyābhidhānasya vakroktyanabhidhānataḥ.

It is clear that Bhāmaha rejects the figures as instances of *Alamkāra* on the same ground that he rejects *Svabhāvokti*; it is that they all lack the element of *Vakrokti*. *Svabhāvokti* expresses *Jāti* and so forth, these *Samudāya*, without an element of *Vakrokti*. This deliberate use of *Vakrokti* is the determining point of a more mature and elaborate view than the simpler attitude of Dandin. The process of development is clear: some authority developed the theory that *Atīgāyokti* was involved in *Alamkāras*; this was merely current, not generally accepted, in Dandin's day; by Bhāmaha's time or by Bhāmaha himself the doctrine was carried to the point of insisting that *Atīgāyokti* was essentially involved in the conception of *Alamkāra*, and those forms of expression which did not contain this feature were refused rank as *Alamkāras*.

Jacobi, it may safely be assumed, would no longer lay stress on similarity of the definitions of *Bhāvīkatva* which in Dandin (ii, 364) runs:

¹ *Vakroktijivita*, p. xiv, n. 17.

² ZDMG., lxiv, 754, n. 1; but see SBA., 1922, p. 218.

*tad bhāvikam iti prāhuh prabandhavīṣayam gunam
bhāvah kaver abhiprāyah kāvyeṣ asya vyavasthitih.*

and in Bhāmaha, iii, 52, presents almost the same first line followed by

pratyakṣā iva dr̥gyante yatrārthā bhūtabhāvinah.

To this there are many other parallels¹ which could be added, but it is obvious that nothing can be made out of such similarities, which may merely be due to common derivation from current theories and contain no conclusive sign of relative priority.

Jacobi, however, still holds,² though with less confidence than formerly, to the belief that the discussion of the relations of *Kathā* and *Ākhyāyikā* in *Kāvyaadarça*, i, 23–30 is aimed at that in Bhāmaha, i, 25–9. Dāṇḍin, with much good sense, dismisses the attempt to discriminate in essence the two forms of literature, while Bhāmaha accepts as valid criteria formal distinctions of no aesthetic value. Jacobi holds that Bhāmaha cannot have known Dāṇḍin's work, since otherwise he must have taken note of his destructive criticism, and that Dāṇḍin is, therefore, the later, unless indeed some predecessor of Bhāmaha had similarly treated the subject. This he deems unlikely, especially as Amara has quite a different distinction of the two classes of literature. This is clearly unconvincing. As Jacobi himself admits, Dāṇḍin's criticism was not sufficient to keep Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Rudraṭa, Hemacandra, and others from upholding the distinction of the two classes, and there is not the slightest ground for supposing that Dāṇḍin knew Bhāmaha's text. The latter lays down for the *Kathā*:

*anyaiḥ svacaritam tasyām nāyakena tu nocye
svagunāviśkritim kuryād abhijātaḥ katham janah?*

Dāṇḍin has:

*nāyakenaiva vācyānyā nāyakenetareṇa vā
svagunāviśkriyā doṣo nātra bhūtarthaçaṇsinah.*

It is impossible from these passages to assert that Dāṇḍin, not Bhāmaha, is the borrower; taken by themselves the statements may each be the source of the other by way of opposition, or they may be based on current controversy without definite relation. A decision on the point really depends, apart from other considerations bearing on the relative priority of the authors, on the question whether in the im-

¹ Cf. Hari Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

² SBA., 1922, p. 215.

mediately preceding passage we have a critique by Dandin of Bhāmaha or by Bhāmaha of Dandin, and reasons will be adduced below to show that the latter is the true explanation of the relation of these passages.

Jacobi does not adduce, and probably would not accept, certain of the arguments adduced by other scholars to establish the priority of Bhāmaha. Thus Dr. De¹ holds that when Dandin (ii, 244) cites as a valid illustration of the figure *Hetu*

gato 'stam arko bhātīndur yānti vāsāya pakṣināḥ.

he is attacking Bhāmaha (ii, 87) who rejects the figure and describes the verse as bad poetry, to which some give the name *Vārttā*. The conclusion, however, is wholly illegitimate. Bhāmaha's mention of *Vārttā* shows that he is not attacking Dandin or at least has others in mind; nor is there any reason to show that Dandin is dealing with Bhāmaha. A common use of older material is here strongly suggested. It would indeed be different if we believed that Dandin's examples were necessarily or even normally his own composition, but in the absence of any evidence on this head no reliance can be placed in the conjecture.

Nothing again can be established from the fact that Bhāmaha (i, 41) gives as an instance of the fault known as *Avācaka* the words *himāpahāmitradharair vyāptam vyoma*, while Dandin (iii, 120) cites the whole verse as an example of the form of riddle called *Parihārikā*. To see in this, with Dr. De,² evidence of criticism of Bhāmaha by Dandin, is clearly impossible; the curtailed citation might be taken as proof of the contrary relation, but independent treatment of common sources is again a legitimate hypothesis.

No other passage seems to have been adduced of any value for proof, and there seems no possibility of resisting the conclusion that we have not a single passage in which we can say with any validity that Bhāmaha is probably criticised by Dandin. The question then arises whether any passage may be taken as proving that the work of Dandin was used by Bhāmaha. As we have seen, those passages adduced to prove Bhāmaha's priority have also been used for the purpose of establishing exactly the opposite conclusion, and probably with about equal or even superior justification. Of other passages many have no probative value, and need not be considered, but there remain points which must be assigned some value.

¹ *Sanskrit Poetics*, i, 65.

² *Sanskrit Poetics*, i, 65.

Firstly, it must be observed that, while Bhāmaha expressly tells us that he has composed many of the illustrations of the rules laid down in his *Kāryālāmkāra*, Dandin in no case refers to or criticises one of these illustrations. The importance of the point is best realized by reflecting that both authors attach importance to their examples, and that, as we have seen, two of these examples are the object of divergent views. Like all arguments *ex silentio* this consideration has no conclusive weight, but it may be set against the probability of use of Bhāmaha by Dandin, and it suggests, having regard to the importance of Bhāmaha's work, that Dandin wrote either before it was written or before it became well known.

Secondly, stress has always been laid by supporters of Dandin's priority on the fact that, while he adopts as vital the distinction of the *Vaidarbha* and *Gauḍa* styles, the attitude of Bhāmaha is severely critical (i, 31, 32):

*Vaidarbham anyad astīti manyante sudhiyo 'pare
tad eva ca kila jyāyas sadartham api nāpare
Gauḍīyam idam etat tu Vaidarbham iti kim pr̄thak
gatānugatikanyāyān nānākhyeyam amedhasām.*

It is idle to deny the *a priori* probability that this is a criticism of Dandin in the usual insulting manner of Bhāmaha. Jacobi seeks to remove this impression by pointing out that long before Dandin the poetry of the *Gauḍas* enjoyed no high repute, seeing that Bāṇa characterises it as *akṣaraḍambara* (*Harṣacarita*, ver. 7). This argument is only technically valid if one believes that Dandin has been proved later than Bāṇa, and as we have seen, there is no real evidence or probability of this. Nor is there any value in Jacobi's further observation that Dandin, though setting out the two main styles, recognizes that there are intermediate shades and types, for even so Bhāmaha's criticism would be justified, apart from the fact that Indian critics, like those of other lands, naturally feel themselves entitled to seize upon the salient characteristics of any doctrine which they condemn, ignoring saving causes which might modify their censure. Nor again is it any argument to say that Bhāmaha recognizes the division as traditional, for the point of the term *gatānugatikanyāyāt* may well be that he is reproaching Dandin with following blindly a wrong tradition. It must in fact be admitted that the view which sees in Bhāmaha's verses a deliberate attack on Dandin remains by far the more plausible. It does not attain certainty, but it is a much stronger argument than any adduced on the opposite side.

Thirdly, it is argued that Bhāmaha's verses (ii, 37, 38):

*yad uktam̄ triprakāratvam̄ tasyāḥ kaiçcin mahātmabhiḥ
nindāpraçānsācikhyāsābhedād atrābhidhīyate
sāmānyaguṇanirdeçāt trayam̄ apy uditam̄ nanu.*

are directed against the *Kāvyādarça*, ii, 30-32 where the three forms of *Upamā* are one after the other defined. Dr. De¹ contends that the attack cannot be addressed against Dandin, because he does not set up only three kinds of *Upamā*. This, however, is clearly an untenable view, resting on a misapprehension of the term *triprakāratvam* which has a simple sense as directed to a connected group of three, and has nothing to do with the total number of divisions of the *Upamā* in Dandin. It is also to be noted that Bhāmaha (ii, 32) rejects *mālopa-mādih* while Dandin (ii, 42) accepts the *Mālā* and other forms.

Fourthly, it is pointed out that the view of *Guṇas* adopted by Bhāmaha is a far more advanced one than that of Dandin, and is easily explained as due to the obvious defects of the system of that author. The historical process, as traced by Jacobi² himself, without apparent recognition of its opposition to his own view, is that Bharata gives the *Dosas* of poetic composition, and then treats the *Guṇas* as their opposites. Dandin felt this to be inadequate, as making the essential qualities of poetry mere negations of defects, although historically it was natural to begin with defects and then advance to the discovery of qualities. He, therefore, bases his discrimination of the two *Mārgas*, *Vaidarbha* and *Gauda*, on the possession by the former of those characteristics which make good poetry and which are lacking in the latter. But the difference of the definition of the several *Guṇas* in Bharata and Dandin sufficiently showed how difficult it was to arrive at clear results, and Bhāmaha found a solution by reducing the number of *Guṇas* to three, which, though this is not stated in Bhāmaha, rest on fundamental distinctions of the manner in which the mind of the reader was affected. The three *Guṇas* are *Mādhurya*, beauty, *Ojas*, force, and *Prasāda*, clearness, and *Bhaṭṭa Nayaka*³ bases the distinction on the melting, the uplifting, and the expansion of the *Citta*. We need not claim for Bhāmaha a precise appreciation of the emotional states to which his *Guṇas* were to correspond; but the reduction to three must clearly have been based on some principle of this kind, and in any event the advance on Dandin is enormous. It is significant that the *Dhvanikāra* and the majority of authorities from *Mammata* to

¹ *Sanskrit Poetics*, i, 68, n. 2.

² SBA., 1922, pp. 223 f.

³ Cf. *Dhvanyāloka*, pp. 68, 70.

Viçvanātha accepted the new division, and it is a strong argument against Bhāmaha's priority that Dandin evidently ignores it entirely.

Fifthly, it is noteworthy that Bhāmaha recognizes besides the ordinary three topics of the Čāstra, *Guṇa*, *Doṣa*, and *Alamkāra*, a fourth, that of the training of the poet. This is fully recognized and interestingly explained in later writers such as Vāmana, Rudraṭa, Rājaçekhara, and Hemacandra, but it is passed over in silence by Dandin. It is, of course, a very natural addition to the ordinary stock in trade of writers on poetics, but the evidence is strongly in favor of its being an innovation after Dandin's period. Jacobi meets this contention by the suggestion that Dandin handled the topic, or meant to handle it, in the *Kalāpariccheda* referred to in iii, 171, perhaps as a counterpart to the treatment by Bhāmaha in his fifth chapter of the doctrine of the means of knowledge. This clearly is a guess without weight, and that it should have been advanced without any authority of any kind may be regarded as satisfactory proof of the difficulty of supposing that Dandin was later than Bhāmaha.

Sixthly, it is significant that Dandin (ii, 366) expressly alludes to the *Lakṣaṇas* and admits them to the rank of *Alamkāras*. These are, of course, the *Kāryalakṣaṇas* of Bharata which are familiar from their description by Viçvanātha, but which, save for this mention by Dandin and a belated revival by Jayadeva, disappear from textbooks of poetics. This is a clear sign of archaism, and is significant as indicating the process of emancipation of the Čāstra from connection with the drama, a process carried further by Bhāmaha than by Dandin.

Seventhly, against the fact that there is the late evidence of commentators apparently in favor of Bhāmaha's priority must be set the fact that in Namisādhu's commentary on Rudraṭa's *Kāryālamkāra* we find the phrase (p. 2): *nanu Dandimedhāvirudrabhāmahādikrtāni sānty evālamkāraçāstrāni?* The order in such a passage is naturally that of historical order, and this view is, of course, in some measure supported by the fact that we know that Medhāvirudra or Medhāvin¹ was actually a predecessor of Bhāmaha. It is at any rate of greater probative value than the view of the late scholiasts. Nor is it in the slightest degree inconsistent with the not infrequent passages in which Bhāmaha appears in phrases² such as "the old writers, Bhāmaha, and so forth," for Bhāmaha was unquestionably for these later writers the head of a school, and it is significant that the phrase sometimes adds to him Udbhāta, his exponent and follower in the tradition.

¹ Cf. P. V. Kane, JRAS., 1908, pp. 545 f.

² Hari Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

Eightly, there must be noticed a passage alluded to above which presents considerable difficulty of interpretation. In the *Kāryādarśa* (i, 21, 22) Dandin has:

gunataḥ prāg upanyasya nāyakam tena vidviṣām
nirākaraṇam ity eṣa mārgaḥ prakrtisundaraḥ.
vançavīryaçrutādīni varṇayitvā ripor api
tajjayān nāyakotkarṣavarnanam ca dhinoti nah.

Bhāmaha has (i, 22, 23):

nāyakam prāg upanyasya vançavīryaçrutādibhiḥ
na tasyaiva vadham brūyād anyotkarṣavidhītsayā
yadi kāryaçarīrasya na sa vyāpitayeṣyate
na cābhūdayabhāk tasya mudhādau grahanam stave.

Dr. De¹ seeks to avoid any contact between these two passages by holding that the meaning of the latter is merely “disapproval of a disastrous ending, perhaps in conformity with a similar conventional prohibition in the drama.” Now Bhāmaha is far from partial to dramaturgy and it is somewhat surprising if it was from this source that he derived his rule. But what makes this view impossible is the extraordinary similarity of language in the two stanzas; it cannot be an accident that Bhāmaha has *nāyakam prāg upanyasya*, *vançavīryaçrutādibhiḥ*, and *anyotkarṣavidhītsayā* in a context where they directly recall Dandin’s *prāg upanyasya nāyakam*, *vançavīryaçrutādīni*, and *nāyakotkarṣavarnanam*. The possibilities of accidental likeness are far exceeded here. The argument of Bhāmaha is quite simple; you must not make a hero of a man by extolling his race, heroism, and learning, and then destroy him to exalt another person as hero; the person who is to come out victorious at the end should be extolled also in the beginning. We have a direct attack on Dandin’s doctrine and it becomes much more probable that the following passage in Bhāmaha, which in itself is not conclusive, may be really directed against Dandin.

The conclusion, therefore, seems to be that there is sufficient evidence to turn the scales strongly in favor of the view that Bhāmaha actually knew and attacked Dandin. The arguments in favor of this view are much stronger than those adduced against it and at the least render the assumption of the priority of Bhāmaha extremely hazardous. Possibly the mistaken idea that Bhāmaha belonged to c. 600 A.D., which was once suggested by Jacobi,² may have encouraged the view that he was anterior to Dandin, and this has been adhered to even when that inaccurate opinion was corrected by its author.

¹ *Sanskrit Poetics*, i, 68, n. 2.

² *Bhavisattakaha*, p. 54*, n. 1.

It remains to consider, disregarding the date of Bhāmaha, the upper limit to be assigned to Dāṇḍin. We may assume that the *Kāvyaḍarṣa* and the *Daśakumāracarita* are by the same hand; the evidence¹ adduced against this theory is clearly of no substantial value. We are assured by Rājaçekhara² that Dāṇḍin wrote three works. The guesses at the third are not happy; Pischel's *Mṛcchakaṭikā*, Jacobi's *Chandoviciti*, may be dismissed, nor is Hari Chand's *Anāmayastotra* worthy of serious consideration. The *Kalāpariccheda* is *prima facie* more plausible, since the form in which it is referred to by Dāṇḍin (iii, 171) is rather suggestive of a treatise of his own. But the very form of the title seems to indicate merely a chapter additional to the three which make up the *Kāvyaḍarṣa* as we have it. If ever written, it may have served as the model of Bhāmaha's work on this topic, which is alluded to in the *Kāmadhenu* commentary on Vāmana (p. 29). The riddle of the third work remains, accordingly, still unsolved. The *Daśakumāracarita* necessarily offers us little material for dating its author; yet something may be deduced from its contents. Its picture of India suggests that it was not composed under the Gupta empire or that of Harṣavardhana, and that it may, therefore, fall in the period between these two events.³ The style is certainly not inconsistent with the view that Dāṇḍin was a predecessor both of Subandhu and of Bāṇa. It may be granted that, as the *Kāvyaḍarṣa* is sufficient to show, Dāṇḍin was well able to display skill in the *Kāvya* manner, and that *Ucchvāsa VII* with its avoidance of any labial letters is a distinct *tour de force*. But that does not in the least alter the fact that Dāṇḍin writes a far more natural style than either of the writers named, and that it is much more probable that he preceded than that he followed Bāṇa.

Efforts, as we have seen, have been made to prove use of Bāṇa, but obviously without any cogency. To these may be added the suggestion of Hari Chand⁴ that Taruṇavācaspati is right when he holds that Dāṇḍin's statement (i, 25), that there are exceptions to the rule that the *Ākhyāyikā* should be narrated by the hero, is an allusion to the *Harṣacarita* of Bāṇa in which the story of Harṣa is recounted by Bāṇa himself. As a matter of fact we have not the slightest reason to adopt this suggestion, which naturally occurred to Taruṇavācaspati, because he, like ourselves, had not before him the older *Ākhyāyikās* and *Kathās* on which the rules of Dāṇḍin's predecessors were based. Whether we

¹ G. J. Agashe, IA., xliv, 67 f.

² Hari Chand, *op. cit.*, pp. 78 ff.

³ Collins, *The Geographical Data of the Raghuvamśa and Daśakumāracarita*, p. 46.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 81.

take Bhāmaha's account or that criticized by Daṇḍin, we have every assurance that they were framed before Bāṇa wrote or at any rate before his works became of importance as models. In Rudraṭa we find that the *Harṣacarita* and the *Kādambarī* have succeeded in winning their way into recognition so that the descriptions of the two types conform generally to their nature.¹ Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha on the contrary preceded this result; were it otherwise, we must have found a very different presentation of the case. We can easily understand by observation of the accounts in the authors of treatises on the drama how definitions of species of literature were drawn up; they rested on imperfect inductions in which minor points were treated as fundamental; Daṇḍin reacted against this, while Bhāmaha, who is often more wedded to tradition, was content to accept the tradition as handed down.

We may, therefore, place Daṇḍin with some confidence before Bāṇa and Subandhu. That he was later than Kālidāsa is indicated by certain hints. Thus in *Kāvyaḍarça*, i, 45:

*prasādavat prasiddhārtham indor indīvaradyuti
lakṣma lakṣmīm tanotīti pratītisubhagam vacah.*

there has been seen a reference to the *Çakuntalā*, i, 20:

malinam api himāñçor lakṣma lakṣmīm tanoti.

Again in *Kāvyaḍarça*, ii, 129:

*sundarī sā bhavaty evam vivekah kena jāyate?
prabhāmātram hi taralam dṛçyate na tadāçrayak.*

there is a hint of *Çakuntalā*, i, 25:

*mānuṣiṣu katham vā syād asya rūpasya sambhavah?
na prabhātaralam jyotir udeti vasudhātalāt.*

Or again for *Kāvyaḍarça*, ii, 286:

*yasyāk kusumaçayyāpi komalāñgyā rujākari
sādhiçete katham tanvī hutāçanavatīm citām?*

a model may be found in the pathetic address in the *Raghuvança*, viii, 56:

*navapallavasamstare 'pi te
mrdu dūyeta yad aṅgam arpitam
tad idam viśahis yate katham
vada vāmoru citādhirohanam?*

¹ De, BSOS., iii, 515.

These instances might be increased, but, without strictly proving dependence, they do give substance to the belief that Dāṇḍin either himself used, or cited poets who used, Kālidāsa as a model. If Dāṇḍin chose, he could doubtless easily have written these verses, and it may well be, though we cannot prove it, that a considerable proportion of his illustrations is of his own composition.

If Dāṇḍin is later than Kālidāsa, it is only natural that he should know Bhāsa, and there is no real doubt that it is from him,¹ and not from the *Mṛcchakatikā*, that he takes the famous verse:

limpatīva tamo 'ngāni varṣatīvāñjanam nabhah.

The conclusion thus suggested, which places Dāṇḍin some time before 600 A.D., would, of course, be entirely overthrown, were we to accept the ingenious theory of Rāmakṛṣṇa Kavi² which finds a third work for Dāṇḍin in the *Avantisundarī*, a *Kathā*, and from that fragmentary text, supplemented by the metrical *Avantisundarīkathāsāra*, deduces that Dāṇḍin was the great-grandson of a certain Dāmodara, who was the protégé of a Pallava king Siṁhavīṣṇu, and who was identical with the famous poet Bhāravi. It must be remembered that the date of Bhāravi is not definitely ascertained, and it is suggested that Siṁhavīṣṇu reigned about 500 A.D., so that it may be held that the date which would thus be attained for Dāṇḍin as his great-grandson would be plausible enough. But it is clearly impossible to accept this evidence seriously, for two reasons, either of which must be conclusive. Firstly, there is the fact that the fragments of the *Avantisundarī* do not in any way identify Dāmodara with Bhāravi, and, secondly, it is not in the least clear that even the *Kathāsāra*, which has no independent authority, does anything of the sort. It merely says (i, 22) of Dāmodara:

*sa medhāvī kavir vidvān bhāravīḥ prabhavo girām
anurudhyākaron maitrīm narendre Viṣṇuwardhane.*

Nothing but ingenuity will enable us to see in *bhāravīḥ* in this stanza a proper name or Biruda, and, even if it were so to be taken, there is nothing whatever to indicate that the author of the *Kirātārjunīya* is meant. It may be added that, so far as one can judge from the deplorably mutilated *Avantisundarī*, there is no reason whatever to accept identification of the author Dāṇḍin, son of Viradatta and Gaurī, grandson of Manoratha, with the author of the *Kāvyaḍarça* and *Daçakumāracaṛita*.³

¹ *Cārudatta*, i, 19; *Bālacakarita*, i, 15.

² Ed. of *Avantisundarī* (Dakṣinabhāratī Series, no. 3, 1924).


³ See S. K. De, *Ind. Hist. Quarterly*, i, 30 ff.

The relation of the *Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya* to Daṇḍin unfortunately remains dubious, as does the actual date of Bhaṭṭi's work, though the mention of King Āśvindharasena of Valabhī assigns it roughly to a period between 550 and 650 A.D. Moreover, it must be remembered that we have not Bhaṭṭi's authority for the names of the figures which he illustrates; these rest on MS. tradition or the commentary *Jayamāṅgalā*. The result of Jacobi's own researches¹ is to show that Bhaṭṭi used a different source, or rather sources, from Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, whose versions may conceivably go back to a common origin. Nothing is adduced by Jacobi² to establish the priority of Bhaṭṭi to Daṇḍin, and there appears in fact no reason to assume any relation of dependence on either side. In the case of Bhāmaha, as we have seen, there is no real doubt as to Bhaṭṭi's priority, but it is not suggested by Jacobi that in his treatment of *Alamkāras* he served as the model for that writer.

¹ SBA., 1922, pp. 218 ff.

² ZDMG., lxiv, 139, but see SBA., 1922, p. 217, and cf. Kane, IA., xli, 208.

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ŚRNGĀRIC ELABORATION IN ŚĀKUNTALA ACT III

By SHRI PAD KRISHNA BELVALKAR

IN an attempt to rise above the recensions of the Śākuntala and to formulate something like an approximation to its *Ur-text*¹ the crux of the critique, no doubt, is the problem of the Śringāric elaboration that we find in the Kāshmīr-Bengāli families of MSS as compared with the Deccan and South-Indian families of MSS. In its shortest form, as given by Cappeller, the scene occupies 3 stanzas and 23 lines of prose, from the exit of the two friends at page 34, line 14, to their re-entrance with Gautamī at page 35, line 24. Patankar's so-called "purer" Devanāgarī text differs from Cappeller's only by the retention of the stanza "Gāndharveṇā vivāhena," etc., which Cappeller finds "überflüssig" (*Einleitung*, xii). On the other hand, Pischel's edition of 1877 enlarges the scene to about 13 stanzas and 78 prose lines, while the text of the Kāshmīr MS., apart from slight variations in readings, differs from Pischel's edition only by the addition of five prose lines after Pischel's stanza 79, while it omits Pischel's stanza 80 and the two prose lines before it, as also the one-line address behind the curtain to the Cakravāka-female after stanza 89. The longer text is accordingly about four times as large as the shorter; and there is so much scope, and even *prima facie* justification, therein for forming a subjective evaluation that I had long despaired of ever being able to reach a satisfactory solution of the problem. A chance remark made by that acute French scholar, Professor Sylvain Lévi, in his epoch-making work, *Le Théâtre Indien*, note 1 to page 182 (Appendice, page 37), set me, however, on the track, and I believe that it is now possible to arrive at a text of the scene neither too short nor too long, a text which retains only the dramatically essential elements, and at which no "Puritan of the type of Monier Williams" needs any longer cavil. I do not propose, for obvious reasons, to give here the actual tentatively constituted text, but only discuss the broad lines along which it can be formulated.

The strongest argument of the champions of the Kāshmīr-Bengāli text has been of course the fact that the stanza "Caruṇā sphuritena,"

¹ The principles underlying such an attempt, and certain results to be obtained by their application, I have discussed in a paper recently contributed to *Asia Major*, vol. ii, fasc. i, pp. 79-104.

etc. (Pischel, 88), which occurs only in the longer version, has been quoted by Viśvanātha, the author of the *Sāhityadarpana*,¹ who belongs to the first half of the fourteenth century. Saradarajan Ray² also points out that in the twelfth century Vardhamāna quotes the latter half of stanza 83 of the elaborated version as of Kālidāsa. The rejoinder on the other side is that this simply proves that the “tampering” with the text was already in Bengal an accomplished fact by the twelfth or thirteenth century, and that it is, therefore, no wonder that Bengal writers like Viśvanātha show their acquaintance with it. But if now it can be shown that even so early a writer as Śriharṣa in the *Ratnāvalī* (first half of the seventh century) has imitated the longer Śringāric version, it will have to be in that case concluded that some part of the “elaboration” probably comes from Kālidāsa himself. Now, Sāgarikā in the plantain-bower, in the second act of the *Ratnāvalī*, is a close enough parallel to Śakuntalā in the cane-bower in the third act of the *Sākuntala*. Both are the suffering victims of the God of Love, and are introduced in the scene with the standard paraphernalia of a bed of lotus-leaves together with a wreath and wristlets of lotus-stalks, and so forth. The hero in both the plays describes the bed and the other objects in the bower from which the heroine has just departed. The heroine in Śriharṣa’s play *returns to the bower and overhears the words of the hero as he places upon his bosom a lotus-stalk trinket*, which she had unwittingly dropped down. In Kālidāsa’s play *this happens only in the longer version* of the scene. This should establish a *prima facie* presumption in favor of the longer version, *provided*, of course, that it can be proved that Śriharṣa was a close student and an imitator of Kālidāsa. Now, that Kālidāsa’s works were diligently and appreciatively studied at the court of Śriharṣa can be safely concluded from the encomium which his court-poet Bāṇa bestows upon Kālidāsa (*Harsacarita*, Introduction, stanza 17):

Nirgatāsu na vā kasya Kālidāsasya sūktiṣu |
Pritir madhurasāndrāsu mañjariśvira jāyate ||

And as to Śriharṣa’s imitating Kālidāsa, we have been able to gather, even in a hurried reading of Śriharṣa’s *Priyadarśikā*³ for the purpose, the following clear-enough instances, besides the imitation of the “Bee episode” pointed out by Sylvain Lévi:

¹ Nir. Sag., ed. of 1922, p. 346. |

² *Sākuntala*, 6th edition, Calcutta 1922, p. 284. ||

³ Parallels are also to be found in the *Nāgānanda*, but it is not intended to be exhaustive on the point.

Priyadarśikā, i, 8.

Priyadarśikā, ii, 3.

“Sarisa sarise rajjanti; duve ettha ummattā” (Priyad., iii, 4, 16).

“Diahām rattim vi tujha anurāo” (Priyad., p. 39, end, Vani Vilas ed., 1906).

“Kassa dāva edam uttantari nivedia sajjhaveanam via dukkham karissam” (Priyad., p. 37, middle).

“Kamaliṇībaddhāṇurāo vi mahuarao māladim pekkhia ahīnavarasassāda-lampado,” etc. (Priyad., p. 39, end).

“Saalapuḍhaviparittāṇasamatthena Vac-
charāṇa parittāanti,” etc. (Priyad., ii, 8, 6).

Mālavikāgnimitra, i, 11;

Vikramorvaśiya, iv, 7;

“Savve sagandhe visasadi; duve vi ettha
āraṇṇāā” (Śākuntala, v, 21, 25);
Also, “Duve ettha ummattaā” (Vi-
kram., ii, 8, 3).

Śākuntalā's love-letter, “Tujha na āne
hiaam mama uṇa kāmo divā pi rattim
pi,” etc.

“Saṇivibhattam hi dukkham sajhavea-
nam hodi” (Śāk., iii, 9, 4).

The well-known song in Act v of the
Śākuntala: “Ahiṇavamahuloluo tu-
mam,” etc.;

“Tumam dāva asahāṇī jāe puḍhavi-
ṇātho samīve vattādi” Śāk., (Pischel
ed., p. 59, end).

But why multiply instances? Nothing can carry conviction if the cases already cited have failed to evoke it.

A careful study of the contexts in which the above parallels occur should indicate to us the way in which Śrīharsa modifies the ideas and images of Kālidāsa to suit his own purpose. I choose just one case by way of illustration. Sanskrit poets are in the habit of mentioning a number of creepers that blossom in the spring, among others the *Mādhavī*, which puts forth flowers in the month of Mādhava, — Vaiśākha, or April–May, and the *Navamālikā*, whose flowering season comes about a month later, in what is known as the Grīṣma-ṛtu. Now, it will be remembered that the Śākuntala opens at the very beginning of the Grīṣma, and hence the creeper *Navamālikā* is described in the opening act as *navakusuma jorvanā*, or “showing forth her youth in the form of new blossom.” The other creeper, *Mādhavī*, is not at all mentioned in the Devanāgarī recension of the play. In the Kāshmir recension (which in my opinion preserves the most genuine version of the garden-scene) the creeper is mentioned, but only to motivate the heroine's movement away from the tree behind which the hero was standing concealed, a movement which Priyamvadā stops with the words, *Cittha idhayyeva dāva baiilarukkhasamīve. . . . Tae samīvatthidāe ladāsanādho via baiilarukkhaō paḍibhādi*. The Bengali version of the scene, as I have elsewhere¹ shown, considerably disturbs the sequence

¹ *Asia Major*, vol. ii, fasc. i, p. 101; also Sir Asutosh Mookerji *Silver Jubilee*, vol. iii, pt. 2, p. 356.

of the speeches and is responsible for large interpolations, amongst others the reference to the *Mādhavīlatā* and its blossoming out of season (*Asamae kkhu esā āmūlādo maūlīdā māhavīlādā*). In the Grīṣma-ṛtu the *Mādhavī* can be properly described only as past its flowering season (*adikkantakusumasamaā*), — as the Kāshmīr MS. in fact describes it, — although the creeper may still put forth a few late buds now and then. If now we turn to Śriharṣa's *Ratnāvalī*, we see the way in which the two-creeper *motif* has been adopted by that poet and turned to a slightly varying use. The second act of the *Ratnāvalī* opens in the vernal season with the *Mādhavī* (for which the Queen in the play affects a partiality) in full blossom. A *Navamālikā* creeper in the same garden is the favorite of the King and it has not yet commenced its normal flowering season. The King, however, secures an *akālakusumasamjananadohala*, or a prescription for inducing the creeper to yield flowers earlier than its normal period, so as to prevent the Queen from securing an easy victory over him in that respect. Here the trend of events follows the regular botanical sequence, which the extra passage in the Bengāli recension altogether subverts, thereby betraying the hand of the unskilful interpolator, who may, possibly, have taken his cue from Śriharṣa's *Ratnāvalī* itself.

Reverting now to the Śringāric passage in the third act of the *Śākuntala*, the most cogent objection against its shorter version is the fact that it plays fast and loose with the time-indications of the scene. The act opens a little before 2 P.M., after the conclusion of the mid-day libation,¹ and the heat of the day is still unabated² when the King objects to Śākuntalā's going out of the bower. If this indicates, let us say, about 4 P.M., Kālidāsa here seems to take nearly seven pages of Cappeller's edition to cover this period of two hours. When Gautamī later enters at the conclusion of the Śringāric scene, it is already evening, and the poet, following the shorter version, requires scarcely half a page of the same edition to cover this subsequent period from 4 P.M. to sunset. It is not, of course, meant that a scene should take as much time in the acting of it as would be required in actual life for the happening of the action represented in the scene. This would be absurd. But *within the same scene* a careful poet is expected to observe the same time-ratio. The shorter version of the present scene fails to do so. The longer version, on the other hand, does observe the proportion and, what is more, interposes in the latter part of the scene a sentence indicative of the flight of time: *Dināvasānacchāyeva puro-mūlam vanaspateḥ* (Pischel, 81). Continuing the scene from this point,

¹ Cappeller, p. 28, l. 11.

² *Aparinirvāṇo divasah*, ibid., p. 34, l. 24.

it will be noted that Pischel's stanza 83 has to be retained on the authority of Vardhamāna, as also stanza 84, which is adopted in the *Ratnāvalī*. If, farther on, we have to retain stanza 88, which is quoted by Viśvanātha, that necessarily involves the retention of the majority of at least the *prose speeches* leading up to it, including the episode of the retying of the lotus wristlet. The essential features of the Śringāric scene have accordingly some kind of a warrant for their existence. On critical grounds I believe it possible to reduce the version of the scene as given by Pischel by the dropping of some five or six stanzas and twice as many lines or prose; but against the genuineness of the scene when thus shortened I know of no valid arguments that can be urged except the purely subjective ones. I am not here ignoring the cogent remarks of Principal S. Ray,¹ which would prove fatal to the longer version if it were not possible to meet them. He says: "The passage describes at great length how the *mrñālavavalaya* was picked up by Duṣyanta and put back on the wrist of Śākuntalā. This, however, contradicts the poet; for later on we find the *mrñālavavalaya* still lying in the grove. Compare *Hastād bhraṣṭam idam bisābharanam ity āsajjamānekṣano Nirgantum sahasā na retasagrīhād īśo 'smi śūnyād api* (infra), which is undoubtedly authentic, being common to all the recensions."

Now, as against this argument it can be urged in the first place that, in spite of the remarks of the commentator Rāghavabhaṭṭa anent the line, *Stananyastośiram praśithilamrñālaikavalayam*, namely, *Mrñālasya ekām mukhyam valayam yatra . . . ekām ity anena valayān tarāsaḥatvām dhvanyate*, we have really no right to conclude that Śākuntalā wore only one wristlet on each hand: there must have been more than one so worn; only, as the word *mrñālaika* points out, they were all made of lotus-stalks alone. But even supposing that we agree to concede his point to Rāghavabhaṭṭa, there was, one may urge, the other hand in any case, from which the equally loose wristlet could drop away any time — even subsequent to the retying of the wristlet by Duṣyanta on one of the hands. Finally, — and this is the most probable hypothesis, — just as the lotus-leaves placed on the bosom of the heroine to allay the heat had to be frequently replaced by fresher ones, so must it have been even with the wristlets. Compare Pischel's stanza 73 (*āśuvimardita* — v. 1, *vivarnīta* — *mrñālavavalayāni*), and particularly the stage-direction in the *Ratnāvalī* at the beginning of the bower-scene — *Nalinīpatraih śayanīyam mrñālair valayāni* (note the plural) *ca racayitvā pariśīṭāni nalinīpatrāṇī Sāgarikāyā hrdaye nikṣipati*; as also the stanza, *Sthitam urasi viśālam padminī-*

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 284.

patram etat, and so forth,¹ in which the king describes the condition of one of the cast-off lotus-leaves. There was surely no dearth of lotus-stalks, so that the friends could prepare only two wristlets and no more. Ray's objection need not be held, therefore, to outbalance the weight of the other internal and external evidence thus far considered.

Finally, a word as to the way in which deliberate interpolations which are of the nature of weak paraphrases of the words of the original, or minor variations of a poetic theme successfully introduced by the author of the original, come to be made and adopted as genuine parts of the text. That this is mostly the work of the cleverer set of students and of self-opinionated pandits who combine in themselves the functions of a second-rate critic and a third-rate poet, may be almost taken for granted; and in connection with this I remember how, in the upper classes of the high schools, we were often required by our Sanskrit teacher to versify simpler passages from the *Kādambarī* or the *Daśakumāracarita*, or put some well-known stanzas from Kālidāsā or other classical writers into metres different from the original, while retaining intact (and even occasionally improving) the central idea of the verse and as many as possible of its words. With some effort, I believe I can still reproduce some of my juvenile efforts, of which I thought very highly at the time and which I often wrote down in my own copy of the original. Such exercises in composition have been all along current in India, and it is conceivable that from the margins of some of the MSS these jejune productions got adopted into the text of the original in the course of successive transcriptions from MSS, with perhaps the addition of the prefatory *api ca*, or *tathā hi*, to mark their adventitious character, although it would be too rigorous an application of the principle underlying this fact to reject as non-genuine every single stanza of a text that has these prefatory particles, as Cappeller seems to have done in his "kürzere Textform" of the play. In dealing with all such interpolations, especially when they are of a respectable age as being vouchsafed for by more than one MS., the conscientious editor has often to fall back upon "higher criticism," which is often subjective in its nature; and the editor can inspire confidence in the conclusions that he may thereby reach only in proportion to the success that he may have already attained in applying to the same text the more objective canons of textual criticism.

¹ *Ratnāvalī*, ii, 12.

A RĀMAYANA STORY IN TIBETAN FROM CHINESE TURKESTAN

BY FREDERICK WILLIAM THOMAS

THE text which forms the subject of this modest study is by no means one that would have been expected to emerge from the now famous hidden library of Tun-huang (Chien-to-fung). The Indian literary works hitherto recovered from Chinese Turkestan, whether Sanskrit or Prākrit originals or versions in other languages, are almost exclusively of a Buddhist character. But here we have manuscripts exhibiting the story of the chief Brahmanical epic, the *ādi-kāvya*, with no infusion of Buddhism. From the extreme east of the region, the very border of China proper, comes a Tibetan version of the story of Rāma.

The first document (A) is one of the numerous rolls of thin yellow-colored paper which were inscribed with Chinese translations of Buddhist *sūtras*. It is quite similar to those illustrated in Sir Aurel Stein's *Serindia*, plates CLXVI-CLXVIII, and along with them is deposited in the India Office Library. It is of considerable extent, measuring 15 feet 1 inch by 10½ inches (26 cm.), and the Chinese *sūtra* for which it was originally pieced together fills with its regular columns (c. 18.5 cm.) of finely written characters the whole of one side. The Tibetan writing, 439 lines (25 cm. in width), in a rather cursive, but for the most part elegant, hand, occupies the greater part of the reverse.

This arrangement of the two languages, which is abundantly exemplified in other cases, affords ground for chronological deductions. We have many Tibetan documents, letters, memoranda, short treatises, and the like, similarly associated with Chinese texts. In all cases the Chinese was the *prius*. It is clear that during one period disused or appropriated MSS of Chinese *sūtras* were freely used by the Tibetans as stationery. The period of Tibetan domination in the eastern part of Chinese Turkestan extends from about 700 to about 850 A.D., when the region passed under the control of the Turkī-speaking Uigurs. We may safely conclude that most of the Tibetan writings from those territories belong to period 700-900 A.D., and that the Chinese books which were turned to such use were of a somewhat earlier date.

The second document (B = Ch. 80. IX. 3), likewise fragmentary at the beginning, is of rough, yellowish paper, measuring 5 feet 1½ inches in length by 11½ inches (c. 29 cm.) in width. The one side is inscribed

with 99 lines, of the full width, in a large hand, which varies between a square formal type of characters and a more cursive style: it contains not a few additions and corrections in a smaller, cursive writing, which also appears on the back of the document. There we find in that hand, but, as regards the latter half, with larger and more formal characters, which may be due to the scribe of the obverse, 39 lines widthwise (c. 25.5 cm.), *plus* one lengthwise line presenting another part (C) of the story: and here also we find one correction similar to those on the obverse. Upon the evidence which we have of the variation of style there is nothing to show that a single scribe is not responsible for the whole.

The corrections on the obverse side correspond, so far as the common ground is concerned, with the readings on the reverse. Elsewhere they to a certain extent correspond with those in document A.

The reverse contains also, in a much blacker ink and partly in a different hand, some notes, drafts of letters and the like.

The three¹ documents are mutually independent. C corresponds rather closely with A, but in such a manner that the two must be different translations of one original. B covers for the most part different ground from A, a preceding part of the story. But in the common part it clearly goes back to the same original. What was this original?

The story, as told, is in form and substance wholly Indian, and the interspersed verses are unmistakably Indian in style and sentiment. But we should seek in vain for an Indian version of the *Rāmāyaṇa* to which the text closely corresponds. It follows the general lines of the narrative in the *Mahā-Bhārata* (*Vana-Parvan*, chapters 274–290); but the incidents and the nomenclature differ widely, and indeed surprisingly. A few examples may be given.

The demon Mālyavant is the son, not of Sukeśa, but of the "Yakṣa" Kore (Kuvera), who is distinguished from Vaiśravaṇa. Daśaratha has only two wives (not named), and only two sons, whose names appear as Ramana and Lakṣana (the latter always so spelled, the MSS showing no cerebrals). Sītā is a daughter of Rāvana (always named Daśagrīva); and, when cast away and found by Indian husbandmen, she is in no way connected with king Janaka of Videha, who, in fact, is not mentioned. The account of the search for Sītā differs in many details from what we find in the *Mahā-Bhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The birth of Lava and Kuśa is prior to Sītā's banishment and is quite differently narrated. The scandal which causes the banishment is reduced to a single saying overheard by Ramana, who has an interview in quite popular style with a washerman's wife, and receives instruction con-

¹ Concerning a fourth document see the *addendum* (p. 212).

cerning the nature of women. The recovery of Sītā and her children takes place upon the earnest representations of Hanumant.

Among the variations of nomenclature, we may mention that Kumbhakarṇa is replaced, in his first occurrence, by Amalakarṇa, or Utpalakarṇa(?), Kaikaśi by Mekesina or Megasina or Mesina, Vibhiṣaṇa by Biriṣana or Birinaśa. Umā is Umade or Upade; Hanumant's companions are Pagśu and Śintu (not Angada and Tāra, as in the *Rāmāyaṇa*); the two eagles are Padā and Sampadā (not Jaṭāyu and Sam-pāti, as in the *Mahā-Bhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*); Mārīca becomes Maruce; the monkeys who make the bridge are Maku and Damsi; and so forth.

Certain incidents have a distinctly popular tone. Besides that already mentioned, we have Rāvaṇa carrying off Sītā *along with the plot of ground* or estate (*sa.gži*);¹ the monkeys enter the cave holding by each other's tails; Sugrīva in his fight with Bālin has a mirror tied to his tail; Hanumant, when captured by Rāvaṇa's forces, begs to be killed as his father was killed.

We have therefore a highly peculiar *Rāmāyaṇa* story. Whence and how did it come to the Chinese frontier of Turkestan? No Rāma story known from India exhibits a majority of the above features, but there are certainly some attachments. The name of Rāvaṇa's father is given (B) as Ratana, which reminds us of the Ratnaśravas (for Viśravas) of the Jaina *Rāmāyaṇa* (sarga I, ll. 132 sqq.). Rāvaṇa's interview with Viṣṇu has some resemblance to that narrated in the *Uttara-kāṇḍa* of Valmiki's poem (c. 24). The story of the washerman's wife recurs in Tulasīdāsa's *Rāmāyaṇa* (Lava-Kuśa *kāṇḍa*: cf. *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*, ix. 11. 8 sqq.) But the largest amount of similarity is found in the first of the two Rāma narratives (IX. c. 51 and XIII. c. 107) contained in the *Kathā-sarit-sāgara*.

There are two indications which perhaps point in different directions. The first is the form of the names of Daśarite (Daśaratha), Pra-haste, the Yakṣa Kore (Kuvera); the nominative in *e* may be due to the language of Khotan. There is also another name which has a rather Central Asian appearance. This is Manlyapanta, or Malhyampata, or Malyapada, for Mālyavant. It is impossible to suppose that the Tibetan concocted these forms or derived them direct from a Sanskrit original. A Chinese source being excluded on the ground of the general correctness of the other names, and the 'Khotanī' and 'Tokhārī' for similar reasons, an original in one of the indigenous monosyllabic languages of Chinese Turkestan is not out of the question.

¹ This is, perhaps, due to the representations showing her on a sort of platform.

A second possibility is perhaps indicated by the reference to the man Litsabyid Dri-ma-dag-pa, whose wife's utterance led to Sītā's banishment. It looks as if we here were dealing with a Licchavi *rajaka* (washerman). In that case a Nepalese source is suggested. The suggestion has no antecedent improbability. During the seventh and eighth centuries Tibet was in close relations with Nepal, and the soldiers or Nepalese auxiliaries may easily have carried the story with the armies which overran the eastern part of Chinese Turkestan. In that case we are dealing with a popular form of the Rāma story having a currency in Nepal. This would furnish the direct connection with India that is demanded by the undiluted Indian character of the narrative.

In any case we have in these documents testimony to the early currency of popular Rāma narratives following the general lines and scale of the *Mahā-Bhārata* and departing freely from the classical version of Vālmīki. Some such narrative may have found a place in Guṇādhyā's *Brhat-kathā*, which in this point may be reflected by the *Kathā-sarit-sāgara*; the extant portion of Budhasvāmin's *Śloka-samgraha* does not seem to give it.

The Tibetan writing in the documents, though it presents some peculiarities, found also in other specimens from Turkestan, is in all essentials identical with that still in use. The language also is what we are accustomed to in inscriptions, edicts, letters, the writings of Mi-laras-pa, and so forth. There are words and phrases not to be traced in dictionaries; and the irregularities in the initial consonants, the abundance of homonyms, and the insufficiency of syntax, which obscure the meaning in all Tibetan writings not guaranteed by versions in other languages, are here also in full operation. But the story is simply told, and the whole might, if it were worth while, be edited and translated, except that the verses would create a difficulty. In the two abstracts given below, the third document C being useful only as supplying a fragmentary part of A, I have inserted most of the verses (*literatim* as regards all peculiarities of spelling, metre and so forth) with renderings of a quite tentative, and in places even conjectural, character.

DOCUMENTS A AND C

1-3. The Yaksinī Megasina [Kaikaśī] finds favour with the Muni [Ratnaśravas or Viśravas], who with her begets three sons, Daśagrīva, Amalakarṇa (distinguished *infra* from Kum-bhakarṇa), and Birinaśa [Vibhiṣaṇa]. Upon Daśagrīva, the eldest, Brahmā confers ten heads, and his strength is in proportion.

4-22. (*fragmentary*). Man-lya-pan-ta (Mālyavant) proposes to (C 1-9) the “sons of gods” [Devaputras] that they should combine and go to Laṅkā-pura, the realm of their uncle [Vaiśravaṇa]. Seeing the prosperity of Vaiśravaṇa, he weeps. Being asked the cause of his tears, he explains that he remembers his father, the Yakṣa Kore [Kuvera], who had been expelled by Vaiśravaṇa and sent down to hell. He implores the assistance of the ‘sons of the gods,’ who are willing to help, but profess their inability.

22-30. At the suggestion of Mālyavant the “sons of gods,” desiring (C 9-15) to conquer the gods, worship Brahmā with asceticism and so forth during one hundred thousand years. Brahmā, however, knowing their evil object, accords nothing. They continue their efforts, and then beg of Brahmā boons, namely: (1) that everyone at whom they shoot an arrow shall die; (2) a life-charm (*g-yuñ-druñ* = *svastika*) to prevent their being killed by others; and (3) sovereignty of the three worlds. Brahmā replies that he is himself the only sovereign of the three worlds and he cannot be reached by an arrow.

30-33. The sons of the gods try to propitiate Mahādeva. But he (C 15-19) also, knowing their evil purpose, will not appear, even when Daśagriva cuts off one of his own heads and makes it into a burnt offering.

33-41. Mahādeva’s wife Upade [C Umade = Umā], being very (C 19-23) compassionate, appeals to her lord; and upon his continuing obdurate she herself comes before the ‘sons of the gods,’ and advises them to give up Mahādeva and propitiate her. They declining upon the ground that she is a woman, she grows angry and prophesies their overthrow by a woman.

41-47. Similarly Mahādeva’s minister Prahasta is rebuffed, as being (C 23-30) a monkey, and prophesies overthrow by a monkey.

47-54. After a long time, as Mahādeva still disdains to appear, the (C 30-36) goddess of speech [Sarasvati] takes the form of a lump on the tip of the tongues of the sons of the gods and so modifies their requests, making them demand (1) sovereignty over the gods, (2) a life-amulet preventing death at the hands of any being who does not first cut off Daśagriva’s horse-head, (3) death of any being against whom they hurl the *first* arrow.

54-56. Thus the gods are defeated by the sons of the gods, and in

(C 36-39) Laṅkā-pura gods and men are destroyed, and the demons who fill the island make Daśagriva their king.

56-60. The gods who rule the three worlds take council together and arrange that a human being capable of destroying the demons must be born as a daughter of Daśagriva.

60-65. A wife of Daśagriva gives birth to a daughter, who, as the sign-readers declare, will ruin her father and all the demons. So the child is enclosed in a copper vessel and committed to the waters. She is found and adopted by Indian peasants, who name her Rol-rñed-ma [Lilāvati].

65-72. The king of Jambū-dvīpa, by name Daśaratha, being without a son, prays to 500 R̄sis dwelling on Gāns-di-se (Kailāśa). They send him a flower, stating that he should give it to his chief queen: he should then have a son. Out of compassion the chief queen causes half of the flower to be given to the junior queen. Two sons are born. The son of the junior queen, three nights the senior, is named Ramana. The chief queen's son is named Lakṣana.

72-82. Daśaratha, returning wounded from battle on the side of the gods, decides to abdicate and discusses with the chief queen the enthronement of Ramana or Lakṣana. He is in perplexity through consideration for the chief queen, and is seriously ill; which Ramana perceiving prays that his father may live on condition of his own retirement to a hermitage. He departs, and Lakṣana is crowned, after which Daśaratha dies.

82-89. Lakṣana visits Ramana and offers to resign the overlordship [*cakravaritva*] of the four Dvīpas, to which he is unequal. Ramana declines, whereupon Lakṣana takes a pair of Ramana's shoes [*chags*] and installs them, himself playing the part of minister.

89-108. The girl Rol-rñed-ma having grown up and being very beautiful, the peasants send everywhere to seek for her a suitable mate. They find Ramana, whose appearance greatly impresses them; they offer him the girl (ll. 95-105) —

skra.ni.mhon.tin.gyasu.hkhyil/dmig.ni.'ud.dp.al.la//
tshans.pa.hi.dbyans.ltar.kha.dog.rnam.par.dag./
hphral.ba.rgyan.mchog.mdzes.pa.dbyisu.śis.//
dpal.ldan.dri.myed.pad.mo.mchog.las.skyes./
lus.ni.yan.lag.yoñs.su.tshañ/
gser.gyi.grugs.la/nor.bu.phyis.pa.hdrah//
phyogs.kun.hod.kyis.rnam.par.gsal.bar.gdah./

lus . la . ca . hdan . rgyal . po . spos . kyi . dri . /
 hgro . ldan . lha . rdzas . yid . hon . brjod . pahi . tshe /
 g - yar . nas . 'ud . dpal . la . hi . nad . kyan . rgyun . du . ltañ //
hdi . ni . gan . du . mdzum . zin . dgod . pa . hi . dus . de . na /
 rol . mo . sgra . sñan . nag . ni . hbyun . bar . hgyur //
 bud . myed . rin . chen . hjig . rten . hdir . byun . ba //
 tha . mal . kun . kyi . dban . du . gyur . ma . lags //
 khyod . ma . gthogs . pa . myihi . hjig . rten . na //
hdi . h - i . bdag . po . gñan . na . gchig . ma . mchis . /
 mtshan . brgyah . hi . sku . gzugs . mdzes . minah . bah //
 yon . than . sna . tshogs . ldan . ba . hi . skuh //
 khyod . kyi . za . snar . bu . mo . hdi . hbul . na /
 sna . tshogs . lo . ma . yan . lag . rgyas . rgyur . chin /
sin . lo . men . tog . mdog . sdug . rgyas . pa . hi . mdog //
 rgyan . dan . bchas / sin . yid . du . hon /
 rin . chen . dar . bas . grubs . pa . hdi . bñes . sig /

Hair dark and curling to the right; eyes like blue lotuses;
 Like the sound of the Veda (*brahma-ghosa*), of colour (articulation)
varna) utterly pure;

In herself, beautified by excellent ornaments, auspicious of form;
 Brilliant, born of the best of soilless lotuses;
 Body in all its members complete;
 Like a gem set in a shape of gold,
 She brightens with radiance all the regions;
 In her body, O king, the fragrance of burning sandal;
 In speaking, O lord of the world, while she speaks what is acceptable,

At her mouth the aroma of lotuses falls continually;
 Whenever in jesting she smiles, at that time
 Her voice is music agreeable to hear;
 This jewel of a woman born in the world
 Should not be at the disposal of any ordinary person.
 Except yourself there is in the world of men
 No other lord for her.

To you, whose gracious form has a hundred good points,
 Whose body possesses all merits,
 We offer at your feet this girl.
 All her limb-tendrils fully developed,
 Leaves and flowers of fair hues fully expanded,
 Made more acceptable as equipped with ornaments,—
 This girl made of jewels in quantity be pleased to take.

— and he, giving up his asceticism, marries her under the name Sītā, and becomes king.

108–118. The five hundred ascetics being near the realization of their aims, a minister of the Yakṣa Kore, by name Maruce [Mārīca], red-haired, tall, large-eyed, with inverted toes (?), his head adorned with human skulls, all his limbs smeared with blood, creates hindrances. The defeated ascetics write and circulate a statement that whoever shall dispel the obstacle shall have a boon. Ramana accomplishes this. Maruce reappearing, Ramana throws a ring at him and deprives him of his eyes, whereupon he flees. The ascetics give Ramana a blessing: anyone at whom he aims a shaft shall perish and be reborn as a god.

118–133. Daśagriva's sister Phurpala [Śūrpanakhā — description] appears before Ramana (ll. 123–125).

*bdag.ni.hjig.rten.rnams.kyis.rtag.tu.bsnags/
bsod.nams.ldan.bas/kun.du.rnam.par.snan/
hjig.rten.lta.bus.noms.par.myi/
mkhah.la.dben.gyi.spring.tshogs.hkrigs.pa.la/
gñi.dro.snan.śār.gsal.bar.gyur.pahi//
gzugs.bzans.mchog.hdi/khyod.kyi.hbansu.hbul//*

Ever lauded by the worlds;
Through being possessed of merit, everywhere resplendent;
As not content with the world alone,
Upon the troops of clouds gathered away in the sky
Shining at the appearance of the warm sun's light —
This fair, excellent form I offer at your service.

Being rejected by Ramana, she withdraws (ll. 127–129) —

*dgyes.pas.lhun.britsegs.brtan.ba.hi.ri.bo.la/
chab.gan.g-yun.drun.gñi.dro.hod.hchar.du//
mkhah.la.dben.ba.hi.spring.tshogs.hkrigs.pa.his/
gñi.dro.gsal.yan.hchar.ba.hi.dus.skabs.myed//*

When joyously on the mountain with its firm, towering frame
The light of the warm sun is reflected in Mānasa, full of water,
For the cloud-troops gathered away in the sky,
Though they shine with the warm sun, it is no time to appear
[rain?].

She returns to her brother in Laṅkā and suggests the abduction of Sītā.

133–163. Daśagrīva consults Maruce, who dissuades him from the attempt; when Daśagrīva persists, he suggests the ruse of the deer. Ramana being persuaded by Sītā to go after the deer, Maruce interposes a storm between him and his wife and brother. Hearing a call for help, Lakṣana at last, after reproaches and insinuations from Sītā on account of his reluctance to leave her, goes after Ramana; and Sītā is left weeping. Daśagrīva appears first in the guise of an elephant and then in that of a horse; finally, when Ramana and Lakṣana are on the point of arriving, he carries off Sītā along with the plot of ground (*sa. gṛi*); he fears to lay hands on her person.

163–188. Ramana and Lakṣana, returning, are dismayed to find Sītā and the plot of ground vanished. Worn out by a long search, they fall asleep on the spot. Next day they depart in grief, and come to a black stream in a valley. Lakṣana is about to drink, when Ramana warns him that it is outflow from some stricken creature. Advancing into the valley, they find that it flows from the eyes, mouth and nostrils of a huge sleeping ape, who, being questioned, explains that he is Sugrīva, younger son of the king of apes. His brother Bālin is king, and, being the stronger, has maltreated him. Questioned as to Sītā, he explains that he himself, being ill, has not seen her. In his service are three apes, who have fled at the coming of Ramana and Lakṣana. They are up on the mountain and may be questioned. Being reassured, the three huge monkeys descend and relate that early on the previous morning they have seen a ten-headed man, on whose front head, a horse's head, was a woman placed upon a plot of ground, who, crying out that she is Sītā, wife of king Ramana, and imploring any merciful person to rescue her, was carried off. Ramana proposes alliance with Sugrīva, offering to make him king, if he will arrange to find Sītā.

188–207. On the morrow the two monkeys fight in Ramana's presence without result. Ramana says that next day he will be a participant and not merely a spectator. Bālin's wife gives her husband good advice. Further fighting, in which a mirror tied to Sugrīva's tail plays a part. Bālin is slain by Ramana's arrow and becomes a god.

208–211. Ramana arranges a meeting with Sugrīva, and, when Sugrīva's army fails to appear at the appointed spot, after three years

he sends him a verse message inscribed on an arrow, warning him of Bālin's fate (ll. 209-210) —

dam.la.gnas.byas.mgrin.bzais.po/
Hbah.li.lam.du.ma.hgro.sig//
gan.du.Hbah.li.bsad.pa.hi.lam//
de.ni.legs.pa.ma.yin.no/

Abiding by his compact, let Sugrīva
 Go not upon Bālin's path.
 Where Bālin met his death,
 That path is not a good one;

whereupon Sugrīva, alarmed, comes with his army.

211-236. Sugrīva nominates three powerful monkeys, Pagśu, Sintu and Hanumanta, to go in search of Sītā, and Ramana furnishes them with a message and his signet-ring. After a long and vain search, they are thirsty. They happen to see two ducks alighting in a hole in a rock, which they regard as a sign of water. Following the ducks and one holding the other's tail, they enter the hole, where they discover a fine apartment. Asking whose it is, they are told that it belongs to a daughter of Śrī Devī, by name Gtsug-rgyal-sgeg-mo [Māyā, daughter of Meru?]. They show respect to her and tell her where they are going. She bids them wink their eyes. Taken in an unknown direction, they find themselves on the shore; and, as they gaze at one another, a great black mountain appears. They notice that it is shaking; and, coming near, they see a black bird with its feathers injured. Upon their enquiring the bird explains that his father was Agajaya, king of eagles: his own name is Padā, that of his younger brother being Sampadā: disputing about the sovereignty, they made a compact that whichever should fly away quickest from the summit of Mount Meru should have the sovereignty. Being the more speedy, he looked behind, and he saw his brother's feathers burned by the sun. Turning back, he went to the assistance of his brother and had his own feathers singed. Thus maimed he could not obtain the sovereignty, and so remains on that spot. To the monkey's inquiry concerning Sītā, he replies that at the time when she was carried off, his father, being a relative of Ramana, shot into the sky two of his feathers, which fell to earth. Being struck by the feathers, the demon was tired and set down

Sitā. He then threw a red iron ball, which Padā's father took for food; having eaten it, his heart was burnt and he died. The demon then made off with Sitā.

236-254. The monkeys take counsel as to proceeding to Laṅkā, which is in the middle of the sea. Śintu avers his own inability to make the passage, while Paśu (sic) thinks that he can go, but being ill, could not return. Hanumanta, having waited to be asked, professes readiness and leaps to Laṅkā. He finds Sitā guarded by an army in a doorless fort with nine circular walls. He approaches very quietly and presents the latter and the signet-ring. Sitā is overjoyed and reads the letter (ll. 245-254) —

Men.tog.hdab.rgyas.lte.bu.hi.sku.mdog.la/
sñun.kyi.than.bas.gdüns.par.ma.gyur.tam/
stag.ris.bun.ba.lte.bu.hi.hkhro.ldiñ.la//
thugs.kyi.grwa.nas/breñ.breñ.myi.brtse.ham/
bdag.ni.bslu.ba.hi.ri.dags.de.bkum.slar.mchisna//
sa.gži.bhasu.bzán.mo.myi.bžugs,.nas//
mye.nān.yid.la.gdüns.pa.hi.lus.mdog.ni/
lo.hdab.lhags.pas.gdüns.pa.hi.hjon.śin.bžin//
mdzes.sdug.śel.mdog.hdra.ba.hi.than.grogs.de.myed.nas//
nur.pa.bžin.du.phyogs.h̄tshams.kun.du.mol//
chab.gāñ.g-yun.druñ.sems.kyi.thag.bsrins.pas/
lo.zla.mañ.po.hi.dus.kyañ.yeñs.la.hdahs/
da.ni.gains.kyi.señ.ge.rtsal.phyin.mthus.gthugs.pas//
sdo.ba.hi.dgra.gžan.rain.ñid.hkham.ste.hchi/
lhun.po.ri.rtser.rin.chen.byin.śar.na/
skar.tshogs.mkhah.la.rgyu.ba.hi.hod.dan.bral//
de.bas.bdag.la.dgoñs.tdan.brtse.ba.hi.nāñ.ñid.kyi/
dkyil.yañ.rgya.mtsho.hi.dkyil.du.gyur.ltar.yan//
phu.chab.lte.bu.hi.yid.kyi.dbah.rgal.dag//
rgya.bskyed.dgoñs.pa.hi.lhun.ni.tshim.par.mdzod//

Upon that body like a flower with expanded petals
Has there been no blighting by the drought of sickness?
Has anger, alighting like a bee, with its axe (?)
Not cut away little by little from the angle of your mind?
When I came back from slaying the illusory deer,
And the fair one along with the plot of land was not there,
My body's hue was blighted by grief at heart,
Like a tree with its leaf-petals blighted by frost:

As in the absence of its loved, crystal-hued mate
 A duck wanders about in all directions,
 Postponing the thought of Mānasa full of water,
 Many years and months have passed in restlessness.
 Now that I am equipped with strength beyond the might of an
 ice-lion

Other venturesome enemies, failing of themselves, perish.
 When the splendid jewel rises on the peak of Meru,
 The stars moving in the heavens lose their light.
 Therefore your affectionate nature in thought of me
 May expand widely its horizon, as though it were the horizon of the
 sea.

Crossing the waves (agitation) of mind, as of a mountain stream,
 Let the mass of your expanding thoughts be satisfied,

stating Ramana's grief and his intentions.

254-284. Sītā impresses upon Hanumanta the necessity of prudence; but he does not listen. He goes into Rāvana's park and inverts all the trees and so forth. This is reported to Rāvana, who commands many of his servants to capture Hanumanta, who however kills them all. Daśagriva then sends his eldest son with a net made of sunlight. Hanumanta will not approach the net; but, when the demon prays to the Siddha gods, these order Hanumanta to enter the net. When the demons propose to kill him, Hanumanta prays them to kill him as his father was killed, namely by tying to his tail cloths dipped in oil, and setting them on fire. Hanumanta leaps on the forts and houses of the demons, sets them on fire, kills many of the demons themselves, and then, removing the cloths from his tail, makes off and seeks Sītā. He says he is departing and begs for a message. She eventually complies, giving him a jewel to convey: and Hanumanta brings the letter to Ramana, who is overjoyed and reads it (ll. 276-284)

*yon.than.yid.bzin.man.po.hi.hphra.tshogs.kyis/
 mdzes.par.brgyan.palyi.sgron.ma.lte.bu.sku.gdun.la//
 sñun.gyi.ser.bus.ma.bskyod.la.me.žes/
 gus.par.rmas.pa.hi.lan.tshigs.sñan.pa.dan//
 brtse.dgois.hphrin.yig.sems.kyi.don.rig.tshig/
 mñen.hjam.lcug.pa.hi.phyag.rgya.no.hshal.te/
 dba.brug(?) sdug.pa.hi./bris.bahi.g-yar.lam.na/
 snon.gyi.pha.ma.gnah.hdahs.phrad.chin.smyis.pa.bzin//*

bdagi.dran.ba.hi.stobs.ni.dban.myed.pas II
 hphains.pa.bzin.du.bsams.pa.nas/lha.nid.la.yan/
 lhag.par.bren.bren.dran.ba.hi.mthu.ma.mchis/
 thugs.rjehi.gzugs.kyis/yun.du.mi.gtan.zin/
 mnah.than.rkyen.kyi.hkhor.tshogs.man.po.la/
 bdag.hdra.hi.myi.dpen./dman.ba.ma.mchis.kyan/
 chab.gan.hkhor.rgyug.re.brtan.ya.rabs.gzin/
 thugs.la.dgoms.par.gnai.ba.gthai.rag.ltshal/

“In that frame, like a lamp finely adorned
 With ornaments of many attractive virtues,
 The chill of illness does not range, I trust” this
 Respectfully spoken, agreeable answer
 And affectionately meditated letter know to be my heart’s mean-
 ing.

Recognizing the supple, finely-turned (?) seal,
 In the presence of the dear . . . writing (?),
 It was as if I dreamed of meeting my old parents long passed away.
 My memory’s strength, uncontrollably,
 As if shot forth from my mind, is with my lord alone,
 And I have no strength to remember anything more.
 For that with compassionate heart you have not in this long time
 given me up,
 When there is a numerous court subject to your authority,
 But upon one like me, lord of men, who, although not lowly,
 Am of the middle rank of the retinue dependent upon you,
 You deign to bestow thought accept my thanks.

284–293. The army of monkeys and men having rejoined, all start for Laṅkā, but a great ocean bars the way. Ramana commands the monkeys Maku and Damsi [Nala] to make a bridge. They set to work, tearing up mountains and trees. As Damsi takes the mountains on his knees and builds the bridge, while Maku stands, they quarrel about their respective strength, whereupon Ramana reproves them (a verse, ll. 291–293). The bridge being finished, the army crosses.

293–299. They having arrived at Laṅkā-pura, the time for giving battle having been fixed, Amalakarṇa, who is wise, gives good advice to his brother. Daśagrīva not heeding, Amalakarṇa goes to join Ramana, whose suspicions he dispels by quoting a verse (ll. 291–293). Ramana being placated, Amalakarṇa becomes his adviser.

299–303. A demon named Rum-rna (Kumbhakarna) had by austerities and through the intervention of Sarasvati in the manner stated above obtained the boon of perpetual sleep. Daśagriva and the others succeed by pouring molten metal [?] into his ears, making thousands of elephants smite his body, beating great drums near him, in awakening him. In response to Daśagriva's appeals he devours the army of men and monkeys: but Ramana he is not able to devour. Hanumanta, whom he seeks to devour, is sometimes at his ear, sometimes in front of him, sometimes in his eye: so he gives up, and the two separate. At last Kumbhakarna is exhausted and falls asleep again.

303–309. Amalakarna states that on mount Kailāśa there grows a herb *Hbri-ta* (*Amṛta*), which could heal the whole army: Hanumanta is sent to fetch it. Not being able to find it, he pulls up Kailāśa, gathers the *Hbri-ta*, and replaces the mountain. With the *Hbri-ta* the whole army of men and monkeys is healed.

309–320. A time for battle is again fixed. Daśagriva with his first arrow kills his younger brother Birinaśa, who is flying. Ramana reflecting that, if he himself went forward and died, Sītā, even if saved, would have no companion, Lakṣana is placed in the van. He being struck by many arrows, Ramana goes forward himself. Daśagriva, concealing himself by magic, kills with his arrows many men and monkeys. Ramana challenges him to show as much as a toe; and, when he does so, aims an arrow at where his horse's head should be and cuts it clean away: it then floats about above the army of men and monkeys. Ramana says 'do you not know how to die: must you go on fighting?'; and, rising above his own army, kills most of the demons over the great body.

320–323. The demon army having been totally destroyed, Ramana breaks with his arrows the nine walls of the fort in which Sītā is imprisoned and liberates her. He then with medicine restores Lakṣana to consciousness.

323–326. Sugrīva with his army of monkeys departs to his own kingdom. Ramana goes to Jambū-dvīpa, where a great feast is held. Sītā bears a son, to whom is given the name Lava.

326–338. Hanumanta is appointed Minister to Sugrīva. The two invite Ramana with his brother and Sītā, and make a great feast. Hanumanta and Ramana are special friends, and keep

up a correspondence. Sugrīva having died, the monkeys offer the sovereignty to Hanumanta, who refuses (in verse, ll. 331-333), but upon earnest supplication (in verse, ll. 334-337) consents.

338-350. A tiff between Ramana and Hanumanta. The latter apologizes (ll. 343-348) —

*khri.lan.noñs.śes.gnoñ.żin.hgyod.//
noñ.bu.las.kyi.phai.mthos.na./
ri.bo.śin.mod.drin.brjed.bžin//
dmah.ba.mthos.na.tshoñ.ma.mchis//
lha.dpal.khyod.kyis.noñs.še.ḥam/
kheñs.te.hgyin.ba.ma.lags.kyañ//
dpyid.ka.ḥi.chad.ñā.chus.blugs.na/
be.ba.brjed.bžin.g-yeñs.par.gyurd/
mtsho.la.brten.pa.ḥi.nain.dan.nur//
gud.du.hphur.du.gnas.ma.mchis//
spre.hu.rigs.dmañ.ba.bdag.hdrah.la//
mtho.nas.byams.pa/khyod.las.dkon/*

“A myriad times I am known to have offended,” that I regret with shame.

To elevate an offending person is waste of labour.

Forgetful of kindness, he is like tree on a mountain.

In elevating the low there is no profit.

Though by you, great lord, I am not regarded as offender
Nor despised as puffed up,

A fish flooded with water in the spring time,

Forgetting . . . , becomes agitated,

Goose and duck, which have their home in the lake,
If they leap out on to the bank, are not in place.

To one like me, a monkey of low race,

Kindness from the high is, except from you, rare;

and they become friends as before.

350-365. A vassal of Ramana, by name Benbala, revolts, and Ramana leads an army against him, depositing the queen mother and her son meanwhile with 500 ascetics on Mount Malaya [*ri.ma.la.ya* error for *Himālaya*?]. He fails to return in time, and the queen, becoming anxious, wanders in search of him, depositing the child with the hermits. The child, however, goes after his mother, and the hermits do not know what has become of him. Has Lava fallen into the water or

been carried by friends? Considering Ramana's love for Lava and his consequent grief, they decide to create a substitute in the Kuśa grass: this they do, and by their power the created child receives consciousness and is in form indistinguishable from the real son. Sītā upon her return finds with the hermits a boy like Lava and asks his name. They reply 'it is Kuśa,' and Kuśa becomes his name. Sītā is content to have the two similar sons.

365-410. Ramana returns, after reducing Benbala to subjection. On one occasion, while wandering about, he sees a Litsa-byed, Dri-ma-dag-pa (Licchavi Malapūta? Rajaka?), and his wife quarrelling. The former says 'This harlot is unlike other women. Where is a moon-image like you, who, not content with her husband, sleeps with other men?' She replies, 'what do you know of other women? For instance, Sītā devī, the excellent wife of king Ramana. For 100,000 years she was with Daśagrīva, king of the demons. But see, she was rescued all the same and is a dear wife. Do you know the nature of all women?' Ramana is troubled and determines to find out from the woman how the nature of woman differs from that of men. He arranges a secret meeting with the woman, and asks her the question. She explains (ll. 384-389) —

rims.nad.tsha.bas.hdugs.pahi.myi//
 rgyun.du.gans.chab.dran.ba.bzin//
 bud.med.hdod.chags.rgyun.du.g-yo/
 skyes.pa.bzan.po.rtag.du.dran/
 gzan.gyis.mthon.sin.thos.pa.dan/
 dpyahs.par.dogs.pa.ma.mchis.pa.hi//
 sa.phyogs.dben.par.bstegs.slan.chad/
 su.yan.hkhyigs.pa.ma.mchiste/
 phyis.kyan.hdod.pa.hi.don.sgrub.bo/
 skyes.pa.rnams.ni.khrel.myed.pas//
 phrad.dguh.gzan.la.smras.na.yan//
 dpyas.par.dogs.kyan.myi.hdzem.par/
 da.duin.ryag.pa.ma.gzigs.sam/

As one tortured by fever's heat
 Constantly remembers icy streams,
 A woman, ever agitated with desire,
 Constantly remembers a handsome man.
 So long as she is seen by others and heard,

No blame attaches to her:
When she has come to a lonely place,
Unrestrained by anything.
She effects even with outsiders the object of her desire.
Persons again, being unabashed,
Though the people speak unfavourably of them,
When blamed are not shame-faced,
But are all the more proud — see you not?

The king believes her, and tells Sītā that she may go where she pleases (ll. 393–396). She departs with her sons to a hermitage. Ramana remains in his palace.

410–439. Ramana invites the monkeys. Hanumanta is surprised to have no evidence of the Queen, and Ramana tells him the story. Hanumanta by showing in what circumstances he found Sītā demonstrates the absurdity of the suspicions. Ramana is convinced and sends for Sītā and her children. They give a great feast in honour of Hanumanta, who returns to his own realm. Ramana and Sītā and the children live happily in their palace.

DOCUMENT B

Ll. 1–20. Vaiśravaṇa, expelling the Yakṣa Kore (Kuvera), is made by Brahmā king of the Three Worlds and the Four *Dvīpas*. [The gods] pray to the Devarṣi and Śrī Devī, who agree to beget a son without bodily contact and each gazing steadily in a mirror: ultimately they have a son, who is called Vaiśravaṇa. He expells the demons from Laṅkā-pura, sending them down to hell, and fills the land with men and gods.

20–52. After many generations of the demons the Yakṣa Kore has a son Mal-hya-pa-ta (Mālyavant), who is found in a quilt. The people of the country ask who are his father, mother and relatives, and he inquires of a Brahman Ratana, who informs him that his father is the great and powerful Yakṣa Kore, who has been deposed by Vaiśravaṇa. Desirous of retribution, but powerless, he decides to practice austerities in the garden (*Śiñ-rtahi-tshal*) of the Vaijayantī palace of Brahmā's son Śvapasina [sic, for Vaiśravaṇa?] He lauds the Devarṣi, as ruler of the Worlds, son of Brahmā and so forth (verse, ll. 31–33), and the Devarṣi inquires the object of his austerities. After three days he replies that to the kind Rṣi,

who warms the world like a sun, he wishes to give his daughter Mekesina (ll. 37-38) —

*hjig.rten.dag.la.gñi.ltar.dro.ba.dkon//
bdag.la.byams.par.khyod.las.gñan.myi.bzugs//
drin.bzo.lan.du.bdag.gyi.bu.mo.hdi//
Me.ke.si.na.hbul.na.bzes.su.gsol//*

In the worlds a warmth like the sun is rare.
For affection to me there is none other than you.
In return for kindness this daughter of mine,
Mekesina, I offer: take her, I pray.

The Ṛṣi is displeased at an idea so inconsistent with his vows, but at the same time loth to violate the maxim of accepting what is offered in kindness: so he says nothing. Mālyavant presses him (ll. 42-44) —

*kun.la.bde.mchog.lon.spyod.ni//
gei.mdains.mdzes.mal.pahi.grogs.dan.bsten.pa.lags//
dpal.brjid.hphrul.gyi.bsten.grogs.lha.mo.hdi/
khyed.la.htshams.zes.kun.bstod.sku.myi.nas//
mgo.phai.dmah.zin//skabs.kyi.zur.myig.chen/
yid.tsam.hdzum.zin//gñog.stegs.tshul.la.mkhas//
hjo.sgeg.che.zin/byi.byad.dag.la.brtson//
lha.mo.hdi.hi.nan.na/dkon.ba.hdi.bzes.sig*

Everywhere the enjoyment of happiness (?)
Depends upon a loved companion as lady of the house (?),
As companion to support your wonderful, brilliant greatness, this lady
Is a match for you — further praise is unnecessary (?).
In rank inferior, quick to see what is opportune;
With a smiling mind, wise in the ways of playfulness;
Of great fascination, earnest in doing what is to be done; —
In this lady are these rarities: take her I pray;

and the Ṛṣi at last consents. To him and Mekesina are born three sons, Daśagriva, Utpa[la]karna (?) and Biriśana. To the eldest the grandfather Brahmā gives ten heads and corresponding strength and so forth.

52-63. Mal-hyan-pan-ta proposes to the 'sons of the gods' to go to Laṅkā, the country of their uncle, and they consent. Mal-hyan-pan-ta advises them to obtain a boon from the gods;

but the gods, discerning their evil purpose, do not grant it. However, a teacher whom they had first worshipped and who had been made by Mahādeva goddess of speech asks for their success; and under her influence the lord of the gods gives them the rule over the gods. From that time they quell the gods, and, defeating the gods and men of Laṅkā-pura, fill the place with demons. They make Daśagriva king: with a court of gods and Nāgas he enjoys himself, and the king [Daśagriva ? Vaiśravana ?] goes where he pleases.

63-77. Daśagriva's Ministers suggest to him that to dominate others is nothing: there is the great Viṣṇu, lord of the world. To Daśagriva's inquiry as to where Viṣṇu is they reply that he is in the Ocean of Milk in the north. Daśagriva goes in his chariot, and his coming is reported to Viṣṇu, who says "Let him come in." Daśagriva says he has come to fight and why then should he come in? Viṣṇu says 'We two, being superior to others, ought not to fight at once like dogs. Today come in and sleep: tomorrow we will fight.' Daśagriva enters; but as Viṣṇu does not rise to greet him, he becomes enraged and demands to fight. Viṣṇu says 'Nothing else is necessary; take one of my earrings.' Failing to effect this, Daśagriva is dejected, and, having bowed before Viṣṇu's feet, goes back to Laṅkā-pura.

77-89. The gods, assembled in heaven, take counsel. Indra inquires of Hjig-ten-gyi-phyva (the fortune[-teller] of the world), who states that Daśagriva, king of Laṅkā, has enslaved the gods and is doing mischief. He asks who first empowered him and is told that it was Mahādeva. The gods go to Mahādeva, who upon inquiry by Bṛhaspati says, 'I did not empower him: I do not know that Daśagriva is so. If he is harming the world, well, I am occupied with a vow: appeal to Viṣṇu.' They go to Viṣṇu, who says, 'At present there is a king of Jambū-dvipa, by name Daśarite [Daśaratha]. He having no son, I will appear as his son and quell the demons.' Viṣṇu appears as Daśaratha's son Ramaṇa, and Viṣṇu's son as the younger brother Lakṣaṇa. The gods also are born variously. A woman capable of destroying the state of the demons is conceived by a wife of Daśagriva.

89-92. The child of Daśagriva's wife is born, sent away, found by husbandmen and named Līlāvatī (as in A).

93-99. Daśaratha pays respect to 500 R̄ṣis living on Kailāśa and begs a son. They send him a flower, bidding him give it to his queen. The chief queen gives half of it to the junior queen, and two sons are born, the son of the junior queen being the elder by three days.

ADDENDUM

A fourth document (D = Fr. 63 = Vol. 56, fol. 11) has come to light. Similarity in paper (though that of D seems thicker), script (*recto* ll. 51 of Tibetan, *verso* ll. 31 of Chinese), size (Tibetan c. 25 cm., Chinese c. 20.5 cm.) and distribution of lines, suggests that this is in reality a (prior) part of A. The subject matter corresponds to ll. 1-47 of B, preceded by a laudatory description of the country ruled by the Yakṣa Kore, which would be Ceylon. The agreement with B is not literal, and in the proper names, as rendered into Tibetan, there is some divergence: thus for *Śin-rtahi-tshal* it gives *Sgyed* (*skyed*) *motshal*, for *Śvapasina Biśurasena*, and for *mekesina megasina*. — F.W.T.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY.

HOW TO LIVE HAPPILY ON NOTHING A YEAR

Translated from the twelfth book of the Mahābhārata

BY ARTHUR WILLIAM RYDER

IMAGINE that what is
Does not exist at all;
Then will you not be grieved,
However low you fall.

Your deeds of yesterday
And those that went before
Are past and gone; for them
You need not sorrow more.

What was, no longer is;
What was not, will not be:
The past need bring regret
To none from blindness free.

Where is your father now?
Where may his father be?
You do not see their life;
Your life they do not see.

And you, O King, and I,
With every foe and friend,
Will surely cease to be,
Since all things have an end.

The men of twenty years,
Or thirty years, or more,
Will all be dead when once
A hundred years are o'er.

And even should riches cling
To you, do not repine,
But seek for comfort in
The thought, "They are not mine."

If man leave not his wealth,
 Then wealth the man will leave.
 Since this is surely so,
 Why should the prudent grieve?

And poor men live to-day
 Who calm a nation's fears
 By wisdom and by strength,
 Your betters or your peers.

They do not grieve like you;
 Then cease to grieve at length;
 Surpass or equal them
 In wisdom and in strength.

Consider what the past
 And what the future teach,
 Not grieving at events,
 Indifferent to each.

Desire the things you may,
 Not those you may not gain;
 Enjoy the gifts of fate —
 Those lost deserve no pain.

And he is surely fool
 Who curses God and weeps
 For what he had, and lost —
 Ingrate for what he keeps.

And be not troubled if
 Men show unworthiness
 Of wealth they have; for thus
 Your sorrows grow no less.

Endure though riches smile
 On all but you alone;
 For men of sense enjoy
 The wealth that others own.

Yea, brave and righteous men
 In willing sacrifice
 Abandon wealth and home,
 Knowing salvation's price.


Even kings a kingdom leave
And count their loss a gain:
In pain's extremity
They seek the end of pain.

From such men learn to find
In penury, relief:
Grief often comes as joy;
Joy wears the form of grief.

Nay, who would set his heart
On gold that ends as dross,
On life that ends as death,
On love that ends as loss?

The pole-tusked elephant
Is like the sage; for he
Lives lonely in the woods,
Gladly, and frugally.

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HINDU-ARABIC NUMERALS

By WALTER EUGENE CLARK

THE numerals which we call Arabic are so called, not because they were invented by the Arabs, but because the Arabs transmitted them to Europe. So much is certain. Arabic literary tradition, as generally interpreted, declares that the nine numerals with zero and place value were invented by the Indians, and that they were adopted by the Arabs during the last quarter of the eighth century A.D. In conformity with this Arabic tradition these numerals were generally called Hindu all through the mediaeval and Renaissance periods in Europe. They were commonly called Arabic only from the sixteenth century. The general opinion of mathematicians, Sanskritists, and Arabic scholars, based on this Arabic tradition and on the Indian evidence itself, has been that these numerals with zero and place value are to be traced ultimately to India.

During the past few years Kaye has written a series of articles¹ in which he disputes this general opinion with greater and greater vehemence and certainty. He claims that he is the first one to apply a strictly scientific method to this particular problem. His method consists in denying all validity to Indian literary tradition and to Indian manuscripts previous to the date at which the manuscripts themselves were written. The only admissible evidence is that of inscriptions and coins. On this basis he tries to prove that the numerical symbols with zero and place value were unknown in India until the end of the ninth century A.D., and that Indians and Arabs alike must have taken them from some third source. Having reached this fundamental position he makes use of Indian literary tradition only in so far as it does not contradict his scientific conclusion. All passages which are definitely in contradiction with this conclusion are later interpolations. The Arabic literary evidence is handled in the same way. All passages which suggest an Indian origin or praise Indian accomplishment in any branch of knowledge are legendary. Such passages as criticize the Indians and belittle their knowledge or methods

¹ *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* (hereafter cited as JASB), 1907, p. 474; 1908, p. 111; 1908, p. 293; 1911, p. 801; 1912, p. 349; *Bibliotheca Mathematica*, x, 289; *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (hereafter cited as JRAS), 1910, p. 749; *Indian Mathematics*, Calcutta, 1915; *Scientia*, xxiv (1918), 53, and xxv (1919), 1; *Isis*, 1919, p. 326.

are accepted as just and reasonable. On the other hand, it is very noteworthy that Kaye fails entirely to apply this same hypercritical method to Greek, Latin, and Chinese literary evidence. This is accepted as valid without criticism and without the support of inscriptions.

The whole problem of the Hindu-Arabic numerals was admirably summed up in 1911 in the little book of Smith and Karpinski, *The Hindu-Arabic Numerals*. An article by Ruska¹ has shown pretty conclusively the superficial nature of Kaye's treatment of the Arabic evidence, and his conclusion (JASB, 1907, p. 498) that there is absolutely nothing Indian in al-Hwarazmi.

After his elimination of the Indians as inventors of the numerical symbols with zero and place value, Kaye suggests a Greek origin for these and for most or all of Indian mathematics, but his reasons for this conclusion are expressed with great vagueness. The most tangible passage is the following:² "It was during this period also that Damascius, Simplicius (mathematicians of some repute) and others of the schools of Athens, having heard that Plato's ideal form of government was actually realised under Chosroes I of Persia, emigrated thither (circa A.D. 532). They were naturally disappointed, but the effect of their visit may have been far greater than historical records show." There is no citation of authority for this statement, no critical analysis of its historical value, and no reference to inscriptional evidence, as is demanded in the treatment of Indian literary evidence. The only good authority seems to be Agathias (ii, 30-31), a sixth-century Byzantine author, who wrote a history of his own times. The passage states that these philosophers were so disgusted with the ideas and practices of the barbarians that they very soon returned to Greece. There is no mention of numerals or mathematics, no suggestion that the brief visit of these Greek philosophers had any appreciable effect on Persian mathematics or Persian thought.

Carra de Vaux,³ independently of Kaye, arrived at similar conclusions, but expressed more definitely and emphatically and with additions which were welcomed with approval by Kaye in a later article.⁴ The new theory of the origin of the digits is the following:

¹ "Zur ältesten arabischen Algebra und Rechenkunst," in *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie*, 1917.

² *Indian Mathematics*, pp. 15-16, 45; *Scientia*, xxiv, 54.

³ *Scientia*, xxi, 273.

⁴ *Scientia*, xxiv, 54. Kaye had anticipated the first two conclusions of Carra de Vaux and vaguely suggested the third. Cf. JASB, 1907, p. 489; 1911, p. 801.

Firstly, the evidence for the Indian origin of the numerals with place value is entirely legendary and this legend is Persian. Carra de Vaux even goes so far as to say that the fables of Bidpai have nothing to do with India, but were developed in Persia by the Neo-Pythagoreans. For this amazing conclusion there is just the bare statement, without the citation of any evidence. Secondly, that the word *hindī* or *hind* is a mistake for *handasī*, or is a parallel derivative from the same root, and means "measure, arithmetic, geometry," etc. It refers, therefore, not to Indian signs but to arithmetical signs in general.¹ Thirdly, that the numerals with place value were invented by the Neo-Platonists or the Neo-Pythagoreans, were taken by them to Persia, revealed to the Persians, and passed on by the Persians to the Indians and Arabs, and by the Arabs to Europe. These conclusions are based entirely on vague generalizations. No effort is made to prove that the Neo-Platonists or Neo-Pythagoreans knew numerals with place value, and not the slightest evidence is produced to show that these numerals were known in Persia before the eighth century. The only Greek or Latin text known to me which throws any light on the activities of the Neo-Platonists in Persia is the *Solutiones eorum de quibus dubitavit Chosroes Persarum Rex* of Priscianus Lydus,² one of the Neo-Platonists who went to Persia in the reign of Chosroes I. This work deals at considerable length with questions of metaphysics and of natural science, chiefly on the basis of Aristotle and his school, but it does not contain the slightest suggestion of mathematics or of numerals with place value.

So far as I know, the only early evidence that Neo-Platonists or Neo-Pythagoreans had any knowledge of numerals with place value

¹ Granted that the word *handasī* has often been mistranslated as if it were *hindī*, still such early mediaeval works as the fourteenth-century *Ψηφοφορία κατ' Ἰνδόν* of Planudes, the *Liber Abaci* of Leonard of Pisa (1202 A.D.), the *Algoritmi de numero Indorum* of the twelfth century (a translation of the eighth-century work of al-Hwarazmi), and many of the other early European works on *algorismus*, seem to prove clearly that the Arabs themselves regarded India as the place of origin of the digits, and understood the word *hindī* to mean Indian. The attempt to explain away the word *hindī* seems to me to be futile. The further contention that in Europe in the mediaeval period the word India was a term of very general meaning and does not necessarily refer to India itself might be valid for independent works in Greek and Latin in Europe, but here we are dealing with works which are translations from the Arabic, or based directly on Arabic works and traditions, and Arabic *hindī* could not have had the same vague meaning to the Arabs that the word India had in Europe. See also Ruska, *loc. cit.*, p. 114.

² Preserved only in this Latin version, and published by Bywater in the *Supplementum Aristotelicum*.

is contained in a passage of Boethius (about A.D. 500). In the Geometry of this author are given nine numerical symbols which are called *apices*, and the statement is made that they were used by the Pythagoreans for calculation on the abacus, which they had invented and named *mensa Pythagorea* in honor of Pythagoras. A great controversy has been waged over the authenticity of this passage. It is still unsettled. The description of these numerals does not occur in the Arithmetic of Boethius, where it would be in place, but in the Geometry, in the midst of a discussion of angles, the subject is changed abruptly to a discussion of different classes of numbers; and then is given an account of the abacus and a representation of the nine numerical symbols used by the Neo-Pythagoreans in connection with it. None of the early successors of Boethius, who used his work and quote him, make any mention of this important passage. None of the manuscripts of the Geometry are older than the eleventh century and there is no other trace of numerals with place value in Europe in the earlier Greek and Latin literature, or in later literature until a Spanish manuscript of A.D. 976, in which they are definitely called Indian.¹ If the same method which is employed by Kaye when dealing with Indian literary evidence is applied to this doubtful passage of Boethius, we must admit that it cannot be used as certain evidence for numerals with place value earlier than the eleventh century, the actual date of the manuscripts themselves. After the hypercritical method used in demolishing the theory of the Indian origin of the digits, the vague and slipshod method employed in building up a positive theory of Greek origin is most unfair and biased.

There is a curious passage quoted by Nau² from the well-known Syrian writer Severus Sebokt. The date is A.D. 662. Sebokt speaks of "the subtle discoveries of the Hindus in astronomy, discoveries which are more ingenious than those of the Babylonians, and their clever method of calculation, their computation which surpasses words, I mean that which is made with nine signs. If those who think that they have reached the acme of science just because they are Greek had known these things, they would perhaps have been convinced, although late, that there are others who know something." Kaye tosses this passage aside³ as obviously worthless, with the words,

¹ Hill, *Archaeologia*, lxii, 151, 170. Another Spanish manuscript of A.D. 992 gives the same characters.

² *Journal Asiatique* (hereafter cited as JA) (1910), ii, 225-227; *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*, 1910, p. 250.

³ *Indian Mathematics*, p. 31.

“ but his authority makes such erroneous statements about ‘ Indian ’ astronomy that we have no faith in what he says about other ‘ Indian ’ matters.” He does not point out the obviously erroneous statements. Surely the oldest known mention of Indian numerals deserves a more critical treatment than this. More certain reasons than Kaye’s personal prejudices and vague generalizations are necessary if the passage is to be cast aside as legendary or a later forgery. It may or may not be valid, but in the present state of our knowledge it certainly has as much value for the subject under discussion as the passages of Agathias and Boethius.¹

Not without possible value is a passage in the *Chronicum Paschale*:² ‘Ἐν τοῖς χρόνοις τῆς πυργοποιίας ἐκ τοῦ γένους τοῦ Ἀρφαξᾶδ ἀνήρ τις Ἰνδὸς ἀνεφάνη σοφὸς ἀστρονόμος, ὃν ματὶ Ἀνδουβάριος, ὃς καὶ συνεγράψατο πρῶτος Ἰνδοῖς ἀστρονομίαν. Whether or not this refers to Aryabhata, as has been suggested, is very uncertain.³ The chronicle ends with the year A.D. 629, but is based largely on earlier sources. The date for which the statement is valid is uncertain, but whatever its date may be, the passage may have historical value as a partial corroboration of Sebokt and as proving at a comparatively early date in Europe the knowledge that the Indians had cultivated astronomy.

There is the same looseness in Kaye’s treatment of Chinese mathematics which, according to him, had much influence on early Indian mathematics. He expresses himself as follows:⁴ “ Mr. Yoshio Mikami states that there is no evidence of Indian influence on Chinese mathematics. On the other hand, he says, ‘ the discoveries made in China may have touched the eyes of Hindoo scholars.’ ” This statement is made on page 23 of Mikami’s book, *The Development of Mathematics in China and Japan*, but it is directly preceded by the words: “ It is certain that the Indian learning exceedingly influenced Chinese thought but at the same time. . . . ” Further, in a chapter entitled *On the Indian Influence* (pp. 56–61), Mikami repeatedly suggests the possibility of Indian influence on Chinese mathematics and astronomy. “ Things Indian exercised supremacy in art and literature, in philosophy, in the mode of life and the thoughts of the inhabitants, in every-

¹ For an account of Sebokt and his works, see Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur*, and Ruska, *loc. cit.* p. 46. Sebokt is not “ a certain Sebokt,” but one of the most famous and trustworthy of Syriac authors.

² Bonn edition of the *Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae*, i, 64. Cf. Georgios Kedrenos (i, 27), in the Bonn edition of the same series.

³ Colebrooke, *Essays*, ii, 384–385, 425; Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde*, ii, 1148–1149; *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, iv, 238.

⁴ *Indian Mathematics*, p. 41.

thing. It is even said, astronomy and calendrical arts had also felt their influence. How then could arithmetic remain unaffected? No doubt the Chinese studied the arithmetical works of the Hindoos."

... "Will it be too rash for us to assume that the problem of the circle-measurement had been transplanted from Indian soil to the fertile land of the Middle Empire?" ... "But all this, it must be confessed, remains mere conjecture; there is nothing positive that serves as an evidence of any actual influence upon the Chinese mathematics. In astronomy some of the Hindoo theories were studied, and there are still extant some part of them in translations and quotations. But neither a single problem nor a single rule for the solution in the domain of mathematics now remains that is definitely known as of Indian origin. The fact, however, that the Indian mathematical works had been studied in China can by no means be denied." Then he sums up by saying, "The possibility of the Chinese mathematics having been influenced by the science of India may well be conjectured from the meagre account here given. As for exact information, we have none." In the next chapter he shows that from about A.D. 618 on there were often Indian astronomers on the Astronomical Board in China, and that they composed calendars which were in general use. He also gives in Chinese the names of six Indian works on mathematics and astronomy which were translated from Sanskrit into Chinese at an early date. Mikami's book is praiseworthy from the purely descriptive point of view, but in the matter of chronology he merely follows orthodox Chinese literary tradition and Kaye blindly follows him.¹ The Chou Pei is regarded as valid for the twelfth century B.C.; the Arithmetic in Nine Sections for the second century B.C., with a revision in the third century A.D.; the Arithmetical Classic of Sun Tsu for the first century A.D.; and the Sea Island Arithmetical Classic for the third century A.D. It is very doubtful whether these texts in their present form are valid for the dates assigned to them by tradition. They may have been much reworked. For instance, Mikami gives a long and excellent analysis of the Arithmetic in Nine Sections, but remarks that "Hayashi has given a summary of the same text which is utterly different from what I know of the book." Nothing definite is to be gained from the jumbled conclusions of Mikami; but Kaye's quotation of him is so unfair and misleading that one becomes skeptical of the rest of his "scientific" method.

The possibility, and even the certainty, of manuscript interpolation has always been recognized by philologists and has to be guarded

¹ *Indian Mathematics*, pp. 38-40.

against carefully; but there is no reason for assuming that Chinese and European manuscript traditions are any more exempt from interpolation than are the Indian and Arabic manuscript traditions. By his method Kaye does undoubtedly eliminate some doubtful or worthless material which has been given undue weight by earlier scholars, but at the same time he undoubtedly eliminates much that is valuable and correct.

In the earliest Indian inscriptions we find numerical symbols without zero and without place value. That is, there are separate signs for the numbers from one to nine, for ten and multiples of ten, for one hundred and multiples of a hundred, for one thousand and multiples of a thousand. Such numerical symbols begin in the third century B.C. and are used exclusively in inscriptions down to about A.D. 600 (or, as Kaye insists, down to the end of the ninth century). After that time this method is used with decreasing frequency, along with other methods which constantly gain in favor, down to the twelfth century or so. At some time, and this exact date is the chief matter under dispute, a new system came into use. In this later system there were only ten symbols, those for one to nine and zero. These were used with place value so that they sufficed for the expression of all possible numbers. The earliest supposed occurrence of any of the first nine symbols is in an inscription of A.D. 595, and between then and the end of the ninth century we have about twenty inscriptions in which they are used. Inscriptions containing the old symbols without place value are much more frequent. From the end of the ninth century the symbols with place value are used with increasing frequency. By the twelfth century the old symbols without place value have almost entirely disappeared. The symbol for zero occurs first with certainty in the ninth or tenth century.¹ Of these twenty inscriptions some are regarded by Indian epigraphists as later forgeries, some as doubtful, and some as genuine. Most of them are land grants inscribed on copper plates. Grants of land or villages were often made by a king to some man or group of men for special service rendered, and such land was exempt from taxation. Consequently there was great temptation to forgery of such grants, especially after periods of political disturbance; and there are many undoubted cases of such forgery, a large proportion made in the eleventh century A.D. in southern India. These can sometimes be detected with considerable certainty palaeographically by the unsuccessful imitation of the older forms of the letters used in the same

¹ The occurrence in the eighth century referred to by Bayley (JRAS, 1883, p. 27) cannot be verified. No argument can be based on it.

part of the country, by the inferiority of execution, or by some inaccuracy in the genealogy or account of the older king as gained from a study of older and genuine inscriptions of the particular king named. Unfortunately our inscriptional material is fragmentary and has many gaps. Since the discovery of undoubted forgeries epigraphists have been very skeptical and critical, and inclined to mark as doubtful any grant about which there is the slightest suspicion. Kaye takes advantage of Fleet's article in the *Indian Antiquary* for 1901 in which about sixty grants are critically discussed and listed as spurious to declare that all of these early grants which contain numerical symbols with place value are later forgeries; or, at least, even if the text of the grant itself seems to be genuine, that the numerical symbols with place value have been added after the end of the ninth century. He makes one possible exception for an inscription of A.D. 813, but thinks that this too must be treated provisionally as a forgery.¹ After the ninth century the material is so ample that the forgery of all the grants can not possibly be maintained. The use of numerals with place value in inscriptions soon becomes the rule, not the exception. The matter of these early grants is one to be decided only by skilled epigraphists as the material increases. I shall not discuss it here, except to remark that it is by no means certain that all the inscriptions in question are forgeries. At the most all that can be said is that some of them are forgeries, that some are doubtful, and that the question cannot be decided definitely on the basis of the present evidence. The problem is an open one.

We have considerable fragments of a birch-bark manuscript called the Bakhshali manuscript² discovered some thirty years ago in the extreme northwestern part of India. These are part of a large work on mathematics giving rules and problems and complete solutions in nine numerical symbols with zero and place value. It bears no date. Hoernle tentatively dated the composition of the work between A.D. 330 and 400, and the writing of the manuscript between the seventh and tenth centuries. Thibaut has expressed the opinion that the manuscript was written between A.D. 700 and 900, while the work itself may be older. Kaye places the work and the manuscript in the twelfth century or later.³ His arguments are not conclusive. The date of

¹ JASB, 1907, p. 481; *Scientia*, xxiv, 55; JASB, 1910, p. 756.

² Hoernle, *Indian Antiquary* (hereafter cited as IA), vol. xvii, and *Verhandlungen des VII Internationalen Orientalisten-Congresses*, Arische Section, pp. 127-147.

³ JASB, 1912, p. 249.

the work and of the manuscript is unknown. It cannot be used as evidence upon which to build any scientific conclusion.

Granted that the inscriptions and the Bakhshali manuscript do not at present furnish proof of the employment of numerical symbols with zero and place value in India earlier than the ninth century, there remains a considerable body of literary evidence which has been entirely ignored by Kaye, but which has, it seems to me, definite historical value.

In the *Vāsavadattā* of Subandhu¹ occurs the following passage: "The stars, because of the nothingness of this world of transmigration, are like ciphers scattered in the sky, as if on the ink-black rug of the Creator who reckons the sum total with a bit of the moon for chalk." The word translated "cipher" is *śūnyabindu*, "the dot which represents emptiness." The earliest form of the zero, as given in inscriptions of the ninth and tenth centuries and in the Bakhshali manuscript, is merely a dot. Also, in the earliest occurrence of zero in connection with the Arabic alphabet (A.D. 873) the zero is represented by a dot.² The exact date of this work is uncertain, but it can be assigned with confidence to a date not far removed from A.D. 600 since it is later than the *Nyāyavārtika* of Uddyotakara, which can be assigned with certainty to the sixth century, and earlier than the *Harṣacarita* of Bāṇa which can be assigned with certainty to the early seventh century. Subandhu is named in the *Gāidavaho* of Vākpati, which dates from the beginning of the eighth century. It is impossible for the *Vāsavadattā* as a whole to be as late as the tenth century.³ The passage in question is found in all editions and in all manuscripts which have been reported. Philologically there is not the slightest reason for considering the passage to be an interpolation of date later than the end of the ninth century.

Numerical symbols are not used in any of the old Indian works on mathematics and astronomy which have been preserved, except in the Bakhshali manuscript. These works are all in verse, and in verse such numerical symbols could not be used. It was necessary to use the ordinary names for the numbers or numerical words or combinations of consonants and vowels with numerical value. Therefore the occurrence of any of these methods does not suffice to prove with certainty that the author was ignorant of numerical symbols with place value.

The commonest way of expressing numbers in literary works from the sixth century on is that of using words with numerical meaning.

¹ Ed. Hall, p. 182.

² Karabacek, in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, xi, 13.

³ Gray, *Vāsavadattā*, pp. 8-12.

Words which denote pairs such as twins, eyes, ears, hands, and the like, mean two. *Kha*, *śūnya*, *ākāśa*, *ambara*, *viyat*, etc., which denote "empty space, hole, sky, nothing," mean zero. The oceans are 4. The teeth are 32. The fingers or nails are 10. Such words denoting numbers from 0 to 49 are in common use. There is a host of synonyms in Sanskrit, so that an author writing in verse need never hesitate for a word which will fit into any place in any metre. It is not possible to express easily in verse a large mass of numerical data by means of the ordinary words denoting numbers.

The earliest Indian inscription which contains a numerical word is from the eighth century, or, if this and another inscription of A.D. 813 are forgeries, from A.D. 945. But numerical words are used in Sanskrit inscriptions in Java in the eighth century and in Indo-China in the seventh century (beginning in A.D. 604).¹ The system must have been in use in India earlier than in these distant colonies, unless, as Kaye suggests,² it "was introduced about the ninth century, possibly from the East." This opinion seems to be based only on the priority of the inscriptions of Java and Cambodia. It disregards completely the certain evidence of Indian literature. There is not a shred of positive evidence in favor of it.

Although in our fragmentary inscriptional material in India there is no certain trace of this method until the eighth or ninth or tenth century, there is ample literary evidence for its earlier use.³ Varāhamihira employs this method in his *Bṛhat Saṃhitā* and in his *Pañcasiddhāntikā*. The instances are so many that it is not worth the trouble to enumerate them. Both works can be dated with certainty in the sixth century A.D. It is used by Brahmagupta in his *Brahmasphuṭasiddhānta*, which can be dated with certainty at the beginning of the seventh century. The date of Lalla's *Śiṣyadhvīrddhida*, which also makes use of numerical words, is not certain. Such evidence as there is points to the sixth or seventh century. This same method is used in the *Sūryasiddhānta*. The original text of this work was earlier than A.D. 500, since Varāhamihira gives an abstract of some sections of it; but our preserved text differs in some particulars from the one described by Varāhamihira and must therefore be a reworked text of uncertain date. It cannot be proved with certainty that the original text used numerical words. Varāhamihira in his abstract of the four

¹ IA, xviii, 24, 48; Barth, "Inscriptions Sanscrites du Cambodge" in the *Notices des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, xxvii, 31.

² *Indian Mathematics*, p. 31; JASB, 1907, pp. 475 ff.

³ Bühler, *Indische Palaeographie*, pp. 80-82.

other early *Siddhāntas* also makes use of numerical words, but it cannot be concluded with absolute certainty that these *Siddhāntas* used such words. It is barely possible that Varāhamihira may be summarizing them in language of his own. It seems unlikely, however, that a large mass of numerical data should have been expressed in verse with nothing but the ordinary names of the numbers. It seems to me likely that even the five old *Siddhāntas*, none of which have been preserved in full form except the reworked *Sūryasiddhānta*, made use of numerical words.

In order to uphold his position, Kaye would have to maintain that the above-mentioned texts of Varāhamihira, Lalla, and Brahmagupta, in which numerical words are used commonly, are not originals at all, that we have only completely rewritten texts, versions dating from the tenth century or later, in which all of the numbers have been expressed in an altogether different system from that of the original texts. It is impossible for any Sanskritist who has worked with any care through these early mathematical and astronomical texts to subscribe to such a theory.

Moreover the beginnings of this method can be traced back with certainty beyond A.D. 500, to still earlier texts for which no definite date can be given. The *Vedāṅga* on Metrics, which goes under the name of Pingala gives examples in very simple form for the numbers 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12. The *Jyotiṣa Vedāṅga* in four passages uses numerical words to denote the numbers 1, 4, 12, 27. The *Śrauta Sūtras* of Kātyāyana and Latyāyana use the words *gāyatrī* and *jagatī*, which are the names of metres, in the direct sense of 24 and 48, the number of syllables which make up the metres.¹ None of these texts can be later than the fifth century A.D. and the last two are almost certainly pre-Christian.

This system of numerical words might of course be used in connection with the old numerical symbols without place value. But when in the *Sūryasiddhānta* (i, 29) the number 4,320,000 is expressed by *khacatuṣkaradārṇavāḥ*, that is to say, four zeros or blank spaces, the teeth (32), and the oceans (4), surely a system with place value is implied. In giving numbers by this method the words are always given carefully in a definite order in such a way that as read the numbers denoted by the words are to be applied from right to left. Likewise, in the *Bṛhat Saṃhitā* of Varāhamihira (viii, 20) the number 3,750 is

¹ For all the texts just mentioned, see Weber, *Indische Studien*, viii, 166–167 and *Über den Vedakalender Namens Jyotisham* in the *Abhandlungen* of the Berlin Academy (1861), p. 6.

expressed by emptiness (0), the arrows (5), the mountains (7), and the Rāmas (3). Surely this implies the recognition that the numerals which make up the number occupy four places. Under the old notation this number would have been expressed by three symbols, that for 3,000, that for 700, and that for 50. It seems to me that the use of long compounds which describe large numbers of several places proves the existence of numerical symbols with place value and zero. The remarks of Woepcke¹ and Bühler² are still valid. Whatever may be the date of the present *Sūryasiddhānta*, and whatever system may have been used in the five old *Siddhāntas*, Varāhamihira carries us back to the beginning of the sixth century for the use of numerical words based on numerals with zero and place value.

The words *kha* "sky" and *śūnya* ("empty") imply either the use of a symbol for zero or a blank space. It is possible, but not certain, that the use of a symbol for zero was later than the use of the other nine symbols. That is, it is uncertain whether the system implies place value in our exact sense of the word, or whether it merely implies an abacus, or at least a board divided into perpendicular columns, the columns having the place values of units, tens, hundreds, and so on, while the column which represented an order of numbers that did not happen to be represented was left blank without any special symbol. Kaye denies that any form of abacus was used at an early date in India. I have not yet found definite evidence for the use of a board divided into columns which had place value, but the words *kha* and *śūnya*, used in connection with the system of numerical words, imply, it seems to me, either such a board or a symbol for zero as early as the beginning of the sixth century.

There is considerable evidence in India for the use of a board and chalk, or of a board on which dust or sand was sprinkled. Such a board might have been divided into columns and made to serve every purpose of the more highly developed abacus. The Arabic tradition, which is treated as legendary by Kaye, maintains that the Indians calculated on boards covered with dust or sand, or with white chalk on a black board, and refers to boards divided into columns. The western Arabs called their numerical symbols *gobar*, "dust numbers," and derived them from India. In Brahmagupta's *Brahmasphuṭasiddhānta*, x, 62, 66, 67 the word *dhulikarma*, "dust work," is used as a synonym of *gaṇita*, "calculation." This, it seems to me, is sufficient proof of the authenticity of the Arabic tradition. The passage quoted above

¹ JA (1863) i, 447.

² As quoted by Bayley in JRAS, 1883, 23-24.

from the *Vāsavadattā* proves the use of chalk and some dark surface on which calculations could be made by about A.D. 600. Varāhamihira (*Pañcasiddhāntikā*, iv, 37) remarks that even an ignorant fellow can reckon with lines made by chalk. There is also an important passage in the *Divyāvadāna* (p. 263):¹ *Bhūrīko ganitre kṛtavī śvetavarṇaṁ gr̥hītvā ganayitum ārabdhāḥ paśyati yathā Bhagavatā vyākṛtam tat sarvam tathaiva*; “Bhūrīka was skilled on the instrument for calculation. He took a piece of chalk and began to calculate. He saw that everything predicted by the Holy One was true.” The passage deals with astrology, the prediction of the future of a child from the position of the planets at the time of his birth, and demands complicated mathematical calculations. The suffix of the word *ganitra* denotes means or instrument. The word must denote some special contrivance for calculation, a specially prepared board, but whether this was divided into columns is uncertain. Elements in this text go back to the second or third century B.C. at least, but in its present form it is later. It must, however, be dated in the early centuries of the Christian era. Varāhamihira’s *Bṛhaj Jātaka* shows a great development of elaborate astrological calculations at the beginning of the sixth century, involving much arithmetical and algebraical work. The words *phalaka* and *ganana*, meaning “wooden board” and “reckoning” can be traced back to *Jātaka*, i, 451, *Mahāvagga*, i, 49 and other Buddhist texts, the earliest of which are probably to be ascribed to the period between the fifth and third centuries B.C. Although the use of a board and training in calculation can thus be traced back into the pre-Christian period, there is no actual description of a board ruled into columns. But the fact that words meaning “emptiness” are used regularly in the later period to denote zero naturally suggests a board and a reckoning by columns with place value, before a symbol for zero was employed. After the discovery of place value, either such a board with columns or a sign for zero is necessary. Whether the sign for zero appeared in India simultaneously with the discovery of place value is uncertain.

Granted, for the sake of argument, the use of a board ruled into columns,² it is not necessary to conclude that numerical symbols were employed. Calculations might have been made by placing a certain number of shells or counters in the columns. But the regular name for the numerical symbols as a whole is *anika*, “mark.”³ This word is

¹ Cf. Fleet, JRAS, 1911, p. 519.

² Cf. Rodet, JA (1880), ii, 463; Bayley, JRAS, 1883, p. 29.

³ Bühler, *Indische Palaeographie*, p. 78.

used by Varāhamihira at the beginning of the sixth century (*Bṛhat Samhitā*, xviii, 33), and often in the *Sūryasiddhānta*, as one of the numerical words meaning nine. By the fifth or sixth century, therefore, calculations were made by means of nine numerical symbols (not with counters), probably without a sign for zero. The fact that *aṅka* was used as a numerical word for nine and not for ten seems to point to the conclusion that at first there were only nine symbols, and that the symbol for zero developed later.¹ It is, of course, possible that the dot was already used to denote zero, but was not regarded as being an *aṅka*, since it represented nothing and was merely jotted down in order to prevent the fact being lost sight of that one or more of the orders of numbers was not represented at all.

One of the oldest preserved works on mathematics and astronomy is that of Aryabhāṭa. The date is given definitely in the text itself as A.D. 499. This work contains the *Daśagītikā*, which gives in ten very condensed stanzas all the numerical data of Aryabhata's system of astronomy, and the *Aryāṣṭaśata*, which consists of 108 *āryā* stanzas in three chapters, one on mathematics, and two on astronomy. In the *Daśagītikā*, a peculiar method of notation is used.² The consonants of the Sanskrit alphabet from *k* to *m* are given the numerical values of 1 to 25. The other consonants from *y* to *h* are given the values of 3 to 10. The nine vowels and diphthongs from *a* to *au* (no distinction is made between long and short vowels) are attached to these consonants either to add zeros or to give them place value. The stanza is as follows:

*Vargākṣarāṇi varge 'varga 'vargākṣarāṇy kāt īmau yaḥ
khadrinavake svarā nava varge 'varga navāntyavarge vā.*

("Beginning with *ka* the *varga* letters are used in the *varga* places and the *avarga* letters are used in the *avarga* places, *na* plus *ma* equals *ya*. The nine vowels are used in the two nines of places *varga* and *avarga*."") The last clause is left untranslated. The words *varga* and *avarga* seem to refer to the Indian method of extracting the square root.³ The number of which the square root is to be taken is divided off into groups of two digits each. The *varga* or square places are the first, third, fifth, and so forth, counting from the right. The *avarga* or non-square places are the second, fourth, sixth, and so forth. The words *varga* and *avarga* are used in this sense in the fourth stanza of the *Ganī-*

¹ Cf. Woepcke JA (1863), i, 448.

² See Rodet, JA (1880), ii, 444; Fleet, JRAS, 1911, pp. 114, 121; Barth, *Collected Works*, iii, 182; Jacquet, after Whish, JA (1835), ii, 118.

³ Cf. Rodet, JA (1879), i, 409.

tapāda. There is no reason for refusing to take them in the same sense here. The *varga* letters are those from *k* to *m*, which are always arranged in five groups of five letters each. The *avarga* letters are those from *y* to *h*, which are not arranged in groups. Therefore the vowel *a* used in *varga* and *avarga* places with *varga* and *avarga* letters refers the *varga* letters *k* to *m* to the first *varga* place, the unit place, multiplies them by one. The vowel *a* used with *avarga* letters *y* to *h* refers them to the first *avarga* place, the place of tens, multiplies them by ten. In like manner the vowel *i* refers the letters *k* to *m* to the second *varga* place, the place of hundreds, multiplies them by a hundred. The vowel *i* used with *avarga* letters refers them to the second *avarga* place, the place of thousands, multiplies them by a thousand. And so on with the other vowels up to the ninth *varga* and *avarga* places. This makes it possible to express numbers up to one followed by eighteen zeros. As a matter of fact the largest number expressed in this notation by Aryabhāṭa himself occupies only ten places. The last clause, which I have left untranslated, offers great difficulty. It may give, as the commentator Parameśvara says, a way of expressing numbers beyond the nineteenth place by means of an *anusvāra* used with the vowels. Fleet emends *vā* to *hau*. The words which I translate "in the two nines of places" are translated by Rodet as "in the two nines of zeros." That is equivalent to saying that each vowel adds two zeros to the numerical value of the consonant. This, of course, will work from the vowel *i* on; but the vowel *a* does not add two zeros. It adds no zero or one zero, depending on whether it is used with *varga* or *avarga* letters. It seems to me, therefore, more likely that a board divided into columns is implied rather than a symbol for zero, as Rodet thinks.

This stanza occurs in the *Daśagītikā*, which, if the name is strictly accurate, ought to contain ten stanzas. As a matter of fact, it contains thirteen. There is an invocation to the Gods, this technical *paribhāṣā* stanza explaining the terminology which is to be used in the *Daśagītikā*, ten stanzas giving the numerical data on which Aryabhāṭa's descriptive astronomy is based, and a colophon. The first stanza contains the name Aryabhāṭa. The thirteenth stanza begins with the words "Having known these ten stanzas which describe the movements of the earth and planets in the celestial sphere." The *paribhāṣā* stanza is not counted. It is obviously from this thirteenth stanza that the name *Daśagītikā* was derived. I see nothing suspicious in the discrepancy between the name *Daśagītikā* and the number of stanzas found

in most of the manuscripts.¹ Nothing is gained by eliminating the *paribhāṣā* stanza as of later date and hence getting rid of the objectionable words *varga*, *avarga*, and *kha*. The explanation given above, or the slightly different ones of Rodet and Fleet (which amount to exactly the same thing so far as the calculation is concerned), are the only ones which will make the numbers come out right, and could be deduced from the numbers involved in Aryabhaṭa's astronomical elements even if this *paribhāṣā* stanza were not present. We can check Aryabhaṭa's numbers by means of later works, especially that of Lalla, which expressly state that they employ the numerical data of Aryabhaṭa with slight modifications. These make use of the system of numerical words, so that there can be no mistake on our part in knowing approximately the numerical values of Aryabhaṭa's combinations of consonants and vowels.

In the other sections of Aryabhaṭa's work only a few numbers are given, and these are always expressed by the ordinary words which denote the numbers. Neither the peculiar notation described above, nor the system of numerical words is used. Kaye insists that Aryabhaṭa invented his peculiar system of notation because no convenient system of numerical symbols was known to him, and because the system of numerical words had not yet been invented. The matter is not as simple as that. It is much more likely that Aryabhaṭa invented and used his peculiar system only for the practical purpose of giving in a very concise form a large mass of numerical data in verse. All of this is crowded into ten brief stanzas. The rest of the work is descriptive and contains very few and simple numbers. Numerical symbols could not be used in verse. The ordinary words for numbers, although usable for a few simple ones, are clumsy, and badly adapted to giving a compact mass of numerical data in verse. A system of consonants and vowels with numerical value allows much greater conciseness than the system of numerical words.² For instance Aryabhaṭa gives in one stanza the whole table of twenty-four sines which, as expressed in the *Sūryasiddhānta* by numerical words, occupies five stanzas.

No later authors follow Aryabhaṭa's method, as would be expected if he for the first time had made it possible to express a large mass of numerical data in verse. It seems to have been purely an individual

¹ See Kern, *Brhat Samhitā*, p. 58 of preface. Kaye (JASB, 1908, p. 111) remarks that there are manuscripts which contain fifteen stanzas. These doubtless correspond to the manuscripts described by Bhau Daji (JRAS, 1865, p. 397), who says that the two additional stanzas are not in the *āryā* metre and are obviously a later addition.

² JA (1880), ii, 440, 453; Barth, iii, 182.

invention for a very particular purpose, and that purpose was not computation but description. Only Brahmagupta at the beginning of the seventh century actually quotes any of Aryabhāṭa's combinations of consonants and vowels with numerical value. *Brahmasphuṭasiddhānta* i, 12, xi, 5, and xi, 17 quotes *Daśagītikā*, 3, 1 and 4. In spite of its wonderful conciseness, this system could not become popular in literature because it manufactured such barbarous and uneuphonic combinations of consonants. The use of it in the ten concise descriptive stanzas of the *Daśagītikā* is no proof at all that Aryabhāṭa was ignorant of the system of numerical words or of numerical symbols with place value. It is quite possible that he used such symbols in his actual calculations. It is pure assumption to conclude with certainty that his actual calculations must have been made by means of consonants and vowels with numerical value.

Kaye has great doubt as to the authenticity of the work as a whole, and in particular insists that the *Ganitapāda* at least is of much later date.¹ The problem of the two or three Aryabhāṭas is a difficult one. Suffice it to say that considerable portions of the work can be proved by quotations in Brahmagupta to be prior to the first part of the seventh century and to have been written by Aryabhāṭa. As Kaye remarks there are no quotations from the *Ganitapāda*. This, it seems to me, is due to the fact that Brahmagupta quoted only such passages as he desired to criticize unfavorably. Either he had no criticism to make of the mathematical section of Aryabhāṭa's work, or he did not take the trouble to criticize it because none of it was in contradiction with *smṛti*. In practically every case where he combats Aryabhāṭa, it is because the latter departs from *smṛti*.

Later another system of numerical letters, called *kaṭapayādi* from a word in the stanza which describes it, came into use, especially in southern India. The letters *k* to *ñ* and *t* to *n* have the values of 1 to 10, the letters *p* to *m* the values of 1 to 5, the letters *y* to *l* the values of 1 to 9. The vowels have no numerical values. The system employs place value. This method allows the choice of much more euphonic combinations of letters, and skilled writers worked out words which had connected meanings, as in the case of the Semitic chronograms. The origin of the system is unknown. The earliest certain instance of it is in the colophon of a manuscript dated A.D. 1174. However, it is used in an astronomical work, the *Mahāsiddhānta* of a later Aryabhāṭa, composed between the seventh and eleventh centuries. It is also vouched for by the astronomical *Jaimini Sūtras* (i, 2, 2) of un-

¹ *Bibliotheca Mathematica*, x, 289; *Indian Mathematics*, p. 11.

known date.¹ The date of the origin of this system is too uncertain to allow of using it in connection with the problem under discussion. It is uncertain whether it is of independent origin or is a modification of the system of Aryabhaṭa.

If the secrecy of the Neo-Pythagoreans is appealed to as the reason why their knowledge of numerical symbols with place value did not leak out in Europe until a late date (except for the doubtful passage of Boethius and for the supposed teaching of it in Persia), we may equally well insist on the same possibility in India. For instance, Varāhamihira (*Bṛhat Saṃhitā*, xiv, 28) says: "The teacher is to communicate these things only to a pupil of steadfast mind; and the pupil after having learned them is to make his astronomical contrivances in such a way as to keep them secret from his own son even." Brahmagupta (*Spaṣṭādhikāra*, p. 45) after an elaborate explanation of the method of calculating the true places of the planets remarks: "This is not to be given, even under oath, to one who is not a son since it will destroy the good *karma* of the one who so gives it, and since military expeditions, marriages, and horoscopes depend on the true positions of the planets." Many such quotations could be given. In the early period in India much secrecy was drawn over astronomical learning. The new numerical symbols may have been used by groups of mathematicians and astronomers for a long time before they came into general use and before they were employed in inscriptions. Writing was known in India several centuries before it appears in inscriptions. This fact alone is enough to make very dubious Kaye's method of determining the date of the invention of the numerical symbols with place value solely from inscriptions. Even in Europe after the time of Gerbert (circa A.D. 1000) numerals with place value did not come into common use, nor are they found on coins and inscriptions, for more than two centuries.

In India from a very early period there was a preoccupation with large numbers and with arithmetical problems. The enumeration of large numbers mounting by powers of ten or a hundred was carried further in India than anywhere else in the ancient world. To each place (power of ten or a hundred) a definite name was given. The *Yajur Veda* (probably as early as the eighth century B.C.) gives names for classes of numbers from one to a number which we should write as one with twelve zeros. The *Mahābhārata* gives names for classes of

¹ *Indische Studien*, viii, 160; JA (1835), ii, 123-125; JRAS, 1911, p. 788, and 1912, p. 459; *Zeit. f. die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, ii, 425; Bühler, *Palaeographie*, §35b.

numbers up to one with fifteen zeros. There are many early passages containing such enumerations.¹ The Buddhist *Lalita Vistara*, which even in its present form belongs to the early centuries of the Christian era, has a long chapter describing the contest at arms and scientific knowledge between the young Buddha and the other princes. The description of the contest in the knowledge of numbers and arithmetical problems occupies seven pages. The names of the classes of numbers up to ten to the ninth power are taken for granted as well known to everybody. Then names are given mounting by powers of a hundred for classes of numbers up to ten to the fifty-third power. A few still higher numbers are given.²

Early in the seventh century Brahmagupta remarks at the end of his chapter on mathematics: "These problems are given only for pastime. The wise man can invent thousands of others, or he can, on the basis of the rules given above, solve the problems propounded by others. As the Sun with its light darkens the stars, so can the man who is skilled in these rules darken the fame of other mathematicians in assemblies when he propounds algebraic problems or solves them." Such passages prove at an early date in India a great interest in numbers and numerical problems. Such contests in mathematics among the learned carry us back in thought to similar contests in knowledge of the sacrifice and of philosophy which we find recorded in the *Upani-shads* in the sixth century B.C.

Such enumerations of numbers based on powers of ten lead easily to the discovery of place value, much more easily than the clumsy Roman method or the Greek system, with the myriad as unit, could do. All that was necessary was to write down in numerical symbols the values of the different classes of numbers as they were given.

Kaye (JRAS, 1910, pp. 759-760 and more positively *Scientia*, xxv, 13) remarks: "Bhaskara speaks with disdain of his Hindu predecessors, but cites certain anonymous "ancient teachers" as authorities. If these ancient teachers had been Hindus, he would most probably have mentioned them by name and indicating thereby certain teachers who were not Hindus." To a Sanskritist who is acquainted with Indian habits of quotation, these statements are so utterly absurd that it is not worth the time to discuss them.

It seems to me that the Indian literary evidence proves conclusively the presence of a symbol for zero by A.D. 600. Before this could be

¹ JA (1863), i, 251; *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, xv, 132-140; *Indische Studien*, viii, 324-325.

² Ed. Lefmann, p. 147. Cf. JA (1863), i, 248.

referred to in a work of general literature it must have had considerable history behind it. It also proves the knowledge of nine symbols with place value (with either a blank column on the reckoning board for zero, or a symbol for zero) by the end of the fifth century A.D. at least. Beyond that the present evidence does not go. But this carries the Indian knowledge of symbols with place value back at least four hundred years earlier than the date assigned by Kaye.

As further proof of Indian knowledge of digits with place value at a date earlier than that maintained by Kaye reference should have been made to the *Yogabhāṣya* iii, 13 (Anandāśrama edition, p. 130, and Woods' translation, p. 216) *yathaikā rekhaḥ śatāsthāne śatām daśāsthāne daśaikā caikāsthāne*, "Thus the same stroke is termed one in the unit-place and ten in the ten's place and a hundred in the hundred's place" and to Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Vedānta-Sūtras* ii, 2, 17 (Nirṇayasāgara edition of 1917 with Bhāmatī, Kalpataru, and Parimala, p. 521, and Thibaut's translation, vol. 1, p. 397) *yathā caikāpi satī rekhaḥ sthānānyatvena niviśamānaikadaśatasahasrādiśabdapratyayabhedam anubhavati*, "So, again, one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with, spoken of and conceived as meaning either [one, or] ten, or hundred, or thousand, &c."

The *Yogabhāṣya* may be as old as the sixth century A.D. (Winteritz, III, 461) and Śaṅkara is at least as early as 800 A.D.

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ÜBER DIE SPÄTERE ENTWICKLUNG DES INDISCHEN STAATSRECHTS

By JULIUS JOLLY

Die epochemachende Entdeckung des Kautiliya oder Kauṭaliya Arthaśāstra hat zu weiteren Nachforschungen über die Quellen des ai. Staatsrechts veranlasst, so ist es dem unermüdlichen Jayaswal in Patna, einem trefflichen Kenner der ai. Politik und Rechtswissenschaft, gelungen drei Hss. des Rājanītiratnākara ausfindig zu machen und auf Grund desselben dieses bisher nur auszugsweise bekannte Werk im Auftrag der Bihar and Orissa Research Society kritisch herauszugeben.¹ Gedruckt war bis dahin von dem gelehrten Minister Cāṇḍeśvara, der dieses Lehrbuch der Politik verfasst hat, nur das juristische Lehrbuch Vivādaratnākara, einer der sieben Teile seiner grossen Enzyklopädie des Dharma, in der Bibliotheca Indica. Die Enzyklopädie wird in dem Rājanītiratnākara (p. 9) unter dem Namen eines Dharmāśastranibandha zitiert, muss also älter sein als der Rājanītiratnākara, der im Auftrag eines Königs Bhavēsa von Mīthilā geschrieben ist, welcher nach Jayaswal nach 1370 n. Chr. auf den Thron kam, als Cāṇḍeśvara schon ungefähr 85 Jahre alt war, was durch andere Beispiele von Langlebigkeit in dessen Familie plausibel gemacht wird. Jedenfalls hatte Cāṇḍeśvara, nach seiner eigenen Angabe in der Enzyklopädie, schon 1314 sein Gewicht in Gold an Brahmanen verschenkt, sein Gönner war damals der König Harisimhadeva aus der Karnāṭaka-Dynastie, der um 1304 zur Herrschaft gelangte und um 1310 Cāṇḍeśvara auf den Ministerposten berief, den schon vorher dessen Vater Vireśvara bekleidet hatte. Es scheint also dass Cāṇḍeśvara erst als ein im Königsdienst ergrauter Minister das Bedürfnis empfand, seine politischen Erfahrungen in einem Lehrbuch für Fürsten niederzulegen.

Dieses Werk handelt in 16 Abschnitten (*taranga*) über den König, die Minister, den Purohita, den Oberrichter, die Richterkollegien, die königliche Burg, die Beratschlagung, den Schatz, das Heer, den Heerführer, den Gesandten, die Pflichten des Königs, die Strafgewalt, die Übergabe der Herrschaft an den ältesten Sohn des Königs, die Übergabe der Herrschaft an den Ältesten durch den Purohita, die Weihe des neuen Königs. Originell und interessant ist die Unterscheidung

¹ *The Rājanītī-Ratnākara*, by Cāṇḍeśvara; ed. by K. P. Jayaswal, M. A. Calcutta, 1924. 28. 8. 873., 8°.

von drei Arten des Königtums: Oberkönig (*samrāṭ* oder *cakravartin*), tributpflichtiger (*sakara*) und tributfreier (*akara*) König, wobei mit dem *sakara* dem Herausgeber zufolge Cāndēśvaras eigener Patron, der König Bhaveśa gemeint ist, der von dem muhammedanischen Kaiser von Delhi als seinem Lehnsherrn abhängig war. Auf die Kaiser von Delhi wäre nach Jayaswal auch die Stelle über die nur durch die Tapferkeit ihres Arms zur Herrschaft gelangten (*kevalaśaur-yādyāptarājyasya*), der indischen Königsweihe entbehrenden Fürsten zu beziehen.

Die Quellen unseres Werks kann man aus den darin vorkommenden Zitaten erschliessen, unter denen die 38 Zitate aus Manu an erster Stelle stehen und M. als die Hauptquelle erscheinen lassen. Von anderen Smṛtis wird Yājñavalkya 19mal zitiert, Nārada 16mal, der Herausgeber hat diese Nārada-Zitate grösstenteils in meiner Ausgabe der Nāradasmṛti nachgewiesen und bemerkt über den Rest mit Recht, dass diese Zitate ihrem Inhalt zufolge nicht aus einem Gesetzbuch, sondern nur aus einem ebenfalls dem Nārada zugeschriebenen politischen Werk stammen können, wie es von 2 solchen Stellen auch ausdrücklich heisst: *Rājanītau Nāradah, Nītau Nāradah*. Da die gedruckte Nāradasmṛti ihrer Einleitung zufolge nur über eigentliches Recht handelt, so kann sie durch ein Buch über Rājanīti ergänzt worden sein, das inhaltlich etwa dem 7. Buch bei Manu entsprach, auf das eines dieser Zitate auch besonders hinweist: *rājānam avīṣeṣeṇa nijagāda Manuh purā*, vgl. M. 7, 1. Übrigens enthält auch der unten zu erwähnende Kommentar zu Somadeva viele solche Nārada-Zitate über Nīti. Im Ratnākara erscheinen ferner Kātyāyana, Vasiṣṭha, Viṣṇu, Vyāsa, Hārīta u. a. Smṛti-Verfasser, das Mahābhārata 14 mal, Rāmāyaṇa 2 mal, wenige Purāṇas, von juristischen Kommentatoren und ihren Werken Lakṣmīdhara und sein Kalpataru, Kāmadhenu, Kullukabhaṭṭa, Gopāla, Mitākṣarā, Śrikara u. a. Kullūka muss hier nach früher gesetzt werden als ich früher annahm (13. oder 14. statt 15. Jh.). Viel geringer als die Entlehnungen aus dem Dharmasāstra sind diejenigen aus dem Arthaśāstra, wofür ausser den schon genannten politischen Zitaten aus Nārada fast nur diejenigen aus dem Kāmandakiya Nītisāra in Betracht kommen, der als Kāmandaka, Arthaśāstra, Nīti und Rājanīti zitiert wird, im ganzen 15mal, ferner die 3 Zitate aus einer Śukranīti, die aber in der zuerst von Oppert herausgegebenen Nīti dieses Namens nicht vorkommen, ein neuer Beweis für die Unechtheit dieses späten Machwerks.

Aus dem Überwiegen des Dharmasāstra über das Arthaśāstra in unserem Werk hat Jayaswal geschlossen, dass schon im Zeitalter

Lakṣmīdharas, dessen Kalpataru *Candeśvara* stark benutzt hat, eine neue politische Literatur aufkam, die nicht mehr auf den alten Arthaśāstras eines Uśanas, Brhaspati und Kautilya, sondern auf den Lehren des Dharmasāstra fußte und daher auch die alten Bezeichnungen des Staatsrechts als Arthaśāstra und *Danḍanīti* aufgab und den neuen Titel *Rājanīti* einführte. Die Verfasser dieser Werke waren Juristen aus der Dharmasāstra-Schule und schrieben Lehrbücher des Dharma. In seiner Zugehörigkeit zu dieser jüngeren politischen Richtung sieht Jayaswal die Hauptbedeutung des von ihm veröffentlichten *Rajanīti-ratnākara*.

Der Übergang von *arthaśāstra* zu *rājanīti* liegt allerdings schon im Kāmandakiya Nītisāra vor, wo der Inhalt dieses Werks als *rājavidyā* bezeichnet und schon dem Vorgänger Kāmandakas, dem Viṣṇugupta oder Kautilya, das Verdienst beigelegt wird, das Ambrosia des Nītisāstra aus dem Ozean des Arthaśāstra herausgeholt zu haben (I, 6–8). Betr. des *rāja* in *rājanīti* ist auch an das alte *rājadharma* "Königspflichten" und an *rājaśāstra* (*rājavidyā*) zu erinnern, das durch die Übereinstimmung von Mhbh. XII, 58 mit Aśvaghoṣa I, 46 und Jātakamālā IX, 10 als alt erwiesen wird.¹ In dem alten Kalpataru (12. Jh.) lautet der Titel des politischen Teils: *rājadharmakāṇḍa*, wie aus der Inhaltsangabe bei Eggeling I. O. III, 410 zu entnehmen ist. Von Anführungen enthält übrigens dieser *rājadharmakāṇḍa* nur solche aus den Smṛtis und Purāṇas, bildet den 11. Abschnitt einer 12 teiligen umfassenden Enzyklopädie des Dharma und entspricht also der Charakterisierung, die Jayaswal von den späteren Systemen der Politik gibt. Es soll nun noch an einigen anderen Werken dieser Art geprüft werden, ob Jayaswals Annahme allgemein begründet ist.

Betrachten wir zunächst den Nītimayūkha oder Rājanītimayūkha des Nilakanṭha, der zwar schon 1880 in Benares gedruckt, aber bisher noch nicht näher untersucht ist. Diese ausführliche Darstellung der Politik bildet das 5. Buch in dem um 1640 unter den Auspizien des Königs Bhagavantadeva entstandenen Bhagavantabhāskara, der eine grosse 12teilige Enzyklopädie des Dharma ist, wie der Kalpataru. Aber der Nītimayūkha schöpft viel mehr aus der politischen Literatur als der *Rajanīti-ratnākara* und der Kalpataru. Grosser Wert wird hier allerdings auf die religiöse Königsweihe (*abhiṣeka*) gelegt, deren Beschreibung die ganze erste Hälfte des Buchs füllt. Dann folgen eine Menge kurzer Kapitel, über die 7 Elemente des Staats, die 18 Laster eines Königs, die täglichen Pflichten desselben, seine Diener, seine sechsfache Politik, seinen Harem, Prinzenziehung, den Schatz, die

¹ Vgl. Winternitz, *Gesch. d. ind. Litt.*, III, 506 ff.

Burg und das Heer, Elefanten und Pferde, Gesandte, Spione, Kriegsführung, Spiel u. a. Hier werden nun sehr viele Stellen aus Kāmandaka oder Nītisāra angeführt, ich konnte über 50 solche Zitate zählen, so beruht die Darstellung der sechsfachen Politik wesentlich auf dem Nītisāra. Selbst Cāṇakya und das Kauṭiliya waren dem Verfasser noch bekannt, wie das Zitat auf p. 52 zeigt: *sthalamṛgayām āha Cāṇakyaḥ suparīksitarakṣitām tu sīmno laghuyānas tu mṛgāṭavīm upeyād iti*, was ungefähr K. 1, 21, 43 entspricht, nur steht dort statt *mṛgāṭavīm* das synonime *mṛgāranyam*. Auch Varāhamihiras Yogayātrā ist reichlich benutzt, ein Zitat aus dem Mānasollāsa, einer alten Enzyklopädie für Fürsten, findet sich auf p. 58. Freilich werden auch die Smṛtis, Manu an der Spitze, und die Purānas sowie Mhbh. häufig genug zitiert, von Dichtern Māgha und Kālidāsa, aber den Grundstock des zweiten Hauptteilsbilden die Zitate aus dem Nītisāra.

Ein ganz selbständiges Werk über die Pflichten eines Königs ist die noch ungedruckte Rājabhūṣaṇī von Rāmanāthadiksita,¹ die nach ihren Zitaten aus Kalpataru, Kāmadhenu, Kullūka, Dāyatattva und Divyatattva (von Raghunandana), Mādhava, Vivādacintāmani, Vivādaratnākara u. a. Dharmanibandhas und Kommentaren zu schliessen kaum vor 1600 entstanden sein kann, also wohl ungefähr in die gleiche Epoche wie Mayūkha und Rājanītiprakāśa gehört. Dieses Werk handelt im Anschluss an die Smṛtis über die Göttlichkeit des Königs, seine Strafgewalt, seine Räte, seine Schreiber und seinen Hauspriester, die Ehrung der Brahmanen, den königlichen Gesandten, die Burg, die Aufgaben und die Laster des Königs, Kampfregeln, Auszug in den Krieg, tägliche Pflichten des Königs, Verwaltung und Rechtsprechung, gefundene Schätze, Zeugenverfahren, Eide, Strafen für Meineid, Mass und Gewicht, Schuldrecht, Hinterlegungen, Opferpriester, Opferlöhne und andere Löhne, Injurien, Sachbeschädigung, Diebstahl, Ehebruch, Spiel und Wetten, Grenzstreitigkeiten. Dann folgt ein kurzer Hinweis auf die im Arthaśāstra (*arthaśāstre*) behandelten Gegenstände: Landmessung, Kochkunst (*sūpakaraṇa*), Prüfung und Heilung der Elefanten und Pferde, auf die 18 Königswissenschaften (*rājavidyā*), besonders Nīti-, Dhanur- und Arthaśāstra, auf die im Mhbh. genannten Autoritäten u. s. w. Das Schlusskapitel handelt über Königsweihe (*rājābhisēka*) und endigt mit einer Reihe von Mantras aus dem Agnipurāṇa. Von sonstigen Purānas zitiert die Rājabhūṣaṇī das Skandapurāṇa, Garudapurāṇa, u. a., die Hauptquelle bilden aber die Smṛtis, besonders das 7. Buch des Manu und der Rājadharma des Mhbh. Das

¹ Münchener Sanskrit-Handschrift Nr. 322, Raj. Mitra Nr. 1207.

Arthaśāstra ist in dieser Darstellung der Rājanīti nur durch die erwähnten kurzen Hinweise vertreten.

Hier verdient auch der angeblich von König Bhoja (11. Jh.) verfasste, 1917 in Calcutta gedruckte, ganz versifizierte Yuktikalpataru Erwähnung, der allerdings nur in seinem ersten Abschnitt über Politik handelt (*iti samkṣepataḥ proktā rājanītiḥ*, p. 17), weiterhin über Baukunst, Hausgeräte, Edelsteine, Schmuck, Waffen, Haustiere, Fahrzeuge, Schiffe, Schiffsbaukunst u. a. zum Arthaśāstra gehörige Gegenstände. Man kann demnach dieses Werk als ein Arthaśāstra¹ bezeichnen, obwohl das Wort *arthaśāstra* nicht darin vorkommt. Als massgebend für Nīti werden im ersten Abschnitt die Nītis von Bṛhaspati und Uśanas bezeichnet, weiterhin allgemein die Nītīśāstras zitiert. Tatsächlich finden sich hier manche Anklänge sowohl an das Dharmasāstra als an das Arthaśāstra. So ist p. 11, 72-74 = M. 7, 63. 64. 66, p. 15, 105 = M. 7, 20, p. 16, 113, 115 = M. 7, 147. 149, p. 17, 118 = M. 7, 74. Anderseits ist p. 8, 52 = Nītisāra 16, 37, p. 9, 63 = Nītisāra 13, 26, p. 10, 71 = Nītisāra 13, 33, p. 12, 81 f. = Nītisāra 9, 1, p. 12, 84 = Nītisāra 9, 28, p. 13, 90 f. = Nītisāra 11, 23 f., p. 14, 93 f. = Nītisāra 30, 29 f., p. 5, 34 = K. A. 2, 9, 23, p. 11, 75 (die drei Arten von Gesandten) = K. A. 1, 6, 2-4. In den weiteren Abschnitten finden sich zahlreiche Zitate aus dem Garuḍa-Purāṇa und anderen Purāṇas, ausserdem aus Lauhapradipa und Lauhārṇava über Metalle, Pālakāpya über Elefantenkunde u. a. Dieses Werk ist wichtig für Kulturgeschichte, besonders für Geschichte des Schiffbaus, und zeugt für das Fortleben des Arthaśāstra.

Allerdings konnte sich die unmoralische Staatskunst des bekanntesten Arthaśāstra, des Kauṭilya, nicht behaupten mit ihren Ratschlägen über raffinierten Steuerdruck, willkürliche Einziehung grösserer Vermögen, Tempelraub, staatliche Konzessionierung der Trinkbuden, gerichtliche Tortur, Ablösung der Körperstrafen durch Entrichtung von Geldstrafen, Erleichterung der Ehescheidungen, schädlichen Zäuber, Betrug und Hinterlist jeder Art. Diese Lehren mussten schon bei der Umarbeitung des K. A. in den populären versifizierten Grundriss Kāmandakiya Nītisāra einer einwandfreieren, wenn auch keineswegs tadellosen Moral Platz machen. Auch in der Märchen- und Fabelliteratur wie in den Kommentaren zu Manu wurde das K. A. als politisches Lehrbuch durch den Nītisāra ersetzt, der besonders im Hitopadeśa ausgiebig zitiert wird. Hatte doch bekanntlich schon Bāna in der Kādambarī (p. 109) das "Kauṭilyaśāstram" als ein ruchloses, von

¹ Vgl. Winternitz, *Gesch. der ind. Litt.*, III, 532.

grausamen Lehren strotzendes Werk (*anṛśamsaprāyopadeśanirghṛṇam*) gebrandmarkt.

Eine ähnliche Entwicklung wie in der brahmanistischen zeigt sich auch in der Jaina-Literatur, wenn man Somadevas *Nītvākyāmr̥tam* (10. Jh.) mit Hemacandras *Laghu-Arhanniti* (12. Jh.) vergleicht. Das erstere Werk ist noch stark von dem K. A. abhängig¹), wenn es auch kaum mit Ghoshal² als ein schwacher Abklatsch (a poor copy) des letzteren Werks bezeichnet werden kann. Die neue Ausgabe des *Nītvākyāmr̥tam* von N. R. Premi (Bombay, 1923) enthält einen alten Kommentar, der voll von interessanten Zitaten aus bisher unbekannten *Nīti*werken ist, die Somadeva neben dem K. A. für sein Lehrbuch benutzt hat, das Jayaswal³ als ein Gemisch von Ethik und Politik, Winternitz⁴ als ein pädagogisches Werk für Könige bezeichnet, und das namentlich in dem letzten Abschnitt über Vermischtes (379–405) die verschiedensten Klugheitsregeln enthält. Die *Laghu-Arhanniti*⁵ dagegen charakterisiert Ghoshal mit Recht als ein Werk nach Art der brahmanistischen *Smṛtis*, nur dass darin die *Rājanīti* auf den jainistischen sagenhaften König Rṣabha zurückgeführt wird. Der Anschluss an *Manu* u. a. *Smṛtis* tritt besonders in der Lehre von den Prozessen und den religiösen Bussen hervor.⁶

So hat Jayaswal die Tendenz der späteren ai. Politik im ganzen richtig charakterisiert und hat sich die traditionelle Ethik als stärker bewahrt als die blosse Nützlichkeitsmoral des *Arthaśāstra*, gemäss dem alten Grundsatz (Y. 2, 21; När. 1, 1, 39), dass das *Dharmaśāstra* dem *Arthaśāstra* überlegen ist und in Zweifelsfällen die Richtschnur für das einzuschlagende Verfahren abgeben soll.

¹ Winternitz, a. a. O., III, 527.

² *A History of Hindu Political Theories*, Calcutta, 1923, p. 243.

³ Jour. Bih. Or. Society, XI, 66 (1924).

⁴ L. c., 528.

⁵ Ahmedabad, 1916.

⁶ Winternitz, l. c., 531.

THE BIRTH OF LÖRIK

BY SIR GEORGE A. GRIERSON

IN the Indian Province of Bihār, and in the United Provinces of Agrā and Audh, the Gōwālās (*Gōpālakas*) or Ahīrs (*Abhīras*) are well known as an important pastoral tribe. Their caste-profession is cattle-keeping and selling milk and its products, and, though the milk they sell is not always free from suspicion,—witness many proverbs,—they are, as a body, looked upon with some consideration. There is a famous tribal legend concerning an Ahīr named Lōrik, which is most popular among them, and the folk-epic describing his birth and adventures is sung at all their festivities. A Bihār proverb runs:

*kētnō Ahirā hōhī siyānā
Lōrik chāri na gāwahī ānā.*

However learned an Ahīr be,
Nothing but Lōrik singeth he.

The cold weather of the years 1888 and 1889 is marked in my memory by two incidents. We were then stationed in the Gayā district of Bihār, and were made happy by a visit from Professor and Mrs. Lanman on their bridal tour through India. Later on, in the same cold weather, while on my own official tour, I found myself in camp at the traditional scene of the birth and early adventures of this Lōrik, and succeeded in getting copies of two recensions of the whole huge poem, taken down from the mouths of two reciters of repute. It is pleasant to think that these two incidents, occurring almost together, so long ago, find themselves again associated with all their memories in these pages.

A not very complete, and not always accurate, abstract of the story of the cycle grouped together under the name of the *Git Lōrik* is given by Beglar on pages 79 ff. of volume VIII of the *Archaeological Survey of India*. This has been corrected and further condensed by Crooke on pages 55 ff. of volume I of *The Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*; so that my readers can mercifully be spared from its repetition. On the present occasion I therefore content myself with giving the translation of the two versions of the first canto, describing the circumstances of the hero's birth. This will be found interesting by students of Indian religion. It is commonly asserted that among the Hindūs of northern India, the worship of the Vedic god Indra disap-

peared many centuries ago, and was supplanted by that of Viṣṇu of Śiva. Apparently this was entirely true only for those who lived in cities, for those who lived a learned or an ascetic life, or for those people who have been preserved to us in literature. Only with difficulty did the worship of Viṣṇu reach the pastoral and agricultural classes, that is, the great bulk of the community, which was largely Mundā or Dravidian in origin. I have dealt with this question at some length in a paper in the "Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik"¹ and I now give one example that is not there mentioned, but that has direct connection with Ahīrs.

According to the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, X, xxiv, the cowherds in Kṛṣṇa's time worshipped Indra. When Kṛṣṇa asks Nanda why he does this, Nanda replies (ll. 8-11), "Parjanya, the Rain-cloud, is the Lord Indra Himself. The clouds are his dearly-loved forms. These pour down water for the delight of all beings and for keeping them alive. Dear one, we and other men sacrifice to this Ruler of the Rain-clouds those things which spring into existence through his rain, and with what remains over after that, we men support ourselves," etc. Here we see clearly that it was as a Rain-god that Indra was the chief object of worship among pastoral "and other" tribes. The rest of the story is well known. Kṛṣṇa persuades them to abandon the worship of Indra, and, instead, to worship him (that is, Viṣṇu) under the form of Mount Gōvardhana. There is a contest between Indra and Kṛṣṇa, in which the latter is easily victorious. We have here a Brāhmanical account of an attempt to spread the new, fashionable Viṣṇu-worship among the lower orders, which, according to the writer, was successful. If there was such a success, it was only temporary, for Indra, the Rain-god, is still a divinity of the Ahīrs and other pastoral and agricultural people. In my paper in the Z. I. I. above referred to, I have shown in detail the state of affairs in modern times. The cowherd peasant of Bihār has, I need hardly say, his local godlings, and those to whom it is useful to appeal on special occasions. He also knows about Viṣṇu and Śiva, but they are misty characters far beyond his mental horizon. In practice his chief great deities are Indra and Durgā, the latter acting as Indra's vice-regent upon earth. The relationship of these two deities to each other, and to the other gods of the Hindūs, is indefinite, varying according to tribe or locality. To the Ahīrs who sing the song of Lōrik, Indra, though sometimes addressed as a single person (for example, verse 267), generally appears as a group of seven brothers, inhabiting with their wives a heaven named Indrāsana, and situated (verse 270) on

¹ II, 133 ff.

Mount Kailāsa. Durgā is their sister, and at some unspecified time the eight had divided their landed property, — exactly as we now see every day in Bihār, — the world of mortals falling to her share, while her seven brothers retained Indrāsana. But here relations begin to be complicated. Durgā is not only the sister of the seven Indras, but is also the sister of Mahādēva. There is no suggestion that she is his *śakti*, or his wife. On the contrary, she (126) addresses him as brother, and he (130) addresses her as sister, terms which no Hindū married couple could possibly use to each other. As in classical legend, Mahādēva is shown as performing arduous austerities; but, unlike the destroyer of Anaṅga, he displays no resentment when Durgā interrupts him, or when she unmasks a trick that he has played upon her, by hiding Kṛṣṇa under his armpit.

This brings us to Kṛṣṇa, whose name naturally turns up in an Ahīr legend. He is not the Kṛṣṇa of the *Mahābhārata*, the Yādava king of Dvāraka, but the youthful Kṛṣṇa whose pranks among the cowherds of the Vraja-mandala are a favorite subject of Hindū story. In our poem he is little more than a favorite servant of the Indras, for whom he acts as masseur. When Durgā wishes to take him down with her to the world of mortals, they are most unwilling to part with him, but finally, under pressure, give their consent.

The account given of the death of Kāṁsa differs materially from that with which students of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* are familiar. It is true that Kṛṣṇa on his birth is hidden away from him among the cowherds, but thereafter the story skips straight away to the well-known episode of Kṛṣṇa's theft of the garments of the herdmaidens.¹ These girls complain about his conduct to Kāṁsa (337). Kṛṣṇa, when Kāṁsa remonstrates with him, retorts by threatening to cut off his head, and Kāṁsa agrees to be decapitated, provided Kṛṣṇa could perform two tasks — to twist a rope of ashes, and to weave a cloth of smoke. Kṛṣṇa performs both (the poem does not say how), decapitates Kāṁsa, and takes his kingdom.

Durgā, having been allotted the world of mortals, descends from Indrāsana to take possession of her property. The mortals take her for a demon, and refuse to worship her, so that she has to spend the night sitting on a dunghill. According to the second recension, there were three persons in the world, whose wickedness she could not endure. These three, in subsequent cantos, appear as the chief villains of the

¹ It may be noted that the herdmaidens are called by the general term *Rādhikās*. We know that, in Sanskrit literature, the name of Rādhā is later than the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*.

story. Whatever the cause, she returns in indignation to the Indrâsana and demands¹ that the Indras should give her Kršṇa as her personal servant. After many subterfuges on their part, and many impish tricks on the part of Kršṇa, she gets him, and arranges for his birth, in an avatâra,— or, rather, in an avatâra of an avatâra,— in the person of Lörik, and so the first canto ends. The poem is called a *Git*, or song, because, in recitation, it is sung or, rather chanted; but, although uttered in short sentences, it cannot be said to be in verse. Like other folk epics of northern India, it is composed in brief clauses, the length and general swing of each of which are governed by the convenience of the singer's breath and by the rhythm of the chant. Whatever these clauses are, they are certainly not verse, whether we measure by accent, by length of syllables, or by counting syllabic instants.

The language of the poem, of course, varies from place to place. As recorded for me it was naturally couched in the dialect of the Gayâ district, that is to say, in the Magahî dialect of the Bihârî language, which, with a few slight irregularities, is the same as that described in volume III of my *Seven Grammars of the Dialects and Sub-dialects of the Bihârî Language*, and on pages 30 ff. of volume V, part 2, of the *Linguistic Survey of India*. Attention may be drawn to the common employment in the text of interjections, usually little more than pleonastic. Note, however, that *hō* is used in addressing a male, and *gē* when addressing a female. *Kī rē daibā*, literally "What, O Fate!" is a common equivalent to our "Lo and behold!" or "What do you think happened next!" A typical Magahî interjection is *rē*— O! In other parts of India the use of this word is more or less insulting, and, except in abuse, its employment is prohibited by good manners. But, even in ancient times it was noted as a word of customary conversation in Mâgadhi Prakrit,² and in the modern speech of the Magadha country, or Magah, it is very common, and, especially in interrogative sentences, is used without the slightest tinge of disrespect. There are many stories based on this peculiarity of the Magahi dialect. For instance, we have the verse:—

*Magah dēs hai Kañcan-puri
dēs bhalā hai, bhâkhâ buri.
rahalā Maggah, kahalā 'rē,'
tekarā-la kā marabē, rē.*

¹ She threatens to curse the seven Indras with impotence if they will not comply. This is a favorite curse of Durgâ's, and is the *Leitmotiv* of a subsequent canto.

² Compare the *Prâkrtâ-kalpataru*, II, ii, 28 (Mâgadhi section), *sambôdhanē . . . 'alē ca 'lē lē.'* There is a somewhat similar use of *rē* in modern Bengali.

Magah land is a golden scene;
 The country 's fine, but the speech is mean.
 I lived there once, and hence my "rē."
 Why do you drub me, rē, Sir, pray?

The unfortunate speaker of this doggrel had once lived in Magadha, and had acquired the habit of using *rē* in every sentence. In some other part of India he does this and gets a drubbing for the insult; yet, so ingrained is the habit that, even while apologizing, he utters the objectionable word.

THE BIRTH OF LŌRIK

The venerable Indras are seven brothers. The eighth is a sister, Dēvī Durgā. The venerable Indras are the rulers of Indrāsana. They divided (their kingdom) between the brothers and the sister. (5) The Indras took the Indrāsana as their kingdom. They gave the world of mortals to Dēvī Durgā. Dēvī Durgā came to (her) kingdom, the world of mortals. She stayed the whole night in (her) kingdom, the world of mortals. When Dēvī came to (her) kingdom, the world of mortals, (10) no man utters the name of Dēvī in the world of mortals. All night long she tarried in a lane on a dunghill. No man repeats the name of Durgā. This is what the (men) of the world of mortals say, — "She who has come is a Hundī, a Rāksasī. (15) O children, she will devour you all."

She passed the whole night amongst the mortals. At dawn she arose and went to Indrāsana. Lo and behold, she enveloped her whole body in fire. Durgā enveloped her whole body in flames. (20) As a pan (of coals) was she blazing, and her matted locks were dishevelled. Dēvī came before the court of Indrāsana. She was going along in furious rage. Lo and behold, her body is quivering in wrath. Dēvī Durgā stood by the door-frame. (25) The Queens of the Indras raise their eyes and see her. Then out speak the Queens of Indra. "Hear, O hear, Lord Indras. Lords, what (useless) Cutcherry are ye holding. Your sister is standing at the door. (30) Lords, she hath already cursed you with a curse. Lords, ye seven brothers will now be childless. Lords, this is now the curse which she hath uttered. O Lords, the whole of Indrāsana will be burnt to ashes. Dēvī will not leave us even a place for sitting."

(35) The venerable Indras are seated. There also is seated their Guru, Mōhan Bariyā Bhāgīrath (that is, the Ganges). Four brothers who were Prime Ministers, Headmen, were also seated there. The venerable Indras then spoke out. "Hear, O hear, Sister Dēvī. (40) To thee, Sister, divided we out thy share. To thee fell as thy share the kingdom of mortals. To us fell as our share Indrāsana. Lo, we re-

mained in Indrâsana. Thee did we send to the kingdom of the mortals. (45) What kind of trouble hath come to thee among the mortals? Why, O Dêvî, hast thou returned to the court of Indrâsana?" To this did Dêvî make reply. "Seven brothers, did ye take Indrâsana for your kingdom. To me did ye give the world of mortals and sent me thither. (50) All night long did I tarry in a lane on a dunghill. No man in the city utters the name of Durgâ. This is what the mortal people say. 'She who has come is a Hunđi, a Râksâsi. She will devour you all.' (55) These are the words the mortal people say.

Now will I not return to the kingdom of mortals. Until ye give me Acyutananda (that is, Kṛṣṇa) as a servant, till then will I not return to my kingdom of the world of mortals." To that do the Indras make reply. (60) "Hear, O hear, Sister Dêvî. Sixteen hundred servants are there in Indrâsan. O Sister, select thou a servant, and carry him off by his topknot." The sixteen hundred servants did the venerable Indras make to stand (in a row). They made them to stand close to Durgâ. (65) Upon them does Durgâ cast her eyes. Now out speaks Dêvî Durgâ. "Hear, O hear, Brother Indras. Wherefore show ye me these servants? Until ye give me Acyutananda as a servant, (70) Brothers, till then will I not return to the kingdom of the world of mortals." Then out speak the venerable Indras. "Hear, O hear, Sister Dêvî. Where wilt thou get Acyutananda? Sister, that servant is dead or is lost." (75) To that gives Dêvî Durgâ answer. "Hear, O hear, Brother Indras. This speech of thine believe I not. Brothers, give ye so much an answer as this. Wherever ye shall conceal my Acyutananda, (80) there will I have power to gain that servant. So much consent, Indras, give ye to me; or else, Indras, will I search for the servant, and pull him forth." To that gave the Indras answer. "Wherever thou mayst find Acyutananda, (85) Sister, from thence search for him, and pull him forth." Such was the command that the venerable Indras gave.

Round and round does Dêvî search through Indrâsana, but nowhere findeth she Acyutananda. From thence went forth Dêvî Durgâ, (90) and behold she came to Nandan's forest. In the Nandan forest are there sixteen hundred nymphs (*parî*). Acyuta was making the sixteen hundred nymphs to dance in the Nandan forest. Every nymph that does not dance in the Nandan forest, her head does Acyutananda cut off and make into a *digrî* (a kind of musical instrument). (95) He cuts up her body, and makes of it a drum. He cuts up her thighs, and makes of them a fiddle. He cuts up her arms and makes of them a fiddle-stick. Thus was he making the sixteen hundred nymphs to dance in the Nandan forest, when, lo, there came there Dêvî Durgâ.

(100) Acyutananda looks towards Dēvī Durgā. He fled off to the Bailī flower garden (or to the garden of Bēl trees). Dēvī Durgā asks from children for his traces. "Hear, O hear, master children. The man who was now superintending a dance, (105) Sirs, whither has that man fled?" To that now give the children answer. "Hear, O hear, Dēvī Durgā. The man who was superintending the dance, his glance fell upon thee, O Durgā, (110) and, lo, he fled to the Baili flower garden." Durgā arrived at the Baili flower garden. Round and round does Dēvī search through the flower garden, but, lo, nowhere does she find the darling Acyutananda.

From thence did Dēvī advance in further search. (115) Behold, she went to Mahādēva's flower garden. Round and round does Dēvī search through Mahādēva's flower garden, but, lo, nowhere does she find the darling Acyutananda. From thence did Dēvī advance in further search. Behold, Durgā approached Mahādēva. (120) The venerable Mahādēva was seated in an arduous worship (*pūjā*). Behold, (under the rules of this worship) there was no permission for him to arise. Now the venerable Mahādēva is burning a maund and a quarter of *ghī* and *bdellium*. Now the venerable Mahādēva is seated with his face to the East. Behold, he is seated in the prescribed position. (125) Then out speaks Durgā to Mahādēva. "Hear, O hear, now, O Brother, Mahādēva. In an arduous worship art thou seated. Lo, Brother, where hast thou put Acyutananda?" To that gives Mahādēva a stately reply. (130) "Hear, O hear, O Sister Dēvī. Hither came not Acyutananda. Behold, he would be in the court of Indrāsana." Then out speaks Dēvī Durgā. "From hence, Brother, will I not turn to go. (135) Until thou raise up both thine arms, till then will I not move a step back." So many words did Durgā speak out, and behold the venerable Mahādēva laughed aloud. The venerable Mahādēva raised both his arms, (140) and, behold, Acyutananda now came forth (from below them). When Acyutananda came forth, Dēvī Durgā runs up and seizes him by the topknot. Then out speaks Dēvī Durgā. "Ah, how much trouble hast thou given me, Acyutananda. (145) Lo, Acyuta come to the kingdom of the world of mortals." Then out speaks Acyutananda. "Hear, O hear, O Dēvī Durgā. I will not go, until I have (first) gone to Indrāsana. Lo, Durgā, till then will I not move a step to the world of mortals."

(150) From thence went forth Dēvī Durgā and Acyutananda. Behold, they both went to the court of Indrāsana. He went, and Acyutananda stood there. He went, and stood in Indrāsana. Behold, he stood close to Indrāsana. (155) The Indras raise their eyes and see him.

In their hearts do the venerable Indras grieve. "What tyranny hast thou done, O Dēvī! that, lo, O Dēvī, thou hast sought out and found the darling Acyutananda. Lo, sixteen hundred servants were there for thee in Indrāsana. (160) Lo, from them thou mightest have selected a servant, and have carried him off by his topknot. But thou hast selected and taken our peculiar servant. Lo, Dēvī, into our soul cometh lamentation. Behold, thou hast made widows of all (the women of) Indrāsana. Ah, thou art taking away for good our jewel. (165) We Indras are seven brothers. To the seven was he the servant doing service. A servant who used to press (that is, could press) a seer and a quarter of mustard-seed in the palms of his hands (to extract the oil). He used to massage the limbs of us seven brothers. Great was the service that Acyutananda used to perform. (170) Ah Sister, the whole of Indrāsana hast thou made desolate."

Then (again) out speak the Indras. "Hear, O hear, Acyutananda. Forasmuch as our sister Dēvī hath seized thee by the topknot, Lo, go thou, a servant, unto the kingdom of the world of mortals." (175) Now out speaks Acyutananda. Weeping, weeping, does Acyutananda speak. With suppliant clasped hands does now Acyutananda make his petition. "Hear, O hear, ye venerable Indras. Prepare ye the book with back of copper, (180) and thereon make ye a writing, O Indras. Whatever I shall tell you to write. That, O Indras, write ye with pen and with ink-case." So many words speaks Acyutananda. Then out speak the venerable Indras. (185) "Hear, O hear, Acyutananda. What kind of words are those that we shall write?" To that Acyutananda gives answer. "Hear, O hear, ye venerable Indras. This many are the petitions that I ask from you. (190) Write ye these letters in the book (of fate). Until ye give me the horse Kāṭar, Kṛṣṇa's steed, Until ye write for me two wives (seated) on my thigh. Sixteen hundred nymphs are there in Indrāsana, — Sixteen hundred with whom Kṛṣṇa (once) sported on (the banks of) the Yamunā. (195) Of these O Indras, two died virgins. Two damsels who were washed away by the Yamunā and died. These two damsels write ye (as seated) on my thigh, and, venerable Indras, write ye something more. Until ye write a brother at my back, (200) till then will I not move a step towards the world of mortals. Until ye give me the sword Maigar, that belonged to Bhīmaśēna the Kṣatriya, — unless ye write the sword Maigar for my arm, — till then will I not move a step towards the world of mortals. And, O venerable Indras, write ye something more. (205) What woman, and what man, may have performed austerities, What woman, and what man, may have slept on a mat of *kuśa* grass, — they who have so slept for twelve

years, — in her womb write ye my birth. Lo, then, Indras, will I set my foot towards the world of mortals."

(210) The venerable Indras are seated. And Gaurī's Ganapati is also seated. The five Pāṇḍavas are also seated. There also is seated there their Guru, Mohan Bariyā Bhāgīrath. Lo and behold, four brothers who were Prime Ministers, Headmen, were also seated there. (215) They produce the book of copper (back). Lo, the four brothers, the Headmen and the Prime Ministers write. First they write the horse Kāṭar, Kṛṣṇa's steed. Then they write the sword Maigar. They write the sword Maigar, that belonged to Bhimasēna the Kṣatriya. (220)

Then they write the two women. Then they write a brother to be at his back. To that last do the Indras give an answer. "Hear, O hear, Acyutananda. They write not a brother to be at thy back. (225) Obstinate fool art thou, thou dost not heed our words. Lo, Acyutananda, we have written for thee a foster brother. A ready made foster brother will we send for thee. Behold, Acyutananda, he will be a foster brother unto thee." Then write the venerable Indras, (230) "West of Gaurā lies Kalaundi village. There dwell aged Kūar and aged Khulhan. Husband and wife, have they performed for twelve years asceticism in the world of mortals. 'Childless' and 'Barren' have the names been given them. While they have been doing asceticism, twelve years have passed. (235) Still the names of 'Childless' and 'Barren' have not departed from them. Dear One, now the thirteenth year hath begun. Now the man and wife are starting to drown themselves in the Ganges. In her womb have I written thy birth."

Then again did the Indras write these words. (240) Then they write a kingdom in the four quarters of the world. Then do they write a crooked word. Lo and behold, they write a six months prison at Kōilā.

The writing and the reading were finished. The accountant closes the book. (245) At that very moment, at that very hour, Lo and behold, the wife and her husband are going to the Ganges to drown themselves. While the wife and the husband were on their way, Durgā, as she slept, gave her a dream. "O aged Khulhan, drown not thyself. (250) My servant Acyutananda of the Indrāsana, — I have already had the reading and the writing done, and am come, — Behold, O Khulhan, he will take incarnation in thy womb." At that very moment, at that very hour, lo and behold, Acyutananda took up his abode in her womb. (255) When the aged Khulhan had carried him in her womb for nine months, behold, in the tenth month Acyutananda took incarnation. When he took birth in the world of mortals, the Brāhmans were summoned, and they calculated his name. According to the constellations,

his name was Acyutananda, (260) and, lo and behold, his pet name was Lōrik Khanjār.

Second Version

‘Rām, Rām,’ I cry when I rise, and when I sit. Had I known the name of Rāma, I would have erected a high sacrificial platform to him. I would have brought Ganges-mud from the Ganges, and have plastered with it the platform. At the time of fleeing, would I call on Mother Bhagēswarī. (265) When night falleth, I would invoke Mother Durgā.

(End of the Invocation)

Then up and spoke Mother Durgā. “The venerable Indra hath sent me to the world of mortals. When I came thither, I sat on one side. White ants settled on my thighs.” (270) Then in the world of mortals up rose Mother Durgā, and went to Kabilās.¹ She dressed herself in patchwork and in rags. Spreading out her hair so that it would fill a basket, she goes along with a castor-oil-tree stalk for a staff. She went, and Durgā stood at the door of Indrāsana. (275) The seven Indra-brothers trembled when they saw Durgā. Then did the Indras address their sister. “In what thing art thou lacking that thou art come to Kailāsa from the world of mortals?”

Then up and spake Mother Durgā, “O Indras understand. Brothers, I have fled hither from the world of mortals. (280) I cannot endure three sins (that are practised there). Such warriors have ye created in the world of mortals, King Harēwā, King Parēwā, and the warrior Jōdhī Paurā. King Harēwā is so base and vile. Every captive that he prisoneth in his prison, (285) if he be old, each one dieth there, if he be young, there becometh he an old man. King Harēwā’s minister is Manār Jit. He also is base and vile. He giveth each prisoner boiling water for his drink, (290) and for his eating, but a quarter of a seer each of cakes of broken rice and bran. Even from that the minister taketh the half for himself. Hungry and without food, man draggeth man and eateth the flesh of man. Such a man of violence is the warrior Jōdhī of Bikatpur, powerful, but vile and base. (295) Sixteen hundred maidens hath he kept unmarried. When a wedding procession cometh to fetch the bride, he killeth the boy-bridegroom, keepeth the bride, and sleepeth with her for a single night. Once he hath destroyed her caste he abandoneth her. In Gaurā there was an aged Gōwālin. (300) Her name is

¹ The Hindi form *Kabilās* for *Kailāsa* is very old. We find it in the *Padumāvati* of Malik Muḥammad (16th century).

Khulhan. Each morn, as she riseth, doth she bathe in the Ganges and offer incense and oblation. That woman is known by the name of 'Barren.' O Indras, give ye me my hero."

Then Mother Durgā stood up in the Indrāsana. Then all the Indras said, "carry thou off thy servant." (305) Then Mother Durgā caught hold of Īśvara Mahādēva. Then away did flee Īśvara Mahādēva. Then did Durgā catch hold of Dāk and Dānava, but all the Dāks and Dānavas fled away. No one agrees to go to the world of mortals. (310) Then went Durgā to the bank of the river Yamunā. There, in the form of a boy, was the revered Kanhaiyā (Kṛṣṇa) playing. Then did Durgā catch hold of him by the arm. "Come with me, Child, to the world of mortals." "O Mother Durgā, I will not go for thee to the world of mortals. (315) Seven births have been mine in the world of mortals. Mother Durgā, my first birth was a birth in the house of a fish. Then did the sailormen net me, and support themselves by selling my flesh. Then, Mother Durgā, was my birth in the form of a boar, and the huntsmen speared and killed me. (320) Then, Mother Durgā, was my birth from the belly of Dēvakī; and, Mother Durgā, my maternal uncle was utterly vile. He it was, Mother, who fettered my father and my mother, and bowed them in the prison-house. My birth took place at midnight in the month of Bhādō. Then all the Indras sent me golden dolls. (325) Then the Indras filled the lying-in brazier with cummin and aniseed. Then the news went to King Kāṁsa, and King Kāṁsa came to search for me. Then just as used to rise the moon of the full-moon day, so, gradually, grew I up to be a youth. (330) With my bamboo flute I had gone to the bank of the Yamunā. Then I, Kanhaiyā, played the flute, and summoned the sixteen hundred Rādhikās. Then the sixteen hundred Rādhikās took up their curd-pitchers. Then all the Rādhikās went to the bank of the Yamunā. (They cried) 'He hath eaten up my curds and broken my pitcher. (335) He hath grasped my arms, and hath pulled me about. He hath torn my garments that I wear.' Then all the Rādhikās went to Kāṁsa and made complaint. 'Hear, Kāṁsa, O hear my words. Kanhaiyā hath taken birth in Dēvaki's belly. (340) To me hath he done a dozen tyrannies.' Then did King Kāṁsa go unto the bank of the Yamunā. Then saith Kanhaiyā, exhorting Kāṁsa. 'Hear, Uncle Kāṁsa, O hear my word. Thou hadst done tyranny to my mother and my father. (345) Now will I cut off thy head, and take thy kingdom to my hand.' Then saith Kāṁsa, exhorting Kanhaiyā. 'Hear, O Kanhaiyā, hear thou my speech. Thou wouldest kill me, Kanhaiyā, and take my kingdom to thy hand. Do thou fulfil for me these two things. (350) Twist thou for me a rope of ashes. Weave thou for me a cloth of

smoke. Then cut thou off for thyself my head.' Then did I, Kanhaiyā, twist for him a rope of ashes. And a cloth did I weave for him of smoke. (355) Then did Kanhaiyā cut off King Kāmsa's head, and take for himself his whole kingdom to his hand."

Then Kanhaiyā took to himself the form of a bee. Then the bee settled close by a flower. Then Mother Durgā caught him by the arm and seized him. (360) "Mother Durgā, if thou art confining me and taking me away, give the command as to what things I shall eat as food. What things, Mother Durgā, wilt thou give me to drink? What weapons, Mother Durgā, wilt thou give me to (bear upon) my shoulder? To whom, Mother Durgā, shall I be married?" (365) Then Mother Durgā gives reply. "For food wilt thou get, my son, eighty still-fulls (of spirit) each day, and eighty goats as a relish to it daily. A sword of eighty maunds¹ in weight will I give thee for a weapon. A shield of seventy-two maunds weight will there be for thee. (370) A dagger will I give thee, my son, of eighty-four maunds. The horse Kāṭar will I give to thee to ride. Thy first marriage will be with Daunā Mājar. Thy second will be an elopement with Chandāin. Then wilt thou rule over the land of Bikaṭpur Agaurī. (375) Then King Kariṅgā will seize thee and imprison thee for six months. Then for six months will he keep thee in a potter's kiln. For six months, my son, wilt thou remain in the River Gadānā. Though struck by iron, thou shalt not die. In the furnace of fire thou shalt not die. (380) In the river Gadānā thou shalt not die. I write not for thee any kind of death. First, my son, shalt thou kill King Karmā, and then King Harēwā." Then Kanhaiyā departed thence. According to the constellations the god Indra wrote his name as Banāwār. (385) And, by love, his name was the heroic Lōrik. Now went forth Durgā to the ancient Khulhan, and Mother Durgā gave her a flower to smell. Then the ancient Khulhan became pregnant, and on the ninth month Lōrik came into existence. (390) In the twelfth year Lōrik became fully grown. Then his friend Rājal, the washerman, and Lōrik used to wrestle by the pond, and there Sairā, the chaste, and Bijādhar, when the two saw Lōrik, used to smile.

¹ A standard maund is equivalent to eighty pounds.

THREE INDO-IRANIAN NOTES

By A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON

1. A Suggestion to Connect Old Persian AG^aR^a[] with a Sanskrit Word.

THE fragmentary Old Persian word AG^aR^a[] in the Bahistān Rock Inscription of King Darius, Bh. 1. 21 (8), has long been a puzzle. The passage in which it stands reads as follows:

Θātiy [Dāra]Java^huš xšāyaθiya^h: aⁿtar imā^h dahyāvā^h martiya^h hya^h AG^aR^a[] āha^t avam ^hubartam abaram, hya^h arika^h āha^t avam ^hufrastam aparsam.

'Saith Darius the King: Within these countries the man who was —?—, him I supported with good support; he who was inimical, him I punished (lit. questioned, inquisitioned) with good punishment (lit. with a good questioning, inquisition).'

The antithetical balance in the case of the adjectival participles (^hubaratam and ^hufrastam) is obvious; and since the evil attribute arika^h is now generally conceded to signify 'antagonistic, inimical,' or the like (cf. Av. *ayra-*), its antonym must mean the reverse of that. A few observations, however, must first be made with regard to the reading itself and to the explanations proposed to explain the meaning. The more important of these are presented in their chronological order.

Rawlinson's transcript of the cuneiform text, published in 1847 (*JRAS.* 10. p. xl, plate, cf. p. 199), gave *agatā*, with *t* partly broken and *ā* supplied; this was rendered, with a question mark, 'of the true faith (?).'¹ Although Rawlinson's *t* was a mistaken decipherment and should be *r*, as King and Thompson's reexamination of the rock in 1904 proved, it is interesting as showing that his restoration [ā] seems to indicate he thought that only a single letter was required at the end of this word. King and Thompson, *The Sculptures and*

¹ Benfey, *Die pers. Keilinschriften*, 1847 (issued shortly after Rawlinson's work appeared), p. 9 (cf. 71), translated by 'truglos,' but this and his etymology may be disregarded. Oppert, *J.A.* 1851, p. 35, suggested *āgantā*, cf. Skt. *āgantr*, 'arrivant, étranger.' Spiegel, *Altpers. Keilinschriften* (2 ed. 1881), p. 202, wrongly emended as *dauštā*, 'Freund.'

Inscription of Behistûn (1907), p. 5, give the correction of Rawlinson's *t* to *r* and read *agar*[. . . .], with a footnote that the lacuna had space for two characters; they translate by 'whoever was a [friend]', as they similarly do in the case of the Susian (Elamitic) version (p. 97), and they render *pi-it-ku-du* in the corresponding Babylonian version (p. 262) by 'zealous.' As regards the question as to whether one or two letters be required to fill the lacuna in the Old Persian text, we must keep in mind below the apparent difference between Rawlinson and the view of King and Thompson. From experience one knows that it is sometimes not easy to determine such a space with precision. Unfortunately when I made four ascents of the rock in 1903, I did not have time to examine this particular word. Scholars have followed King and Thompson in assuming that two letters are missing, as will next be observed, but commented upon below.

Weissbach, when reviewing that work in *ZDMG.* (1907), 61.725, suggested to derive 'a-ga-ra . . .' from the root *gar* 'wach sein + ā,' and kept to this view later in his *Keilinschriften der Achämeniden*, p. 12, § 8, where he reads *āgar[tā]* and translates by 'der umsichtig war.' Bartholomae, *WZKM.* (1908), 22.72, proposed to associate this attribute with Skt. *gūrta-*, Lat. *grātus* (comparing YAv. *āgremaitiś*) and to read the vocable perhaps as *āgar[tā]*, nom. sg. of a noun of agency. Tolman, *Anc. Pers. Lex. and Texts*, 1908, pp. 60-61, s.v. *āgartar*, also takes it as a noun of agency, but prefers (like Weissbach) to derive it from a presumable OP. *ā + *gar*, 'to wake' (YAv. *gar*, Skt. *gr*, cf. TPhl. *vīgarānēd*) as 'a watcher, wakeful, zealous,' and translates (p. 8) by 'watchful.'

The data presented above allow us to conclude that the legible part of AG^aR^a[] is practically certain and that the general connotation of the word is fairly clear, whatever may be its etymology. In what follows I am going to assume, with Rawlinson, that merely one letter is missing at its end; but only a renewed study of the rock itself, with careful measurements of the space itself, can settle the question.

At the risk, therefore, of having the proposal rejected, I venture to offer a new suggestion. This would be to read *āgra^a*[θa^h], not *āgar[tā]*, and to associate it with Skt. *āgrāntha-*, from the Indic root *grath-*, *granth-*, 'to tie, knot, fasten, attach.' This Sanskrit word is at least found as an adverbial gerund in *am* (see PWb. 2. 831; cf. Whitney, *Skt. Gr.* § 995) in *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, 5. 15: *tad yathā punar āgrānthaṁ punar nigrānthaṁ antam badhniyāt*, 'just as one would bind the end, tying (or attaching) it with a knot again, (and)

again tying (or attaching) it down.'² At any rate it gives us a hint, and my notion would be to take the presumable OP. *āgra*^h[θa^h] as an adjective, with passive sense, conveying in general the idea of being bound by the knot or tie of allegiance, like the somewhat rare Eng. 'alligate,' from Lat. *alligo*. If so, *āgra*^h[θa^h] would mean 'attached, devoted, loyal,' as opposed to *arika*^h, 'inimical, hostile, refractory.' Whether this suggested etymology has anything in it, or not, remains for the specialists to decide.

2. Turfan Pahlavi *dāšīn*, a Sanskrit Loan-word in the Manichaean Fragments.

The word TPhl. *dāšīn*, meaning 'gift,' occurs several times in the Middle Persian Manichaean texts brought to light by A. von Le Coq through his memorable discoveries in the Turfan Oasis, Central Asia, early in this century, and first deciphered and published in part by F. W. K. Müller. Five instances of *dāšīn* are thus found in Müller's *Handschriften-Reste*, Teil II, Berlin, 1904. These occur respectively in Frag. M. 47 recto, lines 4 and 5 (the latter written defectively as *dāšn*); M. 74 verso, ll. 14, 16, 18; see Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 84 (bis), 76-77 (tris). In his glossary, C. Salemann, *Manichaeische Studien*, I. p. 65, St. Petersburg, 1908, accepted the meaning of *dāšīn* as 'Geschenk,' but had no etymological explanation to offer for this signification. W. Bang, 'Manichaeische Hymnen,' in *Muséon* (1915), 38. 21, gives a Turkish form *dašīn* (but without precise reference) as likewise meaning 'Geschenk,' and adds in a footnote, 'ich darf das tuerkische Form des Wortes den Iranisten empfehlen.'

The Iranist naturally thinks of Av. *dāšīna-*, Phl. *dāšīn*, as a related form, but in that case the meaning is confined to 'dexter, the right side.' The key lies in the hand of the Sanskritist, who can at once produce both the Skt. adj. *dākṣīna-*, 'relating to the sacrificial gift or to a gift in general,' and the neut. noun *dākṣīṇam*, as denoting such 'a gift or collection of gifts' (comparing also the fem. noun *dākṣīṇā-*, 'gift, donation, remuneration'). Thus the Turfan Pahlavi term *dāšīn*, 'gift,' in Central Asian Manichaeism is plainly a loan-word, borrowed from the Sanskrit, and its etymology is clear.

² Keith, *Rigveda Brāhmaṇas: the Aitareya*, etc. (1920), p. 237 translates, 'twining it again and again intertwining it.'

3. Can the Word *säm* in a Turkish Manichaean Hymn be of Indic Origin?

In a Turkish Manichaean Hymn, the text of which was first made available by Le Coq, *Türkische Manichaica aus Chotscho*, III, Berlin, 1922, p. 47, Nr. II, recto, and later translated with comments by W. Bang, *Muséon* (1925), 38. 41-42, there occurs the word *säm*. It is used in connection with the blessings brought to the world through Māni's having preached the gospel of salvation in his 'Evangelium' (Turk. *äwanglion*, cf. TPhl. 'evangeliyōn), here exalted as the 'Jewel of the Law,' by following the teachings of which the way of release is found. The particular sentence (ll. 3-4) in this passage to which attention is here called runs as follows in Bang's transliteration and translation: *oṣyu qutrluγu yol yiñaqiγ ol nomta äšitip uqar [äm] säm*, 'den Weg der Rettung und Erlösung in jener Lehre (Predigt?) hörend, versteht man das Heilmittel (?)'.

In his translation of the sentence we observe that Bang has translated *säm* by 'Heilmittel (?)' with a query, adding in his comments (p. 47H), 'Etymologisch ist *säm* ganz unklar.' Perhaps a suggestion might be made to help clear up the etymology.

Although my knowledge of Turkish in the Manichaean documents is extremely limited, I would hazard the conjecture that *säm* may be a word of Indic origin, finding its way into Central Asian Manichaeism through Buddhism. If so, especially as it is plainly a word full of religious significance, I would suggest comparing it with the familiar Sanskrit word *śama-*, Pāli *sama-*, in the sense of 'tranquility, repose, cessation, final emancipation.' In that event the sentence as applied to the teachings in Māni's 'Gospel,' would become pregnant with meaning, as follows: 'On hearing the way of rescue and release one comprehends (perfect) tranquillity,' i.e., the spiritual calm which brings final emancipation. We are familiar with Buddhist elements in Māni's syncretic religion.